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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how the objects that we visually perceive in the world are coupled to 
the actions that we make towards them. For example, a whole hand grasp might be coupled 
with an object like an apple, but not with an object like a pea. It has been claimed that the 
coupling of what we see and what we do is not simply associative, but is fundamental to 
the way the brain represents visual objects. More than association, it is thought that when 
an object is seen (even if there is no intention to interact with it), there is a partial and 
automatic activation of the networks in the brain that plan actions (such as reaches and 
grasps). The central aim of this thesis was to investigate how specific these partial action 
plans might be, and how specific the properties of objects that automatically activate them 
might be. In acknowledging that perception and action are dynamicaJly intertwining 
processes (such that in catching a butterfly the eye and the hand cooperate with a fluid and 
seamless efficiency), it was supposed that these couplings of perception and action in the 
brain might be loosely constrained. TTiat is, they should not be rigidly prescribed (such that 
a highly specific action is always and only coupled with a specific object property) but 
they should instead involve fairly general components of actions that can adapt to different 
situations. The experimental work examined the automatic coupling of simplistic left and 
right actions (e.g. key presses) to pictures of oriented objects. Typically a picture of an 
object was shown and the viewer responded as fast as possible to some object property that 
was not associated with action (such as its colour). Of interest was how the performance of 
these left or right responses related to the task irrelevant left or right orientation of the 
object. The coupling of a particular response to a particular orientation could be 
demonstrated by the response performance (speed and accuracy). The more tightly coupled 
a response was to a particular object orientation, the faster and more accurate it was. The 
results supported the idea of loosely constrained action plans. Thus it appeared that a range 
of different actions (even foot responses) could be coupled with an object's orientation. 
These actions were coupled by default to an object's X -Z orientation (e.g. orientation in the 
depth plane). In further reflecting a loosely constrained perception-action mechanism, 
these couplings were shown to change in different situations (e.g. when the object moved 
towards the viewer, or when a key press made the object move in a predictable way). It 
was concluded that the kinds of components of actions that are automatically activated 
when viewing an object are not very detailed or fixed, but are initially quite general and 
can change and become more specific when circumstances demand it. 
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1.1 Background and thesis overview 
If you were asked to describe an apple that you were looking at, the nature of your 
descriptions would be dependent on the context of the description required. Compare for 
example, a general-purpose description of the apple with a description relative to what you 
could do with the apple. Each description might share similar dimensions, yet the 
properties of those dimensions might well be quite different (see Table I . I ) . 
Table 1.1 Context-dependent descriptions of an apple 
Dimensions General-purpose description Action-oriented description 
Identity Apple Edible fruit 
Location Centrally placed Reachable distance 
Shape Roundish Graspable with whole hand 
Texture Smooth Smooth to hold, hard to bite 
Volume Approximately 350 cm'' Fits in hand easily but not in mouth 
Weight Approximately 150g Light enough to lift easily 
Colour Reddish-green Ripe for eating 
Researchers interested in visual perception have arrived at analogously different context-
dependent descriptions of visual processes. For those who asked, "How does vision derive 
useful general-purpose descriptions of the worid?" answers came in the form of an abstract 
computational language of'representations' (e.g. Marr, 1980, 1982). For those who asked, 
"How does vision enable an animal to act effectively in its environment?" answers came in 
the form of an ecological language of *direct perception' that crossed the conceptual 
boundary between animal and environment (e.g. Gibson, 1979). 
This thesis is concerned with exploring an increasingly popular middle ground, which asks 
the question, "How does vision derive action-oriented descriptions of the world that enable 
an animal to act effectively in its environment?" and answers it in the form of a 
computational language of representations that is not abstract, but based on the 
sensorimotor activity of the perceiver relative to aspects of the visual world. The central 
hypothesis under investigation, developed by Tucker and Ellis (e.g. Tucker, 1997; Tucker 
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& Ellis, 1998, 2001; Ellis & Tucker, 2000) states that simply looking at an object, 
regardless of any intention to act upon it, partially activates (i.e. below threshold) motor 
codes (i.e. spatio-temporal patterns of neuronal activity in the motor areas of the brain) that 
are related to components of the actions associated with that object. These motor codes 
form part of the overall visual representation of that object. For example, in addition to the 
various visual properties of the apple that are coded when looking at an apple (e.g. 
location, colour, size, texture etc.), there is also simultaneous coding of components of 
actions. Thus visual indicators of the volume of an object might be relevant to components 
of a specific grasp type, or the location of the object might be relevant to components of a 
reach with a particular hand. An associative mechanism is proposed that temporally 
integrates these perceptual and motor codes; the result of which is a coding that is neither 
visual, nor motor, but rather, visuomotor. It is thought that during a history of species and 
individual development these visuomotor codes come to represent visual objects. This 
hypothesis, an ecologically inspired computational approach to visual perception, will be 
referred to as the Action Potentiation Hypothesis (APH). 
The general aim of this thesis is to expand the APH (both theoretically and in terms of new 
data), by drawing upon insights from a variety of large-scale theories of mind that unify 
perception, action and cognition within the context of an embodied activity. This chapter 
introduces computational and ecological approaches to vision, and critiques the notion of 
mental representation. Chapter 2 examines contemporary theories of 'embodied cognition' 
that seek a principled integration of mental capacities by emphasising the role of the action 
system. Chapter 3 assimilates these ideas with the APH and identifies some theoretical 
ambiguities that are addressed in the experimental objectives. These objectives, which are 
tested in Chapters 3-6, centre on the specificity of the APH, both in terms of action and 
visual object attributes. Chapter 7 simimarises and discusses the experimental findings with 
respect to theory and research implications. 
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1.2 Two approaches to visual perception and its relation to action 
This section introduces computational and ecological approaches to visual perception (and 
more generally, cognition). The following briefly introduces two broad camps of cognitive 
theories within which these approaches fall. Computational approaches are inherently 
representational, and as such assume that perception and cognition involve the processing 
of internally represented information (see 'theories of structure' below). Ecological 
theories however do not invoke representations or computations in perception and 
cognition, and as such are amenable to dynamical explanations that can cross the 
boundaries of brains, bodies and environment (see 'theories of change' below). 
Theories of structure (classical) 
Classical theories use the digital computer as a metaphor for the brain, thus mental 
processes are computational, serial and symbolic. Mental representations are assumed to be 
abstract symbolic structures that correspond to real physical structures in the brain (hence 
Newell's 1980, physical symbol systems). The combinatorial structure (syntactical and 
semantic) of these representations is assumed to correspond to structural relations among 
physical properties of the brain (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). 
Theories of structure (connectionist) 
Connectionists model the information processing content of brain states using 
physiologically inspired artificial neural networks (ANNs). Connectionist architecture 
requires only causal connectedness as the primitive relation among content-bearing units 
(Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988), and its internal structure is typically described in terms of local, 
featural or distributed representations (Franklin, 1995). In local representations, the state of 
a single unit corresponds to an item (e.g. a concept or object). In featural representations, 
patterns of activity over several units correspond to (or 'encode') individual items, and 
individual units correspond to features of the given item (each feature can participate in the 
representation of several different items). In distributed representations the pattern of 
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activity over several units corresponds to an item (and each unit can participate in the 
representation of several different items). Taken as a whole, ANN's can be characterised as 
algorithmic processing machines (Bridgeman, 1998) whose representations consist of a 
correlational correspondence between properties of the world and the emergence of a 
global network state (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). 
Theories of change (dynamic) 
Dynamical theories model the changing behaviour of the brain during state transitions. 
Change is typically described as 'dynamic', and the intrinsic temporality of cognition is 
considered fundamentally important. Cognitive acts imfold in time, whereas 
representationalism (especially of the symbolic kind) is atemporal (Shanon, 1998; Smithers, 
1998). Thus, at the extreme interpretation of the Dynamical Hypothesis formulated by van 
Gelder (1998), the notions of computation and representation are rejected. Instead it views 
cognitive agents as instantiations of dynamical systems (the 'nature hypothesis'), whose 
cognitive processes are best understood as dynamical systems (die 'knowledge' hypothesis). 
Consequentiy, van Gelder's (1995) preferred metaphor for cognition is the standard example 
of a dynamical system, the Watt steam governor (see Figure 1.1). 
—' '— 
+ speed of 
Engine 
Steam Supply Rotation of Governor 
Distance Between * + 
Weights 
Figure 1.1 An illustration of a centrifugal govemor and its feedback loop (adapted from 
Capra. 1996). Steam drives an engine connected to a flywheel that tums a spindle with two 
weights attached to arms. As the engine speed increases the spindle rotates faster, 
increasing centrifugal force, which moves the weights further apart, thus raising the piston 
and cutting off the steam supply. This reduced supply slows the engine down, which slows 
the spindle and reduces centrifugal force such that the weights move closer together, thus 
lowering the piston and increasing the steam supply. The govemor therefore works as a self-
regulating or negative feedback loop. 
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Theoretical debates 
Classical theories adhere to the functionalist doctrine of the Physical Symbol System 
Hypothesis whereas connectionists agree with Searle (1980) that mental hardware matters. 
As most ANN'S are digital simulations they do not fully escape the spectre of fimctionalism, 
and furthermore connectionist representations of^ en appear to have more in common with 
classical symbolism than with real brain states (Smolensky, 1988). Indeed, Fodor & 
Pylyshyn (1988) argued that connectionism is merely a theory of how cognition is neurally 
implemented, and as such is not incompatible with classical information-processing 
approaches. The debate runs deep, but on the whole the digital computer metaphor for the 
brain has been rejected and many commentators champion connectionist over classical 
theories (e.g. Clark, 1997; Franklin, 1995; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). 
While the details of a more recent debate between theories of structure and change are 
beyond the scope of this introduction, it is worth speculating that a) connectionist models 
are themselves special kinds of dynamical models, as stated by Smolensky's, (1988) 
'connectionist dynamical system hypothesis'; b) whether cognition is best modelled 
algorithmically (using Boolean algebra) or dynamically (using systems of differential 
equations) may turn out to be a pragmatic decision (Bridgeman, 1998; Keijzer, Ben and 
van der Heijden, 1998); c) connectionist and dynamical theories share much common 
ground in their reasons for rejecting the digital computer metaphor for the brain; d) a 
theory is needed that incorporates both structure and change (Mitchell, 1998); and d) due 
consideration to the temporality of cognition may be essential, thus representations must 
be seen as dynamic. 
1.2.1 Computational approaches 
Visual Perception 
In keeping with classical theories of structure (although more recently there have been 
connectionist implementations inspired by his work), Marr (1982) suggested that the 
purpose of the visual system is to derive useful descriptions (representations) of the worid 
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that can then be accessed and used by other systems (such as the action system), Marr's 
computational approach closely resembles the three tenets of a caricature of 'pure vision' 
identified by Churchland, Ramachandran & Sejnowski (1994): 
1) The visual world: It is assumed that the goal of vision is to create a detailed model 
of the visual world in the brain. The process of forming visual representations is 
taken to be one of scene recovery, so effective, that what we see is a 'fiilly 
elaborated' representation that corresponds to the visual scene. 
2) Hierarchical processing: The construction of representations is assumed to follow 
a distinct processing order. Early stages of retinal processing lead to the lateral 
geniculate nucleus and then on to various higher cortical stages. As processing 
advances through successive stages, more and more specific features are extracted 
from the earlier retinal stages until integration of highly specified features results in 
the 'ftilly elaborated representation'. 
3) Dependency relations: It is ftirther assumed that in general, higher levels of 
processing (e.g. problems such as segmentation and pattern recognition) depend on 
lower levels of processing (such as determining edges, or detecting motion), but not 
vice-versa. 
Churchland et al. go on to convincingly challenge all of these tenets, suggesting that vision 
is better described as an active, explorative process that interacts with other sensory 
modalities, top-down cognitive influences and the sensorimotor system that controls the 
visual system (in particular exploratory eye, head and body movements that can greatly 
reduce the computational problems of vision). This 'interactive' account of vision that 
moves away from treating representations as essentially passive, picture-perfect 
'snapshots' of the outside world, echoes the criticisms of Gibson (1979) made over two 
decades ago. There is considerable recent support for this view (e.g. Brooks, 1991; Clark, 
1997; Ballard, 1991; O' Regan & Levy-Schoen, 1983; O'Regan <fe Noe, 2001), which will 
receive further attention in section 1.3. 
For present purposes however, it will simply be noted that the caricature of 'pure' vision 
rests on assimiptions of predominantly linear stages of information processing between 
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hierarchically arranged modular systems. Within any particular stage, there may however 
be parallel processing between heterarchically arranged modular subsystems. The end 
result of visual processing is an elaborate representation of a visual scene, the format of 
which is abstract enough to serve as a general-purpose description that is compatible with 
other, predominantly later, information-processing stages. Consequently, Marr's account of 
vision fits seamlessly within the human information-processing tradition, which assumes 
broadly distinct linear stages that are typified by the frequent use of box and arrow flow 
charts (see below for examples). 
Information-processing 
The conventions of the information-processing tradition are similarly stage-like, and three 
distinct processing stages are readily identifiable. Essentially, information is encoded, 
various operations transform this information into motor commands, and these commands 
are executed: 
1) The input stage: a perceptual stage whereby sensory information is passively 
received and processed (for example the construction of a Marrian visual 
representation would occupy this stage of processing). Perceptual processing is 
passive in the sense that no other systems (e.g. the cognitive or action systems) are 
involved. The process is therefore predominantly bottom-up, allowing what is 'out-
there' to be accurately perceived with little or no modulation by cognitive 
processes. 
2) The translation stage: a cognitive stage whereby cognitive processes translate and 
mediate the perceptually derived information in terms of goal-generated 
commands, ready for use by the action systems. 
3) The output stage: an intentional action stage whereby motor commands are carried 
out on the basis of the cognitive output of the previous translation stage. 
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In terms of these three processing stages, consider as an example the task of reaching 
towards and picking up an apple. 
1) The input stage: Visual information about the apple is derived by the visual 
system. 
2) The translation stage: A goal is formulated (e.g. pick up the apple), and relevant 
information derived at the input stage (e.g. the size, shape and location of the apple) 
is translated into various parameters that serve as action plans. 
3) The output stage: These plans are then converted into specific muscle commands 
that are executed. 
As with the caricature of 'pure vision', similar assumptions are made concerning the 
dependency relations of information processing stages. In order to operate, the output stage 
is dependent on the completion of processing at the input stage. 
Two simple models of linear stage information processing 
Consider also a hypothetical experimental abstraction of a rule-determined reach towards 
an apple. Participants sit in front of a monitor, and over several trials they are required to 
respond with left or right key presses to photographs of apples (the key press can be 
considered analogous to the initiation of a reach movement towards the apple). Participants 
are given a rule that arbitrarily maps a stimulus dimension (e.g. colour) onto a response 
dimension (e.g. response location). For example, participants may be required to press a 
key located on the left (wiUi their left hand) when the apple is red, and press a key located 
on the right (with their right hand) when the apple is green. Although irrelevant to 
performing the task itself (which is defined by apple colour), sometimes the apple is 
located on the left side of the screen, and sometimes it is located on the right side of the 
screen. Thus, experimentally at least, there are three distinct stages (see Table 1.2). 
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Table 1.2 Experimental stages in hypothetical apple expenment 
Stage Description Example trial set-up 
Stimulus presentation: 
E.g. a left located red apple. 
Response determination: 
E.g. in accordance with the mapping rule, 
ident i fy the colour (e.g. red) and determine 
the appropriate response (e.g. left) . 
Response execution: 
E.g. press the left key. 
L 
Results typical of an experimental set-up such as this would reveal key presses that are 
considerably faster and more accurate (in that fewer incorrect key presses are made), when 
the task irrelevant location of the stimulus (e.g. an apple on the left) is the same side as the 
task relevant location of the response (e.g. a left key press). These results demonstrate the 
'Simon Eftect' (tlrst discovered by Simon and Rudell, 1967). 
The Simon eflect is usually classified as a case of stimulus-response-compatibility (S-R-
C). This shares some similarities with the Stroop effect', which is usually classified as a 
case of stimulus-stimulus-congruence (S-S-C). The design of the 'apple experiment' 
described above adopts the methodology of the S-R-C paradigm, where there is typically a 
stimulus set, a response set and a mapping rule. 
1) The stimulus set: contains stimuli with various dimensions (e.g. colour, si/c. 
identity, shape, location) some of which may have properties that vary across trials 
(e.g. left location, right location). Unlike the 'apple experiment', typically stimuli 
are abstract in nature (such as coloured two dimensional symbols or shapes), 
2) The response set: contains responses with various dimensions (e.g. efTector type, 
location), some of which may have properties that vary across trials (e.g. left 
location, right location). Responses are typically binary verbal responses (e.g. 
"Yes", "No"), or binary key-presses made with hands, feet or specific digits. 
' The Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935, or see MacLeod, 1991 for a comprehensive review) reveals interference 
efTects of incongruent stimulus properties. For example, the naming of ink colour is slow when the colour 
word is incongruent with the ink colour it is written in (e.g. the word *red\ written in green ink). 
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3) The relationship between stimuli and responses: Sometimes one or more stimulus 
dmiensions can be 'compatible' with one or more response dimensions (e.g. a 
stimulus location can be compatible with a response location), or in S-S-C, two or 
more stimulus dimensions can be 'congruent' with each other (e.g. a colour can be 
congruent with the name of a colour). When there is S-R-C or S-S-C, task 
performance is robustly and reliably facilitated (e.g. fast reaction times and few 
mistakes). These effects are not specific to any modality, and can arise when the 
source of compatibility or congruence is relevant to performing the task, or when it 
is irrelevant. In terms of theoretical interpretation, the task is not usually treated as 
an abstraction of a real-life event (such as reaching towards an apple), but is treated 
at face value as an abstract task (see section 1.2.2. for an alternative view). 
4) The mapping rule: is an instruction given to the participant that determines which 
property of a dimension of a response (e.g. dimension = location, property = left) is 
to be paired with which property of a dimension of a stimulus (e.g. dimension = 
colour, property = red). The precise phrasing of a mapping rule can influence the 
goal a participant formulates (which may refer to the anticipated outcome of a 
response, or to the response itself) and this can be crucial to the size and direction 
of any effects (e.g. Hommel, 1993). 
The following describes two information-processing accounts of the Simon Effect. 
Although both reach different conclusions, it is notable that they both share a commitment 
to distinct linear stages of processing that support the three stages of input, transformation 
and output (presented earlier in the discussion of information-processing). Furthermore, in 
accord with tenets 2 & 3 of the caricature of 'pure' vision discussed earlier, they are both 
hierarchically organised with dependency relations that demand the completion of stimulus 
(input) processing before response (output) processing. 
Hasbroucq and Guiard's (1991) three-stage model 
Hasbroucq and Guiard (1991) argued that the Simon Effect is correctly classified as an S-
S-C effect, caused by interference within the stimulus-encoding stage (stage 1 in Figure 
1.2). They argued that although the relevant stimulus dimension (e.g. colour) may not itself 
have a spatial property, because the mapping rule assigns it to a spatial response, the colour 
dimension acquires a spatial connotation at the stimulus-encoding stage. Thus in the 'apple 
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experiment', the assignment of the colour red to a left response, would result in 'red' 
acquiring a spatial code i e f t ' . When the i e f t ' (red) code coincides with a 'right' (right 
apple location) code, there is stimulus-stimulus incongruence, and poor performance would 
be taken to indicate processing interference between these incongruent codes. 
I I 
relevant 
attribute 
irrelevant 
attribute 
identification 
identification 
determination 
response 
M programming 
and execution 
Figure 1.2 Three stages of information processing in a Simon or Stroop task (from 
Hasbroucq and Guiard, 1991, p.263, with shaded sections added) "This model assumes 
that at the stage of S identification both attnbutes of the S are identified in parallel [and 
automatically, for the irrelevant one], which leads to the production of two mental symbols s 
and s' that either agree or conflict with each other The brace symbolizes an exclusive or 
relationship; The Simon or Stroop interference effect is assumed to end before the R-
determination stage starts." 
Kornblum, Hasbroucq and Osman's (1990) Dimensional overlap model 
Models such as the ^Dimensional overiap (DO) model' (Komblum et a/., 1990), attempt to 
explain a wide range of S-R-C effects in terms of a common, basic cognitive mechanism, 
whereas others such as the 'Dual Process (DP) modeK (de Jong, Liang & Lauber, 1994) 
argue that many different mechanisms are involved, particularly within a range of spatial 
S-R-C tasks. Both however share the idea of dual processes (e.g. DO: automatic and 
rule/search-based, or DP: unconditionally automatic and conditionally automatic). In the 
DO model, the Simon Eflect is classified as an S-R-C effect facilitated by the compatibility 
of two properties whose dimensions overlap. Specifically, facilitation occurs when the 
property of an irrelevant stimulus dimension (e.g. the left property of the left-right location 
dimension of an apple) is compatible with the property of a relevant response dimension 
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(e.g. the left property of the left-right dimension of a key press). See Figure 1.3 for the 
major information-processing operations assumed by the DO model. 
Stimulus —• Stimulus 
Elennent Encoding 
ii i l l 
r, Identity & 
Program 
I 
Verification Congment 
Execute r, 
1 
Incon^ment 
Abort r, 
Identity Retrieve Program 
—» 
-> 
Execute 
Response 
Identification: 
-table lookup 
-search 
-rule 
-etc • 
Figure 1.3 Three bnaad stages of information-processing operations identifiable In DO model 
of S - R - C tasks (adapted from Komblum et al., 1990). Solid lines illustrate DO and dotted 
lines illustrate no DO. The uppermost shaded sections illustrate the operations involved in 
the automatic activation of the congnjent response for S-R ensembles with DO. The lower 
shaded sections of the solid path illustrates the operations involved in the identification of the 
correct response. 
The translation metaphor is adopted that is central to linear stage information-processing 
theories. Stimulus processing stages come first and response execution stages come last, 
with a translation stage bridging the gap between the two. Processing within stages is 
assumed to be automatic, in that any recoding or transformations are preset and occur 
immediately (and are not subject to interference or intervention from monitoring or 
controlling processes). ProcessLng between stages is also assumed to be automatic, in that 
the output from any one stage is direcUy transmitted to and direcdy received by a 
subsequent stage, again without interference or intervention. 
Komblum, Stevens, Requin & Whipple (1999), describe the DO model (and Uieir DO'97 
model) as having two distinct sequential stages of processing, namely stimulus processing 
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and response production. Nevertheless, three distinct stages can be identified within the 
model that correspond to the standard input -> translation -> output sequence discussed 
earlier (illustrated by the three shaded columns in Fig. 1.3). This can be described with 
reference to the 'apple experiment': 
1) The stimulus encoding stage: visual properties of the apple such as its colour and 
location are encoded. 
2) The translation stage: Two translation processes operate in parallel-
a. The representational component of the model: If (and only if) there is DO 
between an irrelevant stimulus dimension (such as left apple location) and a 
relevant response dimension (such as left key press), an activating function 
automatically activates a response code, which will be referred to as the 
primed response code (e.g. a 'left' response code). Because of the 
automaticity of the activating process, it is assumed that it is completed 
before the confmnation process. 
b. The processing component of the model: Stimulus codes are compared to 
response codes via a confirmation function. The correct response is 
identified by a rule (if there is DO then a rule can be used which is fast) or a 
search (if there is no DO then a search is performed through a look-up table 
of S-R pairs, which is inherently slow). By identifying the correct response 
code, the primed response code is verified as valid or invalid. Where valid, 
(i.e. when the primed response code matches the correct response code) the 
primed response code is transmitted to the next stage (with no need for 
modification). Where invalid, (i.e. the primed response code does not match 
the correct response code) then the activated primed response code is 
aborted or modified and the correct response code is retrieved, programmed 
and then transmitted to the next stage. 
3) The response execution stage: Depending upon the outcome of the confirmation 
function, either the primed response code or the correct response code transmitted 
from the previous stage (e.g. a 'left' response code) is directly received and 
immediately executed (as a left key press). 
The assumption of strict separation of the stage sequence has been relaxed in recent years 
by models of parallel and distributed processing. Indeed Komblum et al. (1999) have 
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produced just such a connectionist model called DO'97. How the DO'97 model essentially 
differs fi^om its predecessors (including Komblum & Lee's, 1995 DO model that 
incorporates S-S-C tasks) is that independence between stages is no longer assumed, thus 
allowing for temporal overlap. Importantly however, the dependency relations between 
stimulus and response stages still hold for DO'97. There are two distinct layers (stages) of 
modules corresponding to a stimulus processing stage (input) and a response production 
stage (output). Notably, no processing can take place in the response-production stage until 
the activation has reached threshold in the stimulus-processing stage. 
A self-fulfilling prophecy 
There is a sense in which compatibility investigations that stem from a linear-stage 
information-processing viewpoint are self-fulfilling prophecies. Stimulus sets are arbitrary 
(shapes, symbols, colours etc.), response sets are arbitrary (e.g. digit key-presses, or even a 
'green' response), and mapping rules are arbitrary (e.g. left key-press for symbol x, right 
key-press for symbol +). It is not surprising then, that many information-processing 
accounts tend to be arbitrary and invoke abstract groimdless codes. The DO model for 
example, or accounts such as Weeks & Proctor's (1990) salient features model (which 
simply states that compatibility effects arise from a correspondence between salient 
features of stimulus and response sets) appear to offer plausible descriptions of 
relationships between stimulus and response sets, but do not offer a reason why such 
relationships should exist. Rarely is any attempt made to explain why the task irrelevant 
spatial stimulus dimension is coded in the first place (Umilta, 1994). 
Exceptions to this include a referential-coding hypothesis (Hommel, 1993), which suggests 
that the irrelevant spatial stimulus dimension is coded on the basis of different frames of 
reference (egocentric or object-based); and an attention-shifting hypothesis (e.g. Nicoletti 
& Umilta, 1989, 1994) which suggests that that the irrelevant spatial stimulus dimension is 
coded on the basis of attentional orienting to the location of the imperative stimulus. 
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Stoffer and Yakin (1994) further propose that the relative spatial code is fxmctionally 
related to the initial direction of attention upon stimulus onset, such that the position of 
attention acts as a reference point for spatial code formation. Because visual attention is 
geared to the control of eye movements, an attractive feature of attention-shifting 
hypotheses is their implication, at some level, of the action system in their explanation of 
the Simon Effect. 
Indeed, a 'premotor theory of spatial attention' suggests that various cortical and 
subcortical areas act as neural maps that represent space (Rizzolatti, Riggio and Sheliga, 
1994). These maps do not merely represent space however, as they serve the dual function 
of representing action. There is no linear stage sequence that requires the translation of 
spatial information into information for action, but rather a single representational system 
that simultaneously controls action (e.g. eye movements) and spatial attention. This kind of 
representational account appears to encapsulate what Clark (1997) calls 'action-oriented 
representations'. Clark (1997) describes action-oriented representations as neural maps that 
also act as controllers; they both describe a situation and suggest an appropriate reaction to 
it (this is also what the APH proposes). In this way, action-oriented representations are not 
dependent on separate representations of slates of the world or the cognitive systems goals 
for behaviour (Chemero, 2000). 
Summary of computational approaches 
The information-processing tradition to which Marr's work and linear stage models of S-S-
C and S-R-C effects belong, share assumptions of hierarchical information processing with 
strict dependency relations. This can be simimarised as a sequence of input (perception) -> 
translation (cognition) -> output (action). This sequence (and the abstract nature of the 
codes proposed) ensures an indirect relationship between perception and action. The 
following subsection examines ecological accounts that assume a more direct relationship 
between perception and action. 
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1.2.2 Ecological approaches 
Visual perception 
Gibson (1979, p. 1) expressed the essence of his argument as follows: 
"We are told that vision depends on the eye, which is connected to the brain. I 
shall suggest that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body 
supported by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a complete 
visual system." 
By investigating vision within the context of a complete visual system, it becomes more 
natural to consider the problems encountered in terms of guiding behaviour, rather than in 
terms of creating general-purpose representations. Where Marr's approach fails to 
acknowledge sensorimotor involvement in a complete visual system (concentrating instead 
on the action-neutral recovery of a visual scene), those computational approaches that do 
consider the complete visual system (such as Ballard's 1991, 'animate vision', or 
Churchland et. al's 1994 'interactive vision'), still maintain a degree o f separation between 
visual perception and action. Those in the ecological tradition regard such a divide as 
conceptual rather than real. Perception is seen as an activity rather than as a passive 
process, and the guidance of effective action within an environmental niche is taken to be 
the very essence of perception (rather than a temporally distinct consequence of it). 
Affordances 
Gibson (1979) invented the noun 'afiFordance' as part o f the ecological lexicon to explicate 
the intimate relationship between an animal and its environmental niche. An afifordance is 
a high-order property of an aspect of the environment (e.g. a surface or an object) taken 
with reference to the sensorimotor capabilities of the perceiver. These high-order 
properties can be understood in terms of affordances only when they are considered 
relative to the perceiving animal (see Figure 1.4), Thus an apple affords grasping and 
eating for a human, but not for a fish, and a staircase affords climbing for a human but not 
for a Dalek (as the sensorimotor capabilities needed for grasping or climbing are lacking). 
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"Weli. this certainty /w/.q^r/r our plan to conquer the Uniwmtr: 
Figure 1.4 A staircase that does not afford climbing to Daleks (from The Punch Cartoon 
Albunn. 1991) 
For Gibson, affordances are not purely objective (physicaJ) properties of the environment, 
nor purely subjective (phenomenal) properties of the viewer, but both. The actual physical 
properties o f an object (its size or shape etc.) that afford actions are defined as distal 
properties (and as such constitute distal stimuli), and the theory of affordances is 
essentially a theory of distal stimuh (Michaels and Stins, 1997). 
Information that specifies affordances 
Gibson argued that information about affordances is specified by 'invariances in the optic 
array' that are directly perceived (and not mediated by any information processing). The 
affordance-specifying properties of invariances in the optic array that are available to the 
visual system are defined as proximal properties (and as such constitute proximal stimuli). 
In order to appreciate the important difference between an affordance (distal stimulus) and 
the information that specifies an affordance (proximal stimulus), it is helpfial to consider 
what Gibson (1979, p. 142) refers to as "misinformation for affordances". Consider a sheet 
of glass in a glass door, which serves as a barrier. The distal properties of this glass sheet 
(supported by the doorfiame) afford for a human, collision, opposition, support etc. 
However, under specific light conditions one might walk straight into the glass door and 
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injure oneself. Under these light conditions the information about what the glass sheet 
affords is insufficient or under specified. That is, the proximal properties of the light (the 
information) do not specify what the glass actually affords (e.g. collision) and thus the 
affordance is misperceived. Had there been some dirt or highlights on the surface of the 
glass, then the proximal properties of the light would have been sufficient to specify the 
affordance for collision. 
The realisation that the locus for information about affordances (and its measurement) is in 
the optic array exposes a paradox in the ecological approach. Firstly, there is the holistic 
notion of an affordance (distal stimulus) that implies the "complementarity of the animal 
and the environment" (Gibson, 1979; p. 127), that "cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-
objective" and that "is both physical and psychical, yet neither" (Gibson, 1979; p. 129). 
Secondly, there is the reductionist notion that this unity is somehow specified exclusively 
by invariant structures in the optic array (the proximal stimulus), so exclusively in fact, that 
this information is said to exist regardless of whether or not an animal is perceiving it. 
Furthermore, this information is directly picked-up by the viewer. Gibson (1977, p.249) 
explains the simplicity of his theory of direct pickup, 
"In the case of a persisting thing, I suggest, the perceptual system simply 
extracts the invariants from the flowing array; it resonates to the invariant 
structure, or is attuned to it." 
It is in the second notion of proximal stimuli that Gibson's theory becomes notoriously 
untenable (see Ulman, 1979, 1980 and Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981 for criticisms). Problems 
include just what might constitute higher-order invariant structures in the light (in 
stretching Gibson's theory to logical extremes, Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981 speculated 
whether the Da Vincihood of a painting might be specified by such structures), and just 
how such information is directly perceived (by the ill-defined mechanisms of 'resonance' 
or 'attunement'). 
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Perception-action couplings 
Rather than viewing information in the environment as a source of input that is represented 
and transformed into detailed plans for action, ecologists (e.g. Michaels, 1988; Stins and 
Michaels, 1997) propose that information in the environment is a source of various 
parameters of stimulation that are tightly bound to (or coupled with) various parameters of 
action. Information is said to consist of geometric or kinematic patterns that are lawfully 
related to the environment. Attempts to uncover lawful relations that are coupled with 
actions have revealed that some informational characteristics of a visual scene or object are 
more useful to the viewer than others. For example, in a moving visual scene such as an 
apple that has been thrown towards the viewer, the apple has many measurable 
characteristics such as initial size, final size, expansion duration and so on, that may not be 
coupled to coordinated action (Michaels, 1988 made this observation with reference to a 
moving square). There is evidence that animals (e.g. Lee and Reddish, 1981) and humans 
(e.g. Bootsama, 1989) can use higher-order variables to specify time to contact such as 
Lee's (1976) tau (the ratio of momentary size to expansion velocity), and it is measurable 
variables such as these that are likely to be coupled with coordinated action. 
Similarly, in a static visual scene, such as a photograph of an apple presented on the left of 
a screen (e.g. the 'apple experiment') there are many measurable characteristics (such as 
size, colour, location), some of which may or may not be coupled to parameters action. To 
take a simple example, the extent to which an apple located on the left may be coupled 
with a left hand response may be greater than the extent to which it is coupled with a right 
hand response. Clearly in distal terms, the photograph o f a left located apple presented on a 
flat computer screen affords no actions whatsoever (other than perhaps pointing towards, 
or manipulation with a virtual tool such as a cursor). \n fact Gibson (1979, p.283) refers to 
pictures or photographs of objects as "virtual objects", and in strict Gibsonian terms, it is 
the misinformation in the patterns light that can be misperceived as affording reaching and 
grasping. Here however, misperception of afifordances would not appear to arise from 
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perceiving under specified of insufficient information, but rather sufficient, or indeed over 
specified information. 
Perception-action couplings and S-R-C 
From an ecological perspective, in S-R-C experiments (e.g. the 'apple experiment'), it is 
the coupling of actions with the information specified by properties of the proximal 
stimulus that is thought to be responsible for compatibility effects. There is an action (e.g. 
a left key press or a right key press) that is, to a greater or lesser extent coupled to a 
perceptual event (e.g. a photograph of a red or green apple that is left or right located). 
Furthermore, this coupling often has some ecological validity in its correspondence to real-
life events (e.g. a key press to a photograph of an apple can be considered analogous to the 
initiation of a reach movement towards a real apple). In this context, movement initiation 
times are taken to reflect the extent to which available information guides actions (rather 
than reflecting the number or complexity of information processing operations). 
Consequently Stins and Michaels (1997) redefined S-R-C as information-action-
compatibility (I-A-C). 
Box I . l summarises a typical experimental task that reflects the tension between 
ecological (I-A-C) and computational (S-R-C) interpretations of compafibility effects. 
Despite the interpretation of effects remaining open to S-R-C or I-A-C accounts, the S-R-C 
paradigm offers a useful ( i f crude) technique for uncovering affordances (or at least, the 
misinformation for affordances), whether through the use of static visual displays (e.g. 
Stins and Michaels, 1997, 2000; Adam, Paas, Buekers, and Wuyts, 1996) or moving visual 
displays (e.g. Michaels, 1988; Stins and Michaels, 1999; Brass, Bekkering and Prinz, 
2001). 
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Box 1.1 The problematic nature of interpreting compatibility effects 
In Experiment 2 o f Michaels (1988), participants made forward left or right pushes (likened 
to reaches or catches) o f two joysticks that could be in one of three possible positions. 
Responses were made to the square that moved from two left and right positioned squares. 
The direction o f apparent motion was ipsilateral (illustrated by the left side squares in Fig. a) 
or contralateral (illustrated by the right side squares in Fig. a). The pattem of results was as 
follows: I ) a spatial compatibility effect for responses made to the actual (i.e. initial) position 
of the moving square, 2) a similar yet larger effect when responses were made to the 
destination of the square, which was greatest when responses had an absolute rather than 
relative correspondence to square (that is, as shown in Fig. A, when joysticks were 
positioned at P2, rather than PI or P3), 3) a Simon Effect of task irrelevant destination of the 
square, and 4) a reverse Simon Effect of task irrelevant actual position of the square. 
I I I I I I 
P1 P2 P3 
Figure A 
Curvilinear 
Figure B. 
Linear contralateral Linear ipsilateral 
Michaels (1988) suggested these results demonstrated an affordance for catching a square at 
its absolute movement destination. Procter, Van Zandt, Lu and Weeks (1993) offered an 
alternative explanation, suggesting the coding of salient relative left-right stimulus motion 
and relative left-right response positions caused the effects. They showed experimentally the 
same pattem of results using stimuli that moved towards or away from the viewer and key 
press responses at various positions- all of which had little resemblance to 'catching'. 
Michaels (1993) responded to this critique experimentally by adding a condition with a 
curvilinear moving square that terminated halfway through its trajectory (see Fig. b above). 
Thus relative left-right motion was opposite to actual destination, and the results revealed 
response- destination compatibility that suggested the influence o f absolute rather than 
relative destination. Not to be outdone, Procter, Lu, Van Zandt and Weeks (1994) responded 
with a relative-direction coding account of the data, with reference to motion o f the linear 
contralateral display relative to the new condition o f a curv ilinear display. 
A self-fulfilling prophecy 
There is also a sense in which compatibility investigations that stem from an l -A-C 
viewpoint are se l f - fu l f i l l ing prophecies ( c f earlier discussion regarding linear-stage 
information-processing viewpoints). Stimulus sets are ecologically meaningftil (objects, 
surfaces, motion etc.), response sets are ecologically meaningftil (e.g. pointing, reaching, 
pushing or pulling a joystick etc.), and mapping rules are ecologically meaningftil (e.g. 
mapping rules that are task relevant rather than task-irrelevant). Even when arbitrary 
stimulus sets are used, the mapping rules and response sets are often transparent enough to 
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ensure an ecological interpretation is possible. A good illustration of this comes from Adam 
et al (1996), whose results (speed and accuracy) reflected the comparative ease of pointing to 
one of four locations when compared to responding with one of four possible finger-lifts or 
to verbalising one of four numbers (see Figure 1.5). Such a result is hardly surprising, and 
nor are the conclusions drawn {ibid. p. 518), 
"...a pointing response to a spatially defined target stimulus, might invoke a 
low-level, direct perception-action routine, while a finger and vocal response 
might invoke a more cognitive, higher-level, indirect perception-</ec/5/o/?-action 
routine." 
X X X X WARNING STIMULUS 
X TARGET STIMULUS 
VOCAL response 1 2 3 4 
FINGER-LIFT response middle index index middle 
left right 
POINTING response 
Home Button 
Figure 1.5 A schematic of the stimulus display and three response types (from Adam et al, 
1996) 
This kind of study is trivial in the same sense that one would not be surprised to find that 
people can coordinate a golf shot more successfiilly when swinging a golf club than when 
swinging a log. 
Constraining degrees of freedom 
Michaels and Stins (1997) summarised the ecological gist of perception-action as the 
perceiver-actor selecting goals and the means for achieving them, by bringing under 
control a few motor elements of an action from numerous initial possibilities. The problem 
is therefore one of constraining the degrees of fi^om o f an action. They suggested that 
the concept of constraining degrees of fi^dom (i.e. the constraint of a dynamical system) 
is quite different from that of setting parameters in a generalized motor program (i.e. the 
instruction of a machine). In constraining the degrees of fiwdom within a dynamical 
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system, solutions appear to be 'soft-assembled' and under 'decentralised' control, rather 
than 'hard-assembled' (e.g. in terms of specific programmed instructions) and under 
'centralised' control (e.g. via a detailed inner model). 
As a case in point, Clark (1997) described the everyday example of human walking used 
by Thelen and Smith (1994). Rather than appearing to be driven by a set of precise 
movement commands (as is typical in say a classically programmed robot arm whose 
success depends on the precise control of programmed movement parameters), human 
walking appears to naturally compensate for dramatic changes in the problem space, such 
as icy terrain, blisters, high-heeled shoes and so on. Human walking is robust and fluid, 
and any surprises are coped with by recruiting different patterns of gait, muscle control, 
etc., while maintaining the gross goal of locomotion. More specialised, highly skilled 
behaviours that operate under exceptional real-time demands (such as professional 
skateboarding, snowboarding, rally-driving etc.) make for even more compelling cases of 
soft-assembled solutions to coordinated behaviour that are under decentralised control. 
Links in a perception-action loop 
The concept of perception influencing action is a familiar one. Sensory information is 
perceived, and this influences action either directly (ecological view) or indirectly (linear-
stage information-processing view). A less familiar concept (at least for proponents of 
classical theories of structure) is that action can influence perception. There is considerable 
evidence however, that this is the case (some recent examples include Hecht, Vogt and 
Prinz, 2001; MQsseler and Hommel, 1997; Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti and Umilta, 1999; 
Wohlschlager, 2000, 2001; Hommel, Miisseler, Aschersleben and Prinz, 2001; Stoffregen, 
Pagulayan, Bardy, & Hettinger, 2000). Indeed, action even appears to affect memory (e.g. 
Kerzel, 2001; Noice and Noice, 2001). 
Some perception-action couplings (such as the activity of catching a butterfly) are quite 
obviously dynamic in the sense that perception and action are intimately caught up in an 
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ongoing adaptation to real-time, on-line demands. In cases such as these it is clear that an 
action (moving the hands to catch the butterfly) can influence perception (the butterfly is 
perceived moving away fi^om the hands to avoid capture). These couplings are 
appropriately described in terms of a perception-action loop, where perception influences 
action, which influences perception and so on. Gibson (1979) argued that this is what the 
activity of 'real' vision is all about, and not its various experimental approximations (for 
example, eye, head and body movements all affect what is perceived, and what is 
perceived similarly affects eye, head and body movements). 
There is however a subtler sense in which action can influence perception, and this is well 
illustrated by Michaels and Stins (1997) review of Fitch and Turvey's (1978) analysis of 
baseball hitting. From an initially huge number of action degrees of fteedom, once on the 
plate, the situational constraints of a stance and the intention for a hit to left-centre ensure 
that the possible degrees of fi^dom are dramatically reduced. The player's solutions to 
hitting the ball are soft-assembled, and v^l l be adaptively fine-tuned to the actual details of 
the approaching ball. The organisation of the action is said to "set up" perception, and as 
Michaels and Stins (1997) explained, many action degrees of fiwdom are constrained by 
intentions and task demands, and these determine what information wi l l be attended to. 
However, it is not clear just how action *sets up' perception. Once again the mechanism of 
'direct perception' is somehow involved in this causal connection. 
These principles appear to be equally applicable to S-R-C experiments. In the 'apple 
experiment' for example, the situational constraints come in the form of a mapping rule, 
and the physical layout of key/hand configuration. A finger of each hand is placed on a 
response key, and as Michaels and Stins (1997) noted, because such tasks demand speed, 
the action (in this case for both hands) is presumably organised in so far as possible before 
the stimulus is presented. Thus responses are already to a greater or lesser extent 'soft-
assembled' and these remaining degrees of freedom determine what optical information 
wil l be attended to that might constrain them ftirther (such as information about apple 
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location). The extent to which such information is effective in constraining action degrees 
of freedom is reflected in reaction times. Thus the 'apple experiment' (or any other similar 
S-R-C experiment) can be considered in terms of a perception-action loop. 
Figure 1.6 describes two perception-action tasks in terms of a negative feedback loop - 1) a 
striker in a game of baseball, and 2) the 'apple experiment'. No attempt is made to open 
the loop to other causes that would almost certainly interact with it [e.g. 1) emotions, 
health, environmental conditions, the booing of the crowd etc., 2) the sound of the 
experimenter talking in the corridor, thought processes alleviating boredom etc.]. 
Consequently the process driven (intentions, goals, expectations etc.) loop presented is 
vastly oversimplified, it is however, important to note the loop's operational closure. 
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Proximal 
Stimulus 
ACTION 
(soft-assembly 
constrains action 
degrees of freedom) 
PERCEPTION 
(attend to action-
relevant info) 
Overarching 
goal 
ACTION 
(fine-tuned 
execution) 
COGNITION 
(Intentions.expectations, 
goals, task constraints) 
PERCEPTION 
(perceive effects 
of action) 
Links in loop Process E.g. Baseball E.g. 'Apple 
experiment' 
(+ve link) Intentions 
and task constraints 
-> constraining 
action degrees of 
freedom 
(+ve link) 
Constraining action 
degrees of freedom 
-> detection of 
stimulus 
(+ve link) detection 
of stimulus -> fine-
tuning of action/s 
(+ve link) fine-
tuning of action/s -> 
perceive effects 
(-ve link) perceive 
effects -> intentions 
and task constraints 
(note that this 
negative link 
regulates the loop 
cycle) 
(a) the task constraints, 
expectations and intentions, 
initiate (b) the soft-
assembly of an action thus 
constraining action degrees 
of freedom 
(a) the soft-assembled 
action/s, 'set up' (b) 
anention to action-relevant 
optical information 
(a) the details of the action-
relevant optical information 
attended to, inform (b) the 
on-line fine-tuning of the 
action/s 
(a) from carrying out the 
fine-tuned actions, the 
perceiver-actor perceives 
(b) the visual, auditory and 
tactile effects of actions 
(a) perceiving the efTecls of 
action/s, influences (b) the 
task constraints, 
expectations and intentions 
of the perceiver actor 
(a) initial stance, 
expectation of a slow 
curved pitch, and intention 
to hit ball to lefr-centre, 
(b) step and swing 
(a) step and swing, (b)^ 
release of the ball (needed 
to initiate step) and time-
to-contact (needed to 
initiate swing) 
(a) information of release 
of ball and time-to 
contact, (b) execution of 
step and swing 
(a) step and swing-to-hit, 
(b) feel and sound of hit, 
sight of ball trajectory, 
speed, end position etc. 
(a) feel and hear miss hit, 
ball landed short and wide 
of centre-lefl, (b) adjust 
posture, expect maybe a 
fast straight pitch next, 
intend to hit short and 
centre-right 
(a) hand-key 
configuration, mapping 
rule, expectation of an 
apple picture, intention 
to react quickly, (b) left 
and right response 
(a) left and right 
response, (b) location 
of the apple. 
(a) information of 
location (and colour to 
determine response) (b) 
execution of left 
response 
(a) left response, (b) 
feel and sound of 
response, sight of 
picture disappearing, 
sound of beep 
signalling mistake 
(a) finger feels stiff, or 
slipped from centre of 
key, beep signalled 
mistake, (b) adjust 
body posture, realign 
finger to key, expect 
maybe a red apple next, 
intend to slow down 
response for accuracy 
Figure 1.6 Possible links in a perception-action loop 
^ Stins and Michaels (1997) report that Fitch and Turvey (1978) speculated that this kind of information 
(release of the ball, time-to-conlact) might be exploited. NB. Stins and Michaels (1997) fail to provide a 
reference for Fitch and Turvey (1978), but see Turvey, Fitch, & Tuller (1978). 
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The perception-action loop and linear-stage information processing 
In their treatment of 1-A-C, Michaels and Stins (1997) explicitly avoided a discussion of 
perception-action loops, arguing that perception-action couplings typical of reaction time 
tasks are fundamentally reactive. It has been argued above however, that a typical S-R-C 
experiment (e.g. the 'apple experiment') can be conceived of as a perception-action loop. 
When S-R-C tasks are considered as simple ( i f contrived) instances of perception-action 
couplings, whose effects are derived from a single perception-action psychological process 
(whose usual functioning occurs within the context o f a perception-action loop where, as 
Michaels and Stins, 1997 put it, one perceives to act and acts to perceive), it is hardly 
surprising that attempts to pin down the information-processing stage responsible for, say, 
the Simon Effect, have resulted in contradictory explanations (with Hasbroucq and Guiard, 
1991 locating the effect at the stimulus-encoding stage, and Komblum et al., 1990 locating 
it at the response-production stage)."* 
As with the Watt governor (described earlier in Figure 1.1), any element of a dynamical 
system (information-processing or otherwise) can be isolated and credited with a particular 
functional significance. For the governor, a positive link in the loop can be described as the 
flow of steam (cf. stimulus- encoding stage) determining the engine speed (cf. response-
production stage), and the negative link in the loop can be described as the engine speed 
(cf. response-production stage) determining the flow of steam (cf. stimulus- encoding 
stage). Both are fairiy accurate and useful descriptions, but neither one has more 
significance than the other in the loop. Indeed, other more accurate descriptions are 
possible (the distance between the weights specifies the flow of steam, or the governor 
speed specifies the angle of the arms which specify the distance between the weights etc.). 
In isolation however, no single description does justice to the dynamics of the process. 
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Just as it is difficult ( i f not futile) to separate a somehow privileged cause (input) fi-om an 
effect (output) in the negative feedback loop of the Watt governor, so too is it difficult ( i f 
not futile) to separate perception fi"om action (or input processing stages from output 
processing stages) in a perception-action loop. 
1.2.3 Summary of computational and ecological approaches 
Key assumptions held by computational and ecological accounts of perception (and its 
relationship with action) are summarised in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3 Assumptions of computational and ecological approaches 
Assumptions Computational Ecological 
Study of... 
Models use... 
Purpose of vision 
Mechanism of 
visual perception 
Nature of 
perceptual process 
Mechanism linking 
perception to 
action 
Nature o f 
perception-action 
process 
The mental The observable 
Tools o f information-processing Tools of dynamical systems theory 
To create general-purpose 
descriptions o f the world 
Processing of information 
(symbolic or subsymbolic internal 
representations) 
Visual input is transformed into an 
elaborate representation via 
hierarchical stages of processing 
that have bottom-up dependency 
relations 
Processing o f information 
(symbolic or subsymbolic internal 
representations) 
Visual representation is 
transformed into action via 
hierarchical stages o f processing 
that have bottom-up dependency 
relations 
To effectively guide an animal in 
its environment 
Resonance or attunement to 
information (invariants in the optic 
array) 
A direct, unmediated process that 
utilises the complete visual system 
(eyes, brain, head, body) 
Attunement to action-relevant 
information (aflfordances specified 
in the optic array) 
A direct coupling of perception to 
action, characterised by a 
perception-action loop 
^ A similar argument can be made concerning S-S-C effects. Cohen, Dunbar and McClelland's (1990) 
impressive connectionist model of the Stroop effect (reviewed by MacLeod, 1991), while conventionally 
assuming a unidirectional flow of information from input to output, nevertheless recognised the importance 
of response processes in the Stroop task- a task typically interpreted purely in terms of stimulus processing. 
This recognition serves to emphasise the case made above for rejecting oversimplified analyses of individual 
processing stages at the expense of the wider picture. 
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Possible shortcomings of these approaches can be summarised as follows: 
Computational approaches 
• In tackling 'pure vision' there has been a failure to acknowledge the complete 
visual system and its role in guiding behaviour. 
• The need for a ' ful ly elaborated representation' does not appear to be reflected by 
the real-time demands of 'interactive vision'. Often the worid can act as its own 
best model (see section 1.3 for further discussion). 
• Linear-stage information-processing accounts o f vision and how it relates to action 
(the indirect, abstract nature of which is captured by coding accounts of S-R-C 
effects) do not reflect the dynamic nature of vision and its place in a perception-
action loop. 
Ecological approaches 
• In placing the burden of information entirely in the optic array, the ecological 
concept of ' information' becomes untenable. 
• The mechanisms of direct perception ('resonance' and 'attunement') are i l l defined 
and almost mystical, perhaps inevitably so owing to the previous shortcoming. It 
has been proposed that similar mechanisms constrain a system's action degrees of 
freedom. As well as suggesting that upon stimulus presentation, perceptual systems 
"detect the information to which they are attuned", Michaels and Stins (1997, p.335) 
add to the explanatory vacuity of such terms by claiming that the perceiver-actor 
'taps' information appropriate to constraining actions (this 'tapping' is analogous to 
the escapement mechanism in clocks that selectively taps potential energy at the 
right phase to sustain oscillation). 
• On the basis of imconvincing notions of resonance, attunement and tapping, an 
outright rejection of alternative information-processing and representational 
approaches is inappropriate. As Marr (1982, p.30) wrote, "... the detection of physical 
invariants, like image surfaces, is exactly and precisely an information-processing 
problem". Indeed, there are good reasons to persevere with information processing, 
for as the next section argues, refined notions o f representation answer many of the 
legitimate criticisms levelled at classical representations. 
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1.3 The Representation Debate 
To reiterate the core idea of the APH, it is argued that simply looking at an object, 
regardless of (and in spite of) any intention to act upon it, partially activates motor codes 
that a) are related to components of the actions associated with that object, and b) form an 
integral part of a visual object representation. The APH shares obvious similarities to 
Gibson's theory of affordances, so much so that potentiated actions are termed micro-
affordances (Tucker and Ellis, 2001; Ellis and Tucker 2001). 
There are however, two important theoretical differences between affordances and micro-
affordances. Firstly, m/cro-affordance refers to elements of an action that are afforded 
(such as a particular component of a reach or hand shape), rather than the all-encompassing 
Gibsonian affordance; such as the postbox that "...affords letter-mailing to a letter-writing 
human in a community with a postal system" (Gibson, 1979, p. 139). Secondly, micro-
affordances are realised in the representation of a visual object (whereas Gibson's 
affordances are distal properties of the environment that are not represented but directly 
perceived). 
Actually, in saying what affordances are not ("Note that the size of an object that constitutes a 
graspable size is specified in the optic array. If this is true, it is not the case that a tactual sensation 
of size has to become associated with the visual sensation of size in order for the affordance to be 
perceived."), Gibson (1979, p. 133) came close to defining what is meant by micro-
afifordance. More than the perception of a size-related affordance occurring through 
associations that are sensation-based however, the APH requires that actions are directly 
involved in the visual representation of an object. It is therefore to representations and just 
what they might be that discussion now tums. 
1.3.1 Different understandings of representation 
It has been noted earlier that ecological psychologists and dynamical systems theorists 
reject the notion of representation. The following argues that such rejections are more 
appropriately directed towards detailed, fully specified representations (whether symbolic 
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or connectionist), rather than towards refined notions of representation that emphasise 
content over structure (such as the action-oriented representations of the APH). 
Classical Art and Classical Representations 
Interesting parallels can be drown between the debate in the scientific arena concerning 
what a representation is, and the debate in the artistic arena concerning what art is. Once 
trained as an art critic, these skills are applied to all things, including piles of bricks 
(discussed later). The same is true in cognitive science. An academic's training often 
shapes his or her opinions about representations. For example, researchers in areas such as 
psycholinguistics often fall into the symbolic representation camp, reasoning that language 
must surely be representational, with its symbols (words) and their relations corresponding 
lawfully to things and their relations in the worid. Maybe then, thought itself is a language 
too, a single symbolic language of representations (e.g. Fodor, 1975). 
With a painting or sculpture by Michelangelo (see Figure 1.7) there is an identifiable 
attempt to represent a person or an object that is structured and meaningful to both artist 
and observer and this would presumably qualify as an instance of art (and as is argued 
later, also qualifies as an instance of representation). Is this masterpiece equivalent 
however to a puddle of paint or to a pile of bricks? Similarly a symbolic representation, 
such as might be expected in solving a complex mental arithmetic problem, is lawftilly 
structured and meaningful, and presumably qualifies as an instance of representation. 
Activities such as language, mathematics, predicate logic or chess playing are particularly 
amenable to this kind of explanation. They do not however exhaust the entire repertoire of 
human behaviour, and it is not clear why the mental processes involved in a child's ability 
to crawl should be treated as equivalent to a mathematician's ability to derive the square 
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root of seventy-three .^ Nevertheless, this has tended to be the case, and the 
Representational Theory of Mind (e.g. Fodor, 1997) makes no discrepancy between mental 
processes- they are all supposedly based on the principles of symbolic representation. 
Several authors (e.g. Grand, 2000; Brooks, 1990, 2002; Clark, 1997; Hamad, 2001; 
Franklin, 1995) have expressed serious doubts that these language-like activities reveal the 
essence of intelligent behaviour. While a linguistic, action-neutral, planning and reasoning 
mind may reflect some of the needs of the 2P* Century person. Homo Sapiens Sapiens 
actually emerged in and adapted to an entirely different environment to ours. Indeed, 
recent investigations suggest that the mammalian brain evolved through adapting to 
specific ecological and ethological niches (Brown, 2001; de Winter & Oxnard, 2001). 
Figure 1.7 The Creation of Man' (a fragment of the Sistine Chapel ceiling painted by 
Michelangelo, 1511-12) 
If this argument is taken seriously, an understanding of how the mind works may be better 
served by examining behaviours that are common to other animals (such as sensing and 
acting in an environment). 'Embodied Cognition' for example (see Box 1.2), describes an 
approach that connects intelligence to the outside world via the body of the intelligent agent. 
* Although it does make sense to assume that so-called higher-level abilities such as mathematics are cases of 
'exaptation' (e.g. Dennett 1995) or 'piggy-backing' (e.g. Clark, 1997). That is, biological machinery that has 
been coopted for new purposes (Buss, Haselton, Shakelford, Bleske and Wakefield, 1998), either by natural 
selection (exaptations) or as a fortuitous side effect of adaptation (spandrels). The Representational Theory of 
Mind, however, does not assume that this is the case. 
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Box 1.2 An overview of 'Embodied Cognition'. 
An animal can be said to interact with its environment through experiencing it and through 
acting in it. It can be argued that to act effectively in the world requires an experience of it, 
and to experience the world fully requires acting in it . It is this circularity that sums up 
'embodiment' proper, and in explaining cognition as a biological phenomenon, it is this 
perspective that makes sense of Maturana & Varela's (1989, p. 26) aphorisms o f ' a l l doing is 
knowing, and all knowing is doing' and 'knowledge brings forth a world' . 
Experiencing a world 
Brooks' (2002, p.51-52) first principle of embodiment presents a phenomenal or experiential 
view, **A situated cveoXxxTQ or robot is one that is embedded in the world, and which does not 
deal with abstract descriptions, but through its sensors with the here and now of the world, 
which directly influences the behaviour of the creature." This view is exemplified by the 
'niche-dependent sensing' (Clark, 1997, p. 24) o f Brooks' robot Herbert, whose can 
collecting behaviour emerges from its sensorimotor capabilities situated within its effective 
environment (a laboratory littered with drink cans). Sharkey and Ziemke (2000) termed this 
phenomenal view *Uexkullian embodiment' after the biologist von Uexkiill (1864-1944). 
Von Uexkiill proposed that an organism's perceptual and motor worlds are brought together 
in its Umwelt (subjective or phenomenal world). Similarly, for Varela, Thompson & Rosch 
(1991) a 'phenomenological animal' has an 'inner' body with an experiential structure that 
provides the context for living. 
Acting in a world 
Brooks' (2002, p.52) second principle of embodiment presents a mechanistic or behaviourist 
view, "An embodied creature or robot is one that has a physical body and experiences the 
world, at least in part, directly through the influence o f the world on that body. A more 
specialized type of embodiment occurs when the fu l l extent of the creature is contained 
within that body." As an example, he suggests that a robot that repeatedly executes the same 
paint-spraying pattern is thus embodied, but not situated. Sharkey and Ziemke (2000) 
termed this mechanistic view 'Loeb'ian embodiment' after the biologist Loeb (1859-1924). 
For Loeb the environment was seen to 'force' the behaviour of the organism, and Sharkey 
and Ziemke argued that under this view, the behaviour or dispositions to behaviour are 
grounded in the interaction between the agent and environment. Cognition is therefore 
embodied in the mechanism itself, and hence no separate cognitive apparatus is needed. 
Similarly, for Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) a 'biological animal" has an 'outer' body 
with a physical structure that provides the context for cognitive mechanisms. 
Interactive accounts of vision also share this intuition, as does the APH. As mentioned in 
section 1.2.1, in treating vision as an explorative activity that guides actions (by virtue of a 
complete visual system), fully specified, 'picture-perfect' representations lose their appeal. 
Various experimental techniques support this shift towards '"partial-representation per 
glimpse", '"visual semi-world" or "minimal representation" views of visual perception. For 
example, during saccades, changes of object colour go completely unnoticed even if that 
object is integral to a current task (Ballard, Hayhoe and Pelz, 1995). Similarly, in reading 
moving windows of text, surrounding 'junk' text is not noticed (Rayner, Well and 
Pollatsek, 1980; O'Regan, 1990). Not everything, it would appear, is represented. 
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Experiments on 'change blindness' reveal a similar phenomenon. When the cyclic 
sequence of two photographs of a visual scene (e.g. a cityscape) is disrupted by some 
technique (e.g. splatters of pixels, a global flicker created by a blank screen, eye blinking, 
eye saccades), major changes in the second photograph (e.g. a large building is removed) 
are not noticed. Even when an observer is told that a change wil l occur it can take nearly a 
minute to identify the change, and furthermore, attention is needed to detect this change 
(e.g. Rensink, O'Regan and Clark, 1997). As Figure 1.8 illustrates, while change blindness 
does not necessarily imply that nothing is represented (but see O'Regan, 1992; O'Regan 
and Noe, 2001; Brooks, 2002), it does raise issues about the temporal nature of 
representations and what level of information might be preserved across views. 
5 Causes of Change Blindness 
T m l 
Th« Stiimdus Rrtt imprciilons 
Nothing is F«atup« 
cofitination 
Figure 1.8 Five explanations of change blindness from Simons (2000). The 'thought bubble' 
indicates the content of the person's accessible representation of what was seen. 
Minimalist Art and Minimal Representations 
As suggested earlier, much animal behaviour, and similarly art, may require different kinds 
of explanation. Consider for example Carl Andre's (1966, 1976) sculpture entitled 
'Equivalent V I I I ' (see Figure 1.9). For some, the arrangement of 120 American firebricks 
was considered an "insouciant masterpiece," (e.g. the London Sunday Times), while for 
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others it was a "pile of bricks" (e.g. the Evening Standard). Whether or not it counts as art 
is still a contentious issue, but in the midst of the controversy there is a voice of common 
sense pleading that / / it is art, it is not very sophisticated art, and it is surely not worth 
£2000,000. For all the clever meanings one might attempt to bestow upon it, it is for the 
most part, simply a pile of bricks. 
Figure 1.9 Equivalent VIM" in Tate Gallery (London), by Carl Andre (1976) 
Similarly, in the midst of controversy over representations, there is a voice of common 
sense (e.g. Clark, 1997) pleading that for many behaviours, / / they involve mental 
representations, they are not very sophisticated ones (personalised, multiple, partial, 
minimal, or action-oriented representations), and nor should they cost much (in terms of 
computational resources). For all the sophisticated representations one might bestow upon 
a person negotiating a crowded room, s/he may nevertheless simply be negotiating a 
crowded room. That is not to say nothing representational is going on, but it may be far 
simpler than expected. As Simons (2000) noted, across views minimal information (e.g. 
object location) may be preserved for guiding actions (e.g. ''just-in-time'' models such as 
Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook and Rao, 1997), but the details of visual features may not be 
preserved. There may be no route planning, or specialised map building, or distance 
35 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
calculating, or hypothesis forming, or in short, classical representing. Indeed, this is just 
what Grand (2000) and Brooks (1991) concluded from their autonomous agents that could 
successfully negotiate environments without anything resembling a classical symbolic 
representation. 
Insights from contemporary Artificial Intelligence 
Grand's Artificial Life 'Creatures' for example, are built with meticulous bottom-up detail, 
with their own simulated brains and physiology. They experience life in an environmental 
niche of food, objects and a limited ecosystem (i.e. they are situated), and their behaviours 
are driven by the interaction of their bodies v^th the environment (i.e. they are embodied). 
In accounting for their remarkably adaptive behaviours, Grand (2000, p. 172) explained 
that, "The thoughts are not programmed in- the behaviour of the whole structure is not imminent in 
any of its parts but an emergent consequence of many tiny, concurrent, 'thoughtless' interactions, 
tuned by nature." Grand's Creatures are certainly representational, since they have program 
scripts for sequences of walking movements and 'concept' neurones that can 'wire 
themselves up' to represent new situations. Nevertheless, these are minimal, personalised 
representations (e.g. Ballard, 1991), such that 'something edible is moving towards me' 
might be encoded, rather than 'something green and edible was moving towards me on 
Tuesday and I was bored'. 
That intelligent-looking behaviour is both emergent and under decentralised control (rather 
than fii l ly specified and under centralised control), is a familiar feature of both ANN's and 
the perception-action loop discussed earlier. It is also inherent in the behaviour-based 
robotics of Brooks. Brooks (1991) denied his robots used representations because their 
high-level behaviours were not reflected directly in any of the simple computations they 
carried out. His autonomous insect-like robot Genghis, for example, can fluidly negotiate 
complex environments by simply connecting 'perception' to action in each layer of a 
'subsumption architecture' that was built using 51 augmented finite-state machines 
(AFSM). These small, simple programs (none more complex than might be used in a 
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electronic drink dispenser) were connected in parallel by fixed wires. Some AFSM's were 
directly connected to a motor, and the output of a given AFSM could provide input to 
another AFSM, activating it or inhibiting it. The little information that was passed occurred 
exclusively over outputs and inputs (one AFSM could not read the contents of another). 
The layers were hierarchically organised, with later more complex capabilities built on top 
of earlier simpler capabilities (which nevertheless remained fi i l ly operational). These 
higher layers could subsume the activity of lower layers, taking over as environmental 
events dictated. 
The crucial implication of Brooks' work is this- / / i t is accepted that simplistic autonomous 
robots get by without representations, could the same be true for us? While the embodied 
approach may convince us that learning to accomplish progressively more abstract tasks 
involves building on bodily experiences, some of these tasks (especially language) may only 
be understood by resorting to some form of representation (Brooks & Stein, 1993). One such 
task might be simulating future scenarios. Genghis is very much a reactive creature, not a 
predictive one. It could not for example simulate the pitfalls of a particular path, choosing 
instead a more appropriate one before embarking on its travels. To illustrate this point, 
consider Dennett's (1996) intentionally oversimplified attempt to describe the evolutionary 
design options for various brains (see Figure 1.10). Although Genghis has no 'brain', the 
principles behind its subsumption architecture allow us to extrapolate anyway that it appears to 
be nothing more than an artificial Darwinian creature (all of its behavioural capacities are 
hardwired and no learning takes place). Brooks' (1991) occasionally radical anti-
representationalist claims however, extend well beyond Darwinian creatures to Gregorian 
creatures (us). Aside fix)m being too simplistic, a related caution against reading too much into 
physical robots such as Genghis is the preclusion of developmental or evolutionary 
perspectives. As humans build these robots there is no examination of the ongoing interactions 
between the central nervous system, organism and environment in the development of 
complex behaviours (Pfeifer, 1999, 2001). 
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Darwinian creatures, diSisrent 
''hardwired'* phenotypes 
selection of one favored 
phenotype 
maltfplication of the favored 
genotype 
Sdnnerian creature 
''blindly" tries 
difiEsrenl responses • 
. . . nntil one is selected by Next time, the creature's 
Brst choice will be the 
reinforced respuuse, 
Popperian creature has 
an inner selective 
envlroiiment thai 
previews candidate acts. 
First time, the creature 
acts in an insightful 
Mray (better than 
chance). 
Gregorian creature imports mind tools from the (cultural) 
environment; these improve both the generators and the testers. 
Figure 1.10 Design options for brains (adapted from Dennett, 1996) 
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For Dawkins (1976), the most profound mystery facing modem biology concerns how humans 
evolved a capacity to simulate the ftiture (which he speculated, has culminated in subjective 
consciousness). Genghis, it would appear, does not convince us that such a capacity is possible 
without representations. In Chapter 2 a number of embodied approaches to cognition are 
reviewed that suggest a kind of anticipation or potentiation allows us to select from various 
possible actions in a given context, without calling upon conscious simulation or imagery. 
Those approaches that are explicitly representational nevertheless use minimal, action-oriented 
representations. 
Furthermore, when imagery, simulation, or a more recent notion of emulation are explored, 
Dawkins* 'profound mystery' turns out to be a closely related project ( i f not the very same 
project) to that of understanding the links between perception and action (see Barsalou, 1999; 
Richardson, Spivey and Cheung, 2001). Kosslyn and collegues^, for example, have shown in 
various neuroimaging studies (and other sources of evidence, such as studies of brain-damaged 
patients and studies of the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation), that imagery draws on 
mechanisms used in other activities, such as perception (even as low-level as the primary 
visual cortex) and motor control (see also Jeannerod, 1995). It is argued that imagery is 
produced when perceptual and motor processing areas are activated from 'top-down' 
influences, and flirthermore, imagery is believed to assist perceptual processing by providing 
an additional source of information when perceptual input is incomplete. 
Crush (2002) on the other hand, argues that imagery and perception are not two separate 
processes where one can aid the other, but rather two modes of operation of the same 
process. This process is described as the continual updating of an estimate of the state of 
the environment and the primary perceptual areas. During perception this process is 
influenced by sensory information, whereas during imagery it is not. By appealing to the 
' E.g. Kosslyn, Albert, Thompson, Maljkovic, Weise, Chabris, Hamilton, Rauch and Buonanno (1993); 
Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim and Albert (1995); Kosslyn, Ganis, Thompson (2001) 
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same process. Crush argues that his theory of emulation^ can account more readily for the 
intimate relations imagery and perception have to motor processes. Rather than a general 
observation that motor areas are active during visual imagery, the theory predicts (and has 
empirical support, e.g. Wexler, Kosslyn and Berthoz, 1998) that motor areas that are active 
are those areas responsible for the motor commands that are used in producing actual overt 
movements (such as might correspond with the imagined event). 
Bearing in mind the close relations between imagery, perception and action, it is 
reasonable to hope that Brooks' subsumption architecture might nevertheless provide a 
good foundation for producing imagery or simulation-like behaviours. Indeed, Stein's 
(1994) MetaToto uses its subsumption architecture to build an internal map of its 
environment, such that it can select from a variety of 'imagined' possibilities. This map is 
built as real exploratory behaviour unfolds, such that the sonar it uses to act in and navigate 
around its environment is simulated (or perhaps more accurately, emulated) so as to 
explore a virtual world. After using this map off-line, MetaToto can engage its sensors and 
motors online to find a target location that it has only ever visited in a virtual context. So, 
although derived fi-om its subsumption architecture, MetaToto does appear, in a tangible 
way, to represent its environment. As Stein (1997) explained, the robot "imagines" 
wandering around in the environment; an environment which is represented by a map that 
functions as though it were navigating in the real worid. 
*• While Crush's (2002) 'emulators* are relevant to many of the issues discussed, they are beyond the scope of 
this Introduction. In short, an emulator is a proposed neural mechanism that mimics the input-output function 
of some system in such a way that creates, both online and ofHine, a mock sensory feedback (that is much 
faster than real sensory feedback) of interactions between internal systems or a sensory system and the world. 
41 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
1.3.2 Defining representations 
In appealing to the above arguments, a definition of representation is needed that is broad 
enough to accommodate personalised, multiple, partial, minimal, and action-oriented 
representations. Clark (1997, p. 147) suggested that we call a processing story 
representational, 
" . . . i f it depicts whole systems of identifiable inner states (local or distributed) 
or processes (temporal sequences of such states) as having the function o f 
bearing specific types o f information about external or bodily states o f 
affairs..." 
In elaborating on this view. Table 1.4 presents a teleological definition of representations 
that complements Clark's position. Three conditions ( R l - R3) are identified that are 
deemed necessary (and sufficient) for something to count as a representation: 
Table 1.4 Three conditions necessary for a representation, adapted from Chemero (2000), 
(previously adapted from Miltikan, 1984) 
A feature RoOf a system (S) counts as a representation for S if and only if the following 
conditions are met: 
R l A representation must be part of a system of representations. Thus, there are in addition 
to Ro,transformations of Ro, Ri-.-Ro, that have as their function to adapt the 
representation consumer to corresponding transformations o f Ao, A i . . . An. 
R2 Ro stands between a representation producer and a representation consumer that have 
been standardized to f i t one another. That is, Ro serves as a representation within the 
context of representation producing and consuming devices 
R3 The proper function o f Ro is to adapt the representation consumer to some aspect Ao of 
the environment, (such that S behaves appropriately with respect to AQ even when AQ is 
not the case) 
It is notable that the above definition is concerned with content over structure, thus 
allowing a far broader range of representations than would be allowed under a structure-
based definition (for example an insistence on combinatorial structure would leave little 
room for anything other than symbolic representations). Table 1.5 demonstrates how this 
definition fairs using examples we have encountered earlier. It is of interest that according 
to Table 1.5, Genghis does use representations (despite them in no way resembling 
classical symbolic representations). Furthermore, micro-affordances count as 
representations, and in a usefiil sense inanimate objects such as paintings or sculptures also 
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Examples R1: content that is 
complex 
R2: content that can 
be consulted 
R3: content that has a specific 
function 
Conditions 
satisfied 
Michelangelo's 
'Creation of 
Man' 
It Is part of a system of 
representations loosely 
defined as art 
There is a 
representation producer 
(artist) and a 
representation 
consumer (us) 
It is supposed to be painting about 
the 'Creation of Man'. 
3 
Andre's 
'Equivalent VIII' 
It is part of a system of 
representations loosely 
defined as art 
There is a 
representation producer 
(artist) and a 
representation 
consumer (us) 
It is supposed to be sculpture of 
something meaningful. However, 
what this meaning may be is not 
accessible to everyone 
3 
A puddle of spilt 
paint 
It is not part of a system of 
representations loosely 
defined as art 
There is no 
representation producer 
(e.g. the wind blew over 
the paint tin) but there 
is a representation 
consumer (us) 
It is not supposed to be a puddle 
of paint, it just is. It has no 
function, meaning or purpose. 
0 
Genghis It is part of a system of 
representations (there are 
inner states that exhibit a 
systematic kind of 
coordination with a whole 
space of environmental 
contingencies) 
There are 
representation 
producers (AFSM's) 
and representation 
consumers (other 
AFSM's) 
Each behavioural layer has a 
function (stand up, involuntary 
step, voluntary walk, walk over 
obstacles, walk competently, 
chase prey) 
3 
Mlcro-
affordance 
As above There is a 
representation producer 
(the visuo-motor 
system) and a 
representation 
consumer (the cognitive 
and motor systems) 
It has the function of representing 
possibilities for action 
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Content that is complex (R1) 
Firstly, there must be whole systems of representations in order to give the content of a 
mental process sufficient complexity to merit a representational explanation. For Clark 
(1997) this condition is met by "... inner states that exhibit a systematic kind of coordination 
with a whole space of environmental contingencies" {ibid, P-147), but is not met by cases of 
simple causal correlation between a mental state and an environmental (or bodily) state, or 
cases of simple 'adaptive hookup' such as a light-seeking robot or a sunflower that has the 
sole function by evolution, design or learning, of coordinating a behaviour with an 
environmental contingency. 
This is possibly the least contentious condition. Clearly i f a system cannot represent more 
than one thing there is little point in calling that system representational. Art, as a system 
of representations, meets this criterion. That Genghis might represent is at least in part 
dependent on it having a range of possible internal states present in its behavioural layers. 
Content that can be consulted (R2) 
Secondly, there is no point in requiring a certain level o f complexity unless this complexity 
can be used. For Franklin (1995) the only way this can happen is i f representations are 
consulted for their content. Thus, implicit to having whole systems of representations, 
Clark (1997) suggests that we think of a representation as a kind of irmer code that can be 
read by other systems that need to be informed. 
A literal reading of the 'consultation' or 'reading' o f inner codes raises the problem of 
dualism, a major criticism of representations. It implies that there is some kind of 
homunculus doing the consulting or reading. This is particularly so for 'look-up tables' of 
the sort proposed in Komblum et al's (1990) DO model. Just what privileged component 
of a system has the ability to Mook-up' some information? The most obvious candidate for 
a homunculus in a symbolic system is the central executive. In Genghis however, no one 
part o f the system is ' in charge', and furthermore, one AFSM carmot 'read' the contents of 
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another; it is simply activated or inhibited by the value of another AFSM's output, passed 
along a fixed v^re. Similarly, it is not obvious what is 'read' or what does the 'reading' in a 
micro-affordance. A partially activated motor code for example, appears to be nothing 
more than one of Grand's (2000) 'thoughtless' interactions between perception and action. 
It is simply an element in a complex flow of information. 
An attractive feature of ANN's is their lack of a central executive. Control is instead 
achieved in a distributed fashion. For example, 'content addressable memory' (e.g. 
McClelland and Rumelhart's, 1981 word recognition network), allows a degraded or 
partial input (such as a couple of letters of a word) to trigger distributed patterns of activity 
that settle on content (e.g. a word) that is meaningful (to us at least). The distributed 
database of words in such a network is not 'read' or 'consulted' as might be the case in a 
traditional database. 
In merely requiring a representation producer and a representation consumer however (see 
R2 in Table 1.5 above), these unwanted connotations are avoided. 'Reading' of 
information can be relaxed to a 'passing' of information. A representation producer 
produces a product (e.g. a numerical value outputted by an AFSM), which is consumed as 
an input (e.g. by another AFSN4). One AFSM does not 'need to know' the details of 
another AFSM's informational content, it just 'needs to know' what the product of that 
content is (e.g. does the 'chase prey' layer need to be activated? Yes or No?). In this sense, 
there is active producing accompanied by passive consuming, and the product of an AFSM 
is content bearings but is not itself content laden. It is in this context that the following 
sentiment of Grand (2000) makes sense- information acts on the brain at least as much as 
the brain acts on information. 
Content that has a specific function (R3) 
Thirdly, a representation should have a specific function- it is supposed to represent 
something. For Clark (1997) this means that regardless of the proposed nature of 
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representations (e.g. classical or connectionist), correlations between bodily or 
environmental states and mental states should be used in such a way that suggests the 
system of inner states has the specific function of carrying specific types of information. 
Boers (2002) for example, suggested that waving pattems in reed do not represent wind 
direction or speed, because it is not a functional property of these pattems to do so. The 
notion of function is intimately tied to notions of meaning or intentionality, and this has 
both practical and philosophical implications that are discussed in the following section. 
1.3.3 The function of representations 
The illusive nature of representational functions 
From a practical point of view, it can be hard to ascertain the specific function of a 
representation. Just what Andre's (1976) 'Equivalent VUF is supposed to represent is 
anyone's guess. Andre presumably intended it to be more than just a pile of bricks, so it 
qualifies as a representation because it has a function or meaning (even i f this meaning 
changes from person to person, context to context, and even i f these meanings do not relate 
to Andre's own original understanding). 
Chemero (2000) argued that action-oriented representations are problematic because it is 
difficult to say exactly what they represent While it can be said that an action-oriented 
representation (e.g. a micro-affordance) has the dual function of providing featural 
properties of objects and affording actions towards them, it is not easy to say exactly what 
is being represented. As Chapter 2 argues at some length however, this is precisely the 
point that makes action-oriented representations attractive. Their function is neither static 
nor prescribed, and consequently one would not expect to find a definitive answer to what, 
exactly, it represents. It is the behavioural activity (in accordance with Brooks' intuitions) 
that gives a representation its function, rather than some highly specific pre-determined 
function. 
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The core problem with the 'brain as computer' metaphor is that the digital computer was 
modelled on the outward appearance of mental processes, rather than the structures that 
give rise to them (Grand, 2000). However, when a 'brain-as-Genghis' metaphor is adopted, 
it is similarly hard to identify function from the numerous tiny parallel computations. 
Brooks & Stein (1993) recognised that approaches such as theirs suffer from being 
inscrutable in so far as there is little explicit structure that can be described by abstraction. 
Although unhelpful, it may well be that this inscrutability reflects the way the brain 
represents. Although Brooks (1991, 2002) argues that there is nothing in any of Genghis' 
layers that has the function of representing, he nevertheless speaks freely of behavioural 
layers having the function of 'chasing prey', 'walking competently' and so on. He 
maintains the view that the complex behaviours of his robots only appear to reflect 
representations to him as an observer. 
Nevertheless, contrary to Brooks' views, not all of our observations are necessarily 
misleading. Dennett (1995) for example, argues that an intentional position is essential. By 
looking for semantic-level facts one can explain the causal regularity of patterns. One 
would be left baffled by the long necks of giraffes, i f every causal fact in the history of all 
giraffes that ever lived were to be described in micro-detail (c.f trying to explain every 
causal fact in Genghis' history of computations). Dennett argues that going up an 
explanatory level or two, one can look for reasons nature might have had for the long 
necks of giraffes. In this light it is not an empty claim to say that a behavioural layer in 
Genghis has the function of representing prey. After all, the various behavioural layers 
were carefully designed to correspond to likely "stable plateaus of performance that evolution 
might find" (Brooks, 2002, p.244). Similarly, it is not an empty claim to say that in certain 
behavioural contexts an action-oriented representation (e.g. a micro-affordance) has the 
function of affording a power grip or a hand of response. The actual micro-details may not 
be forthcoming, but it is a sensible level of enquiry to start out with (although see below 
for a cautionary note). 
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Apparently obvious representational functions 
The ftinction of a representation is not always illusive. The more Classical looking the 
representation, the easier it is to identify its function. Michelangelo's 'Creation o f Man' for 
example, aside from its historical connotations, self-evidently has the function of 
representing the outward appearance of the male form. This is analogous to clearly 
describable symbolic representations that model the outward appearance of mental 
processes. Thus for Komblum et al's (1990) DO model, there is an identifiable 'activating 
function' that is then processed via an identifiable 'confirmation function'. 
A semantic-level interpretation of the so-called 'bug-detectors' in fi-ogs suggests that they 
have the function of representing prey. However, such obvious functional assignations do 
not come without a philosophical price. Dretske (1988) suggested that natural 
representational systems have indicators (e.g. the indicator mechanism in fi-ogs that 
indicates small, black, moving dots), some of which have their own natural functions (e.g. 
the fi-ogs indicator mechanism has the ftmction o f indicating prey). Through natural 
selection a particular set of indicators (the frogs neural 'bug detectors') have been adapted 
to serve the function of indicating prey. These intrinsic indicator functions are derived 
from their development and use within the system, and it is only when it is an indicators 
natural function to indicate what it indicates, that it achieves representational status. 
However, as Dennett (1995) points out, when this f rog is taken out of its natural setting, 
determining its representational function is not so simple. The frog readily flicks its tongue 
to dried pellets rather than flies. Because its 'natural function' is to represent prey (flies), it 
cannot be said to 'represent' dried pellets. Furthermore, what i f the ft^og's offspring is bom 
in a laboratory of dried pellets. Does this frog represent dried pellets? What i f some frogs 
are more successful pellet detectors than others, and as a result their progeny is strong? In 
this case, there has been genuine selection for pellet detection, and this presumably counts 
as a natural representational function of indicating pellets. Thus some frogs are said to 
represent pellets and others are not, yet as Dennett notes, it seems unlikely that the eyes of 
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'prey representing' frogs tell their brains something different to those of 'pellet 
representing' frogs. Similarly, it would seem unlikely that, in terms of micro-affordances, a 
person brought up exclusively on an orange plantation, would fail to represent the 
possibilities for a grasp when confronted with a previously un-encountered apple or cricket 
ball. What one might instead expect is that the grasp-related properties of an orange can be 
generalised to other objects with similar grasp-related properties. 
Derived Intentionality 
What might be needed is an ability to abstract behavioural relevance from an infinite set of 
possibilities (e.g. from instances of pellets to flies or oranges to cricket balls...). Thus an 
abstraction of behavioural relevance for a frogs bug detector might simply be an object's 
size (which is of course shared by many objects such as small black dots, bugs, flies, 
pellets, raisons and so on)'. Similarly an abstraction of behavioural relevance for a micro-
affordance might also simply be an objects' size (such as a small size for a precision grip, 
or a large size for a power grip), or its orientation, texture, location etc. Chapter 2 explores 
this issue of abstraction when it discusses various 'higher-order' approaches to perception, 
action and cognition that deal with a level of coding that is abstract (but crucially, not 
arbitrary). 
hi this light it makes little sense to talk of a natural ftinction, such that a frog can be said to 
represent flies, but not pellets. What the ftinction of a representation is depends on a 
history of interactions with the world and the context of a current behavioural activity. 
Dennett's (1995, p.408) views on intentionality are in agreement, "Meaning, like function, on 
which it so directly depends, is not something determinate at birth. It arises not by saltation or 
special creation, but by a (typically gradual) shift of circumstances". Thus over time 
sensorimotor associations serve the ftmction of representing objects (flies, pellets, oranges, 
apples or balls), and this ftinction is meaningfiil in the sense that it is effective in guiding 
' For this reason a frog will starve itself to death flicking its tongue out at small moving black dots in a 
laboratory. 
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actions in a particular environmental niche. Thus, as Tucker and Ellis (2000) suggest, 
during development, associations 'come' to represent visual objects. 
Intentionality is 'derived' rather than 'original', and viewing intentionality in this light 
provides a tangible basis for 'grounding' representations to their referents. Connectionism 
has typically failed to do this. Smolensky's (1988) classic paper, 'On the proper treatment 
of connectionism' made what Lakoff (1988) considered to be a huge omission- the body. 
Smolensky had failed to acknowledge that the neural networks in the brain connect to the 
sensorimotor system, thus falling victim to the 'symbol-grounding problem' (e.g. Hamad, 
1990). Rather than seeking intentionality or meaning in the optic array (e.g. Gibson, 1979), 
or in an action-neutral brain (e.g. Smolensky, 1988), or on Twin Earth (e.g. Putnam, 1975), 
intentionality is sought in agent-environment interactions. 
1.3.4 Summary of representations 
The major objections to representationalism held by several approaches to cognition (e.g. 
dynamical, ecological, artificial life, real worid robotics) appear to target detailed, fully 
specified representations that are exemplified by Classical symbolism. However, a range of 
alternative representations (personalised, multiple, partial, minimal, or action-oriented) 
appears to withstand much of this criticism. Action-oriented representations are 
particularly appealing because they ground themselves to their referents in the world 
through action. 
When representations are suitably defined, Genghis, an intriguing case study against 
representations, actually appears to be representational af^ er all. Regardless of whether this 
is accepted, it has been argued that Genghis is merely an artificial 'Darwinian Creature', 
and as such does not pass as a sufficient model for human cognition. This does not 
however, close the door for more sophisticated automata that might be built using the 
principles of subsumption architecture (e.g. MetaToto). 
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Suitably defined representations satisfy three necessary and sufficient conditions: 
1. Content that is complex (a representation must be part of a system of 
representations). 
2. Content that is accessible (content 'bearing', rather than content Maden' 
information is produced, and can be passed to a consuming device such as the 
motor system). 
3. Content that has a fimction (rather than specific or optimal, this function need only 
be viable within the context of a history of interactions and a currently exercised 
behavioural activity. This function can be legitimately sought through semantic-
level investigations). This view is developed further in Chapter 2. 
When these three conditions are met, representations can complement embodied 
approaches to cognition, which appeal to the temporality of cognition through a history of 
lived interactions between an embodied agent and its environment. It should however be 
noted that any number of other definitions could be generated that might not accept that 
Genghis, or humans for that matter, use representations. Thus a sensible position held by 
Clark (1997) is to acknowledge that talk of representations is an explanatory *gloss', albeit 
a useful and perhaps essential one. 
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2.1 Introduction 
That, perception, cognition and action are often studied in isolation (and, as Chapter 1 
noted: linked via separate stages of information processing) is symptomatic of an 
underlying tendency in cognitive science to treat different faculties of the brain as 
legitimate isolated units of study. Grand (2000, p. 142, 143) referred to attempts to 
separately solve individual aspects of intelligence and then somehow slot them together as 
the 'outside-in approach\ He concluded that, 
*\..an elephant has skin like parchment, a trunk like a serpent and makes a 
noise like a foghorn, but wrapping a cobra round a lighthouse containing the 
Magna Carta does not give you an elephant...As usual, reductionism rules, and 
nobody can see the wood for all the trees". 
This chapter concentrates on the wood rather than the trees by discussing a variety of 
approaches that seek some principled rather than piecemeal way of explaining how the 
brain might engage in perceiving, acting and thinking. As a general observation, when the 
wood is sought, the perception-aclion-cognition story that emerges closely resembles the 
loop described in Chapter I , and there is no recourse to linear stage information 
processing. What is more, fully specified internal representations do not feature, and any 
talk of representations is necessarily of the action-oriented kind. Following discussions of 
scparablc-but-iinked views (section 2.2). through to various unitar\ approaches of 
perception, action and cognition, (sections 2.3 and 2.4), it is argued in section 2.5 that the 
APH can be seen as compatible with all the various approaches discussed. Attention, 
however, is drawn to the ambiguity that surrounds the sources of data that are thought to 
support the APH. 
2.2 Separable-but-linked perception-action perspectives 
2.2.1 Interacting senses 
Rather than sensory modalities functioning in a perceptual vacuum (as seems to be 
implicitly assumed by theories of 'pure vision'), the insights gained from cross-modal 
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investigations appear to favour integrative (or at least interactive) perceptual mechanisms 
(see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Some examples of cross-modal interactions 
Authors Cross-modal 
influence of.. 
On Type of evidence 
McGurk & 
MacDonald(l976) 
Finney, Fine & 
Dobkins (2001) 
Doyle & Walker, 
(2002) 
Kennett, Taylor-
Clarke & Haggard 
(2001) 
Taylor-Clarke, 
Kennett & Haggard 
(2002) 
McDonald, Teder-
Salejarvi & Hillyard, 
(2000) 
Eimer & Schroger, 
(1998) 
Elmer & Driver, 
(2000) 
Eimer, van Velzen & 
Driver (2002) 
Vision 
Vision 
Vision, audition 
and touch 
Vision 
Vision 
Vision and 
audition 
Vision and 
audition 
Vision and 
touch 
Vision, audition 
and touch 
Auditory 
perception 
Activity of auditory 
cortex in the deaf 
Saccade target 
selection 
Spatial resolution 
of touch 
Spatial resolution 
of touch 
Cross-modal spatial 
attention 
Subjective report (phoneme 
identity) 
Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging 
Behavioural (saccade 
trajectories) 
Subjective report (tactile 
two-point discrimination 
thresholds) 
Somatosensory event 
related potentials ( E K P s ) 
Psychophysical 
Cross-modal spatial . . . , . „ „ „ 
^ Visua and auditory E R P s 
attention ^ 
Cross-modal spatial Visual and somatosensory 
attention E R P s 
Cross-modal spatial Visual, auditory and 
attention somatosensory E R P s 
The nature of these mechanisms is as yet unclear. Whether or not a particular modality is 
relevant to the task appears to be important. For example, when touch was task-relevant, 
modulation of activity in the somatosensory cortex by non- (tactile) informative vision was 
increased (Taylor-Clarke, Kennett & Haggard, 2002), whereas when tactile stimuli were 
task-irrelevant, touch was decoupleable (i.e. no modulation of somatosensory activity) 
from attentional orienting within the visual and auditory modalities (Eimer & Driver, 
2000). Cases like these appear to suggest what Eimer, van Helzen & Driver (2002) refer to 
as the 'separable-but-linked' view, where perceptual processing (e.g. spatial selection) 
primarily arises from the task relevant modality and then spreads to others. 
55 
Chapter 2- Seeing the wood 
On the other hand, the similarity between patterns of ERP modulations in different 
modalities (touch, audition and vision) for shifts of spatial attention (Eimer, van Helzen & 
Driver, 2002); together with evidence that some modalities (i.e. vision) cannot apparently 
be decoupled from attentional orienting within other modalities (i.e. audition and touch, 
Eimer & Schroger, 1998) suggest a role for supramodal perceptual mechanisms, hideed, 
from a radical ecological viewpoint, Stoffregen (2000) and Stoffregen & Bardy (2001) 
propose that there are not separate senses at all, but a single perceptual system that directly 
perceives information that is fully specified in a 'global array' {ibid. p. 206, "spatiotemporal 
structures that extend across multiple forms of ambient energy"). 
Regardless of whether sensory perception is best understood in terms of supramodal or 
'separable-but-linked' mechanisms, the overall impression from the studies reported above 
stresses perceptual interdependence rather than independence (i.e. no perceptual vacuum). 
Central to this interdependence are the intentions of the viewer that are influenced by task 
constraints (as was the case in the perception-action loop presented in Chapter 1, and as is 
the case in much of the remaining discussion). 
2.2.2 Interacting visual systems 
As with links in cross-modaJ perception, both unitary and 'separable-but-linked' 
mechanisms have been implicated in sensorimotor perception. In the visual domain, rather 
than a unitary perception-action visual system, the consensus of opinion favours a range of 
neuropsychological, neurophysiological and psychophysical evidence that suggests a 
'separable-but-linked' relationship between vision-for-perception and vision-for-aclion via 
two broadly separate visual systems (see Creem and Proffitt, 2001a for a recent review). 
The key characteristics of the two visual systems (ventral and dorsal) are summarised in 
Table 2.2. While a direct route to action is catered for by visuomotor perception in the 
dorsal stream ('separable-but-linked'), it is notable that 'conscious' visual perception is 
not an entirely separate endeavour, but can inform and be informed by the simultaneous 
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activities of the dorsal system ('separable-but-linked'). So much so in fact, that it can 
make sense to talk of the two systems functionally in terms of 'semantic' and 'pragmatic' 
systems, which are not devoted respecters of the anatomical separations of the more widely 
accepted 'what' and 'how' systems (e.g. Jeannerod, 1999). 
Table 2.2 Key characteristics of the two visual systems 
Characteristics Ventral system Dorsal system 
Anatomical 
Physiological 
Temporal^ 
Frames of 
reference' 
From primary visual cortex, terminating From primary visual cortex, termmating in 
in inferior temporal cortex posterial parietal cortex 
Includes units that selectively process 
invariant aspects of even complex 
objects (e.g. faces^ rather than elements) 
Key point is end-stage recognition 
Subjective report of stimulus change is 
slow, hence lasting representations. 
Units have stronger world-referenced 
modulation 
Includes object and motor-type units that 
selectively respond to spatial or shape 
elements relevant for visually controlled 
actions^ Key point is visuomotor nature 
Movement correction to stimulus change is 
immediate, hence online transformations 
Units have stronger body-referenced 
modulation 
a) Velocity information is only perceived a) Velocity information is used for action in 
after 2 months^  
Developmental 
b) Newborns cannot perceptually 
distinguish (no dishabituation) different 
directions of motion' 
newborns 
b) Newborns can crudely direct arm 
movements to a moving toy'° 
c) 6-month-olds fail to extrapolate object c) 6-month-olds predict linear object motion 
motion in preferential looking tasks" when reaching'^ 
Functional 
Damage to system impairs visual 
awareness (object discrimination and 
recognition) but not visually guided 
actions". Key point- vision for 
perception, hence *What* system'- interpretation' 
Damage to system impairs visually guided 
actions but not visual awareness . Key 
point- vision for action, hence 'How' 
system'** preferred over earlier *Where' 
1) Ungerleiger & Mishkin, 1982; 2) Perrelt, Mistlin & Chitty, 1987; 3) Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda 
& Sakata, 2000; 4) Castiello & Jeannerod, 1991; 5) Snyder, Grieve, Brolchie & Andersen, 1998; 6) As 
reviewed by van der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2000; 7) Wattam-Bell, 1990; 8) Jouen, l^pecq, Gapenne and 
Berthenthal, 2000; 9) Wattam-Bell, 1996; 10) Von Hoftten, 1982; 11) Speike, Katze, Purcell, Ehriich & 
Breinlinger, 1994; 12) Von Hofsten» Vishton, Speike, Feng & Roseander, 1998; 13) Goodale , Milner, 
Jacobson & Carey, 1991; l4)Jakobson, Archibald, Carey & Goodale 1991; 15) Goodale & Milner. 1992 
Separab/e-but-linked visual systems 
The most compelling evidence of two quasi-independent systems comes from a double 
dissociation of functional capabilities in patients with small lesions to either system (see 
"Functional" row in Table 2.2 above). However, it should be emphasised that the two 
systems share many connections, and cross talk between the two systems is extensive in an 
intact visual system (Milner and GoodaJe, 1995). This is especially so when semantic 
processing of an object is required (e.g. Humphreys, 2001; Creem and Proffitt, 2001a). 
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Despite this, by employing techniques that involve 'tricking' the visual system, it is 
possible to sever links between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action in visually 
intact participants. 
To these ends, early studies on induced motion (e.g. Bridgeman, Kirch and Sperling, 1981) 
presented a fixed target and a background frame that was displaced to the left or right. The 
visual experience was of 'stroboscopic induced motion', whereby the fixed target appeared 
to jump in the opposite direction to the background fi^ime. When target and fi-ame 
disappeared and participants pointed to the Mast' target position, points were unaffected by 
the consciously experienced target jump (that is, points were accurately made to the 
veridical target position). Furthermore, when participants had no conscious experience of 
motion (they adjusted the real motion of a target into phase with the background), they 
nevertheless pointed in accord with the veridical last position of the target. 
A range of studies using visual illusions report a similar phenomenon, where typically 
parameters of an action such as grasping (e.g. Haffenden and Goodale, 2000; Jackson and 
Shaw, 2000; Servos, Camahan and Fedwick, 2000) and hand transport (e.g. Fischer, 2001) 
remain unaffected by the perceived visual illusion (e.g. a line appears to be longer than is 
veridical, or a disc appeared to have a larger diameter than is veridical). 
Separable-but-/Med visual systems 
Some researchers however (e.g. Franz, Gegenfurtner, Biilthoff and Fahle, 2000; Haffenden 
and Goodale, 1998) have raised methodological doubts about certain illusory studies 
(notably a benchmark study by Aglioti, DeSouza and Goodale, 1995). Others have 
demonstrated that certain illusion induced differences between perception and action 
actually reflect two experimental conditions rather than two visual systems (Mon-Williams 
and Bull, 2000). 
Indeed, it has been shown that with careful experimentation visual illusions can influence 
various parameters of action such as grasping (Daprati and Gentilucci, 1997; Franz et al. 
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2000; Vishton, Rea, Cutting and Nunez, 1999; Brenner and Smeets, 1996; HafFenden and 
Goodale, 1998; Pavani, Boscagli, Benvenuti, Rabuffetti and Fame, 1999, HafFenden and 
Goodale, 2000), reaching (Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani and Gangitano, 2001), movement 
times (Westwood, Dubrowskl, Camahan and Roy, 2000) pointing (van Donkelaar, 1999) 
and grip force (Jackson and Shaw, 2000). Although these illusory effects on action occur, 
the influence generally appears to be less pronounced than illusory effects on perception 
(although see Vishton et al. 1999). 
Two recent studies by Sowden and Bruyn, (2001) and Sowden, Bruyn, Myers (2002) have 
avoided the controversy of illusory studies by using a change blindness paradigm. Rather 
than visual illusions that make two objects that are veridically identical lengths appear 
different (e.g. the Muller Lyer illusion), here two objects that actually are different lengths 
do not appear different owing to change blindness (until, that is, the change is finally 
detected). In Sowden and Bruyn's (2001) study, participants made open-loop reach-to-
grasp movements to a bar stimulus presented on a monitor. Using a 'flicker' paradigm (a 
global screen flicker occurs as the second image replaces the first, thus masking the 
change), bars were presented in sequential pairs that could change in length by 1 cm. On 
trials before the change was detected, grip aperture was consistent. Once the change was 
detected (verbal report), the average modulation of grip aperture was 1.1 cm greater than 
before the change was detected. Sowden, Bruyn, Myers (2002) repeated the study with real 
three-dimensional bars, whereby participants reached for bars presented sequentially, using 
a rotating turntable. A blank display screen that separated the pairs of bars induced change 
blindness. A similar pattern of results was found. Thus action was only affected once a 
change had been consciously detected. 
Overall, studies such as these do not support a simple dichotomy of function (vision-for-
action and vision-for-perception) but rather suggest the functional interaction of ventral 
and dorsal streams. 
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2.3 Unitary perception-action perspectives (non-representational) 
When cognition, perception and action are seen as emergent properties of multiple layers of 
interacting feedback loops (in which intention, attention and values all contribute), the 
*outside-in approach' reveals itself to be oversimplistic and perhaps fundamentally 
misguiding. While careful experimental manipulations, developmental milestones or specific 
damage-induced brain defecits can reveal a severence of links between senses or between 
perception and action, there is nevertheless a danger of overlooking emergent global 
phenomena. Ilie approaches discussed below have all opted for a holistic approach to 
studying the dynamic contingencies between brain, body and world. The general perspective 
of embodied cognition (see Chapter 1) underlies all of these approaches, and while there arc 
undoubtedly differences of emphasis, all commit to explaining a unified brain-body system 
comprising of various sensory modalities and their respective sensorimotor systems. 
The purpose of this section is not to review in any detail the evidence associated with the 
unitary approaches discussed, but rather to communicate the ideas involved, and in 
particular, point out the underlying similarities between these superficially different 
approaches. The first, and perhaps most elegant theory to be discussed, comes from 
O'Regan and Noe (2001). 
2.3.1 Sensorimotor contingencies 
O'Regan and Noe (2001) are not surprised that two relatively independent visual systems 
might subserve different capacities because they view vision as an activity that depends 
upon a broad range of relatively independent capacities (e.g. bodily movement and 
guidance, speech, rational thought). O'Regan and Noe (2001) outline a sensorimotor 
theory of vision and visual consciousness, the underlying principles of which apply to all 
sensory modalities. They argue that experience within any modality exists only within the 
context of an acting organism and all of its available senses. Any experience associated 
with a particular modality (vision, audition, touch etc) wil l have its own specificities 
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(owing to the nature of its particular sensors and sensorimotor contingencies), yet there 
will be interactions between these senses by virtue of systematic correlations and some 
common *sensorimotor contingencies' (i.e. sensory changes produced by various motor 
actions and vice versa). 
Talk of distinct yet interacting senses might suggest that this is a 'separable-but-linked' 
account of vision. However, O'Regan and Noe (2001) do not appeal to sensory-modality-
specific essences, mechanisms, nerve energies or pathways- what matters when 
distinguishing between the senses is the different things that we do when see or hear or 
touch etc. A sensory experience (whether visual or auditory etc) is constituted by its mode 
of environmental exploration. From this perspective, the principles or laws of sensorimotor 
contingency unify the sensory modalities that underlie perception and action. 
Sensorimotor contingencies in the context of behavioural activity 
As with interactive approaches to vision discussed in Chapter 1, vision can be 
appropriately described as an exploratory activity. O'Regan & Noe (2001) emphasise the 
exploratory activity of vision and consequently place the burden of explanation on the 
activity itself, not on the internal representing of the world. Two studies reviewed by 
Jarvilehto (1998a) shed some light on the importance of considering an entire behavioural 
activity (see Box 2.1). 
It is generally accepted that visual perception can be modified by top-down influences. The 
rabbit-duck illustration routinely reproduced in Visual Perception textbooks is testament to 
this. The two studies reported in Box 2.1 suggest that more than mere perceptual 
modulation, efferent connections can influence the sensory organs themselves. What 
appears to be important is not some passive sensory transmission of environmental 
information, but how the system behaves as a whole within a behavioural activity (see later 
for similar arguments). 
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Box 2.1 An illustration of the importance a behavioural activity has for sensation 
Astrand, Hamalainen, Alexandrov and Jarvilehto (1986) studied the responses of cutaneous 
peripheral neural units (i.e. skin cells) while human subjects performed different tasks. 
Recorded via microelectrodes from the radial nerve at the wrist level, the responses of single 
mechanoreceptive units were found to change with the task given. When subjects attended to 
varying intensities of tactile pulses (that were applied to the receptive field of a single unit), 
certain response characteristics were found. The response characteristics of the very same 
unit changed when the task involved counting deviant tones in an auditory task- even though 
identical tactile pulses were applied. Jarvilehto (1998 a) raised the possibility that these 
dynamic changes might reflect a general sensitisation of receptors while attending to 
different types of stimuli. 
However, a study by Alcxandrov, Grichcnko, Shvyrkov, Jarvilehto and Soininen (1986) 
suggests otherwise. Such changes appear to come about from the activity itself, that is, the 
whole behavioural situation. Thus in a food-acquisition task, when receptor level activity (of 
units located in the optic nerve prior to entering the lateral geniculate body) was recorded in 
a rabbit, the activity of the units covaried with certain phases of the rabbit's behaviour (e.g. 
activation covaried with the rabbit's approach to a food-release pedal or an automatic 
feeder). This covarying activation was reproduced when the trained rabbit performed the task 
with non-transparent cups that prevented the use of visual information. These effects were 
therefore not due to visual stimulation or visual attention. Furthermore the unit discharges 
were shown to reflect the activity of ganglion cells (and not of efferent fibres). The key point 
of these two studies is this- an important factor that influences sensation is the behavioural 
activity that the perceiver-actor is currently involved in. As was argued in Chapter 1, 
perception is not a passive process, but an activity. It would appear that the same applies to 
sensation itself*. 
Laws of sensorimotor contingency that govern visual exploration 
Bearing in mind the importance of a currently exercised behavioural activity, we can turn 
to O^Regan & Noe^s (2001, p.4) central claim: 
Vision is a mode of exploration of the world that is mediated by knowledge, on 
the part of the perceiver, of what we call sensorimotor contingencies". 
According to the theory, there are two sets of laws that distinguish visual percepts from 
perception in other modalities. 
* Jarvilehto (1998 a, b, c, 1999, 2000) argues that receptors do not code environmental information and 
transmit it to the nervous system, but are instead connections that support dynamic organism-environment 
systems. Clark's (1998) response to Jarvilehto (1998 a) is more liberal- sometimes (but not always) the 
senses engage in selective and minimal information transmission- not such that it is necessarily used to create 
a rich inner model of the environment, but the senses nevertheless support transmission. 
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1. Visual Apparatus: Visual exploration obeys certain laws of sensorimotor contingency 
that are determined by the visual apparatus itself (e.g. eye movements distort and 
shift retinal stimulation; eye blinks produce uniform retinal stimulation; forward or 
backward body movement produces an expanding or contracting flow pattern on the 
retina; sampling density varies from peripheral to central vision). These 
contingencies are unlike other senses, such as audition, which is affected by head 
movements for example, but not by eye blinks. Thus certain laws of sensorimotor 
contingency are specific to the visual apparatus, and these are in part responsible for 
the visual experience. 
2. Visual attributes: Visual exploration obeys certain laws of sensorimotor 
contingency that are determined by the visual mode of sampling three-dimensional 
objects, and this mode reveals the visual attributes of objects (e.g. the retinal image 
only provides a view in front of an object, whereas moving around an object makes 
part of it appear and disappear; the size of an object's retinal projection depends on 
distance; an object's colour or brightness changes lawfully as the object, the light 
source or the observer move; surfaces of objects undergo perspective changes when 
they are shifted or tilted, or when we move in relation to them; there are laws of 
sensorimotor invariance associated with the properties of lines, curves and comers, 
such that they are neural-code independent^). These contingencies are unlike other 
senses, for example touch, which does not have a 'point of view' and does not 
change with lighting conditions. Thus certain laws of sensorimotor contingency are 
specific to the visual mode of exploration that reveals visual attributes of three-
dimensional objects, and it is these contingencies that are in part responsible for the 
visual experience. 
In addition to satisfying the condition of an animal exploring its environment in a way that 
is governed by the two main sets of sensorimotor contingencies (1 and 2 above), O'Regan 
& Noe (2001) suggest that vision must also satisfy the condition of being 'tuned to' these 
laws of sensorimotor contingency. Unlike the Gibsonian 'attunement' or 'resonance', 
being 'tuned to' these laws simply means that the animal must be actively exercising its 
mastery over them. In this sense these are not given laws, but laws that must be mastered 
through doing. Through currently exercising a mastery of these laws, one is said to have a 
' For example, moving the eyes along a straight line will stimulate the same photoreceptors at all points along 
the line (lines are 'self-similar under translation along their length*). This law of sensorimotor invariance is 
an intrinsic property of lines, and is therefore independent of any code used to represent them. 
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practical knowledge of them'**. For example, because our brains are 'tuned' to certain 
potentialities, when seeing a bottle, we have knowledge (in our nervous systems) that if our 
eyes are moved upwards towards the neck of the bottle or dovmwards towards its base, 
sensory stimulation will change in a lawful and predictable manner. Similarly we have 
knowledge that rotating particular objects will make parts appear and disappear (e.g. the 
handle of a pitcher might disappear as the pitcher is rotated). O'Regan and Noe, 2001, p.7, 
write, 
"... the visual quality of shape is precisely the set of all potential distortions that 
shape undergoes when it is moved relative to us, or when we move relative to it. 
Although this is an infinite set, the brain can abstract from this a series of laws, 
and it is this set of laws which codes shape". 
That knowledge of these laws comes about through currently exercising a mastery over 
them is demonstrated by studies where participants wear inverting glasses. O'Regan & 
Noe (2001) review several such studies, where glasses invert the retinal image such that 
the world appears upside-down and/or left-right inverted. They claim that the observer's 
brain registers the fact that the normal laws of visually determined sensorimotor 
contingencies are not being obeyed, and consequently the observer has the impression that 
something is wrong (a weaker sense of this will be familiar to anyone who has worn a new 
pair of glasses with a different prescription). The brain must adapt in order to establish a 
mastery over a new set of laws appropriate to the new visual world. Indeed, this is what 
happens, and after initial incapacitation, wearers of inverted glasses gradually become able 
to move around effectively such that after about two weeks the visual world appears 
'normal' again (a similar process of adaptation occurs when the glasses are removed). 
Interestingly, the process of adaptation is fragmented and task and context specific. For 
example, O'Regan & Noe (2001) review Kohler's (1951) study, in which visual context 
dramatically affects the visual appearance of objects. A candle that appears upside down 
suddenly flips when lit (because flames must go upwards); a coffee cup that appears upside 
Indeed, a substantial claim of the theory is that visual awareness arises when a currently exercised mastery 
of these laws is integrated with separate capacities for thought and planning. 
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down suddenly flips when coffee is poured into it (because coffee must pour downwards); 
and an observer standing on the sidewalk correctly sees vehicles driving on the right (and 
hears them approaching from the correct direction), yet still reports that the number plates 
appear in mirror writing. This last observation is telling, and as O'Regan & Noe (2001, p. 
26) explain, 
"reading alphabetic characters involves a subspecies of behaviour connected 
with reading. Judging laterality involves another, independent, subspecies of 
behaviour, namely reaching. An observer adapting to an inverted world will in 
the course of adaptation only be able to progressively probe subsets of the 
sensorimotor contingencies that characterize his or her new visual world, and so 
inconsistencies and contradictions may easily arise between 'islands' of visuo-
molor behaviour". 
This interpretation fits well with their explanation of the two visual systems discussed 
earlier, and is also compatible with the principles behind Brooks' specialised capability 
producing layers that £U^ present in the subsumption architecture of his robots. 
Laws of sensorimotor contingency and representation 
For the laws of sensorimotor contingency, the brain can 'anticipate' possibilities for action 
(e.g. affordances), through being 'tuned' to certain potentialities (one has a latent and not 
activated practical knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies). These potentialities remain 
latent'' until a potentiality-contingent activity is currently being exercised. For example, 
O'Regan and Noe suggest that there are stored programs of movement that will only be 
activated when appropriate laws of sensorimotor contingency are currently being 
exercised. In other words, the active visual percepts/codes associated with a currently seen 
light switch have the potential to interact with the contingencies associated with aspects of 
the light switch's tactile attributes. These might be tactile location relative to the perceiver-
actor, tactile shape, tactile size and tactile texture. 
" A quote from Ryle (1949/1990, as quoted by O'Regan and NOe, 2001, p. 13), concerning a person 
contemplating a thimble, helps to explain what is meant by this latent practical knowledge, "Knowing how 
thimbles look, he is ready to anticipate, though he need not actually anticipate, how it will look, if he 
approaches it, or moves away from it; and when, without having executed any such anticipations, he does 
approach it, or move away from it, it looks as he was prepared for it to look. When the actual glimpses of it 
that he gets are got according to the thimble recipe, they satisfy his acquired expectation-propensities; and 
this is his espysing the thimble." 
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This readiness to anticipate without actually anticipating may explain why O'Regan and 
Noe claim their account is not representational. A latent practical knowledge of 
sensorimotor contingencies does not represent anything precisely because it is latent. When 
this practical knowledge is actualised through doing, there is similarly no need say it 
represents anything, because whatever might be 'represented' it aheady being done. 
The necessity for knowledge of the laws of sensorimotor contingency that comes about 
through a currently exercised mastery over them is also central to the Enactive Approach 
(which, incidentally, O'Regan & Noe, 2001 credit as an inspiration for their own theory). 
As is suggested by inverted glasses studies, a world is not simply re-presented as given, but 
in the words of the Enactive Approach, must be 'enacted' or 'brought forth'. Similarly, 
knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies comes about through doing and vice-versa, 
hence Maturana & Varela's (1987, p. 27) profound claim that "All doing is knowing and 
all knowing is doing". 
2.3.2 The Enactive Approach 
Meaning that is meaningless without the context of a history of lived interactions between 
an agent and its environmental niche (see discussion of derived intentionality in Chapter 1) 
is implicit in Varela, Thompson and Rosch's (1991) 'Enactive Approach'. Their approach 
explicitly rejects representations, arguing instead that the world and the perceiver come to 
mutually specify each other over time. Cognition does not recover (an objectivist view) or 
project (a solipsist view) a world, but 'enacts', or 'brings forth a world' through a history 
of structural couplings. 
Core ideas of the Enactive Approach 
The history of structural changes that unfolds in a living being (thus changing its initial 
structure) comes about from its interactions with the environment. These interactions can 
be explained in terms of perturbations of the environment that trigger (rather than 
determine, select, instruct or specify) changes in the living being that are actually 
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determined by the structure of the living being. The same applies to the environment (or 
indeed any system); perturbations of the living being trigger changes in the environment 
that are actually determined by the structure of the environment. 
A living being and its environment are seen as two operationally distinct unities'^ (c.f. the 
operational closure of the perception-action loop described the Introduction). There is 
however, a necessary structural congruence between them that arises from a history of 
recurrent interactions (during which they both undergo a history of structural changes). 
The initial structure of a living being conditions the course of its interactions with the 
environment and also constrains the possible changes to its structure that the environment 
may trigger in it (again, this is implicit in the perception-action loop). 
There are four domains or classes of structural change: changes of state (all changes a 
unity can undergo without changing its organisation); destructive changes (all changes a 
unity can undergo with a loss of organisation); perturbations (all interactions that trigger 
changes of state); and destructive interactions (all those perturbations that trigger a 
destructive change). For example, Maturana & Varela (1987) consider an instance of a 
destructive interaction between a person and a bullet. The perturbation of the bullet triggers 
in the person a destructive change (the loss of organisation resulting in death) that is 
determined by the person's structure. For a vampire however, the bullet merely triggers 
non-fatal changes in state that are determined by its structure. An encounter with a wooden 
stake through the heart however, would be a destructive interaction for the vampire. 
This ongoing process of mutual sources of perturbations triggering (but not determining) 
changes of structure is called 'structural coupling'*^, and 'enaction' describes this process 
of'bringing forth of a world' through its history of structural couplings. 
An alternative view by Jflrvilehto (1994,1998 a, b and c) proposes that there is a single organism-
environment unity. Organism and environment are functionally inseparable and there is no transfer process 
from the environment into the organism because there are not two systems to transfer between. 
Structural couplings are conceptually similar to 0*Regan and N5e*s sensorimotor contingencies. The 
second set of laws (that are related to visual attributes of the objects) could be said to trigger changes in 
structure that are determined by the first set of laws (that are related to the visual apparatus itself)-
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Varela and colleagues offer many insightful examples of enactive cognition that essentially 
reflect the process of structural coupling (including Genghis). However, they use colour 
vision as the case study of enactive cognition (in particular, see Thompson, Palacios and 
Varela, 1992). Perturbations of light are said to merely trigger states of neuronal activity 
that are determined by a person's individual structure and not by features of the 
perturbations. Consequently, our naming of colours correlate with states of neuronal 
activity, but not with the wavelengths of perturbations of light. Colours, they argue, are 
neither 'out there' in the world independent of perceptual and cognitive capacities, and nor 
are they 'in here' independent of our biology and culture. 
This fits well with the views of Brooks & Stein, (1993), who invite us to consider a neuron 
that fires (or a particular wire that carries a positive voltage) when something red is seen. 
The neuron or wire could easily be misunderstood as 'representing' the presence of 
something red to the agent, but for the agent (i.e. its experience) the neuron or wire 
actually is the presence of something red. In the language of the enactive approach, the 
colour red is enacted - it does not exist independently "out there" and so cannot be re-
presented "in here". Maturana & Varela (1987) extend this notion to all dimensions of the 
visual experience (movement, texture, form etc.) and to all perceptual modalities. 
The Enactive Approach and Evolutionary Theory 
A major objection the Enactive Approach has to representationalism is its assumption that 
representations recover a 'pregiven' world. Varela et. al (1991) (and previously, Maturana 
& Varela, 1987) parallel their approach with increasingly popular views of "natural drift" 
in evolutionary theory; views that challenge the adaptationist emphasis on optimisation in 
"natural selection" that is so central to neo-Darwinist views. In short, adaptationists view 
evolution as a process by which organisms progressively adapt to a pregiven worid, 
optimising their use of it through the mechanism of natural selection. 
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Varela et.al (1991) favour alternative 'natural drift' accounts whereby evolution is seen as 
a process of structural drift that undergoes phylogenic selection. There is no optimisation 
of the use of a pregiven environment, only the conservation of adaptation and autopoiesis. 
Autopoiesis is another central theme of Maturana & Varela (1987) that describes the 
process of self-making (i.e. persisting as an autonomous being). Of more relevance for 
present purposes however, is the notion that the adaptation of a living being to its 
environment is a necessary consequence of its structural coupling with that environment. 
Organism and enviroimient remain in a continuous structural coupling (the drift occurring 
in both unities such that there is 'mutual specification' or 'codetermination'). Varela et.al 
(1991) suggest that this mutual specification is particularly evident in apparent cases of 
coevolution such as the ultraviolet reflectance of flowers coevolving with the ultraviolet 
sensitive trichromatic vision of bees. Consequently the evolutionary process is seen as 
proscriptive not prescriptive, and natural drift describes the taking of suboptimal rather 
than optimal solutions. The human visual system for example, appears to have taken a 
suboptimal solution to vision, in that it is wired up back to front. These solutions are 
nevertheless satisfactory, as they allow the organism to maintain its integrity to persist. In 
this way selection is seen as a "broad survival filter" (Varela et. al, 1991, p. 196). 
Enaction and representation 
The Enactive Approach appears to offer a more holistic understanding of cognitive 
processes than most representationalist accounts. The rejection of representations, 
however, appears to be based on dated notions of representation. Consequently, it can be 
argued that the 'bringing forth of a worid' is not necessarily incompatible with refined 
notions of representation (see Chapter 1). The idea of structural coupling is intuitive, yet it 
does not appear to exclude subsymbolic connectionist representations. Even the simplest 
forms of connectionism, for example content addressable memory, appear to undergo a 
form of structural coupling. An 'environmental' input (e.g. a couple of letters), merely 
triggers changes in state. It is the initial structure of the network that determines what these 
69 
Chapter 2- Seeing the wood 
changes will be. The settled state of the network (e.g. a word), if it is not then reset to 
default values, will constrain the course of structural changes that a consequent input may 
trigger. Furthermore, there is no reason in principle (or indeed practice) why an 
appropriately organised ANN should not connect its output layer to its input layer, thus 
(perhaps more legitimately) constraining the course of ftiture structural changes. This first-
order structural coupling, it seems, is not at odds with a representational stance. 
What of second-order structural couplings, whereby animal and environment mutually 
specify each other? Clark (1997) dismissed the Enactive Approach on the basis of the 
problematic idea that objects are not independent of mind. The Enactive Approach need 
not be interpreted as saying this however. It does not appear to say that objects do not exist 
independently of mind, just that properties of objects are not independent of mind (in the 
same sense that a Gibsonian affordance of an object can only be considered relative to the 
perceiving animal). Indeed, Varela et. al (1991) endorse the theory of affordances, but not 
the 'pregiven' nature of information in the optic array. As Varela et. al (1991, p.l67) 
explain, 
" ...how are we to specify what counts as a surface? How are we to specify its 
edges, boundaries, texture, and orientation, if not in relation to some perceiver 
for whom these distinctions are relevant?" 
In this sense, information does not come 'ready-made' in the world, but is 'enacted' in a 
world. This view does not challenge representationalism, for as we have seen in the 
Introduction, action-oriented representations embrace this very idea. Furthermore, as was 
argued in Chapter 1, a sensible treatment of intentionality (when applied to 
representational functions) rejects 'original intentionaJity' (some 'truth' about the world) 
and accepts a 'derived intentionality' that comes about from a history of interactions 
between an animal and /75 world. This is in keeping with the Enactive Approach's rejection 
of a 'pregiven world'. 
What is more, saying that animal and environment are two operationally distinct unities 
that are necessarily structurally coupled does not imply that objects do not exist 
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independently of mind. A simple example Maturana and Varela (1987, p.99) offer is the 
history of structural coupling between lineages of automobiles and cities, 
"...there are dramatic changes on both sides, which have taken place in each 
one as an expression of its own structural dynamics under selective interactions 
with the other." 
A car does not cease to exist if taken out of a city, yet aspects of its structure reflect the 
fact that it emerged from a city environment. It is however, unlikely that a car would exist 
if its lineage came from a desert village with wood as the only raw material, and it is 
unlikely that a city like Plymouth would exist as we know it (with its roads, car parks and 
penchant for roundabouts) if cars had not been invented. Similarly an object (e.g. a Granny 
Smith apple) would not cease to exist if all perceiving animals disappeared; yet aspects of 
its structure reflect the fact that it emerged from a particular environment (such as one 
inhabited by humans with pesticides). 
Second-order structural couplings seen in this way simply reflect the process by which, 
over the course of time (whether this is over an individual's or evolutionary timescale), the 
world shapes its animals, and animals shape their world. Representationalism can beneflt 
from this view by adopting 'natural drift' over 'natural selection' as its preferred 
mechanism for development. Rather than viewing organisms as progressively adapting to a 
pregiven world (optimising their use of it through natural selection), the adaptation of an 
organism can be seen as necessary consequence of a lived history of structural couplings. 
As Varela et. al (1991, p.205) explain, 
"If this coupling were to be optimal, the interactions of the system would have 
to be (more or less) prescribed. For coupling to be viable, however, the 
perceptually guided action of the system must simply facilitate the continuing 
integrity of the system (ontogeny) and/or its lineage (phylogeny)." 
By allov^ng this kind of 'viability function', the emphasis on optimal representations is 
removed and we can avoid the temptation of seeing the brain as encoding what Clark 
(1997) calls "frilly programmed specifications of development or action". 
Another unified theory of cognition that appeals to evolutionary theory comes from 
Edelman (1978, 1987, 1992). Although appealing to the mechanisms of natural and 
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somatic selection, Edelmzm's theory is actually a closely related effort to that of the 
Enactive Approach. 
2.3.3 The theory of neuronal group selection 
Edelman's 'theory of neuronal group selection'''* (TNGS) is again an embodied account of 
cognition. As with the knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies and the Enactive 
Approach, cognition comes about thanks to a history of interactions with the world. The 
world is not seen as 'pregiven', with objects or categories coming ready-made in the world 
(unlike, say, the Gibsonian 'information in the optic array'). Instead, the brain must 
selectively create objects and categories through a history of embodied experience ("The 
mind does not mirror nature", Edelman, 1992, p.234). Similarly, the brain is not 'pregiven' in 
that it is not hard-wired with pre-determined information-specific networks (although, of 
course, the genetic code ensures the gross architecture of the brain). 
As mentioned above, although Edelman's account depends on the mechanisms of selection 
(natural and somatic), it does not appear to be at odds with a 'natural drift account''^. 
Selection that is viable rather than optimising seems to fit Edelman's approach well, for he 
sees 'degenerative' neuronal groups as the basis for selective processes. Their functional 
degeneracy (whereby different neuronal groups provide different ways of doing the same 
thing more or less well) ensures that there is no 'optimal' solution to a particular function. 
Several different neuronal configurations for example can carry out the same function, and 
a single neuronal group can contribute to multiple functional relations. It is no surprise 
then, that Edelman (1992) also rejects cognitivism and representafionalism (adding them to 
Edelman's Neural Darwinism has not received overwhelming support, largely because many find it 
unreadable. Indeed, Edelman (1992) recounts Francis Crick's suggestion that it should be called 'neural 
Edelmanism'. There are however, accounts of cognition that are closer to Darwinism proper (e.g. Calvin, 
1996). 
Indeed, Varela et al (1991, p.200) argue that some selectionist theorists (and Edelman in particular) do lean 
towards a natural drift view of evolution. 
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'a graveyard of isms'), and claims that the brain does not process information'^ (again, as 
with the Enactive Approach, the brunt of this criticism is directed at the easy target of the 
'brain as computer' metaphor). Instead, the brain is seen as a selective rather than 
instructive system that is essentially a correlator (especially the cerebral cortex), adapting 
to the environment through a kind of 'neural Darwinism'. 
Core ideas of the TNGS 
Edelman proposes that stimuli (that result from the relationship between the environment 
itself and previous actions of the agent, such as head and body movements, saccades etc) 
select among (i.e. enhance or suppress the activation of) previously formed states of the 
nervous system. These states are described as degenerative neuronal groups (closely 
connected collections of cells), which contribute to more complex nervous system states 
such as maps, classification couples and global mappings (see below). Recognition and 
categorisation occur only as a result of this selection. In terms of the Enactive Approach, it 
could be argued that environmental stimuli trigger changes in the system (i.e. selection), that 
are actually determined by the current structure of the system (i.e. pre-existing neuronal 
groups). That these neuronal groups are pre-existing does not mean that they are 'pregiven' 
in the sense meant by the Enactive Approach. Particular neuronal groups do not necessarily 
come with a 'pregiven' fiinction, but compete for one. This is demonstrated by cases of 
neural plasticity*', such as the recruitment of the auditory cortex for visual processing 
reported earlier in Table 2.1. 
Three steps to ontogenic brain development 
Edehnan argues that there are three broadly independent steps in the development of a brain: 
Some commentators have argued that Edelman's theory does concern information-processing, and that 
Edelman bases his rejections on misunderstood, oversimplified and outdated accounts of information-
processing (e.g. Dennett, 1995, Johnson, 1992). As with representations, the debate has more to do with 
stereotypical prejudices and terminology than it has to do with underlying ideas. 
Edelman (1992) offers as an example the plasticity a monkey*s somatosensory cerebral cortex. When 
nerves mediating finger touch are severed, the map boundaries subserving touch rapidly change, which 
Edelman lakes to be the selection among groups competing within a map. 
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1. Selection of neuronal groups: A primary repertoire of neuronal groups arises 
epigenctically from several levels of somatic selective processes (e.g. various 
mechanical, chemical and molecular events that bring about cell divisions, 
connections and death). These processes are merely constrained (not determined) 
by the genetic code; hence no two individuals wi l l have identical wiring. 
2. Selection of degenerative functions: A secondary repertoire of neuronal groups 
arises from the selection of variant functional circuits. This essentially involves the 
selection of neuronal groups for degenerative functions through behavioural 
experience. Neuronal groups are the units of selection (no individual neuron is 
selected), and those groups that happen to fit a stimulus better than others respond 
more strongly and are selected by strengthening their synaptic connections (while 
others are weakened). The next time a similar stimulus is sensed, the selected 
groups wi l l respond to it more strongly than others. 
3. Selective formation and coordination of maps: Finally, a broader functional 
repertoire emerges from collections of neuronal groups that arc called maps or 
mappings. Edelman (1992) describes maps as follows: 
"maps relate points on the two-dimensional receptor sheets of the body (e.g. the 
skin or the retina of the eye) to corresponding points on the sheets making up 
the brain". 
For example, a frogs' visual system includes a map of visual space on the retina 
that is mapped in a definite way to particular regions of the frog's optic tectum, 
such that stimulation of a specific point on the retina will lead to the stimulation of 
neurons in a 'place dependent' region of the optic tectum. A iocal map' consists of 
several neuronal groups that are functionally related. When two local maps 
'reentrantly' connect (by massively parallel and reciprocal connections), they 
constitute what is called a 'classification couple'. When multiple local maps 
connect they form higher-order structures called 'global mappings'. 
Reentrant signals, classification couples, global mappings and values 
Reentry: Primary and secondary repertoires provide basic functionality, but for an organ 
that is as adaptive as the brain, new functions must be generated. In order to account for 
multifiinctional neuronal assemblies (rather than simple fixed-wire pathways that are 
sufficient for the robotic automaton Genghis, say), independent brain areas subserving 
different functions must be coordinated. Edelman invokes his principle of 'reentry''* for 
this purpose. Massively parallel and reciprocal connections between maps (maps formed 
by primary and secondary repertoires) allow for real time reentrant signalling. Neuronal 
'* Franklin (1995) suggests that Edelman's reentrant signalling is essentially equivalent to feedback in 
recurrent connectionist networks. 
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groups selected in a local map can select other groups in other local maps via these 
reentrant connections. Reentrant signalling and strengthening of connections therefore 
correlates and coordinates a variety of functions specific to local but distributed maps. 
Classification couples: A classification couple is a minimal unit of reentry, where two 
ftmctionally different maps are reentrantly connected. Each map independently receives 
signals from other maps or from the worid (e.g. one map might receive visual inputs, and 
the other map, tactile inputs), and real time reentrant signalling connects certain active 
areas of one map to certain active areas of the other map. Synapses v^thin groups in each 
map (and in their connections to reentrant fibres) are strengthened or weakened. 
Global mappings: When multiple maps are reentrantly connected they form 'global 
mappings' that yield the global fiinctions deemed necessary for adaptation and survival 
(e.g. categorization, memory and learning). Notably, these global mappings connect the 
selectional events of local maps to motor and sensory areas. Global mappings couple the 
outputs of multiple motor and sensory reentrant local maps, and they can interact with non-
mapped parts of the brain (e.g. specialised structures such as the hippocampus and the 
cerebellum that serve as value systems). Learning is said to result from the operation of 
neural linkages between global mappings and the brain's value centres. 
Value criteria: Values are crucial because they provide some constraints {not 
specifications) on what kinds of sensations or behaviours are appropriate for the animal. 
Edelman (1992) argues that the bases for value systems in animals are already set by 
evolutionary selection and are exhibited by those brain regions that regulate bodily 
functions (e.g. heartbeat, breathing, sexual responses, feeding responses, endocrine 
fiinctions, autonomic responses). For example, the behaviours of Darwin IE (Edelman's 
simulated autonomous agent that embodies the principles of TNGS) are constrained by 
value (e.g. light has more value than dark, light and stimulation have more value at the 
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centre of vision than at the periphery). In a similar fashion, values constrain the behaviours 
of Brook's Genghis and Grand's Creatures. 
Implications of the TNGS 
Global mappings allow 'objects' in the world to come into existence as objects- (that can 
be recognised, categorised, memorised and so on). Global mappings construct our objects 
and events in accordance with our embodied experience of the world. There is no 'object 
recognition centre' or 'apple neuron'; objects and events are created through the 
coordination and correlation of various fiinctionally distinct brain areas (crucial to which 
are sensory and motor areas). 
Edelman (1992) argues that the three basic tenets of TNGS are sufficient to account for all 
cognitive functionality (whether it be recognition, categorisation, learning, memory, or 
even consciousness). Concepts for example, come about through re-combinations of 
different kinds of global mappings. Once again, there is no need for specialised 'concept 
neurones' (unlike Grand, 2000, for example, whose Creatures formed 'concept neurones'); 
or for some homunculus to interpret them. 
Global mappings have all the qualities of a dynamic loop similar to the one presented in 
Chapter 1 (although we now can add a value system to the loop). Ludwig (1995, p.4) offers 
a useful description of global mappings in this light, whereby a global mapping, 
"...is continuously forced to reorganize by the flow of signals from many 
sources in- and outside the brain. Moreover, the organism is permanently 
endeavoured to seek new information or even new inspections of interesting 
objects or events. The mapping of perceptual categories onto behavioural 
categories in continuous time is the necessary basis for being in operational 
closure with the world." 
Neural Darwinism and representation 
Could a representational gloss do justice to this dynamic loop that continuously matches 
perception with action across the whole body? Edelman's (1992, p. 158) suggestion is 
appealing; it is we, and not our brains, that "represent" the world. 
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2.4 Unitary perception-action perspectives (representational) 
The final two unitary approaches to be discussed are representational accounts of 
perception and action planning. Both accounts propose a common representational domain 
that does not respect the conventional boundaries between perception and action planning. 
That is, perceiving and anticipating are treated as equivalent both in terms of function and 
neural codes. Both are embodied accounts of cognition whose proposed abstract codes 
develop through worldly and bodily experience. The first is a developmental account of 
action control (Eisner and Hommel, 2001), and the second is a wider Theory of Event 
Coding (TEC), upon which the developmental model is based (Hommel, Musseler, 
Aschersleben and Prinz, 2001). 
2.4.1 The emergence of action control 
Appropriately enough, T E C assumes that perception and action are intimately linked 
(indeed, they are seen as indistinguishable) via abstract (but not arbitrary) common codes. 
Before discussing the core assumptions of T E C (which revolve around the common coding 
of events), the following presents the 
proposed developmental basis for these 
event codes. Eisner and Hommel (2001) 
present the developmental foundations of 
T E C in a two-stage model of the 
emergence of action control (see Figure 
2.1). This model incorporates all perceptual 
modalities and deals with the development 
of voluntary action control. 
Prinz (1990, 1997) has presented similar 
ideas, which like T E C , share strong 
similarities to James' (1890) ideomotor 
Stage 1 
Cognitive System 
Stage 2 
Cognitive System 
Outcome 
Motor System Motor System 
Figure 2.1 The emergence of action 
control (from Eisner and Hommel, 2001). 
At Stage 1, the motor pattern producing a 
particular effect is automatically integrated 
with the cognitive codes representing this 
effect. At Stage 2, the motor pattern is 
intentionally executed (white units) by 
activating the cognitive codes that 
represent its expected effect. 
theory and ideas on action representation expressed by Lotze (1852) and Harlefi (1861). 
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Hommel (1997) suggests that the major difference lies in the scope of a movement effect. 
For Lotze, HarleB and James, a movement effect was limited to movement-produced 
sensory feedback (i.e. intrinsic feedback). For the Prinz and Hommel camp, a movement 
effect is far broader, in that the majority of action goals refer to extrinsic feedback, such as 
switching on a light, or stepping on a car's brakes (this is discussed in more detail later). 
Stage 1: the formation of cognitive codes 
The first stage of Eisner and Hommel's (2001) model concems the acquisition of 
contingencies between movements and the effects that movements have on objects or 
events in the world. Hommel (1997) and Eisner and Hommel (2001) consider a newborn 
infant who initially must make involuntary actions'^ before it can logically perform a 
voluntary action. They argue that the voluntary control of action must develop from a 
history of perceived interactions, such that the effects of actions can be anticipated prior 
their production. 
For example, a motor pattern is randomly generated (see the lower pattem of activated 
units in the motor system. Fig 2.1) and an action is executed (cf 'motor babbling'. Bullock 
and Grossberg, 1989). On occasion an executed action (e.g. a flailing arm movement) will 
lead to specific changes in the relationship between the infant and its environment (e.g. the 
hand comes into contact with a beaker, the beaker falls to the floor). These changes are 
perceived (e.g. sensory information is coded, such as the feel of the hand-beaker contact, 
the visual features of the hand-beaker contact, the sight of the beaker falling, the sound it 
makes crashing to the floor, etc.) and these changes are registered as more abstract 
cognitive codes (see upper pattem of activated units in the cognitive system. Figure 2.1). 
" In reviewing the work of Lotze and HarleD, Hommel (1997) suggests that an involuntary action may be 
produced by external factors (e.g. stimuli directing direct, inbuilt sensorimotor connections), or internal 
factors (e.g. emotions or a curiosity drive). Nevertheless the actions will be random and erratic. This comes 
close to acknowledging that inbuilt values may constrain actions, which as we have seen, Edelman and others 
consider essential. However, value criteria are not mentioned in Eisner and Hommers (2001) two-stage 
model or T E C , and it is unclear whether they have been overlooked, implicitly assumed, or are not 
considered important. 
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As the activated sensory and motor patterns are temporally overlapping they become 
integrated such that on a later occasion activation of one pattern will lead to automatic 
(partial) activation of the other^ **. 
Stage 2: the selection of an action 
The second stage of the model concerns the goal-directed recruitment or selection of 
movements. Movements are selected by activating the 'effect code' that represents the 
desired goal (e.g. the code of a perceivable effect that has previously been associated with 
a motor pattern; such as the code for the sound of a beaker crashing to the floor). In 
activating this effect code, the associated motor patterns will be activated to some degree. 
Thus goal-directed movements are selected through activating the codes of their 
consequences (hence 'effect' codes), or put another way, the effects movements have on 
the world (e.g. a beaker that crashes to the floor) are anticipated. The actual spreading of 
activation fi^m the effect codes to response codes is automatic and hence independent of 
any specific intention to act (cf. the APH), although this does not exclude the potential for 
additional intentional processes to control the selection of motor patterns. Any number 
feature-effect codes for a particular event, are represented by integrated structures that 
Hommel (1997, p.287-288) calls 'action concepts', 
"...both to express the different janus-faced functions they serve and to 
emphasise that they may comprise sensory and motor as well as more abstract 
information, such as the meaning of a movement forming a gesture or a 
symbolic act". 
Behavioural evidence supporting the two-stage model 
Eisner and Hommel (2001) tested their two-stage model in a small series of studies. 
Experiment la consisted of an acquisition phase and a test phase (corresponding to each 
stage of the model). 
^ Eisner and Hommel (2001, p.230) claim that the sensory and motor pattems become integrated. Whether 
they really do mean sensory (rather than cognitive) deserves some attention, and this is discussed in section 
2.3.5. 
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1. Acquisition phase: On each trial (200 trials) 24 participants responded randomly with 
a left or right key press to a white rectangle that appeared on the screen. An auditory 
tone (which participants were instructed to ignore) was presented 50 ms after the 
onset of each key press response. For 12 participants the left key triggered a low tone 
and the right key triggered a high tone (Response-Effect Mapping A). The other 12 
participants received the opposite key-tone mapping (R-E Mapping B). 
2. Test phase: The imperative stimulus was now a tone (high or low). Participants were 
pseudorandomly split into two groups (12 in each group), such that each group had 6 
participants from each R-E mapping. As in the acquisition phase, responses triggered 
a tone contingent on the R-E mapping. 
a. Non-Reversal group: Participants had to respond to tones in accordance with 
their R-E Mapping. For example, those participants in R-E Mapping A (left 
response / low tone, right response / high tone) were instructed to respond 
with a left response to low tones and with a right response to high tones. 
A- Reversal group: Participants had to respond to tones in disagreement with 
their R-E Mapping. For example, those participants in R-E Mapping A (left 
response / low tone, right response / high tone) were instructed to respond 
with a right response to low tones and with a left response to high tones. 
The results revealed that those participants in the non-reversal group responded more 
quickly than those in the reversal group. This data was interpreted as evidence that 
perceiving several co-occurrences of a self-produced movement (e.g. a certain key press) 
and a movement-contingent sensory effect (e.g. a certain tone) leads to the automatic 
association of the motor code representing the movement and the cognitive code 
representing the effect (despite this effect being task-irrelevant). Furthermore these 
associations were bi-directional, such that perceiving an event (e.g. a certain tone) 
automatically primed the associated action (e.g. a certain key press). 
Variations on this experiment were run; all of which supported the two-stage model. For 
example. Experiment lb revealed that acquired R-E associations were robust and resistant 
to extinction (removing the effect tone from the test phase did not change the pattern of 
results). In Experiments 2-4, when the test phase was free-choice rather than forced-choice 
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(i.e. when participfinls were allowed to choose a response upon hearing a tone), they 
showed a bias for responding to the tone with the key that had previously (in the 
acquisition phase) produced that same tone. By introducing a third tone that enabled a 'go-
no-go' design. Experiment 3 showed that this response bias increased when possible 
premature response selection was prevented (i.e choosing a response before the tone 
appeared). Furthermore, in an attempt to rule out possible strategic response-decision 
processes in the test phase (i.e. being consciously aware of the R-E Mapping, and trying to 
respond accordingly), participants in Experiment 4 had to count backwards during the test 
phase. The response bias was nevertheless still present. 
2.4.2 The common coding account of TEC 
Having presented the developmental model for action control, we can now examine the wider 
theory on which it is based, namely, TEC. T E C holds four core assumptions (as does the two-
stage model) concerning its 'common codes' (these assumptions are shown in Figure 2.2 
below). 
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Assumption 2: Feature codes are 
amodal 
Assumption 3: Feature codes 
do not distinguish t>etween the 
remoteness of sensory effects 
Assumption 1: Representations 
are disthtyuted and featural 
Assumption 4: Feature codes 
represent percepts and actions 
C o m m o n C o d i n g S y s t e m 
H I G H 
m, m . 
hand eves v is ion 
S e n s o r y S y s t e m s Motor S y s t e m s 
® 
® 
® 
® 
sensory code (v isual ) abou t apparent source of sound (e .g . le f lness f rom f rame of re ference a) 
sensory code (v isual ) about apparent source of sound (e .g . lef tness f rom f rame of re ference b) 
sensory code (v isual) about presence of viol in (e.g. l e f lness f rom f rame of re ference a) 
sensory code (audi tory) about the source of sound ( e . g . lef tness f rom f rame of re ference a) 
sensory code (audi tory) a txx j t the pitch of sound (e .g . h ighness of pi tch relat ive to x) 
sensory code (audi tory) about the pitch of sound (e .g . h ighness of pi tch relat ive to y) 
moto r code (hand) to produce left movemen t (e.g. left hand) 
moto r code (hand) to produce left movemen t (e.g. left movemen t relat ive to a) 
moto r code (hand) to produce high movement (e.g. u p w a r d s movement of hand) 
moto r code (speech) to produce left word (e .g . say ' lef t ' ) 
moto r code (speech) to produce high pitch sound ( e . g . h ighness of pi tch relat ive to x ) 
moto r code (speech) to produce high pitch sound ( e . g . h ighness of pi tch relat ive to y ) 
motor code (eyes) to produce left movemen t (e.g. left saccade) 
moto r code (eyes) to produce high movemen t (e .g . u p w a r d s saccade) 
Figure 22 Adapted from Hommel et al (2001) Feature codir»g according to T E C In the example, the 
event is a viobn playing a musical note Sensory incoming infonnation from two different sensory 
systems (Si. S2, %. and S4, S5. S5. respecbveiy) converges on two abstract feature codes (fi and f2) in a 
common-coding system, which agam spread their activation to codes belonging to three different motor 
systems (mi. mj. m^ nrv ms, me, and m?. n^. respectively) Sensory and motor codes refer to proximal 
information, feature codes in the comnxxvcoding system refer to distal informatxxi. The four 
assumptions are elaborated in the text 
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Assumption J (featural representations): T E C assumes that actions are represented 
in a distributed fashion in terms of their features (e.g. see description of featural 
representations in Chapter 1). A c t i o n representations comprise of integrated 
bundles of feature codes. Activating just a few feature codes belonging to an action 
representation will tend to activate the integrated whole (including its motor part). 
Consequently, one does not need to anticipate aJI the effects of an action to recruit 
the corresponding movement. This assumption can be seen visually in Figure 2.3. 
Cognitive System Cognitive System^ P i g u ^ 2.3 An illustration of T E C ' s 
assumpt ion 1. White units are not 
activated. Activating just two feature 
c o d e s ( s e e upper left sect ion) in an 
action representation may lead to partial 
activation of a motor pattem ( s e e lower 
left sect ion) . However , b e c a u s e these 
two feature c o d e s a re merely part of an 
integrated whole, their activation spreads 
and the whole action representation 
including its motor part b e c o m e s 
activated ( s e e right sect ion) . 
IVIotor System Motor System 
Nevertheless, the more effects that are anticipated (i.e. the more feature-effect 
codes that are initially activated), the greater the level of activation will be on the 
motor part (and this in turn increases the likelihood of selecting this action). Thus 
there is a bi-directional influence of activation (cognitive -> motor; motor -> 
cognitive). 
A notable property of distributed featural representations is that a single feature can 
play a part in (i.e. become integrated with) any number of other representations (but 
not at the same time, as discussed later). In this sense (Sense I) TEC's feature 
codes are 'common codes' (in that they can be common to many different 
representations). 
2. Assumption 2 feature codes are amodal): T E C assumes that there is no difference 
between movement effects that are derived from different sensory modalities. 
However, it is acknowledged that during certain learning or action contexts, an 
agent may rely more heavily on information from one modality than from another. 
For example, kinaesthetic and tactile information may be especially useful for 
guiding hand movements, whereas visual information may especially useful for 
controlling eye movements (as was seen earlier in the cross-modal attention 
studies reported in section 2.2.1). In this sense also (Sense 2), T E C ' s feature codes 
are 'common codes' (in that they are common to all sensory modalities). 
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3. Assumption 3 (feature codes do not distinguish between movement effects of 
differing remoteness): T E C assumes that movement effects are coded irrespective 
of whether they derive from proximal sensation (e.g. the proprioceptive feeling of 
the arm moving towards a light switch), or distal consequences (e.g. the visual 
sensation of a light going on). This seems straightforward enough, but T E C is 
inconsistent on this assumption, and there are deeper underlying issues at stake 
(see section 2.3.5). Nevertheless, in this sense also (Sense 3), TEC's feature codes 
are 'common codes' (in that they are common to both proximal and distal effects). 
4. Assumption 4 (feature codes are both perceptual and anticipatory codes): T E C 
assumes that the very same feature code will be activated when an agent forms an 
intention to produce a certain action effect (i.e. endogenous activation owing to the 
anticipation of an action effect) and when s/he perceives an event that resembles a 
known action effect (i.e. exogenous activation owing to the perception of an 
event). Thus an intention to reach with a left hand towards an object (e.g. L E F T 
feature code) activates the very same code that is involved in perceiving that object 
(e.g. it is located on the left, hence L E F T feature code). Thus perception and action 
planning (anticipation) are considered to be functionally equivalent, as they both 
internally represent the interactions between external events and the agent (for 
similar ideas see Prinz, 1990, 1997). It is in this sense (Sense 4) that T E C refers to 
its feature codes as 'conrmion codes' (in that they are common to both perception 
and action planning)^'. 
The event coding of TEC 
It is often assumed that some sort of control mechanism is needed to ensure that we are not 
stimulus driven agents. If, as T E C suggests, motor pattems are automatically activated 
through perception and/or anticipation, then some sort of mechanism is needed to stop 
actions from running wild^ .^ Furthermore, subsymbolic representations (such as featural 
representations) require integrating so as to ensure that features belonging together (both 
spatially and temporally) are represented as such. In line with these considerations, T E C 
argues that an activated and integrated collection of feature codes constitutes an event code 
that has temporal and conceptual coherence. 
'^ For a recent A>fN architecture that has (independently) implemented a very similar idea of sensorimotor 
anticipation that is constrained by intentions and goals, see Gross, Heinze, Seiler and Stephan (1999). 
^ As seen for example in cases of alien hand syndrome, where one hand operates everyday action routines 
whilst being completely resistant to conscious control (e.g. Parkin, 1996). 
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This event code (c.f 'action concept') is the core theoretical construct o f TEC, and it is the 
product of feature codes that have been bound together (see Figure 2.4). 
Attent ion to the colour 
of the orange heightens 
the we«ghtir»g o f f^  
feature codes (anxxJal) about an abstracted ' L E F T N E S S * . 
• O R A N G E N E S S " . ' R O U N D N E S S ' . ' G R E E N E S S ' . and ' R I G H T N E S S ' 
The intent ion of reaching 
for the orange heightens 
the weight ing o f f, 
C o m m o n C o d i n g S y s t e m 
Event 2 Event 
O R A N G R O U N D R I G H T 
Hands VI sua 
® 
® 
sensory code (visual) at>out left 
locat ion of object (I.e. the orange) 
sensory code (visual) atx>ut 
colour of object (I.e. the orange) 
sensory code (visual) about 
shape of object (i.e. the orange) 
sensory code (visual) about 
shape of object (i.e. the apple) 
sensory code (visual) a txx j t 
colour o f object (i.e. the apple) 
sensory code (visual) about right 
locat ion of object (I.e. the app le) 
'm~; 
(5) 
motor code (eyes) to produce 
left m o v e m e n t (e .g . lef t saccade) 
motor code (eyes) to produce 
right m o v e m e n t (e.g. right saccade) 
motor code (left a r m ) to produce 
left m o v e m e n t (e.g. lef t reach) 
motor code (left h a n d ) to p roduce 
round m o v e m e n t (e .g . power gr ip) 
motor code (r ight hand ) to p roduce 
round m o v e m e n t (e .g . power gr ip) 
motor code (r ight a r m ) to produce 
right m o v e m e n t (e.g. right reach) 
motor code (speech) to produce left wo rd (e .g . say ' left ') 
motor code (speech) to produce round w o r d (e .g . say ' round' ) 
motor code (speech) to p roduce g reen w o r d (e .g . say 'green' ) 
motor code (speech) to produce o range word (e .g . say 'orange' ) 
motor code (speech) to produce right wo rd (e.g. say 'r ight ') 
F i g u r e 2.4 A d a p t e d f r o m H o m m e l e t al (2001) In tegra t ion o f fea tu re c o d e s in to event 
representa t ions Fea tu re c o d e s that a re ac t i va ted by ex te rna l s t imu la t ion or internal 
p rocesses a re t )ound into separa te , cohe ren t even t s t ruc tu res . In t he e x a m p l e , an a p p l e and 
an o r a n g e are s e e n , but at tent ion is d i rec ted t owa rds the o r a n g e E a c h of the two 
represen ted events inc ludes two un ique fea tu res (fi, f2 a n d f4, fs. respect ive ly ) , but the two 
represen ted events over lap wi th respec t to o n e fea tu re (fa). T h e so l id - l ine e l l ipse ind icates 
in tegrated fea tures (cont inu ing to sol id- l ine e f fe ren t connec t i ons ) , a n d the dashed - l i ne e l l ipse 
ind icates part ial ly s u p p r e s s e d fea tu res (con t inu ing to e f fe ren t d a s h e d - l i n e connec t i ons ) 
Act ivat ion is partial l ly s u p p r e s s e d in e f fe ren t g rey connec t i ons , a n d e n h a n c e d in e f fe ren t 
b lack connec t i ons 
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T E C proposes that integration occurs via a binding mechanism, such as the temporal 
coupling or activation synchronisation of feature codes (e.g. Singer, 1994; Treisman, 1996) 
There are two distinct phases to event coding. Firstly, an event is perceived or planned 
by activating corresponding feature codes. The activation of another event may be 
facilitated if it shares overlapping features. Secondly however, as soon as the perceived or 
planned event becomes integrated, the activation of the other event(s) is suppressed or 
inhibited. Thus only one event representation can be simultaneously activated and 
integrated at any one time (as illustrated in Figure 2.4). As T E C does not develop the idea 
of binding in any detail, certain assumptions have been made. For example, it is assumed 
in Figure 2.4 that the suppressed activation of Event 2 spreads to its associated motor 
codes, thus inhibiting unwanted motor responses. In this way, there is selective control of 
actions through facilitation and inhibition. 
T E C suggests that context, intention and attention all modulate the activation and 
integration of event codes (see Figure 2.4). Starting with the assumption that a particular 
feature is relevant for a current task, that feature's code will be weighted highly. The 
activation level of this feature code will be greater than that of a task-irrelevant (yet 
nevertheless associated, and hence partially activated) feature code. Furthermore, the 
higher the activation level of a particular feature code (e.g. a task relevant one), the more 
strongly and/or likely it will be integrated into a useable event code. Thus feature-
weighting can influence both activation and integration. Features are weighted according to 
their task relevance, and T E C suggests that in terms of perception, feature weighting is an 
attentional process that selectively prepares the cognitive system for features that might be 
relevant (to-be-attended) or irrelevant (to-be-ignored); and in terms of action planning, 
^ This is known as the binding problem. However, O'Regan and N5e (2001, p. 51) argue that the binding 
problem is a fallacy, in tenns of both the temporal and conceptual unity of experience, "What explains the 
temporal unity of experience is the fact that experience is a thing we are doing, and we are doing it 
now... What explains the conceptual unity of experience is a thing we are doing, and we are doing it with 
respect to a conceptually unified external object. Nevertheless, if one holds a representational stance (as 
T E C does, but O'Regan and NOe do not), the consensus is that binding is a genuine problem that needs 
addressing, and as the brain apparently solves the binding problem by synchronising the things we are doing 
with the fact that we are doing them now, O'Regan and NSe's position is implicitly held anyway. 
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feature weighting is an intentional process that selects features that are relevant to an 
intended effect (i.e. a to-be-produced event)^ ''. 
2.4.3 Distinguishing between sensation and perception 
As mentioned earlier, T E C is not consistent about its assumption (Assumption 3) that 
feature codes are common to both proximal and distal effects. After pointing out the 
inconsistency (see Box 2.2 below), the following suggests that the confusion arises from a 
failure to adequately distinguish between sensation and perception. 
B o x 2.2 S e l e c t e d quo ta t ions r e v e a l i n g T E C ' s i n c o n s i s t e n c y 
Proposition A: Common codes are proximal and distal codes 
"... the distinction between intrinsic, natural, body-related action effects on the one hand and 
extrinsic, artificial feedback on the other... TEC leads one to doubt that such distinctions 
make sense at all, because for a cognitive system any infomiation is necessarily extrinsic and 
natural—the only thing that counts is the event the information refers to...the instruction had 
the expected effect in persuading the key group to code their actions in terms of proximal 
effects (keypressing or finger moving) and the light group in terms of more distal effects 
(light flashing)...coding actions in terms of artificial, "extrinsic" effects is no less easy and 
natural than referring to more "intrinsic" feedback sources". Hommel et al (2001, p.26) 
"...the model does not distinguish between movement effects that differ in their degree of 
remoteness, such as proximal sensations (e.g., feeling the arm moving toward the light 
switch) and distal consequences (e.g., experiencing the light going on)...from the intemal 
perspective that the cognitive system necessarily adopts, there is no qualitative difference 
between a body sensation and an extemal event." Eisner & Hommel (2001, p. 231) 
Proposition B (contradiction): Common codes are exclusively distal codes 
"...distal codes represent distal attributes of the perceived event...and /or produced event, 
but not proximal effects on the sensory surface or muscular innervation pattems... In fact, 
there is no way in which the sensory code representing a particular spatial distance would be 
similar to the muscular innervation pattem driving the hand over the same distance, 
suggesting that a match or mismatch between stimulus- and action-related codes can only be 
assumed on a more abstract distal-coding level, and it is this level our approach is referring 
to" Hommel et al (2001, p. 14 - 15). 
"...feature codes that represent a given perception or action effect do not refer to proximal, 
sensory or muscular regularities, but to distal attributes of the event, such as the perceived 
location of an extemal movement-contingent feedback light." Hommel et al (2001, p.32). 
It is clear from Figures 2.3 and 2.4 (where there are sensory codes, motor codes and then 
common codes), that the distinction T E C wants to make is between sensation (i.e. proximal 
In Chapter I it was argued from an ecological perspective that action 'sets up' perception (Michaels and 
Stins, 1997). However, it was suggested that ''sets up" was too vague, in a similar way to terms like 
'resonating', or 'direct perception*. TEC*s feature weighting ofTers a principled way by which action might 
'set up' perception. Thus the weighting of features (which might simultaneously code for possible actions) 
can influence which properties of an event are perceived. 
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coding of sensory or muscular regularities) and perception (i.e. distal coding of percepts), 
but it is not sure how to do this. The inconsistency therefore arises because T E C has no 
principled way of distinguishing between sensation and perception. 
Others have demonstrated a similar difficulty, which is again tied up in the (mis) use of the 
terms proximal and distal. Michaels and Stins (1997), for example, argued that distal 
stimuli are properties of objects and events themselves (e.g. affbrdances) and proximal 
stimuli are properties of structured arrays that are directly perceived (e.g. the information 
about affordances). This definition however, suffers from the issues related to the 
ecological notion of 'information' (as argued in Chapter 1), it bypasses sensation 
altogether through 'direct perception' (see Gibson, 1979, p.238), and furthermore, 
Michaels and Stins are not consistent or accurate in their usage of the terms (see 
Ehrenstein, 1997 for criticisms). 
As we have seen in Box 2.2, TEC fails to provide a useful definition of proximal and distal 
stimuli. From reading between the lines however, a definition from T E C might read as 
follows: Distal stimuli are perceivable properties of our interaction with objects and events 
(that are coded as event codes, and might refer to action-contingent effects of varying 
remoteness) and proximal stimuli are the raw properties of pattems of stimulation available 
to our sensory systems (that are coded as sensory codes). 
Sensation codes proximal effects and perception codes distal effects 
One way of defining the terms 'proximal' and 'distal' is to adopt O'Regan & Noe's (2001) 
two sets of laws of sensorimotor contingency, which make a broad yet principled 
distinction between sensation and perception: 
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1. Sensation: Proximal coding could be said to relate to the first set of laws that are 
specific to the sensory apparatus. In vision for example, eye movements distort and 
shift retinal stimulation. These shifts and distortions of retinal stimulation tell us 
about how the eyes work and not how the environment should appear. These 
sensations (that are defined by the sensory-apparatus and are independent of any 
categorisation or interpretation of events) might be said to code proximal 
information. O'Regan & Noe (2001) argue that this first set of laws might underlie 
sensation 
2. Perception: Distal coding could be said to relate to the second set of laws that are 
specific to the sensory mode that reveals sensory attributes of objects and events. In 
vision for example, the visual attributes of an object are revealed by a retinal image 
that only provides a view in front of an object, whereas moving around an object 
makes part of it appear and disappear. These visual attributes (or sensory attributes 
revealed by other modalities) might be said to code distal information. O'Regan & 
Noe (2001) argue that this second set of laws might imderlie perception. It is 
important to note that perception is, of course, based on sensations derived from the 
sensory apparatus-just as TEC's event codes are based on sensory codes. 
This distinction makes some sense of TEC's distal-level coding, which can now be 
meaningfully described as perceptual codes that are abstracted from sensory codes. A 
fiirther point that adds to the utility of this explanafion comes from O'Regan and Noe's 
(2001) claim that the structure of the laws abstracted from the sensorimotor contingencies 
underlying perception (e.g. visuomotor contingencies associated with flat, concave, and 
convex surfaces, comers etc.) are neural code independent (return to footnote 9, p. 62 for 
an example). This fits well with TEC's common codes. They are not specific to a particular 
sensory modality, but instead integrate and abstract information from different modalities, 
such that common codes are also neural-code independent (e.g. "...distance, size, and 
location of stimulus and response only match with regard to a distal description of the 
environmental layout, but not in terms of the particular neural codes or activation pattems by which 
it is represented", Hommel et al, 2001, p. 15). 
A similar distinction between sensation and perception comes from Crush (2002), who 
argues that percepUial processes are amodal (i.e. neural code independent), accommodating 
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all the different sensory modalities, imagery and motor imagery. Sensation however, is 
modal (i.e. neural code dependent). Crush (2002) argues that less sophisticated systems are 
engaged with their sensors, whereas more sophisticated systems set their goals in terms of 
objects and locations in the environment, and thus obtain information according to these 
terms. 
The above discussion of sensation and perception will prove useful in the next chapter, 
where it is argued that the APH and T E C are closely related endeavours precisely because 
they both occupy the perceptual rather than sensory domain of coding. 
2.4.4 An ecological criticism of TEC 
In criticising T E C from an ecological perspective, Richardson and Michaels (2001) argue 
that TEC's event codes are arbitrary and ungrounded. They argue that event coding is an 
entirely mental process that is grounded neither in reality nor in information. This is a 
standard ecological argument. It assumes that the burden of information processing (e.g. 
forming event codes) is exclusively a mental one, and it wants instead to place this burden 
solely on the environment (i.e. on the 'information' in the ambient array). 
However, it is argued below (see section 2.5), that the 'middle way' of the unitary theories 
discussed (including TEC) allow this burden of 'information' to be shared by environment 
and organism. This is most conspicuous in the Enactive approach, but is nevertheless 
evident in T E C . The environment is not pregiven- // does not specify what a feature code 
will be. A feature code is not pregiven- // does not specify how an environmental feature is 
coded. Thus T E C ' s feature codes evolve and change through experience, intention and 
context; and are not a pregiven, arbitrary or fixed set, but are based on a history of 
interactions in the world. For example, a colour (or more accurately, perturbations of light) 
does not specify that feature codes will always code RED. Rather, a single feature code 
(RED) can through experience and context become differentiated into a larger number of 
codes (CRIMSON, ORANGE etc.), and one can learn to distinguish between these codes. 
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The same can occur for action feature codes, such that L E F T may differentiate lo 
LEFTWARD or LEFT-OF-BODY etc. 
One suspects that Richardson and Michaels (2001) criticism is in part directed towards 
TEC'S language of features or elements (such as green, red, big, left, right). However T E C 
is not proposing that there are arbitrary GREEN symbols floating around the brain; it is 
purely a language of convenience. Nevertheless, where Richardson and Michaels' (2001) 
criticisms do ring true is in their dissatisfaction with TEC's explanation of a distal level of 
coding. Richardson and Michaels (2001) are concerned that perception-action 
interdependence only occurs in the sphere that T E C refers to as "late perception" and 
"early action", and accuse T E C of dualism. However, as has been argued previously 
(section 2.4.3 above), TEC's distal-level coding is confusing because it does not 
adequately distinguish between sensation and perception. According to the arguments 
developed in section 2.4.3, so-ceilled Mate perception' is actually perception (of which there 
are surely many levels), as opposed to sensation (which T E C might well take to be 'early 
perception'). So-called 'early action' is self-evident, it is action planning (plans that may 
prime actions, but need not demand that they are in fact executed). Richardson and 
Michaels (2001) are bound not to appreciate this distinction (even though T E C did not 
make it particularly clear), because they believe that firstly, information is specified in the 
world, and secondly, that this information is directly perceived. This is the specification 
principle of'information': 
"...potential sensory stimulation is sufficient for accurate perception because 
the animal-environment interaction is specified in the spatiotemporal structure 
of ambient arrays. Specification refers to a lawful, 1:1 relation between pattems 
in ambient arrays and the aspects of the animal environment interaction that 
give rise to them"" Stoffregen and Bardy (2001, p. 195). 
2.4.5 Evidence for common coding 
Having clarified T E C s distal-level coding in terms of perception rather than sensation, the 
follov^ng briefly examines some evidence for common codes. 
" As was noted in section 2.1, rather than the conventional ecological idea of various arrays (e.g. the optic 
array), Stoffregen and Bardy (2001) argue for a global ambient array of energy. 
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Synchronisation studies A. 
Prinz (1997) refers to synchronisation studies (e.g. Aschersleben & Prinz, 1995, 1997) in 
which participants are required to tap their index fingers on a silent electrical contact plate 
in synchrony with the onset of a sequence of auditory clicks. While participants 
confidently believe they are synchronising their tap onsets perfectly with the onset of 
clicks, actually there is a negative asynchrony, such that tap onsets occur 30-50 
milliseconds before click onsets. Prinz (1997, p.l36) suggests that "... it is the taps' sensory 
or perceptual effects that get synchronised with the sensory or perceptual effects arising from 
clicks". In other words, Prinz is suggesting that synchronisation does not occur between 
auditory input and motor output (as evidenced by a 50 millisecond asynchrony), but rather 
occurs between the sensed or perceived click and the sensed or perceived tap. 
It is of interest to note that, in a similar manner to T E C , Prinz (1997) is not sure what kind 
of effects are involved, as he refers to 'sensory' or 'perceptual' effects. He does however, 
settle on sensation, arguing that; "...synchrony is established in a common-coding domain 
where clicks are represented by sensory codes and taps by sensory feedback or effect codes". 
In applying O'Regan and Noe's (2001) distinction between sensation and perception, we 
can see that if Prinz wants to claim common-coding (which he does) then he is wrong to 
speak of sensory codes and sensory feedback. Certainly, it appears that it is not the 
kinaesthetic proprioceptive feedback of the finger moving down towards the key that is 
synchronised with clicks (and this proprioception might accurately be described as 
proximal feedback). What is synchronised, is the distal effect of the click (that is, the 
perceived auditory attributes of the click), and the distal effect of the tap (that is, the 
perceived tactile attributes of the key). 
In this sense, it can be assumed that the perceived attributes of tactile and auditory 
objects/events are amodal, and consequently can be synchronised in a common-coding 
domain through the temporal integration of feature-effect codes. If these objects/events 
were classed as sensory (as Prinz does), then a common-coding explanation would not be 
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legitimate. As O'Regan and Noe (2001) argue, what allows interactions between different 
modalities of sensorimotor contingencies is the fact that they are all referring to neural-
code independent attributes of objects and events, and not to raw modality specific 
sensations. 
Hommel et al (2001) and Prinz (1997) review additional studies where taps produce 
artificial auditory effects. Introducing a delay between the (silent) finger tap and its 
artificial effect (a short tone), serves to increase the negative asynchrony between tap onset 
and click onset. This is taken as further evidence that the click is not synchronised with the 
motor code that produces the tapping movement, or with its kinaesthetic proprioceptive 
feedback. Indeed, the pattems of data are best explained in terms of a synchronisation 
between the click and a temporal average of the two perceivable effects associated with the 
tap (see Figure 2.5). 
Perceived action-
contingent effects 
Delay 
TONE (Auditory attributes) 
A 
(Tactile attributes) 
Perceived externally-
produced effects 
'CLICK" (Auditory attributes) 
I S Y N C H R O N Y 
Temporal average 
F i g u r e 2.5 S c h e m a t i c of increased negative asynchrony (or 'anticipatory error*) between tap 
onset and click onset. T h e synchronisation actually o c c u r s between a temporal average of 
the two perceived action effects (one natural and one artificial) and the perceived click. 
Thus in terms of our previous understanding, the perceived auditory attributes of the click 
(distal) are synchronised with a temporal average of the perceived tactile attributes of the 
key (distal) and the perceived auditory attributes of the tap (distal). Once again, as all of 
these effects are perceptual they can all be represented in a common coding domain. 
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Synchronisation studies B. 
If common-coding is to be demonstrated in a way that avoids any possible confusion 
between proximal sensation and distal perception, then a study is needed that pits a purely 
motor-based source of information (e.g. muscular innervation patterns that are easily 
categorised as proximal) against a purely perceptual source of information (such as a 
visually perceived event that is easily categorised as distal). Enter a recent study by 
Mechsner, Kerzel, Knoblich and Prinz (2001). It is a well-known phenomenon that people 
have a spontaneous tendency to produce bimanual movements that have mirror symmetry 
(for example, note the mirror symmetry that occurs when you make small circles 
simultaneously with your two index fingers). Even when initially asymmetrical 
movements are made, there is a tendency to slip into symmetry (but not vice versa). 
Traditional interpretations of this phenomenon have assumed a tendency to co-activate 
homologous muscles. Under this interpretation, the symmetry that occurs is due to 
proximal constraints (muscular and motor). 
Mechsner et al (2001) however, have demonstrated that this phenomenon has a purely 
perceptual basis (i.e. symmetry arises at a distal-coding level). In their third experiment, 
Mechsner et al (2001) instructed participants to circle two flags inwards and maintain the 
visual circling pattern either in mirror symmetry (see Figure 2.6b) or in antiphase (see 
Figure 2.6c). As a clever design twist, the two hidden cranks that operated the flags 
produced different temporal effects on each flag. The left crank operated its flag directly, 
such that the left flag circled directly above the left crank and hand. The right crank 
however, was geared such that the right flag circled in a 4:3 frequency ratio to the right 
crank and hand. If we consider the two hands circling in temporal synchrony, then the 
right flag would circle more slowly than the left flag (i.e. the flags themselves would not 
circle in temporal synchrony). 
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F i g u r e 2.6 Apparatus used in Mechsner et a l 's (2001) Experiment 3, and instnjcted 
synchronous circling pattems of the flags, a. Apparatus. T h e participant c i rc les two visible 
flags using his or her hidden hands. T h e left flag m o v e s coincidentally with the left hand 
w h e r e a s the right flag moves according to a well defined angle and/or frequency 
transformation with regard to the right hand ( s e e text), b. Symmetry, that is, 0 ° relative angle, 
c. Ant iphase, that is, 180'' relative angle. F rom M e c h s n e r et al (2001). 
When people circle their hands in a horizontal plane, the tendency towards symmetrical 
synchronisation means that it is almost impossible (unless trained) to produce circling 
pattems under non-harmonic frequency ratios of the hands, such as a 5:4 or 4:3 frequency 
ratio. Consequently, because bimanual circling in a 4:3 ratio is practically impossible for a 
naive participant, no body-oriented strategy could bring about iso-frequency, symmetry or 
anti-phase in the flags. Furthermore, owing to the frequency transformation in the right 
crank and flag system, symmetry or antiphase in the flags could not be predicted from the 
corresponding hand movement pattern (which is identical in both cases). 
The results revealed that participants could circle flags in symmetry and speed up. They 
could also achieve antiphase (but this deteriorated at high speeds). Also, switches into 
symmetry occurred. Mechsner et al (2001) concluded that symmetry and antiphase in the 
flags were achieved in visual space despite the absence of a specific translation of 
characteristic body activity pattems into perceptual pattems. Furthermore, participants 
coiJd easily perform otherwise 'impossible' body movements in order to achieve 
instmcted flag movements. Mechsner et al (2001) further argued that the tendency towards 
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flag circling symmetry (independent of what the hands were doing) supported the notion 
that the phenomenon of symmetry tendency in bimanual circling is purely perceptual .^ ^ 
In terms of T E C , the perceptual basis of synchronisation-for-symmetry phenomena bears 
all the hallmarks of a common representational domain in which distal effects of a 
perceived event are coded. The proximal effects associated with the activity do not play a 
part in this common coding. As Mechsner et al (2001) concluded, 
"...not only spontaneous but also intentional symmetry and antiphase are 
clearly organized exclusively in the domain of perception and perceptual 
imagery... We speculate that voluntary movements are, in general, organised by 
way of a simple representation of the perceptual goals, whereas the 
corresponding motor activity of, sometimes extreme, formal complexity is 
spontaneously tuned in." 
For 'spontaneously tuned in', read the automatic activation of associated motor pattems. 
2.5 The middle way of unitary theories 
The following attempts to tie together the core ideas expressed by the theories discussed in 
this chapter. It is argued that these unitary theories all complement what Varela et al. 
(1992) have called 'the middle way'. The Enactive Approach call their level of explanation 
'the middle way'- an examination of the human experience that provides for both its 
reflective and its immediate lived aspects; where the distinction between the self and the 
world is acknowledged, yet so too is the continuity between them (Varela et al, 1992, p.3-
4). For O'Regan and Noe (2001), this middle way can be seen in the brain's adaptation to 
and abstraction of the second set of laws of sensorimotor contingency that are neural-code 
independent. For Edelman (1992), this middle way can be seen in the environmental 
selection of higher-order 'global mappings' that account for the present and the past of 
lived experiences. Edelman (1992) argues that reentry combined with memory (which 
itself is explained by the three tenets of the TNGS) provides the essential link between 
physiology and psychology. The distal-level coding of T E C appears to occupy this level of 
explanation. Thus for Hommel et al (2001), the middle way assumes that perception. 
Additional experiments revealed a similar perceptual basis for a symmetry tendency in the bimanual 
synchrony of left-right finger oscillation pattems, and for a symmetry tendency in bimanual finger tapping. 
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attention, intention and action all operate on a common representational domain in which 
common codes do not distinguish between previous, current or future perceptions and 
actions. 
The behavioural activity 
Central to this middle way is the emphasis on the behavioural activity rather than a fixed, 
specified or 'pregiven' behavioural functionality. The importance of the behavioural 
activity has already been mentioned in Chapter I and in section 2.3.1 (see also Box 2.3 
below). This sentiment of activity-based coding is broadly comparable to the behavioural 
layers of Brooks' Genghis (which can be decomposed by activity but not by fiinction); the 
'viability' function of the Enactive Approach (where interactions are not fixed or 
prescribed, but simply viable within the context of a current activity); O'Regan & Noe's 
(2001) laws of sensorimotor contingency, the mastery of which must be exercised in a 
current activity (again, these laws are not fixed, but are based on a history of sensorimotor 
contingencies); and the 'degenerative' rather than fixed neuronal groups of Edelman 
(1988), that are constrained (and not specified) by value. This activity-based coding shapes 
the function of representations (as illustrated by Condition 3 of the definition of 
representations offered in Chapter 1). 
A number of developmental and adaptation studies have similarly revealed the importance 
of the behavioural context of an activity. Clark (1997) for example, reviewed a study by 
Thelen and Smith (1994) where two different age groups of infants (the youngest were 
crawlers, and the oldest were walkers) were placed at the top of slopes of varying 
steepness. Crawlers dauntlessly tackled slopes of 20" and greater (usually falling). Walkers 
were wary of the same slopes and sometimes slid down them or refused to descend. As 
crawlers increased in experience they learned to avoid steep slopes. Remarkably however, 
when the crawlers first began to walk, they tackled steep slopes with the same reckless 
abandon as they had when first crawling. They had only learnt about steep slopes within 
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the behavioural context of crawling, and could not apply this practical knowledge to the 
new experience of walking. 
A similar phenomenon arises in perceptual adaptation studies where adults wear image-
shifting glasses. Thus Clark (1997) reviewed a study by Thach, Goodkin and Keating 
(1992) where adults gradually adapted to glasses that shifted the image sideways, while 
performing the task of throwing darts overhand. After a time wearers adapted to the 
glasses, and dart throwing became as accurate as it had been before wearing the glasses. 
Still wearing the glasses, when asked to throw the darts underhand, or with their non-
dominant hand, performance showed no comparable improvement. They had only adapted 
to the glasses within the behavioural context of dominant overhand throwing, and could 
not carry it over to other behavioural contexts (even in the same task domain). 
Box 2.3 The middle way of TEC 
As well as 'sensory codes', 'perceptual codes', 'action codes', 'feature codes', 'effect codes' 
and 'event codes', TEC frequently refers to its 'common codes' as 'cognitive codes' (see 
previous section for the inherent confusability of these codes). Indeed, here are some of the 
various classes of codes that Hommel and his colleagues have referred to: 
/. 'abstract codes \ 2. 'action codes', 3. 'action concepts'. 4. 'action-feature codes', 5. 
action files \ 6. cognitive codes', 7. 'common codes \ 8. distal codes', 9. 'effect codes \ 10. 
event codes', 11. feature codes', 12. motor codes', 13. 'object files', 14. 'perceptual 
c(xies', 15. 'proximal codes', 16. response codes', 17. 'sensory codes', 18. stimulus 
codes'... 
Interestingly, the culmination of years of research from Hommel and colleagues has resulted 
in the more-or-less definitive event code'. It is notable that for TEC, the most productive 
way of understanding a wide variety of mental capabilities comes from a coding perspective 
that incorporates the entire behavioural event (or as others prefer, the behavioural activity). 
This necessarily takes into consideration the ongoing interactions between the brain, the 
body and the environment. 
This holistic solution underlies an important point; attempts to isolate distinct structures or 
processes in perception, action or cognition- or even in the environment (e.g. Gibsonian 
'information')- may be misleading. Instead, one can consider the activity (or the event) that 
characterises the dynamics of coding. As has been argued earlier, the various 'middle ways' 
of the unitar> theories discussed, consider 'cognition' as a dynamic activity. This is couched 
in terms of higher-order global mappings (Edelman), modes of sensorimotor exploration 
(O'Regan and Noe), activity producing behavioural layers (Brooks), second-order structural 
couplings (Varela et al), or event codes (Hommel et al). 
While the theories discussed are all relatively recent, these ideas are not new. One of the 
earlier proponents of 'action-oriented perception' that stresses the importance of the whole 
ongoing behavioural activity (including affordances, current goals, tasks and internal states 
for determining what is perceived) was Arbib (1972). 
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Furthermore, various perception-action compatibility studies have demonstrated that 
within an experiment, compatibility effects can be found for different aspects of the task 
(such as location-action effects for a key press, or for the light bulb itself), depending on 
how the participants strategically interpret (either implicitly or through instruction) the 
activity they are engaged in (e.g. Guiard, 1983; Michaels & Stins, 1997; Stins and 
Michaels, 1997; Stins and Michaels, 1999; Hommel, 1993). 
2.5.1 Summary of Chapters 1 and 2 
Chapters 1 and 2 have attempted to recommend the utility of adopting increasingly popular 
'embodied' approaches to cognition. This has taken the form of an initially broad 
introduction (Chapter 1) followed by an increasingly theory-specific coverage (Chapter 2). In 
adopting an embodied perspective, it has been argued that there has been a move away from 
strict linear-stage information processing accounts that see perception and action as two 
separate and incommensurate endeavours that need to be bridged by computational 
translation. Instead, perception and action are seen as closely related (if not 
indistinguishable) endeavours that naturally interact by means of highly parallel, distributed 
and dynamic processes. In terms of S-R-C phenomena, this change of perspective has made 
linear-stage coding accounts (that are founded on arbitrariness) seem somewhat 
inappropriate and dated. Nevertheless, purely ecological accounts have failed in some 
respects as a convincing alternative owing to their scientific unaccountability (through terms 
such as 'information in the optic array', 'direct perception', 'resonance' and 'attunement'). 
This change of emphasis has had serious implications for representationalism. Consequently, 
there has been a need to consider more carefully just what a representation might be. In 
doing this, there has been a move away fix)m highly specified, detailed internal 
representations towards less specified, less detailed action-oriented or personalised kinds of 
representation (think Andre rather than Michelangelo). The functions of these 
representations are flexible enough to adapt to the changing context of a behavioural activity 
(just as Andre's sculpture can be seen as a pile of bricks or an insouciant masterpiece). 
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Discussion of a variety of separable-but-linked and unitary approaches has culminated in an 
understanding that perception and action are best characterised as amodal or neural code 
independent processes, such that complex interactions are possible between attention, 
intentions, goals, different modalities, perception and action planning, perception and 
imagery, pseudo-independent visual systems and so on. In this way it makes sense to 
characterise perception and action in terms of a 'middle way' - a process-driven dynamic 
loop that can be interpreted within the context of a history of sensorimotor interactions and a 
current behavioural activity. This view is supported by insights from behaviour-based 
robotics, neurophysiological, behavioural, adaptation and developmental studies. 
The remaining chapters apply the ideas discussed above to the interpretation, development 
and objective testing of the APH, 
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3.1 Interpreting the APH from an embodied perspective 
I his Chapter attempts to assimilate the insights from embodied cognition with the APH; a 
hypothesis that proposes the automatic potentiation of motor activity afTorded by certain 
features of a visual object (see Chapter 1). It is argued that such a basic proposal is fully 
compatible with an embodied approach to cognition. There are however, questions thai 
remain concerning the specificity of these so-called 'micro-afTordances'. After examining 
some sources of evidence that might support the APH, the experimental work that follows 
in this and later chapters addresses the specificity of micro-affordances, both in terms of 
the actions that are afTorded and the visual attributes that might be evoke such afTordances. 
Tucker and Ellis (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001; Ellis and Tucker, 2000) draw on a range 
of sources to support their developing APH. The essence of their argument is this- there is 
a growing body of evidence (neuropsychological, neurophysiological and behavioural) that 
suggests perception and action are intimately linked. The cumulative impact of this kind of 
evidence recommends the plausibility of the APH (see Tucker, 1997 for a selective 
review). The following subsections take a critical look at some of these sources of 
evidence. 
3.1.1 Neurophysiological sources of evidence 
In the quest for the neural correlate for consciousness, representations or some mental 
faculty or other, neurophysiological data is often assumed to be the most direct source of 
evidence for theories of mind. Thus when single cell recordings reveal cells in the parietal 
cortex that are sensitive to both visuospatial stimulus properties and the type of grip 
required to interact with them (e.g. Sakata, Taira, Murata and Mine, 1995; Taira, Mine, 
Georgopoulos, Murata & Sukata, 1990; Sakata, Taira, Mine & Murata, 1990; Stein, 1992), 
there is a temptation to give them a representational interpretation. Thus for Tucker and 
Ellis (2001, p.770), this kind of sensorimotor integration might be an 'Ideal candidate for 
representing affordances*', whereas for Hommel et al. (2001, p.20) these same populations of 
neiu-ons are "the neuroanatomical substrate of the common codes". That TEC's common codes 
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and micro-afifordances both/draw on the very same source for supporting evidence suggests 
the similarity of their ideas. 
However, understanding the response properties of individual cells is not the same as 
understanding a pattern of activity over space, and time that itself arises through the 
connectivity of these cells. Tucker and Ellis (1998) recognised this problem, arguing, that 
there is no reason why response properties of cells should equate with their 
representational role in as complex a network as the brain. 
Furthermore, according to the Enactive approach, there is no reason why we should expect 
a passive mapping of environmental features at all (as demonstrated in work on colour 
perception). Thus finding a group of cells that behave a certain way to a certain stimulus 
does not necessarily mean that this is their sole f\xnction (e.g. Lehky and Sejnowski, 1988), 
or that under different conditions they might not produce a different pattern of activity to 
the same environmental stimulus. For example. Freeman and Skarda (1985)^' 
demonstrated that there is no one to one mapping of a specific odour to a global pattern of 
activity in a rabbit's olfactory bulb. Firstly, an odour specific pattern will not emerge from 
a globally chaotic state at all unless the rabbit has some motivation (e.g. intention, attention 
or expectation). What is more, a specific odour produces a stereotypical pattem of activity 
that is soon changed under any number of conditions (e.g. learning a new odour changes 
the patterns of all previously leamt odours, and associating an odour with a different 
behavioural response changes that odour's stereotypical pattem). In short the same 
environmental stimulus can produce different neural states depending on the behavioural 
activity that an organism is engaged with. 
From the opposite perspective, O'Regan and Noe (2001) convincingly argue to similar 
ends that exactly the same neural state can underlie different experiences. Thus when PET 
scans (e.g. Grezes and Decety, 2002) or fMRl scans (e.g. Grezes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis, & 
Passingham, in submission) reveal certain patterns of activity in appropriately visuomotor 
" As reviewed by Varela et al. (1991); and Franklin (1995). 
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areas that apparently support the APH, it should not be taken for granted that a snapshot of 
'the' object representation has been 'lit up' for all to see. 
If a representational gloss is to be credible representations must be conceived of as 
dynamic. As was argued in Chapter 1, one way of doing this is to allow their functions to 
simply be viable (i.e. loosely constrained) rather than specific, fixed and prescribed. As a 
case in point, consider T E C ' s evolving feature codes that are abstract enough to influence a 
wide range of actions, and that do not represent a direct mapping of environmental features 
thanks to their susceptability to the context of an event with regard to an agent's situational 
context, intentions, goals and attention. It is argued later that the APH also allows this 
flexability by arguing that micro-affordances can be modulated and elaborated through 
semantic knowledge, context and intention. 
This is an important point, for as mentioned before. Brooks' (2002) rejection of a 
traditional representational account for his robots was based on the fact that their high-
level behaviours were not reflected directly in any of their simple computations. According 
to a 'viability function' view of representations however, this lack of transparency is 
exactly what would be expected (one could not, for example, pin down exactly what an 
abstract L E F T feature code represents). Indeed, reviews of motor representations 
(particularly those involving population coding for the direction of forthcoming 
movement) by Georgopoulos (1986, 1991, 1992) reveal what a spatial code might look 
like, and its functionality is by no means specific (it does not for example control a specific 
muscle contraction, but is instead rather abstract). 
For example, Alexander and Crutcher (1990)^* trained monkeys to guide a cursor towards 
a moving visual target using their forearm. In the standard task, the target and cursor 
moved in the same direction as the forearm. In the dissociation task, the target and cursor 
moved in the opposite direction to the forearm. The activity of 40 % of the cells in the 
motor cortex, 36 % in the supplementary motor area, and 38 % in the putamen showed 
As reviewed by Geourgopoulos (1991). 
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selective discharge prior to all 'pre-planned' (anticipated) movements of the cursor (left or 
right), irrespective of the direction of the limb movement (elbow extension or flexion). 
Geourgopoulos (1991) argued that changes of activity in the central motor structures in 
tasks involving visually guided movements reflect higher order processing of visuomotor 
information (rather than exclusivity to upcoming muscle contractions)^ .^ These results 
might even be interpreted as reflecting the motor activation associated with TEC's 
anticipatory feature-effect codes, which code distal effects (e.g. the anticipated direction of 
the cursor movement), but not proximal effects (e.g. muscular contractions). 
It is only when a representation leans towju-ds a 'prescribed' symbolic level, that one might 
realistically expect to pinpoint some interpretable causal element (such as a so-called 
'grandmother cell'). What is more, as has already been argued v^th reference to Dennett's 
(1995) giraffes and Brooks' (1991) Genghis (see Chapter 1), examining in micro-detail the 
causal facts of any number of tiny interactions would not tell us much about the kind of 
questions we are interested in anyway. This same insight should be applied when 
attempting a representational interpretation of a range of neurophysiological data. 
3.1.2 Behavioural sources of evidence 
Given the above notes of caution, behavioural data is therefore crucial to our understanding 
of representations, although this does not come without its own set of interpretative 
pitfalls. With a view to testing the APH, Ellis, Tucker and colleagues have performed a 
series of choice reaction-time experiments that adopt the S-R-C paradigm. 
The basic claim is that that a seen or currently represented object activates elements of an 
associated action (a micro-affordance) for at least three elements of a reach-to-grasp 
action; namely hand of response, wrist rotation and grip type. In a series of experiments, 
participants were shown either real everyday objects, or photographs of them on a monitor. 
While viewing the object (or recalling an object), participants made some response (that 
^ Interestingly, Geourgopoulos (1991) reports evidence that only a fraction of motor cortical cells actually 
relate to muscular activity. Ironically, despite being visuomotor representations, the nature of this kind of 
higher-order processing reminds one of representations that are 'general-purpose descriptions' in a Marrian 
sense. 
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mimicked a likely object-related action) according to some otherwise arbitrary object 
category (such as whether it was manmade or natural). The general finding fi-om these 
experiments revealed that despite an action-irrelevant response assignment, responses were 
faster and more accurate when a property of the seen or recalled object (e.g. its size or 
orientation) coincided with a response that mimicked the kind of action that would be most 
appropriate for interacting with that object property. 
For example, when objects such as jugs and saucepans were oriented such that a handle 
pointed into the left or right visual field, key presses were faster and more accurate for the 
hand of response that was the same side as the object's handle (see Figure 3.1 part A). This 
was the case even though responses classified whether the object was upright or inverted. 
In other words, the object's horizontal orientation was task irrelevant. 
When vertically or horizontally oriented objects such as bottles were responded to with 
clockwise or anticlockwise wrist rotations (always from a starting position of 11:00), then 
responses were faster and more accurate when the wrist rotation was appropriate for the 
object's orientation (see Figure 3.1 part B). For example, clockwise, rotations were most 
compatible with verticcdly oriented objects. This was the case even though responses were 
signalled by an arbitrary high or low pitched auditory tone. In other words, the object's 
horizontal or vertical orientation was task irrelevant. 
Similarly, when a series of objects that were large or small in size were responded to with 
responses that mimicked the kind of grip one might use (e.g. a precision grip that one 
might use to pick up a grape, and a power grip that one might use to wield a hammer), 
these responses were faster and more accurate when they were object-size compatible (see 
Figure 3.1 part C). This was the case even though responses classified whether the object 
category was manmade or natural. In other words, the object's size was task irrelevant. 
When the task demanded that objects were recalled, a similar pattem of results was 
obtained. Thus recalling fi-om a display of four objects the one object that was small 
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evoked faster and more accurate precision grip responses, whereas recalling the one object 
that was large evoked faster and more accurate power grip responses (see Figure 3.1 part 
D). This was the case even though responses classified whether the object category was 
manmade or natural (an arrow pointed to the screen location of the now-absent object that 
was to be recalled). In other words, the object's size was task irrelevant. 
Similarly, when an object had to be recalled from a sequence of objects, when this object 
was oriented, key presses were faster and more accurate for the hand of response that was 
the same side as the object's handle, regardless of the recalled object's position in the 
sequence (see Figure 3.1 part E). This was the case even though responses classified 
whether the object that was visually named after the sequence had stopped (e.g. 'JUG') had 
been present or not in the sequence (e.g. left response for present, right response for not 
present). In other words, the object's orientation was task irrelevant. 
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Figure 3.1 Behavioural evidence for the APH: A) Object-hand compatibilrty effects (Tucker 
and Ellis, 1998). B) Object-wrist compatibility effects (Ellis and Tucker. 2000). C) Object-grip 
compatibility effects (Tucker and Ellis. 2001). D) & E) Object-grip and object-hand 
compatibility effects for recalled objects (Derbyshire, Ellis and Tucker, in submission) 0 
symbolises data sent to disc. 
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Thus in a similar manner to the Simon Effect described in Chapter 1, performance was 
facilitated (faster average reaction times and fewer average mistakes) when a task-
irrelevant object property (such as orientation or size) coincided with an action-compatible 
response, despite responses being assigned according to some apparently arbitrary 
imperative stimulus (e.g. an object category, the pitch of a tone). In the experiments 
reported above, it is of particular importance to note that the task-irrelevant object property 
was relevant to an object-related action (such as a component of a reach-to-grasp 
movement). 
That similar results were obtained using visual imagery (Derbyshire, Ellis and Tucker, in 
submission) supports the views expressed in Chapter 1 (e.g. Kosslyn and colleagues; 
Grush, 2002) that perception and imagery are intimately related. It further supports the idea 
that a visual object representation (whether imagined or real) that implicates actions 
(whether imagined or real) involves the coactivity of the two visual systems. This is 
especially so because the dorsal system is often characterised as being a strictly on-line 
controller of actions (e.g. Goodale and Milner, 1992), and visual imagery is an off-line 
endeavour. 
As might be expected fi-om the discussion of S-R-C effects in Chapter 1, the findings 
reported above could be given an alternative arbitrary abstract coding explanation. From a 
DO perspective for example, object orientation could be coded along a Meft-right' 
dimension, thus overiapping with the Meft-right' response dimension (although Tucker and 
Ellis, 1998, suggested that the complex nature of the real objects presented may not have 
been codeable in simple binary terms). While an arbitrary abstract coding account of the 
object-wrist compatibility effects is less obvious, object size could be coded along a 
'small-large' dimension, thus overlapping with a 'small-large' grip-type dimension. 
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Furthermore, a purely attention-based argument*^ for these kinds of compatibility effects 
has recently been offered as an alternative explanation of Tucker and Ellis' (1998) effects 
(see Box 3.1 for a synopsis of this argument). 
Box 3.1 An attentional view of perception-action links 
Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia (2002) ran a small series of experiments using stimuli 
similar to those presented in the Table below (two-dimensional depictions of real or non-
objects). 
Nomial 
Clockwise-
oriented 
Asymmetrical stimuli 
Object Non-object 
b) c) d) 
Symmetrical stimuli 
Object Non-object 
The examples above show only clockwise orientations. The stimuli also included anti-
clockwise orientations, and there were also opposite images of all stimuli (e.g. there was a 
clock face depicting 8:45). Separate experiments were run for objects and non-objects, and 
these included symmetrical and asymmetrical pattems. Participants were introduced to 
'normal' oriented stimuli, and on experimental trials were presented with the oriented stimuli. 
Key press responses were made according to the stimulus orientation (e.g. left for 
anticlockwise and right for clockwise). 
The general results revealed compatibility effects that reflected where attention was directed. 
Responses were facilitated when the hand of response was the same side as: the clock hands 
(a); the salient end of the scissors (for some it was the blades, for others, the handles) (b); the 
patch next to the central circle that was the largest (c); the patch next to the central circle (d); 
and the 'bowl' component of the wine glass (e). For f), there was no facilitation of responses as 
there was no salient feature to direct attention towards. 
It was argued that all of the data could be accounted for simply by the directing of attention 
that formed the basis for motor signals automatically generated by the visual objects. The 
directing of attention was said to arise from an attentional bias that was induced by the visual 
asymmetry of the target objects. It was assumed that the non-objects and the clock-face in 
particular, did not afford any actions, yet they produced compatibility effects. Furthermore, in 
the case of scissors, because the compatibility effects varied (according to which end 
individuals deemed salient) it was argued that they could not have been based on behaviourally 
relevant actions afforded by the scissors. It was concluded that the 'afifordance-hypothesis' 
(e.g. Tucker and Ellis, 1998) could not account for this data, and consequently the attention-
based hypothesis was favoured. 
30 From this point on, this view will be referred to as the 'attention-directing hypothesis' 
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While Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia's (2002) data does highlight the importance of 
attentional processes in perception-action compatibility effects; its dismissal of the 
'affordance-hypothesis' may be unwarranted. Firstly, the potentially action-relevant 
property of the stimuli involved (an object's orientation) was the very property that 
participants were required to base their responses on. It is not surprising then that attention 
might be directed towards the areas of the object that best informed the viewer of its 
orientation. Secondly, and more importantly, while attention may play a significant role in 
some compatibility effects, it should not be seen as the only factor. Attention is just one 
link of many in a perception-action loop, and there is little point in asking the chicken-egg 
question of which came first, action or attention. Indeed, if pressed, it could be argued that 
the state of the action system (e.g. an action system that is partially prepared to make a left 
or right key press) 'sets up' or prepares perception such that attention is drawn to action-
relevant properties of objects and events. This does not detract from Anderson et al's 
(2002) intuition that attention plays a substantial role in many compatibility effects- it 
does- but not in isolation of other links in the perception action loop (see for example, 
Tipper, Lortie and Baylis', 1992, 'action-centered attention'). 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the material covered thus far has been sufficiently persuasive 
in recommending accounts of perception and action that do not stem from arbitrary sources 
of explanation (e.g. the DO model), or from isolated links in a perception-action loop (e.g. 
the attention-directing hypothesis), but rather from embodied and thus 'grounded' sources 
of explanation, hideed, a number of findings in Chapter 6 support this argument. 
3.1.3 The APH and the middle way 
The following briefly argues that the APH would be at home in any and all of the 
separable-but-linked and unitary approaches described in Chapter 2 (i.e. 'the middle way'). 
Indeed, Ellis and Tucker (2000) aligned their hypothesis to Edelman's (1978, 1987, 1992) 
theory of brain development. Appealing to TNGS as a biological backdrop to micro-
affordances, Ellis and Tucker (2000) suggested that the learning of coordinated actions 
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such as reaching and grasping occurs through the gradual adaptation of neuronal groups. 
Those involved in a successfiil action (e.g. leading to contact with an object) become 
selected for that purpose. Once selected they can be said to represent possibilities for 
action, such that regardless of an intention to act, viewing an object automatically activates 
the motor codes needed to interact with that object in a certain way (e.g. a certain grip 
type). Thus Ellis and Tucker (2000) speculated that micro-affordances reflect the 
involvement of the motor components in global mappings. 
The development of micro-affordances would be equally at home within the context of 
Eisner and Hommel's two-stage model, where associations between visual features and 
action features are acquired by chance, and then recruited for action control via 
anticipating action-contingent effects. Again, as with the APH, associated motor patterns 
are automatically activated regardless of an explicit intention to act (as assumed by the 
APH, the two-stage model and T E C , an explicit intention will increase the likelihood of 
executing the already activated movement codes). 
Indeed, a micro-aflfordance could easily be described as an instance of a T E C feature code. 
For T E C , in perceiving a visual stimulus such as an apple, certain perceptual features are 
registered as abstract feature codes (e.g. L E F T , ROUND, G R E E N etc). Some of these 
activated feature codes also serve as codes of action features (e.g. L E F T , ROUND), and 
activation automatically spreads (below threshold) to associated motor patterns (e.g. a left 
response, a power grip, a wide open mouth...). For the APH in perceiving a visual stimulus 
such as an apple, certain perceptual features (e.g. left location, round) are coded, and motor 
patterns for elements of an associated response are automatically activated below threshold 
(e.g. left response, power grip). 
The only obvious difference between micro-aflfordances and feature codes might lie in the 
abstract nature of feature codes, which might appear to operate at a separate and higher 
level than those of micro-affordances. If this is a genuine difference, and micro-
111 
Chapter 3 - Action Potentiation Hypothesis 
affordances are believed to occur through fundamentally direct links to action (i.e. they are 
not 'mediated' by amodal codes), then it must be assumed that they are sensation-action 
couplings of the most basic kind, rather than perception-action couplings. However, there 
are good reasons to believe this is not the case, and as the following argues, micro-
affordances are almost certainly a perceptual phenomenon: 
1) The APH concerns visual object representation (of which the micro-aflfordance 
part is said to contribute). As has been previously argued, when an object is 
seen, its visual attributes are revealed. The APH is concerned with how these 
visual attributes (size, shape, orientation, location etc.) automatically influence 
action. These visual attributes are necessarily the product of perception. 
2) Various authors have recently argued that objects and events come into 
existence for an agent at a higher level than any direct one-to-one sensorimotor 
connections. This level deals with amodal or neural-code independent 
perception (e.g. O'Regan and Noe, 2001; Hommel et al, 2001; Crush, 2002; 
Mechsner et al, 2001). Alternatively, for Edelman (1992), this level is achieved 
through reentrant signalling in and between higher-order global mappings. 
Whichever account is preferred, this level is a perceptual level. 
3) Ellis and Tucker (2001) have emphasised that visual object representation 
comes about from the conjoint activity of the ventral and dorsal systems. This 
involves perceptual coding. Indeed Grush (2002) argues that the conjoint 
activity of the two visual systems amounts to amodal perception (which he 
characterises in terms of an amodal egocentric space/object emulator). 
Whatever interpretive slant is preferred, visual object representation is a 
perceptual feat, not a sensory one. 
4) Derbyshire, Ellis and Tucker's (in submission) imagery experiments reported 
earlier add further support to the perceptual rather than sensory nature of micro-
affordances. It is perhaps unlikely that a recalled image of an object would re-
activate the precise pattems of sensory stimulation that would occur when 
seeing. 
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The APH and the behavioural activity 
While the APH does not always appear to acknowledge the importance of a behavioural 
activity, it can easily be framed in these terms. While the overall impression of the APH 
may be one of reliable default visuomotor representations that occur simply through seeing 
an object (regardless of an intention to act); the APH does allow for the possibility of a 
subtler treatment. For example, Tucker and Ellis (1998, p.844) write, 
"According to this position, representing visual information involves 
representing information about possible actions and thereby potentiating them. 
One consequence of this is that intended actions are formed from, and informed 
by, already existing visuomotor representations. Actual actions are produced by 
the selection and elaboration of such representations". 
This appears to say that micro-affordances reflect some kind of 'representational default 
setting' (although the APH itself does not make such a characterisation). A visuomotor 
representation exists (i.e. a default setting), and the intentions that come afterwards (e.g. I 
see an apple...I want to pick it up) are formed from and informed by this default setting 
(note that T E C is more liberal; intentions can also come first, directing the system both 
online and offline towards activating feature codes, and hence automatically potentiating 
motor patterns). Nevertheless, the APH proposes that these initially default representations 
can be elaborated, and intentions can modulate them. Crucially then the 'default setting' is 
neither fixed, nor prescriptive. It is this point above all others that allows us to see the APH 
as complementary to the middle way theories discussed. 
To elaborate on this point. Tucker and Ellis (2001) acknowledge that semantic knowledge 
can influence the dorsal system, thus emphasising the conjoint activity of ventral and 
dorsal systems (e.g. Goodale and Humphrey, 1998) rather than an oversimplified 
fiinctional dichotomy. Furthermore, they make a distinction between 'high-level 
affordances' (usually goal-directed) that arise from knowledge about an objects ftinction, 
and 'low-level affordances' (micro-affordances) that arise from the purely physical 
characteristics of a visual object. In the absence of a current goal (or as the APH fi^quently 
says, 'regardless of any intention to act'), viewing an object triggers a default 
113 
Chapter 3 - Action Potentiation Hypothesis 
representational setting that is fairly primitive and quite general. When there is a current 
goal however, then selection, moduaJtion and elaboration of motor representations occurs. 
This is actually an attractive position to hold that is in keeping with many of the ideas 
discussed previously. The initially default representational setting is a perfect example of 
an action-oriented representation. To reiterate from Chapter 1, an action-oriented 
representation both describes a situation and suggests an appropriate reaction to it (Clark, 
1997). Furthermore, an action-oriented representation is not dependent on sepjirate 
representations of states of the world or the cognitive systems goals for behaviour 
(Chemero, 2000). 
This initial goal independence also fits well with Brooks' (1991) subsumption architecture. 
Thus a low-level behavioural layer (that might connect perception to action in some way) 
goes about its business in a 'semantically blind way' (just as a micro-affordance might) 
until a higher-level behavioural layer modulates its activity through enhancement or 
suppression, in line with some more pressing behavioural goal. Thus while the APH has 
tended to focus on what it assumes to be the lowest level of affordance (micro-afFordance), 
it is open to the possibility that within the context of a current behavioural activity, this 
£iffordance can be accepted, rejected or elaborated for real action generation. 
These sentiments however, have not been tested formally by the APH, and indeed they 
have been confounded through its choice of stimuli. This is so for compatibility effects 
found when responding to small and large objects (e.g. a drawing pin or a hammer) with 
small and large grip types (e.g. a precision grip and a power grip); and for compatibility 
effects found when responding to oriented objects with a left and right hand responses. 
Owing to the design of these studies (where responses have always mimicked an 
appropriate action and the objects used have always had an everyday function), the 
following possibilities- which are not necessarily mutually exclusive- have not been 
addressed: 
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L The specificity of actions: The action properties an object affords may be highly 
specified (in the sense of a detailed, fully specified motor program). As has been 
argued previously in Chapter 1, this kind of fully specified representation is not 
theoretically appealing. Nevertheless, such a case might be reflected behaviourally by 
the facilitation of only one specific action. Alternatively, the action properties that an 
object affords may be loosely constrained (i.e. general enough to be common to 
several actions, in the way that a common code might be). This might be reflected 
behaviourally by the facilitation of a range of actions. Also in keeping with this latter 
case, one might expect that actions can be 'set up' (i.e. partially programmed) by 
virtue of the physical context of a task. Here too, one might expect the facilitation of 
a range of actions, providing they have been 'set up' in the first place. 
2. The specificity of visual attributes: It is possible that purely visual attributes (e.g. 
size, orientation, texture etc.) of an object reveal the physical possibilities for 
action, such that various properties of an action are automatically potentiated 
(through simply viewing the object regardless of any intention to act on it). This is 
the possibility that the APH emphasises. If this is the case, then just what are these 
visual attributes? For object orientation in particular, just what properties of an 
objects' orientation underiie an affordance for action? Perhaps it is crude visual 
cues such as spatially protruding features that afford action; or perhaps it is the 
angle of an objects' axis of elongation; or even the functional aspects of an object 
(such as an object's handle), whose significance for action may be learned through 
experience (see 3. below). 
J. The behavioural activity: It is possible that perception-action compatibility effects 
are derived from a functional knowledge of what one does with an object (in a 
particular context), such as grasping the handle of a hammer or a saucepan (c.f. 
O'Regan and Noe's, 2001, 'practical knowledge'). Tucker and Ellis (2001) 
attribute this functional knowledge to 'higher-level affordances', perhaps because it 
is thought to involve complex semantic processes. However, developmental 
literature strongly suggests that action is initially guided by just this kind of 
functional knowledge, which arises from trial and error rather than semantic insight 
(i.e. simply through doing; Maturana & Varela, 1987). It is only after considerable 
world experience that a more sophisticated awareness of the higher-level physical 
structure of objects and events emerges (e.g. Bremner, 2000; Lockman, 2000; 
Carey and Xu, 2001). For example, infants as old as 8 months fail to individuate 
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two objects that are in contact in the horizontal plane, treating them instead as if 
they were one object (Needham and Baillargeon, 1997). 
Anecdotal observations support this insight. Thus when an infant tries to post 
shapes (stars, triangles, circles, squares) through a box with shape receptacles, the 
infant with a triangle will explore every possible shape receptacle. Perhaps the 
triangle is oriented incorrectly for its receptacle. The infant does not rotate it to fit, 
but instead tries each shape receptacle again. Once successful, it gradually becomes 
more and more likely that the triangle will be posted through the correct triangle 
receptacle. The infant does not yet have a sophisticated awareness of the higher-
level physical structure of triangle shaped objects. Rather, functional knowledge of 
a specific triangle in the behavioural context of a specific game is being acquired. 
Indeed, it makes sense to assume that early functional knowledge of this sort is the 
most basic source of affordance. Furthermore it is probably highly (or even totally) 
dependent on the behavioural context of an activity (in the sense of Thelen & 
Smith's, 1994 crawlers and walkers study). Developmentally later, insight and 
awareness of the higher-level physical structure of objects and events becomes 
increasingly sophisticated. This sophistication might enable a child to automatically 
abstract fi-om and generalise to, those properties or dimensions of any number of 
new objects that are relevant for goal-independent action (i.e. physical-attribute 
based affordances such as micro-affordances). For T E C this abstraction might be 
abstract distal-level codes. For O'Regan and Noe (2001) as we have seen, this 
means abstracting from an infinite set of possibilities a series of laws of 
sensorimotor contingency that codes various properties of objects (such as shape). 
Of course, as argued earlier, these initially 'default representational settings' (or 
abstracted series of laws) can be modulated by goals, intentions and so on. 
3.2 Experimental Aims and Objectives 
In investigating these different possibilities, the experimental chapters that follow used a S-
R-C paradigm to explore the specificity of affordances related to an object's orientation; 
both with respect to the specificity of action properties afforded, and the specificity of 
visual attributes that evoke these affordances. The experimental work reported in this 
thesis therefore aimed to answer the following two questions: 
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1. "Do perception-action compatibility effects associated with an objects' orientation 
reflect a 'representational default setting' that is derived from a particular visual 
attribute (such as its axis of elongation within a particular dimension)." 
2. "If so, does this 'default setting' reflect a fixed affordance for a specific property of 
an action; or a loosely constrained affordance that is abstract or primitive enough to 
influence components of a range of left-right actions. Furthermore, is this 
affordance modifiable with respect to the behavioural context of a currently 
exercised activity." 
These questions are addressed by the following four objectives: 
Objective 1: To replicate a study by Symes (1999) where object location and object 
orientation compatibility efl'ects were obtained using left and right hand key-press 
responses to photographs of everyday objects. In this replication however, left and right 
responses are made with the feet, thus testing the hypothesis that a range of left-right 
actions can produce orientation-action compatibility eflects (Experiment 3.1). 
Objective 2: l o test for orientation-action compatibility etTects associated with diagonal 
two-dimensional lines, thus exploring the possibility that a specific visual attribute might 
aflbrd left-right actions; namely the angle of an object's X - Y axis. Using these simple 
stimuli, difl'erent left-right response types are used in order to test whether an\ 
compatibility effects are specific to hands, or viable for a range of actions (Experime 
4.1 4.3). 
nls 
Objective 3: l o lest for orientation-action compatibility effects associated with 
computer-generated three-dimensional cylinders that are oriented in three-dimensional 
space, thus exploring the possibility that a specific vi.sual attribute (i.e. the angle of an 
object's primary axis within a particular three-dimensional plane) might aftbrd left-right 
actions. Using these stimuli, dilTerent left-right response types are used in order to test 
whether any compatibility' etTects are specific to hands, or viable for a range of actio 
(Experiments 5.1 -5.3). 
Objective 4: lo develop Objective 3 further by exploring how the orientation-action 
compatibility effects established in Chapter 5 might be modulated by various task 
manipulations that include stimulus onset asynchrony, apparent motion and participation 
in an ongoing dynamic activity (Experiments 6.1 - 6.3). 
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3.3 A brief justification of the reaction time experiment 
The experimental work of this thesis involved a series of standard reaction-time 
experiments that adopted the S-R-C paradigm. The following briefly explains why such an 
approach is appropriate, despite popular criticisms that might suggest otherwise. As 
Hommel et al. (2001) noted in their response to the peer review for T E C ; standard 
reaction-time experiments (such as those employed using an S-R-C paradigm) have 
received criticism and even ridicule for being both too simple (see 1. below) and too 
difficult (see 2. below). Following fi-om this, there can be a tendency to promote dualism 
(by using tasks that are clearly delineated in terms of a stimulus and a response). This 
tendency was highlighted in Chapter 1, when reporting linear stage information processing 
accounts of S-R-C effects (e.g. Hasbroucq and Guiard, 1991; Komblum et al., 1990). A 
major objection targets the highly artificial nature of the typical reaction-time experiment. 
1. Too simple: On the one hand, the stimuli (e.g. arbitrary shapes, colours etc.), and 
the responses (e.g. key presses) themselves, are considered too simple. 'Real' visual 
stimuli involve complex scenes that are not static (e.g. look out of your window). 
'Real' actions involve the unfolding and coordination of multiple components of 
action (e.g. throw your pen in the air and catch it). 
2. Too difficult: On the other hand, the rule-imposed relationship between the stimuli 
(e.g. arbitrary shapes, colours etc.) and the responses (e.g. key presses) requires an 
often-arbitrary (hence difficult) coupling that is atypical to most everyday 
perception-action couplings.^' 
It is argued below that that these criticisms are not overiy damaging, and can even be seen 
as a distinct advantage. Firstly however, the following suggests that an altemative 
approach of applying more ecologically meaningful experimentation, suffers fi-om 
shortcomings that are the polar opposite of those presented above (these shortcomings are 
similar to those discussed in Chapter 1 with regard to the Ecological approach): 
'^ However, as Hommel et al (2001) argued, many perception-action couplings do involve simple arbitrary 
responses to stimuli (e.g. keyboards, alarm clocks etc.), yet we are nevertheless proficient at using them. A 
pertinent example is games consoles, where a series of arbitrary symbols on a controller soon become tightly 
coupled to realistic action effects that are realised in increasingly complex and realistic virtual worlds. 
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1. Too difficult: On the one hand, the stimuli (e.g. real objects and scenes), and the 
responses (e.g. real sequences of actions) themselves, can be considered too difficult. 
\x\ using complex visual scenes that are not static (i.e. real-world scenes) and complex 
coordinated actions (i.e. real-world actions), it is difficult to isolate the genuine 
influences of specific variables. In other words, in appealing to the real world, there 
is a danger of inscrutability owing to the vast number of interacting variables. 
3. Too simple: On the other hand, within certain perception-action couplings the natural 
relationship between a stimulus (e.g. a punch bag) and a response (e.g. a punch) can 
be so simple as to be trivial (e.g. Adam et al's 1996 study discussed in Chapter 1). 
Essentially the argument amounts to little more than a textbook debate on the pros and 
cons of various laboratory-based techniques versus more naturalistic techniques. It may be 
helpfril to appecd to an analogy here. Consider the crash testing of automobiles. The 
reaction-time experiment's equivalent might be to test in a controlled environment the 
effects of various targeted impacts. For example a car might be stationary, and various 
impact devices target specific areas of the car at varying speeds and forces. Findings are 
extrapolated to the potential impacts of real-world car crashes, and research and design 
modifications are made accordingly. One is not obliged to develop theories of car design 
that are restricted to this unnatural crash-test setting (hence cars are designed to move and 
not to be stationary in a testing bay). Analogously, in terms of reaction-time experiments in 
perception-action research, one is not obliged to import dualism fiom method into theory^ .^ 
The benefits of this highly controlled yet artificial approach include value and efficiency in 
terms of money and time, experimental control over specific variables, and repeatability. 
The drawbacks have been discussed above (it may be too simple and too difficult). 
Alternatives might be to stage life-like car crashes involving two or more cars; piece 
together in a post hoc fashion the factors involved in real car crashes; or (ethics aside), to 
lie in wait of an accident near potential crash sites. This is analogous to the more 
naturalistic perception-action experimentation favoured by the Ecological tradition (e.g. 
" Hommel et al (in press) make this same point in their defence. As a case in point, their theory explicitly 
attempts to avoid dualism. Thus T E C does not differentiate between a code for a percept and a code for an 
action. Similarly, the theoretical construct of an action-oriented representation avoids dualism, by 
simultaneously describing a situation and suggesting an appropriate reaction to it. 
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analysing the whole event of hitting a baseball). The major benefit of this approach 
principally involves uncovering nuances that might only emerge through the complex 
dynamics involved in real-world perception-action couplings (or real-world car crashes). 
Drawbacks include those discussed above (it may be too difficult and too simple), and the 
numerous practical issues involved in carrying out and analysing such work. 
Clearly both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, in asking 
the two major questions posed by this thesis (see section 3.2 above), the controlled 
reaction-time experiment is considered appropriate for the following reasons: 
1. Visual attribute specificity: When 'ecological' stimuli have been used in reaction-
time experiments; such as real-worid objects or photographs of them (e.g. Tucker 
and Ellis, 1998); one is left with a lack of specificity that results from the relative 
inscrutability of these objects. Hence it is not clear from Tucker and Ellis' (1998) 
study what aspect or aspects of an object's orientation actually afforded left-right 
actions. The use of simple artificial stimuli that are carefully controlled along one 
or two dimensions allows for a finer-grained investigation (e.g. Chapters 4 and 5). 
2. Action specificity: In using simple binary responses (e.g. hand key-presses) there is 
a danger of assuming that these responses are somehow privileged and exclusive 
(above and beyond the context of the experiment). Thus it has been assumed that 
facilitation for right hand key presses reflects an affordance for specific elements of 
a right-hand reach-to-grasp acfion (e.g. Tucker and Ellis, 1998). Nevertheless, this 
assumption can be challenged within the very same experimental fi-amework, 
simply by comparing performance to other kinds of simplisfic response, such as 
foot key-presses (e.g. Chapters 3-5). 
3. The behavioural activity: While ecological-type experiments are ideally suited to 
engaging a participant in a meaningful behavioural activity (e.g. hitting a baseball), 
there is also plenty of scope within a reaction-time experiment to pursue this line of 
enquiry. By using artificial stimuli that can be passively manipulated (i.e. viewer-
independent), or manipulated by action (i.e. viewer-dependent) within the context 
of a meaningful behavioural activity, there is an opportunity (which may not 
present itself in real worid activities) to isolate and control specific aspects of this 
activity (e.g. Chapter 6). 
120 
Chapter 3 - Action Potentiation Hypothesis 
3.4 Experiment 3.1 
Objective 1: l o replicate a study by Symcs (1999) where object location and object 
orientation compatibility etTects were obtained using left and right hand key-press 
responses to photographs of everyday objects. In this replication however, left and right 
responses are made with the feet, thus testing the hypothesis that a range of left-right 
actit)ns can produce orientation-action cc>mpatihilil\ cttccts. 
In using feet as the response effector, this first experiment directly tested the possibility 
that perception-action compatibility effects associated with an oriented object are not 
exclusive to hands, but instead reflect an advantage for a range of left-right compatible 
actions. There are a number of hypotheses that can be generated in this light: 
Action Specificity' Hypothesis 1 (Exclusive): An object property (e.g. orientation) 
alTords a left or right action property that is specific and exclusive to a particular action. 
Facilitation might occur for an interprelable affordance for left-right action (e.g. spatial 
hand key presses that are considered analogous to a reach towards an object), but not for 
other left-right actions (e.g. spatial foot kc\ presses that arc not oh\ ioiisix al lordcd). 
This first hypothesis is close to the APH's early intuitions. Thus in interpreting their object 
orientation compatibility effects. Tucker and Ellis (1998, p.844) wrote, 
'insofar as coding is involved, it arises from the potentiation of specific actions 
afforded by the object, in this case reaching by a particular hand, and 
n^nsequently, the stimulus dimensions along which compatibility etTccts 
emerge are based on their relevance for controlling those actions." 
Under this hypothesis, foot resjwnses would presumably not be expected to reveal 
orientation-compatibility effects, as they are not the specific lef^-right actions (e.g. 
reaching with a particular hand) that are relevant to the object's orientation. Indeed, Tucker 
& Ellis (1998) reported some preliminary evidence suggesting that orientation-compatible 
effects were specific to a hand of response. In their Experiment 2, unimanual finger 
responses were made to oriented objects, and no significant interaction was found in mean 
RTs (although significance was obtained using median RTs). Nevertheless, the incorrect 
response data did appear to suggest an advantage for orientation compatible responses. 
Overall, Tucker & Ellis' (1998) Experiment 2 did not provide data convincing enough to 
draw strong conclusions regarding the specificity of lef^ -right actions afforded by an 
object's orientation. Further doubts are raised concerning the affordance of a specific/ 
exclusive response, when a recent priming study by Phillips and Ward (2002) is 
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considered. Here, S-R-C effects were produced that suggested an object's visual 
affordance evoked more abstract spatial response codes that potentiated, in a similar 
manner, a wide variety of lateralized responses corresponding to the visual affordance (e.g. 
crossed hands, uncrossed hands, foot responses). 
Action Specificity Hypothesis 2 (Primitive): An object property (e.g. orientation) 
alTords a primitive left-right action property that is a common component to man\ 
different actions. Facilitation might occur for a range of actions that share as a 
component a certain visuomotor primitive. The level of behavioural facilitation for this 
range of actions would be expected to be indistinguishable, since the basis for 
l a c i l i t a t i o n is c \ a c t l \ ihc saFiic tor al l o t ' l h c m - n a m c l \ a s h a r e d \ isiiomolor primitive. 
This second hypothesis is close to the APH's more recent intuitions. In explaining their 
position. Tucker and Ellis (2001, p.773) wrote, 
" . . . the kind of motor representations automatically generated by a visual object 
may be expected to remain fairly primitive, possibly restricted to visuomotor 
primitives that are common to many different actions. Visuomotor primitives of 
this sort correspond to what we have termed the micro-affordances of the object 
and would be more likely to be generated by a semantically bhnd system such 
as the parietal-motor systems''. 
1 he details of which component of an action a proposed visuomotor pnmili\e might 
correspond to can only be speculated, but at a guess it might be expected that the initiation 
of certain left-right responses (e.g. spatial hand key presses, spatial foot key presses), 
might share the same spatial visuomotor primitive (or set of visuomotor primitives). 
Interestingly, this hypothesis does not necessarily suppose that whole classes of left-right 
actions are in some general sense afforded. Instead the APITs earlier assumption of 
specificity can be maintained (but this specificity cannot be treated as exclusivity). Thus it 
is possible that properties of a specific action are afforded by the orientation of a visual 
object (e.g. an oriented object might afford a specific component of a reach by a particular 
hand), it Just happens to he the case that the visuomotor primitives involved in initiating 
this action are also common to other actions. 
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Action Si)cciricity Hypothesis 3 (Weighted): An t)hjccl property (e.g. objeel orientation) 
alTords a specific left or right action property (that is weighted strongly), and the 
activation of this action property may spread by association to other action properties 
(whose weightings are weaker) within a distributed perception-action network. 
Facilitation might occur for an interpretable affordance for left-right action (e.g. a spatial 
key press that is considered analogous to a reach towards an objeel), and facilitation ma> 
also occur, but to a lesser extent, for other left-right actions (e.g. spatial foot responses 
that are not obviously atTorded). 
This third hypothesis resembles a standard associative accoimt, where a specific (and 
perhaps exclusive) action property may be strongly activated on viewing an object. This 
action property is associated with other actions and hence activation spreads, but 
characteristic of distributed networks, weakens. Thus the primary motor recipient of a left-
right affordance (e.g. a component of a reach with the left hand) will be strong, and its 
associated motor codes (e.g. for a left foot movement) will be activated to a lesser degree. 
A slightly more sophisticated account that maintains the notion of shared visuomotor 
primitives is TEC's common coding approach. A given feature code (cf. visuomotor 
primitive) is common to many objects and actions, and thus a range of actions may be 
facilitated by a certain object property (as would also be expected under Action Specificity 
Hypothesis 2). However, according to the relevance for action in a given circumstance 
(that is modulated by intentions, attention and a history of interactions), TEC's 'feature 
weighting principle' (return to Figure 2.4) would predict that action properties that are also 
initially activated by viewing the object (such as a grasp for a left hand) will have the 
knock on effect of increasing the weighting of their associated codes. Thus those 
properties pertaining to the most relevant action (e.g. a common L E F T code, or a shared 
spatial visuomotor primitive) will be weighted more highly than those very same 
properties that might be activated by less relevant actions (e.g. a left foot response). 
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\ c t i on Specificitv H>p<»tht>is 4 (Set I p): A n action thai is 'set up* (i.e. partial!) 
programmed or soft-assembled) will heighten perceptual awareness (in terms of 
attention) to visual properties of the object that are relevant to that action. In tum that 
visual property will be more likely to afford the same properties of an action that have 
been \set up'. Eacilitation might occur for a range of actions that are compatible with an 
object propcriN w i t h i n the context o\ {he physical paranicu ic experiment. 
This fourth hypothesis fits with the notion of a perception-action loop as discussed in 
Chapter 1 (where action influences perception and vice-versa). Accordingly, it would be 
expected that a physical and intentional preparedness to perform certain actions (e.g. left 
and right foot presses) should make these actions relevant to certain object properties (with 
which they might not normally share an obvious compatibility). Unfortunately, the pattern 
of behavioural facilitation that might be expected under this hypothesis (e.g. the 
facilitation of both hand and foot key presses) does not necessarily distinguish between 
those expected under hypotheses 2 (similar facilitation) and 3 (differential facilitation). 
This 'setting up' of actions is complementary to TEC's common codes, which are 
indiscriminate in that they do not distinguish between a cause and an effect (or a stimulus 
and a response). This is so because a perceptual feature code (e.g. L E F T ) and an action 
feature code (e.g. L E F T ) are one and the same entity. Thus L E F T and RIGHT codes might 
be partially activated by a physical readiness to perform a spatial task, and perceptual 
features of an object that correspond to a Meftness' or 'rightness' will already have been 
planned or anticipated (because they are represented by the same common codes), thus 
paving the way for a compatibility effect once the object is seen. 
Overview 
Experiment 3.1 reported below, replicated^^ Experiment 1 of Symes (1999). In the Symes 
(1999) study, photographs of a selection of horizontally oriented objects fi-om the kitchen 
(e.g. saucepans, mugs, jugs etc.) and horizontally oriented objects from the garage (e.g. 
drills, hammers, screwdrivers etc.) were shown to participants. The objects were located 
This replication was identical to Symes (1999) with respect to the number of participants, the stimulus set 
and the procedure. 
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either on the left or the right of the screen (thus testing whether the relationship that spatial 
responses had with object location and object orientation were separate and distinct). As 
participants responded with a left or right hand key press to the object category (e.g. left 
response for kitchen, right response for garage), the location and orientation of the objects 
were task-irrelevant* .^ Compatibility effects associated with object location and object 
orientation were found to be distinguishable (and indeed, there were signs that they 
interacted with each other). 
The Symes (1999) study revealed two findings associated with responses that are of 
particular relevance for this replication: 
1. A statistically significant interaction between the object location (left or right) and 
the hand of response (left or right). Responses were faster and more accurate when 
they were compatible with the location of the object (e.g. a right response is 
compatible with a right object location). This result resembled a straightforward 
spatial S-R-C effect (i.e. a Simon-like effect). 
2. A statistically significant interaction between the horizontal orientation of an object 
and the hand of response. Responses were faster and more accurate when they were 
compatible with the orientation of the object (e.g. a right response is compatible 
with an object oriented rightwards). This result resembled the orientation 
compatibility effect reported in Tucker and Ellis's (1998) study (return, to Fig A. in 
Box 3.1). 
In replicating the Symes (1999) study. Experiment 3.1 revealed similar results. For 1, the 
trend of the interaction was similar for response speeds and accuracy; while for 2, the trend 
of the interaction was similar for response speeds only. It is not surprising that foot 
responses produced a Simon-effect (location is an object property that has relevance for a 
vast range of actions), and the literature on the Simon Effect demonstrates its robustness 
across any number of response types that have a spatial dimension (see Chapter 1), 
^ Actually, it is over-simplistic to claim that object location was task-irrelevant, as clearly in order to 
categorise an object one must look at it (and therefore its location). Nevertheless, location was not the critical 
stimulus. 
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Of most theoretical interest was the observed interaction between the horizontal orientation 
of an object and the foot of response (where responses were faster when they were 
compatible with the orientation of the object). In this light. Action Specificity Hypothesis 1 
(Exclusive) can be rejected. In comparing the data to the Symes (1999) study (which used 
hand responses), no statistically significant results were found between experiments. This 
finding does not support Action Specificity Hypothesis 3 (Weighted). However, the 
finding of an orientation-action compatibility effect using foot responses does supports the 
idea of an amodal action-oriented representation that operates at a common coding level 
(cf. visuomotor primitives common to many actions). This is in keeping with Action 
Specificity Hypothesis 2 (Primitive) and Action Specificity Hypothesis 4 ('Set up'). The 
motor component of this representation was presumably abstract or primitive enough to 
influence foot responses by virtue of either a) these responses sharing the same visuomotor 
codes as those of simple hand responses, and/or b) these responses having been 'set up' in 
the first place by the constraints of the experiment (even though foot responses have no 
obvious action-relevance to an object's horizontal orientation). 
3.4.1 Method 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduate volunteers fi^om the University of Plymouth were awarded either 
course credit or £2.50 for participating. They were all naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal colour vision and normal 
motor control of the hands and feet. Age, gender and handedness were not controlled for, 
although the vast majority of participants were female, right-handed and in their late, teens 
or early twenties (reflecting the current demographics of Psychology undergraduate 
courses). 
Apparatus 
The experiments took place in a small, darkened room that contained a single table and 
chair. On the table was a PC that ran a program equipped with millisecond timers. Stimuli 
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were displayed on a Mitsubishi 67tx 19-inch colour monitor (1024 x 768 @ 100 Hz) and 
all reaction times (RTs) and mistakes were recorded to a data file. 
The foot response device: A wooden board with two inlaid micro-switches fixed 
approximately 60cm apart, was located on the floor directly under the monitor. Hinged 
Perspex flaps covered the micro-switches, allowing the balls of the feet to rest on them. 
The back of the board was raised fi-om the floor at an angle of approximately 25**, 
allowing the feet to rest at a comfortable angle. 
Materials 
A blue background with the centrally placed words 'Get Ready' served as the inler-trial 
stimulus. The stimulus set consisted of 44 colour digital photographs (640 x 400 dpi) of 
common household objects. 22 objects were kitchen-related and 22 objects were garage-
related (see Figure 3.2). The objects were manipulated in two horizontal orientations 
(leftwards and rightwards) and two locations (left and right). In total there were 44 
(objects) X 2 (horizontal object orientations) x 2 (object locations) = 176 different images. 
See Figure 3.3 for an illustration of the stimulus set and stimulus properties associated with 
one kitchen and one garage object. 
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Figure 3.2 44 objects used in Experiment 3.1 (and the study by Symes, 1999) Above the 
dotted line are kitchen objects, below the dotted line are garage objects The objects are only 
shown in the rightwards horizontal orientation 
a) 
X X 
X X 
b) 
Figure 3.3 A definition of stimulus attributes, a) An example object shown in two locations and 
two horizontal orientations The icons illustrate the screen location of the object (grey icons) 
and its horizontal orientatbn (green icons) b) This illustratkjn depk:ts the X-Z plane (the plane 
in which the objects are oriented). The thick green lines represent an arbitrary reference point 
in this plane (located at the leading edge of the plane, which is nearest to the viewer in space) 
This reference point allows the use of arrowheads in the X-Z plane icons (which always point 
towards the reference point). Thus arrowheads in the icons of a) that point left define the object 
as t)eing oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane, and arrowheads that point right define the object 
as t>eing oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane 
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Design 
The two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. The three within subjects 
independent variables were horizontal object orientation (leftwards, rightwards), object 
location (left, right) and foot of response (left, right). The between subjects independent 
variable was mapping rule. Thus the experiment was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures 
design, as illustrated in Table 3,1. 
Table 3.1 Experimental design for Experiment 3.1. Key: mapping rule (MR), condition 1 (C1), 
condition 2 (C2). experimental group (G) 
M 
CI 
R 
C2 
. Leftwards Onentation „ . , 
Rightwards 
G | ( n = 1 5 ) 
G , ( n = l 5 ) 
Gz ( n = 1 5 ) 
Gz ( n = l 5 ) 
Left Location „ . . Right 
G | ( n = l 5 ) 
G | ( n = l 5 ) 
G2 (n=15) 
^Gz (n=15) 
Left Response „ . . ^ Right 
G , (n=15) 
G i ( n = l 5 ) 
G2 ( n = I 5 ) 
G2 (n=15) 
In mapping rule: condition 1 (MR: C I ) [n = 15], left foot responses were made to kitchen 
objects and right foot responses were made to garage objects. This 'foot of response/object 
category' pairing was reversed in mapping rule: condition 2 (MR: C2) [n = 15]. A practice 
session consisted of one block of 30 trials. The main experiment consisted of one block of 
352 trials (each image was presented twice, thus 176 images x 2 = 352 trials). The order of 
images was randomised in one block of 352. As responses were dependent on the kitchen 
or garage category of the object, the independent variables of object location and object 
orientation were task irrelevant. 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
All participants were asked to read and sign a consent form informing them of their rights 
within the context of the ethical guidelines outlined by the British Psychological Society. 
In addition participants were asked to sign a form acknowledging their receipt of payment. 
Participants sat at the table, facing the monitor with an initial eye to screen distance of 
approximately 50cm. As a general instruction, participants were asked to make fast 
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responses to stimuli, without incurring more than 10 % mistakes. Participants were told at 
some length that there was an ideal balance of speed and accuracy to aim for, which 
involved malting quick responses, but not so quick that they continuously made mistakes. 
By the same token they were not to avoid making mistakes altogether, as this would 
suggest they were not responding quickly enough overall. Participants were given a 
practice session to familiarise themselves with the task, and then started the main 
experiment. All mistakes and time-outs (see below for definitions) were signalled by a 
beep from the computer. Keys "p" and "c" on the keyboard served to pause and continue 
each experiment, and were available throughout, had the participant required a rest. 
Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- MR: C I , 
Group 2- MR: C2). According to their group allocation, they were instructed which foot to 
respond with for each object category. After completing the practice session, the main 
experiment began. The experimental trial procedure is outlined in Box 3.2. 
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Box 3.2 Trial procedure for Experiment 3.1. The clock icon depicts a millisecond timer 
and the shoe icon depicts a foot key press. The colour red corresponds to an 
incorrect response. 
The schematic below depicts three typical trials for a participant assigned to MR C2 (left 
responses for garage objects, right responses for kitchen objects). For each trial, the inter-
tnal stimulus was shown for 1 5 seconds and was then replaced with the target stimulus A 
millisecond timer measured the time that the target stimulus remained on the screen This 
could be until the participant made a left or right foot response, or until three seconds had 
passed and the thai was given time-out Following the response (or time-out) the target 
stimulus was immediately replaced with the inter-tnal stimulus for a new trial, thus 
completing the loop. 
Trial 1 
^ Required ^ ^ 
m R T - _ ^ Response V Actual f /Tf^ RT 
^ ^ ^ " ^ (Kitchen) ^ Response Vl>/stop 
/ T T N r r r K i ^^^^^uired Actual Response 
\ {_ j j / secs 
^ -^ « Required ^ „ 
(fT^ _ ^ W Response Actual V RT 
Vl^start \ (Garage) ^ ^ P ^ ^ ® • vL^stop 
3.4.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analysis by Participants (A by P): Two subsets of data were selected from the raw data for 
statistical analysis. The correct response data consisted of the mean RTs (for each parlicipanl 
in each condition) of all trials that remained once the following had been removed: 
a Trials that violated the task rule (i.e. mistakes were removed). 
b. Trials that exceeded a 'time-out' limit of 3 seconds (i.e. 'time-outs' were removed). 
c. Trials that were two standard deviations above or below each participant's overall 
mean correct score (i.e. outliers were removed). 
From the remaining R T data, means were calculated. These mean correct RTs served as input 
for the first analysis of variance (ANOVA). The incorrect response data was derived from the 
mean percentage of mistakes (see a. above) for each participant in each condition. The mean 
percentages of mistakes served as input for the second ANOVA. In each A by P, participants 
were entered as a random factor. The depxmdent variables were RTs and mistakes. 
131 
Chapter 3 - Action Potentiation Hypothesis 
Analysis hy Materials (A by M): Two subsets of data were selected from the raw data for 
statistical analysis. The correct response data consisted of the mean RTs (for each object 
in each condition) of all trials that remained once the following had been removed: 
a. Trials that violated the task rule (i.e. mistakes were removed). 
b. I rials that exceeded a 'time-out' limit of 3 seconds (i.e. nime-outs' were removed). 
c. Trials that were two standard deviations above or below each object's overall mean 
correct score (i.e. outliers were removed). 
From the remaining RT data, means were calculated. These mean correct RTs served as 
input for the first analysis of variance (ANOVA). The incorrect response data was derived 
from the mean percentage of mistakes (see a. above) for each object in each condition. I he 
mean percentages of mistakes served as input for the second ANOVA. In each A by M , 
objects were entered as a random factor. The dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. 
Four repeated measures ANOVAs (located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between 
subjects independent variable of mapping rule (condition 1: kitchen objects/ left response, 
condition 2: garage objects/ right respx)nse), and the within subjects independent variables 
of X-Z object orientation (leftwards, rightwards), object location (left, right), and foot of 
response (left, right). The dependent variables were RTs (the first two ANOVAs; A by P 
and A by M) and mistakes (the second two ANOVAs; A by P and A by M). The results for 
Experiment 3.1 are summarised in Table 3.2. Key results are reported in the text and 
remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
Table 3.2 Main effects and interactions reported in Experiment 3.1. Key: analysis by 
participants (A by P). analysis by materials (A by M). mean RTs (black), mean mistakes 
(red), statistical significance status (approaching, yes, no) M depicts results of key 
theoretical interest 
Result no Source 
3.1.1 y X - Z object orientation 
3.1.2 Response X Mapping rule 
3.1.3 Object location ^ Mapping rule 
3 1 4 y Object Location x Response 
^ . c . X - Z object orientation x 
Response. 
^ ^ g Object location x Response x 
Mapping rule 
A by P : A by M 
Yes No : Yes No 
No Yes : Yes Yes 
No Yes : No No 
Yes Yes : Yes Yes 
a 
I 
App No ; Yes No 
No No i No Yes 
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Main Effects [3.1.1 y ] 
There was a significant main effect (in both analyses) of X-Z object orientation in RTs (A 
by P: [ F ( l , 28) = 11.675,/?< 0.005], A by M: [ F ( l , 42) = 6.511, p < 0.05]), but not in 
mistakes (A by P: [ F ( I , 28) = 0.732,/? > 0.1], A by M: [F(1, 42) = l.212,p > 0.1]). Mean 
RTs were 13 ms (A by P) and 7 ms (A by M) faster for objects oriented rightwards rather 
than leftwards. This main effect revealed that regardless of which foot (left or right) 
responses were made with, there was an advantage for rightwards-oriented objects. It can 
be speculated that the predominantly right-handed participants were more perceptually 
sensitive to objects that were oriented rightwards, by virtue of their long history of 
interacting with handled objects predominantly with their right hands. This is obviously a 
major speculation that would require considerably more evidence than is provided here to 
support it. Nevertheless, it is an intriguing possibility with major theoretical implications. 
Means and standard errors for this main effect [3.1.1] are shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Mean RTs (ms) and standard errors (SE) for significant main effect in Experiment 3.1. 
X-Z Orientation Aby P Aby M 
[3.1.11 '^(ms) SE (ms) S E 
Leftward 746 22 736 7 
Rightward 733 20 i 729 7 
Two-way Interactions [3.1.4y] 
There was a significant interaction between object location and foot of response, in both 
RTs (A by P: [F{\, 28) - 29.497,p< 0.001], A by M: [F(\, 42) = 6 0 . 5 8 0 , < 0.001]) and 
mistakes (A by P: [ F ( l , 28) = 20.351,p < 0.001], A by M: [ F ( l , 42) = 25.136,p < 0.001]) 
(see Figure 3.4). For left located obiects. mean RTs were 19 ms (A by P) and 20 ms (A by 
M) faster (and mean mistakes were 2.1 % (A by P and A by M) fewer) for left rather than 
right foot responses. For right located obiects. mean RTs were 30 ms (A by P) and 24 ms 
(A by M) faster (and mean mistakes were 2 % (A by P and A by M) fewer) for right rather 
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than left foot responses. This pattern resembled a straightforward spatial stimulus-
response compatibility effect (e.g. a Simon Effect). 
A by P A b y P 
S 730 
Left Right 
Object Location 
Left Right 
Object Location 
H 740 
- T O r - A b y M A by M 
Left Right 
Object Location 
Left Right 
Object Location 
KEY 
9— Left response 
I Right response 
MEANS TABLE 
A b y P A b y M 
Loc Resp ms SE SE ms SE SE 
L L 727 21 2.0 0.4 721 7 2.0 0.5 
L R 746 21 4.1 0.7 741 8 4.1 0.8 
R L 757 22 4.1 0.5 746 8 4.1 0.7 
R R 727 21 2.1 0.4 722 7 2.1 0.4 
Figure 3.4 (A by P and A by M) Mean RTs (black lines) and mean mistakes (red lines) as a 
function of foot of response and object location 
Two-way Interactions [3.1.5/^] 
I here was a significant interaction between X-Z object orientation and foot of response in 
RTs (A by P: [ F ( l , 28) = 4.060,p = 0.054], A by M : 42) = 4.732,/? < 0.05]) but not 
in mistakes (A by P: [ F ( 1 , 28) = 0.115, p > 0.50), A by M : [F ( 1 , 42) = 0.147,/? > 0.5]) 
(see Figure 3.5). For objects oriented leftwards, mean RTs were 3 ms (A by P) and 4 ms (A 
by M) faster for left rather than right foot responses. For objects oriented rightwards, mean 
RTs were 12 ms (A by P) and 8 ms (A by M) faster for right rather than left responses. 
This interaction revealed an advantage when horizontally orientated household objects 
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were compatible with foot responses, supporting the notion of abstract action-oriented 
representations (e.g. 'common codes') that are sufficiently under-specified as to influence 
a range of compatible responses, so long as those responses have been 'set up' by a 
physical context.^' 
A by P 
S 740 
Q: 735 
A by M 
O 
Left Right 
Object Orientation (XZ) 
Left Right 
Object Orientation (XZ) 
KEY 
e — Left response 
•f^— Right response 
MEANS TABLE 
A b y P A b y M 
On Resp ms SE ' SE ms SE % SE 
L L 744 21 0.5 734 8 2 8 0 6 
L R 747 23 3.0 0.6 738 8 3.0 0.6 
R L 739 21 3.3 0.5 733 7 3.3 0.6 
R R 727 20 3.2 0.5 725 7 3.2 0.5 
Figure 3.5 (A by P and A by M) Mean RTs as a function of foot of response and X-Z object 
orientation 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3.1 was a replication of a study by Symes (1999); a study that reported 
facilitation of lef\ and right hand key presses that were compatible with the horizontal 
orientations and locations of a series of objects. Tlie purpose of the replication was simply 
to establish whether foot responses would produce similar compatibility effects as those 
found for hands. Four Action Specificity Hypotheses were generated: 1- a specific action 
property is afforded that is exclusive to one action; 2- a primitive action property is 
afforded that is common to many actions; 3- a specific action property is maximally 
" A direct statistical comparison of this Experiment 3.1 with Experiment I of Symes (1999) did not reveal a 
significant difference between the interaction of X-Z object orientation x hand of response (found in the 
Symes, 1999 Experiment I ) and the interaction of X-Z object orientation x foot of response (reported above). 
It therefore appears that hand and foot responses do not behave differently with respect to horizontal object 
orientation, further supporting the notion of 'common codes'. The statistical comparison between 
experiments has not been reported for reasons of brevity, however the ANOVA is located in Appendix 1. 
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afforded but other action properties are to a lesser extent activated; 4- a range of actions 
can be afforded by virtue of being physically 'set up' by task parameters. 
The most important result relating to the orientation of an object [3.1.5y] revealed the 
facilitation of compatible foot responses (reflected in RTs) in a manner similar to those 
effects found for hand responses used by Symes, 1999 (and Tucker and Ellis, 1998). This 
fmding did not support Action Specificity Hypothesis 1 (which proposed that a specific 
action property is afforded that is exclusive to one action), but instead provided some 
support for Action Specificity Hypothesis 2. Here, an object property (e.g. orientation) 
might afford a primitive left or right action property that is a common component to many 
different actions. In addition, this finding is in keeping with Action Specificity Hypothesis 
4, whereby an action that is 'set up' (i.e. partially programmed or soft-assembled) will 
heighten perceptual awareness (in terms of attention) to visual properties of the object (in 
this case orientation) that become relevant to that action. In turn that visual property will be 
more likely to afford the same properties of an action that have been 'set up' 
In finding support for Action Specificity Hypothesis 2, there is no need to accept that the 
'setting up' of actions played a part in the interaction between foot of response and object 
orientation reported in Experiment 3.1. The commonality of visuomotor primitives to a 
range of actions is in itself a sufficient (if somewhat under-specified) explanation of the 
data. Indeed, the APH does not accept that the 'setting up' of actions contributed to their 
compatibility effects. Thus Ellis and Tucker (2000, p. 466) explained with respect to their 
object size compatibility effects (return to Figure 3.1 part C), 
"It is true that an aspect of the object is relevant to a viewer's current behaviour. 
He/she is after all making compatible/incompatible responses. Our point is that 
a viewer is being affected by grasp-related properties of an object, which he/she 
has no intention of grasping". 
O f course an arbitrary coding account such as the DO model would also predict the results obtained. 
However, as has been argued earlier, this interpretation loses credibility i f an embodied approach to cognition 
is accepted. 
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In other words, Ellis and Tucker (2000) are claiming that their compatibility effects do not 
reflect, in part, an influence of the actions that are 'set up', (such as a power grip that is 'set 
up' by holding a cylindrical response device in a power grip). They appear to be claiming 
instead that this action (the power grip) is the afforded action regardless of any intention to 
grasp the object (and crucially also, regardless of any intention to grasp the power grip 
response device). Ironically however, participants do have an intention to grasp the power 
grip response device (and in Experiment 3.1, to press a key with a particular foot), 
precisely because the task demands it. This fact exposes something of a vicious cycle in the 
reaction-time experiment approach. The response that is being made is often designed to 
mimic a real-world action (e.g. a power grip or a reach), and the inferences drawn concern 
an affordance for this type of action. However, as a consequence it can only ever be 
speculated that the effects produced relate to an underiying affordance for the said action, 
rather than the influence implicitly involved in being intentionally and physically prepared 
to make that same action. There is of course no reason why both influences should not be 
at play- indeed a perception-action loop account (see Chapter 1) would make exactly this 
claim. 
3.5 General Discussion 
If the notion of a perception-action loop is taken seriously, then it is clear that the 
influences of intentions and physical constraints involved in a task should not be ignored. 
Fortunately, accepting this does not oblige one to get bogged down with all die 
complexities of a dynamic perception-action loop (which as has been argued previously, 
can lead to inscrutability). In justifying this claim, it is helpful to discuss an approach that 
Clark (1997, p. 104) refers to as the "catch and toss" approach. Clark (1997) suggested 
that the "catch and toss" approach is a sensitive and canny version of componential 
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explanation"''. Here, the environment is treated as a source of inputs to the thinking brain (a 
dichotomy that the Enactive Approach rejects). Thus the world tosses inputs to the brain 
and the brain catches these inputs and tosses actions back. That this view applies to the 
APH is particularly apparent when Ellis and Tucker (2000, p. 466) suggest that, "...a viewer 
is being affected by grasp-related properties of an object". Thus the world tosses inputs to the 
brain (e.g. grasp-related visual properties of an object), and the brain catches these inputs 
and tosses actions back (e.g. elements of a power grip are automatically potentiated). 
This approach is nevertheless sympathetic to an embodied perspective, and appreciates the 
dynamics of environment-agent interactions without committing to a dynamical systems 
theory approach. According to Clark (1997, p.466) it recognises the multiple and complex 
ways in which 'inner jobs' can be simplified by means of real-world structure, bodily 
dynamics and active interventions in the world. Clark (1997) offered animate vision as an 
example (see Chapter 1 for discussion), whereby low-resolution visual input can lead to 
real-world actions (e.g. head or eye movements) that in turn generate more suitable input 
for higher-resolution processing. Interestingly, because this appreciation of the dynamic 
agent-environment relationship is grossly oversimplified, it consequently allows for a 
componenti£il explanation. As was argued in section 3.3, this can be advantageous. 
Somewhat unsatisfactorily however, Ellis and Tucker (2000) only appear to commit to one 
half of the "catch and toss" approach, and therefore might be described as "tossers". On 
occasion, the APH appears to uphold the traditional temporal ordering of an 'input -> 
output' relationship by only arguing that inputs (e.g. visual attributes such as object 
orientation or object size) are caught and then outputs are tossed back (e.g. potentiated 
elements of a reach or grasp action). They have not acknowledged that actions can be 
tossed (i.e. the 'setting up' of a power grip or a hand for reaching) which influences the 
" According to Clark (1997), componeniial explanation explains the capacities of an overall system by 
addressing the capacities and roles of its components. In short it is a reductionist approach. The APH (and the 
experiments in this thesis) essentially aims to provide a componential explanation o f the vision-action system 
by identifying the capacities and roles of its components (primarily, how components of actions are 
influenced by components of visual inputs). 
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kind of inputs that are caught (e.g. attention is directed, or perceptual sensitivity is 
heightened, to the action-relevant size or orientation of an object). 
The specificity of visual attributes 
The discussion of Experiment 3.1 has concentrated on the specificity of properties of 
actions that might be afforded by properties of an object. It is equally important to address 
the specificity of visual attributes (visually perceivable properties of an object) that might 
afford actions. It is apparent from the stimulus set of Experiment 3.1 (return to Fig. 3.1) 
that each object had various features that contributed to its orientation. Thus a screwdriver 
had one horizontal axis of elongation whereas a hammer had two. A jug on the other hand 
had as its principal axis, a vertical axis of elongation. Furthermore all objects were 
ftmctional objects with handles that carried connotations for action, and in each case the 
handle was pointed towards a particular side of the screen (i.e. towards a particular side of 
the viewer's body). It is not clear then, in using photographs of real-world objects, what 
property or properties of orientation might carry the most relevance for left-right actions. 
In short, what visual attribute or attributes influence the outcome of orientation-
compatibility effects? 
A more carefully controlled stimulus set might consist of artificial objects that vary along 
one or two specific dimensions only. In using artificial objects, the influences of particular 
object properties could be examined in relative isolation, thus allowing a systematic 
examination of which specific properties of an object's orientation might afford left-right 
actions. The next two experimental chapters adopt this approach by examining a range of 
left-right response types (thus continuing to investigate action specificity) that dJt made to 
a series of artificially constructed objects. 
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4, Two-dimensional (2D) object orientation 
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4.1 Experimental Hypotheses and Overview 
Objective 2: To test for orientation-action compalibilily effects associated with diagonal 
two-dimensional lines, thus exploring the possibility that a specific visual attribute might 
afford left-right actions; namely the angle of an object's X-Y axis. Using these simple 
stimuli, diflerent left-right response types are used in order to test whether an\ 
c o n i p a l i b i l i l N clTccls arc specific \o hands, or \ i ah ic for a range of actions. 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that the orientation-action compatibility effects that 1 ucker and 
Ellis (1998) interpreted as evidence for micro-afTordances did not distinguish between a 
number of possibilities, which included the following: 
Firstly, i f these effects reflected the automatic potentiation of left-right actions associated 
with purely visual attributes of an object (possibly through activating a 'default 
representational setting' that is abstracted from viewing an oriented object); then one must 
ask what these visual attributes are. 
Secondly, there is the possibility that the motor components of these visual attribute-related 
affordances are abstract or primitive enough to influence any number of compatible 
responses, particularly i f these responses are 'set up' in the first place by the physical 
context of the task. Experiment 3.1 provided some evidence supporting this notion. 
Thirdly, it is of interest how the role of a currently exercised behavioural activity might 
give an object an 'activity-based' or 'functional' affordance (that might modulate an 
already existing default representational setting). 
The three experiments in this chapter addressed the first two possibilities by examining 
how different left-right response types behaved with respect to simplistic artificial objects. 
In addressing the specificity of left-right actions afforded, the four Action Specificity 
Hypotheses generated in the previous chapter remained under investigation ( 1 - a specific 
action property is afforded that is exclusive to one action; 2- a primitive action property is 
alTorded that is common to many actions; 3- a specific action property is maximally 
afforded but other action properties are to a lesser extent activated; 4- a range of actions 
can be afforded by virtue of being physically 'set up' by task parameters). In addressing 
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the sp)ecincity of visual attributes that afford left-right actions, the following hypothesis 
was under investigation: 
Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1: The most basic property of an object's orientation (its 
primary axis of elongation in the X-Y plane) is a specific visual attribute that affords 
left-right actions. Facilitation might occur for left or right responses that are compatible 
with this X-Y orientation. 
In testing Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1, Experiments 4.1-4.3 used as an abstract visual 
stimulus the most basic property of an object's orientation, namely its primary axis of 
elongation in the X-Y plane. Thus two diagonal lines (one oriented at 45° from the 
perpendicular, the other its horizontal mirror image) were used to explore the possibility 
that this basic dimension of orientation might afford left-right actions. Because responses 
were made to the colour of the 2D diagonal lines, the X-Y orientation of these lines was 
task irrelevant. Consequently it was assumed that any orientation-action compatibility 
effects obtained would reflect a goal-independent automatic activation of responses. The 
results consistently failed to demonstrate performance-related benefits associated with the 
task-irrelevant X-Y orientation of a 2D line. This was in spite of manipulations that varied 
the ease of colour discrimination and manipulations that varied the critical stimulus onset. 
In testing the four Action Specificity Hypotheses, hand responses and foot responses were 
made to the same 2D stimuli. The results consistently failed to demonstrate performance-
related benefits associated with the task-irrelevant X-Y orientation of a 2D line, regardless 
of whether hand or foot responses were made. 
It was concluded that Experiments 4.1-4.3 did not support Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1, 
where it was suggested that the most basic visual attribute imderlying an object's 
orientation (i.e. its primary axis of elongation in the X-Y plane) was a visual attribute that 
might afford left-right actions. Furthermore, no conclusions could be drawn regarding the 
four Action Specificity Hypotheses, owing to the generic lack of a compatibility effect 
associated with the X-Y plane. 
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4.2 Experiment 4.1 
In in using two-dimensional diagonal lines as stimuli, varying their location, and 
comparing foot responses with hand responses; Experiment 4.1 served as a broad one-shot 
experiment that addressed many of the issues raised by Experiment 3.1. Thus it was tested 
whether the orientation in the X-Y plane of an abstract stimulus (that carried no 
connotations of object function or visual saliency) would reveal itself as a basic visual 
attribute that might afford left-right actions (Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1). I f so, perhaps 
this was the action-relevant visual attribute that had been extracted from the real visual 
objects used in Experiment 3.1. Furthermore, it was tested whether object location would 
again be shown to have a separate influence on responses (as was the case in the Symes, 
1999 study). Finally, it was tested whether foot and hand responses would behave 
differently; or not, as was demonstrated in Experiment 3.1. 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants 
As lixperiment 3.1 (undergraduate volunteers etc.), but 32 participants were used. 
Apparatus 
As Experiment 3.1 (small darkened room, PC etc.), but two response devices were used 
(one for hands and one for feet). A gentle downward press of a response device depressed 
a micro-switch that registered the response. 
1. 77?^  hand response device: A wooden board with two inlaid micro-switches fixed 
approximately 40cm apart, was located on the table directly in front of the monitor. 
2. The foot response device: As Experiment 3.1. 
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Materials 
The screen background was a light grey colour at all times. The inter-trial stimulus was a 
centrally placed black circle. The stimulus set was based on two computer-generated 
diagonal lines (a 2D vertical line rotated 45 ° clockwise about its centre, one clockwise and 
the other anti-clockwise). Both diagonal lines were reproduced in two colours (green and 
yellow), resulting in a stimulus set of four lines. These lines were displayed in three screen 
positions (left, centre and right). See Figure 4.1 for an illustration of the stimulus set and 
stimulus prop>erties. 
a) ^ WW X \ 
X \ X 
Figure 4.1 a) Stimulus set for Experiment 4 1, showing all combinations of location and X-Y 
onentation (only yellow lines are shown) The grey icons illustrate the screen location of the 
line (left, centre, right) and blue icons illustrate the X-Y onentation of the line b) This 
illustration depicts the X-Y plane (the plane in which the lines are oriented). The thick blue 
line represents an arbitrary reference point in this plane (located at the bottom edge of the 
plane, which is nearest to the viewer's hands in space) This reference point allows the use 
of arrowheads in the X-Y plane icons (which always point towards the reference point) Thus 
arrowheads in the icons of a) that point left define the object as being oriented leftwards in 
the X-Y plane, and arrowheads that point right define the object as being oriented rightwards 
in the X-Y plane 
Design 
The two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. The four within subjects independent 
variables were spatial response (left, right), X-Y line orientation (leftwards, rightwards), 
effector (hands, feet) and line location (left, centre, right). The two between subjects 
independent variables were mapping rule 1 and mapping rule 2. Thus the experiment was a 
2 x 2 x 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design, as illustrated in Table 4.1. 
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In mapping rule 1: condition 1 ( M R l : CI ) [n = 16], responses were made with hands for 
the first block of the experiment and feet for the second block. The order of response 
effector was reversed in mapping rule 1: condition 2 ( M R l : C2) [n = 16]. In mapping rule 
2: condition 1 (MR2: C I ) [n = 16], left spatial responses were made to green lines and right 
spatial responses were made to yellow lines. The 'spatial response-colour pairing' was 
reversed in mapping rule 2: condition 2 (MR2: C2) [n = 16]. A practice session consisted 
of 20 trials, divided into two blocks of 10 trials (allowing for response effector 
changeover). The main experiment consisted of 720 trials, divided into two blocks of 360 
trials (allowing for response effector changeover). For each block, each incidence of line 
was presented 30 times (2 blocks x 4 lines x 3 locations x 30 presentations = 720 trials). 
The order of lines was randomised within each block. As responses were dependent on line 
colour, the independent variables of line location and X-Y line orientation were task 
irrelevant. 
Table 4.1 Experimental design for Experiment 4.1. Key: mapping rule 1 (MRl), mapping rule 
2 (MR2). condition 1 (C1), condition 2 (C2), experimental group (G) 
Effector Hands 
Feet 
Left location Location „ . , , 
. Leftwards orientation Orientation „ . , 
Rightwards orientation 
Left spatial response Response . - . j ^ l ^ Right spatial response 
Effector Hands 
Feet 
, . Left location Location . . , 
^ . , Leftwards orientation Onentation „ . . . . . . 
Ri^twards onentation 
Response """" Left^ spaViai "response 
Right spatial response 
MRl 
CI 
G, 
G, 
G, 
G. 
G, 
G. 
G, 
G, 
G3 
G3 
G3 
G3 
G3 (n 
G3 (n 
G3 
G3 
C2 
G2 
9.2. 
G2 
9.2. 
G2 
92. 
G2 
G2 
(n = 8) 
{n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
G4 
9a 
G4 
9i 
G4 
G4 
G4 
G4 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
{n = 8) 
(n = 8) 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
As Experiment 3.1 (consent forms, general instruction of fast and accurate responses etc.). 
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Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- M R l : 
C I , MR2: C I ; Group 2- M R l : C2, MR2: C I ; Group 3- M R l : C2, MR2: CI and Group 4-
M R l : C2, MR2: C2). According to their group allocation, they were instructed what order 
of response effector to use and which spatial response to make to each line colour. The 
effector changeover associated with mapping rule 1 was signalled on the screen halfway 
through the experiment, and participants took a short break before resuming the 
experiment with the newly assigned effectors. After completing the practice session (20 
trials), the main experiment began. The trial procedure is outlined in Box 4.1. 
Box 4.1 Trial procedure for Experiment 4.1. The clock icon depicts a mill isecond timer, 
the shoe icon depicts a foot response and the hand icon depicts a hand response. 
The colour red corresponds to an incorrect response. 
The schematic below depicts three typical trials for a participant assigned to MR1:C2 (foot 
responses first half, hand responses second half) and MR2:C1 (left responses for green, 
right responses for yellow). For each trial, the inter-trial stimulus was shown for 15 seconds 
and was then replaced with the target stimulus A millisecond timer measured the time that 
the target stimulus remained on the screen This could be until the participant made a left or 
right (hand or foot) response, or until three seconds had passed and the trial was given time-
out Following the response (or time-out), the target stimulus was immediately replaced with 
the inter-trial stimulus for a new trial, thus completing the loop 
1 Trial 1 
o _ 
Vi^'secs 
— • 
Vi>>'start 
Required 
Response 
F 
Actual 
Response 
r Vi^stop 
Trial 2 
o — • ^ CL s^tart ^ 
Actual 
Respor>se 
\u>/stop 
1 Trial 361 
r X l 5 ^ V /^T^RT ^ Response Response i<T^ RT 
V^ secs ^ il^start ^ ^ W s t o p 
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4.2.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures ANOVAs 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variables of 
mapping rule 1 and mapping rule 2, and the within subjects independent variables of 
effector, spatial response, line location and X-Y line orientation. Participants were entered 
as a random factor, and the dependent variables were RTs (the first ANOVA) and mistakes 
(the second ANOVA). The results for Experiment 4.1 are summarised in Table 4.2. Key 
results are reported in the text and remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
Table 4.2 Main effects and interactions reported in Expenment 4.1. Key: statistical 
significance status (approaching, yes. no) y depicts results of key theoretical interest 
Result no. Source Correct Resp 
Incorrect 
4.1.1 Line location Yes 
4 1 2 Effector Yes Yes 
4 1 3 Effector x MR 1 App No 
4.1.4>^ X-Y line orientation x Response No No 
4 15 Line location x X-Y line orientation No Yes 
4 1.6 Response x MR 1 Yes No 
4.1.7y Line location * Response Yes Yes 
4 1 8M Effector x x-Y line orientation x Response No No 
4 19 Line location x X-Y line orientation x MR1 Yes No 
4 1 10X Effector x Line location x Response Yes Yes 
4.1.1iy Line location x x-Y orientation x Response No No 
4.1.12y 
4.1 13 
4 1 14 
Effector x Line location x X-Y orientation x Response 
Effector x x-Y line orientation x mR1 x MR2 
Line location x X-Y line orientation x Response x MR1 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Two-Way Interactions [4.1.4 
There was no significant interaction between X-Y line orientation and spatial response (i.e. 
collapsed across hand and foot key presses), in either RTs [ F (1 , 28) = 2.004, /? > 0.10] or 
mistakes [ F ( l , 28) = 0.004,/? > 0.50]. This suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line 
did not have any associated performance-related benefits for spatial responses. See Table 
4.3 for associated means. 
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Table 4.3 Mean RTs (ms). mistakes {%) and standard errors (SB) for result [4 1 4y ] 
Oh Res ms SE % SB 
L L 469 10 2.5 0.5 
L R 467 10 2.7 0.4 
R L 470 10 2.2 0 3 
R R 465 10 2.4 0 4 
Two-Way Interactions [4.1.7 x ] 
There was a significant interaction between line location and spatial response in both RTs 
[F (2, 56) = 106.070, p < 0.001] and mistakes [F (2, 56) = 27.492, p < 0.001] (see Figure 
4.2). For left located lines, mean RTs were 26 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 2.9 % 
fewer) for left rather than right spatial responses. For centrally located lines, mean RTs 
were 7 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 0.3 % fewer) for right rather than left spatial 
responses. For right located lines, mean RTs were 30 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 
2.1 % fewer) for right rather than left spatial responses. This pattern resembles a 
straightforward Simon liffect. 
485 H 
480 H 
a: 470 H 
m 465 H 
460 H 
1 I 
Left Centre Right 
Line Location 
u) 3.0 
Left Centre Right 
Line Location 
K E Y 
Left response 
Right response 
MEANS TABLE 
LOG Res ms SB SB 
L L 458 10 ' 0 2 
L R 484 10 4.3 0.5 
C L 466 11 2.2 0.4 
c R 459 10 1.9 0.3 
R L 485 10 3.5 0.7 
R R 455 10 1.4 0.3 
Figure 4.2 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of spatial response and 
line location 
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Three-Way Interactions [4.1.8 
I here was no significant interaction between effector type, X-Y line orientation and spatial 
response, for either RTs [ F (1, 28) = 0.309, p > 0.50], or mistakes [ F (1 , 28) = 0.099, p > 
0.50]. This suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line did not have any associated 
performance-related benefits for either hands or feet. See Table 4.4 for associated means. 
Table 4.4 Mean RTs (ms), mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [4.1 8>*^ ] 
Eff Ori Res ms SE SE 
H L L 443 9 3 1 0 6 
H L R 444 9 3 3 0.5 
H R L 444 9 2.8 0.5 
H R R 443 10 2.9 0.5 
F L L 495 11 2 0 0.4 
F L R 490 12 2.1 0.4 
F R L 496 11 1 5 0.3 
F R R 487 11 1.8 0.4 
Three-Way Interactions [4.1.10 
There was a significant interaction between effector type, line location and spatial response 
in RTs [F (2 , 56) = 22.863,/? < 0.001] but not in mistakes [F(2 , 56) = 0.788,/? > 0.1]. The 
patterns of mean RTs for feet and hands were similar to the interaction reported earlier in 
Figure 4.2 (which showed an interaction between line location and spatial response 
collapsed across etTector type). The primary difference in the interactions between line 
location and spatial response for diflerent effector types can be readily explained by the 
main etTect of effector type reported earlier (where RTs were faster for hands rather than 
feet). This main effect can be clearly observed when comparing the two mean RT 
interactions in Figure 4.3. 
In addition, it is notable that the effect size of the interaction for feet was almost twice as 
large as that of hands. This trend is somewhat unexpected considering that spatial S-R-C 
effects tend to reflect relative rather than absolute coding of spatial dimensions (e.g. 
Proctor and Reeve, 1990; Umilta and Nicoletti, 1990). So long as a relative left-right 
dimensional overlap exists, according to an abstract coding account the effect sizes should 
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be comparable for hands and feet. There is however, room for (purely) speculative 
interpretation when one adopts the perspective of actions that are 'set up' by the physical 
task. It is possibly relevant to these results that the foot response device had keys that were 
20 cm farther apart than those of the hand response device. Consequently it is conceivable 
that the left-right dimension was more prominent or salient in the foot condition. This 
saliency may have impacted on the weighting of soft-assembled (or partially programmed) 
foot responses (thus potentially magnifying spatial S-R-C effect sizes). 
5 2 0 , 0 
5 0 7 . 5 
4 3 2 5 
4 2 0 . 0 
^ 4 9 5 . 0 
— 4 8 2 . 5 
OC 4 7 0 . 0 
^ 4 5 7 . 5 
S 4 4 5 . 0 
1 r 
Left Centre Right 
Line Location 
5 2 0 . 0 
5 0 7 . 5 
4 9 5 . 0 
^ 4 8 2 . 5 
QE 4 7 0 . 0 ^ 
^ 4 5 7 . 5 
I 4 4 5 0 
4 3 2 . 5 
4 2 0 . 0 
Hands 
MEANS TABLE 
Eff Loc Res ms SE SE 
H L L 436 9 19 0 4 
H L R 454 9 5.2 0.6 
H C L 439 10 3.0 0 . 5 
H C R 438 9 2.4 0.4 
H R L 455 10 3.9 0.9 
H R R 438 10 1.7 0.3 
F L L 480 11 0.8 0.2 
F L R 513 12 3.5 0.6 
F C L 492 12 1.4 0.4 
F C R 481 11 1.3 0.3 
F R L 516 11 3.1 0.6 
F R R 472 11 1.1 0 . 4 
K E Y 
- e— Left response 
I Right response 
Left Centre Right 
Line Location 
Figure 4.3 Mean RTs and mistakes as a function of effector type, spatial response and line 
location 
Three-Way Interactions [4.1.11 y j 
There was no significant interaction between line location, X-Y line orientation and spatial 
response, for either RTs [F (2, 56) = 1.810, /? > 0.10], or mistakes [F (2,56) = 0.385, p > 
0.50]. This suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line did not have any associated 
p>erformance benefits when interacting with line location. See Table 4.5 for associated 
means. 
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Table 4.5 Mean RTs (ms). mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [4 1 11 
LOG Oh Res ms SE S E 
L L L 457 10 1.7 0.4 
L L R 486 11 4.4 0.7 
L R L 458 9 1.0 0.2 
L R R 482 10 4.2 0.6 
C L L 466 10 2.0 0.5 
c L R 459 10 1.7 0.3 
C R L 466 11 2.3 0.3 
C R R 460 10 2.1 0.5 
R L L 485 10 3.9 0.7 
R L R 458 10 2.0 0.5 
R R L 486 10 3.1 0.7 
R R R 452 11 0.8 0.3 
Higher Order Interactions [4.1.12y] 
I here was no significant interaction between effector, line location, X-Y line orientation 
and spatial response, for either RTs [F (2, 56) = 0.127, p > 0.50], or mistakes \F (2,56) = 
0.059, p > 0.50]. This suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line did not have any 
associated performance benefits for hands or feet, when interacting with line location. See 
Table 4.6 for associated means. 
Table 4.6 Mean RTs (ms). mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [4.1.11 y ] 
Eff Loc Ori Res ms SE S E 
H L L L 435 9 2.3 0.6 
H L L R 455 10 5.5 0.8 
H L R L 436 9 1.5 0.4 
H L R R 454 9 4.8 0.8 
H C L L 440 10 2.6 0.8 
H C L R 437 9 2.1 0.4 
H C R L 439 9 3.3 0.5 
H C R R 438 10 2.8 0.7 
H R L L 455 10 4.3 0.9 
H R L R 441 9 2.3 0.6 
H R R L 456 10 3.5 1.1 
H R R R 435 11 1.0 0.4 
F L L L 479 12 1.1 0.3 
F L L R 516 13 3.4 0.7 
F L R L 480 11 0.5 0.2 
F L R R 510 12 3.6 0.7 
F C L L 492 12 1.4 0.4 
F C L R 480 12 1.3 0.4 
F c R L 493 13 1.4 0.4 
F c R R 482 11 1.4 0.4 
F R L L 515 11 3.4 0.8 
F R L R 475 12 1.7 0.6 
F R R L 517 11 2.7 0.5 
F R R R 469 11 0.5 0.3 
152 
Chapter 4 - 2D Object Orientation 
4.2.3 Discussion 
It is of course possible that the X-Y orientation property of 2D visual stimuli simply does 
not afford left-right actions. As Anderson et al's (2002) recent study argued (see Chapter 
3), orientation-compatible responses to 2D shapes did not appear to reflect afforded 
actions, but appeared instead to be derived from the directing of attention towards salient 
features of the shape. Thus, there was facilitation of responses when there was a salient 
feature to direct attention towards (e.g. the bowl component of a 2D wine glass) but none 
when there was no salient feature (e.g. a central circle accompanied by two equal sized 
dots). A diagonal 2D line similarly has no salient features. However, in terms of a possible 
source of affordance for left-right actions, there is a 'proximity argimient'. One end of a 
diagonal line (or one of the dots from Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia's, 2002, circle-
and-dots stimulus) is closest to a particular hand (see Figure 4.4), and this may be the basis 
of an affordance for a left or right action. 
Despite this proximity argument, Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia's (2002) circle-and-
dots stimulus did not facilitate responses. However, their stimulus was unusual in that it 
was not a uniform shape (or even a visibly interconnected collection of shapes), but rather 
a disconnected configuration of three separate shapes. Any one of these three shapes might 
conceivably be represented (in an abstract manner) as something that could be reached 
towards and picked up (a disc, a round pellet). Taken together however, there is no obvious 
way of seeing the configuration as a single uniform object that might afford left-right 
actions. 
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Figure 4.4 The closeness argument for 2 D object-onentation On the left the diagonal line 
used in Expenments 4 .1 -4 3 is shown; on the nght. the stimulus from Anderson et al , 
( 2 0 0 2 ) is shown. 
A diagonal line however (e.g. as shown in Fig. 4.4 above), is a uniform object that might 
be represented (in an abstract manner) as something that could be reached towards and 
picked up (e.g. a rod of some kind). In terms of visual saliency, there is no visual cue that 
might favour one end of the line or the other. Similarly, in terms of an arbitrary left-right 
coding of the line, there is no obvious reason why the line should be coded as left rather 
than right or vice versa. In this light, although Experiments 4.1- 4.3 were run in ignorance 
of the Anderson et al's (2002) data, the stimuli employed nevertheless offered a useful test 
of one dimension of an object's orientation (the X-Y dimension), while controlling for 
salient features that might bias the directing of attention. Furthermore, in contrast to 
Anderson et aPs (2002) study, the orientation property was task-irrelevant. 
Considering the 'one-shot' approach of this experiment, it is not surprising that the 
numerous factors produced a wide range of significant sources of variance. Most of these 
sources however, were not of immediate theoretical interest. The primary aim of this 
experiment was to establish whether the X-Y orientation of a 21) line would facilitate 
performance for compatible left-right responses (Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1). The 
critical results, with responses collapsed across hands and feet [4 .1 .4y] , suggested not. 
Furthermore, it was of interest to see whether hands and feet behaved differently with 
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regards to the X-Y orientation o f a 2D line (Action Specificity Hypotheses 1-4), The 
results did not reveal any differences [4 .1 .8y] . However, as neither hands nor feet were 
facilitated by the 2D line orientation, no useful conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
specificity of actions that might be afforded. 
Of secondary interest was the effect of line location on responses. The Simon effect is a 
notoriously robust effect, and in itself, its appearance [4.1.7y & 4.1.10y] was not of 
primary interest to the aims of this experiment. Its presence however, does serve to 
distinguish it from orientation-action compatibility effects; and in keeping with Symes 
(1999), it does appear that the two are separate and distinct phenomena. It was tentatively 
speculated that a more salient 'setting up' of foot responses over hand responses (possibly 
based on the 20 cm larger distance between left and right key locations on the foot 
response device) may have been responsible for the magnified effect size observed in RTs 
when line location interacted with spatial responses [4.1.1 O X ] . 
It would have been of theoretical interest had X-Y line orientation and responses interacted 
with line location (raising issues such as competing or compatible affordances from 
different object properties). Nevertheless, no such interactions proved to be statistically 
significant [4.1.11 y & 4.1.12//]. 
In conclusion, this experiment did not provide support for the hypotheses that a) the X-Y 
orientation of a 2D line is a visual attribute that affords left-right actions (Visual Attribute 
Hypothesis 1); and b) rather than an exclusive action, a range of left-right actions might be 
afforded (Action Specificity Hypotheses 1-4). It is possible that the highly abstract nature 
of the stimuli diminished the chances of finding any orientation-action compatibility 
effects. It was considered possible that a more difficult response criteria (that required 
additional attentional resources) might compensate for any adverse affects related to the 
abstract nature of the stimuli. The next two Experiments addressed this possibility. 
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4.3 Experiment 4.2 
In Experiment I of Symes (1999), when the object category (kitchen or garage) defined 
left and right responses to photographs of real objects, orientation compatibility effects 
were found. However, when left and right responses merely categorised the same objects 
as red or green, no orientation compatibility effects were found (Experiment 2, Symes 
1999). It can be speculated that a certain level of attention or awareness is required to 
derive affordances fi*om potentially complex object properties such as orientation. Indeed, 
when the task requirement was simply to categorise an object's colour, it is possible that 
participants mostly (or only) attended to or were aware of, a patch of colour that appeared 
to the left or right of the screen. This perceived patch of colour may have provided 
sufficient information upon which to base a response, without the need to process the 
object in any more detail. 
In Experiment 4.1, there was not a large 'patch' of colour, since the colour itself 
structurally defined the diagonal line (and as such there was no patch of colour, but a 
diagonal line of colour). Nevertheless, in terms of dedicated feature maps (e.g. a colour 
map that simply gets flagged when a certain perturbations of light are detected), it is still 
possible that the line's orientation was not processed sufficiently. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the level of attention or awareness directed at the line was 
insufficient to derive a possible alfordance for left-right actions. The level of attention or 
awareness needed to derive various visual-attribute based afifordances is a matter of 
empirical investigation. The nature of the task may be influential, such that determining an 
object category (e.g. kitchen or garage) may well require coding the object 'as an object'. 
This may involve the automatic integration of features into what have been called 'object 
files' (e.g. Kahneman, Treisman and Gibbs, 1992). In extending this notion to action 
properties, Hommel and colleagues speak o f 'action files' and more inclusively, 'event 
files' (e.g. Hommel, 1998; Hommel et al, 2001; Hommel, 2002). 
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It is not clear however, what is meant by 'levels of attention' or 'levels o f awareness'^^. In 
change-blindness studies, there is a 'Eureka' moment that occurs when one notices the 
change. In terms of action, Sowden and Bruyn, (2001) and Sowden et al's (2002) change-
blindness studies (as discussed in 2.2.2) clearly demonstrate that motor responses are only 
modulated when the physical stimulus change is consciously perceived. Although the 
change-blindness paradigm presents a fairly extreme manipulation o f a normal visual 
event, it does offer some insight into the level of awareness that can be needed to influence 
at least some classes of action. 
Whether one considers the perusal of a scene in a change-blindness study (such that a 
change is noticed), or seeing an object 'as an object' under more natural circumstances 
(such that an affordance is derived), time is clearly involved to an extent. Initially at least, 
a considerable amount of time (up to a minute) is needed to notice a change in a change-
blindness scene. Once a change has been detected however, it is immediately detected on 
later occasions. In the Symes (1999) study, the object categorization task of Experiment 1 
ensured considerably longer RTs than those in the colour categorisation task of Experiment 
2 (where no compatibility effects were found). Whatever the underlying cognitive 
processes that may have been at work, part of the reason colour categorisation did not 
produce any compatibility effects may have been because not enough time was spent 
looking at the objects. 
The terms attention and awareness are used loosely. Does awareness require attention, or vice-versa, or are 
they the same thing? O'Regan and N(Je, 2001 argued at length that consciousness, awareness, experience or 
qualta (of which ihey do not distinguish between) come about through currently exercising the laws of 
sensorimotor contingency. 
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Indeed, contrary to the typical finding of a rapid decay of the Simon effect (a decay which 
is more or less linear with increasing RTs) Tucker & Ellis (2001) reported an opposite 
pattern in the time course of their compatibility effects (compatibility between object size 
and grip type). The longer the RTs were (and hence the more time spent looking at the 
objects), the greater the size the compatibility effect was (again, in what appeared to be a 
linear fashion). Once the object disappeared from view however, the effect soon decayed. 
It is therefore possible that the green and yellow colours used in Experiment 4.1 were 
easily discriminated (and consequently the stimuli did not need to be looked at for very 
long), and this short viewing time might have contributed to the lack of a compatibility 
effect for line orientation. This issue was addressed in Experiments 4.2 and 4.3, which used 
two colours (yellow and orange) that were subjectively harder to discriminate (and 
therefore categorise). Furthermore, stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was introduced, such 
that a grey diagonal line was presented for a short time before it changed to the colour 
(yellow and orange) upon which responses were based. This ensured that participants 
looked at the oriented line for some time before they were able to make a colour-based 
response towards it. 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
As Experiment 3.1 (undergraduate volunteers etc.), but twenty participants took part. 
Apparatus 
As Experiment 3.1 (darkened room, PC etc.), but only the hand response device was used. 
It is assumed that an automatically generated irrelevant response code decays, perhaps because it may not 
be selected for an actual action. See for example, Hommel (1993, 1994a, 1994 b, 1995), and de Jong, Liang 
and Lauber (1994) (but see Zhang & Komblum, 1997, for a criticism of de Jong et al's distributional 
analyses). 
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Materials 
The screen background was a light grey colour. 
The inter-trial stimulus was a centrally placed 
black circle. Two diagonal lines (as used in 
Experiment 4.1) were reproduced in three colours 
Figure 4.5 Stimulus set (lower section) for 
(grey, orange and yellow), resulting in a stimulus Expenment 4 2 Only the stimulus set for 
grey lines is shown. The icons (upper 
-m. r i j i A section) illustrate the screen location and 
set of SIX Imes. ITiese Imes were always displayed ^ y orientation of the line 
in the centre of the screen. See Figure 4.5 for an 
illustration of the stimulus set and stimulus properties. 
Design 
The two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. The three within subjects independent 
variables were delay (50 ms, 1(X) ms), sp^atial response (left, right) and X-Y line orientation 
(leftwards, rightwards). The between subjects indepjendent variable was mapping rule. Thus 
the experiment was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design (see Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 Experimental design for Expenment 4 2 Key: mapping rule (MR), condition 1 (C1), 
condition 2 (C2). experimental group (G) 
\1K 
C I C2 
Delay 50 ms G , (n = 
10) G2 (n = 10) 
100 ms G , (n 10) G? (n = 10) 
Orientation Leftwards orientation 
Rightwards orientation 
G , 
G, 
( n -
( n -
10) 
10) 
G2 
G? 
(n = 
(n = 
10) 
10) 
Response Lef) hand response 
Right hand response 
G, ( n -
<n 
10) 
10) 
G2 
( , 
(n = 10) 
In mapping rule: condition 1(MR: CI ) [n = 10], left hand responses were made to orange 
lines and right hand responses were made to yellow lines. The 'hand o f response - colour 
pairing' was reversed in mapping rule: condition 2 (MR: C2) [n = 10]. A practice session 
consisted of one block of 20 trials. The main experiment consisted o f one block of 400 
trials. Each variation of the coloured line was shown 50 times in each o f the two delays (50 
presentations x 4 lines x 2 delays = 400 trials). The order of coloured lines was randomised 
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within each delay. As responses were dependent on the line colour, the independent 
variables of delay and X-Y line orientation were task irrelevant. 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
As Experiment 3.1 (consent forms, general instruction of fast and accurate responses etc.). 
Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- MR: C I , 
Group 2- MR: C2). According to their group allocation, they were instructed which hand to 
respond with for each line colour. Participants were warned that on each trial a grey line 
would appear that would change colour after an unspecified period of time. Participants were 
instructed to respond after the grey line had changed colour. After completing the practice 
session (20 trials), the main experiment began. The trial procedure is outlined in Box 4.2. 
Box 4.2 Trial procedure in Experiment 4.2. The clock icon depicts a millisecond timer, 
and the hand icon depicts a hand response. The colour red corresponds to an 
incorrect response. 
The schematic t>elow depicts three typical tnals for a participant assigned to MR. C1 (left 
responses for orange, right responses for yellow) For each trial, the inter-tnal stimulus was 
shown for 1.5 seconds and was then replaced with the delay stimulus (a grey line) that was 
shown for 50 or 100 ms. The delay stimulus was then replaced with the target stimulus. A 
millisecond timer measured the time that the target stimulus remained on the screen This 
could be until the participant made a left or right hand response, or until three seconds had 
passed and the tnal was given time-out. Following the response (or time-out) the target 
stimulus was immediately replaced with the inter-trial stimulus for a new trial, thus 
completing the loop 
f p s X f\\RT 
\^secs \ ^ m s Vtj/start 
Required 
Response 
Actual 
Response 
Vlj/stop 
Trial 2 
m i O O 
Vi-^secs \ ^ ms vi-^start 
Required 
Response 
Actual 
Response 
/ ^ T i m e 
Vj^-out 
Vt^stop 
Trial 3 
o • • • 
Required 
Response 
Actual 
Response 
/ ^ 1 5 (^^100 / T ^ R T n ^ R T 
Vi-^secs x<^ms Vtj/start Vj^'stop 
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4.3.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures ANOVAs 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variable of 
mapping rule, and the within subjects independent variables of delay, X - Y line orientation 
and hand of response. Participants were entered as a random factor, and the dependent 
variables were RTs (the first ANOVA) and mistakes (the second ANOVA). The results for 
Experiment 4.2 are summarised in Table 4.8. Key results are reported in the text and 
remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
T a b l e 4.8 Ma in e f fec ts a n d in terac t ions repor ted in Expe r imen t 4 2 Key stat is t ical 
s ign i f i cance s ta tus (approach ing , yes . no) y dep ic ts resul ts of key theo re t i ca l in terest 
Resul t no Source 
Cor rec t 
R e s p o n s e s R e s p o n s e s 
4 2 1 Mapp ing rule No Y e s 
4 2 2 Delay No Y e s 
4 2 3 y X-Y line or ientat ion x R e s p o n s e No N o 
Delay ^ X -Y l ine onen ta t ion x R e s p o n s e No N o 
4 2 5 Delay x R e s p o n s e x M a p p i n g rule Yes 
Two-Way Interactions [4.2.3 X ] 
There was no significant interaction between X-Y line orientation and hand of response, in 
either RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 2.547,p > 0.1] or mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 2.950, p > 0.1]. This suggested 
that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line (collapsed across delays) did not have any associated 
performance benefits for hand key press responses. See Table 4.9 for associated means. 
T a b l e 4.9 M e a n R T s (ms) , m is takes (%) a n d s tandard er rors (SE) for resu l t [4 2 3 y ) 
O n Res m s SE S E 
L L 4 2 9 10 2 8 0 6 
L R 4 2 6 10 4 .1 0.7 
R L 4 3 6 10 4 .0 0.7 
R R 4 2 3 11 3 4 0.5 
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Three-Way Interactions [ A . 2 A M ] 
There was no significant interaction between delay, X - Y line orientation and hand of 
response either in RTs [ F (1, 18) = 0.441, /? > 0.5] or in mistakes [F (1, 18) = 0.479, p > 
0.1]. This suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line did not have any associated 
performance benefits for hand responses at delays of 50 or 100 ms. See Table 4.10 for 
associated means. 
T a b l e 4 .10 M e a n R T s ( m s ) , m is takes (%) a n d s tanda rd e r ro rs ( S E ) for resul t [A 2.3M] 
Del (ms ) Ori Res m s SE S E 
50 L L 4 3 1 10 2.4 0.8 
50 L R 4 2 9 11 3.3 0.5 
50 R L 4 3 6 10 3.8 0.6 
50 R R 4 2 5 12 2.3 0.4 
100 L L 4 2 7 11 3.1 0.8 
100 L R 4 2 4 10 4.8 1.3 
100 R L 4 3 7 10 4 2 1 
100 R R 421 11 4 5 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Following from Hxperiment 4.1, the narrower aim of this experiment was simply to 
investigate whether the X - Y orientation of a 2D line would facilitate performance for 
compatible hand responses (thus testing Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1). Despite having 
made the colour distinction harder (orange and yellow) and having introduced SOAs of 50 
and 100 ms (for the purpose of making participants look at the oriented line for a 
substantial period of time before responding), the crucial interactions between X - Y line 
orientation and hand of response [4.2.3 X ] and between X-Y line orientation, hand of 
response and delay [4.2.4y], did not reach statistical significance. In light of this, it 
appears that the X - Y orientation of a 2D line is not a visual attribute that affords left-right 
actions. More specifically, it appears that one potentially action-relevant visual attribute 
underlying an object's orientation (i.e. its primary axis of elongation in the X-Y plane) is 
not (by itself at least) a visual attribute that might afford left-right actions (in this instance, 
hand responses). It was considered possible that the SOA's of 50 and 100 ms might not 
have provided sufficient processing time to allow the orientation of the line to inftuence 
responses. As a final attempt, the last experiment in this series therefore increased the 
length of SOA's. 
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4.4 Experiment 4,3 
Purely in the interests of thoroughness, this experiment made a final attempt to establish 
whether the X - Y orientation of a 2D line could by itself influence hand responses (Visual 
Attribute Hypothesis 1). SOAs of 0, 200 and 800 ms addressed the possibility that a 
potential influence of X - Y orientation might occur immediately (0 msf^, or at 
considerably later intervals than were tested for in Experiment 4.2 (200, 800 ms). To 
simplify matters, there was only one mapping condition. 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants 
As Experiment 3.1 (undergraduate volunteers etc.), but fifteen participants took part. 
Apparatus 
As Experiment 3.1 (darkened room, PC etc.), and the hand response device was used. 
Materials 
As Experiment 4.2. 
Design 
The two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. The three within subjects 
independent variables were spatial response (left, right), delay (0 ms, 200 ms, 800 ms), and 
X - Y line orientation (leftwards, rightwards). Thus the experiment was a 2 x 3 x 2 repeated 
measures design (see Table 4.11). The meiin experiment consisted of one block of 636 
trials. Each variation of coloured line was presented 53 times in each of the three delays 
(53 presentations x 4 lines x 3 delays = 636 trials). The order of coloured lines was 
randomised within each delay. As responses were dependent on the line colour, the 
independent variables of delay and X - Y line orientation were task irrelevant. 
^ Experiment 4.1 (which did not employ delays) had effectively tested the condition of a 0 ms delay. 
However, as the line colours were different (easier to discriminate), this condition was considered to be worth 
repeating. 
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T a b l e 4.11 E x p e r i m e n t a l des ign for E x p e n m e n t 4 3 K e y expe r imen ta l g r o u p (G) 
0 ms G, i n 15) 
Delay 400 ms Ci, (n = 15) 
800 ms G, (n = 15) 
Orientation 
Leftwards orientation 
Rightwards orientation 
G, 
. . . . . G , . . . 
(n = 
(n = 
15) 
15) 
Response 
Left hand response 
Riuhl hand rcsp(Misc 
G, 
^• 
(n = 
(n = 
15) 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
As Exp>eriment 3.1 (consent forms, general instruction of fast and accurate responses etc.). 
Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
All participants were instructed to make left hand responses to yellow lines, and right hand 
responses to orange lines. Participants were warned that on some trials a grey line would 
appear and would change colour after an unspecified period of time. Participants were 
instructed to respond as soon as the grey line changed colour. After completing the practice 
session (20 trials), the main experiment began. The trial procedure is outlined in Box 4.3. 
B o x 4 .3 T r ia l p r o c e d u r e in E x p e r i m e n t 4 .3 . T h e c l o c k i c o n d e p i c t s a m i l l i s e c o n d t imer 
a n d t h e h a n d i c o n d e p i c t s a h a n d r e s p o n s e . T h e c o l o u r red c o r r e s p o n d s to a n 
i n c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e . 
T h e s c f i e m a t i c be l ow dep ic ts t f i ree typical t r ia ls For e a c h tna l , the inter- tnal s t imu lus w a s 
s h o w n fo r 1 5 . s e c o n d s a n d was then rep laced w i th t he de lay s t imu lus (a grey l ine) that w a s 
s h o w n for 0, 2 0 0 o r 8 0 0 m s The de lay s t imu lus w a s t h e n rep laced wi th the ta rge t s t imu lus 
A m i l l i second t ime r m e a s u r e d t he t ime that the target s t i m u l u s r e m a i n e d on the s c r e e n Th i s 
c o u l d be unt i l t he par t ic ipant m a d e a left or nght h a n d response , or unti l 3 s e c o n d s had 
p a s s e d a n d the tr ial w a s g iven t ime-ou t Fo l low ing t h e r e s p o n s e (or t ime-ou t ) the ta rge t 
s t i m u l u s w a s i m m e d i a t e l y rep laced wi th t he inter- t r ia l s t imu lus for the nex t tr ial , t hus 
c o m p l e t i n g the loop 
Trial 1 
V ^ s e c s Vi->^ms v ^ s t a r t 
Requi red 
Response 
Actua l 
Response 
\ i ^ s t o p 
Trial 2 
• - / - / -
( ^ 1 . 5 ( ^ 2 0 0 / ^ R T 
\ < ^ s e c s V i - ^ start 
Requi red 
Response 
Actua l 
Response ®r 
V i ^ s t o p 
Trial 3 
Requi red 
Response 
Actua l 
Response 
V ^ s e c s VLy 's taf t stop 
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4.4.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures ANOVAs 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the within subjects independent variables of 
delay, line orientation and hand of response. Participants were entered as a random factor, 
and the dependent variables were RTs (the first ANOVA) and mistakes (the second 
ANOVA). The results for Experiment 4.3 are summarised in Table 4.12. Key results are 
reported in the text and remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
T a b l e 4.12 M a m ef fec ts and in terac t ions repor ted in E x p e n m e n t 4 3. Key: stat is t ical 
s ign i f i cance s ta tus (approach ing , yes, no ) ^ dep i c t s resu l ts of key theore t i ca l in terest 
Resu l t no. Source 
Cor rec t 
R e s p o n s e s R e s p o n s e s 
4 3 1 Delay Y e s Y e s 
4 3 2 R e s p o n s e A p p r o a c h i n g Y e s 
4 3 3^^ X -Y l ine or ientat ion x R e s p o n s e N o N o 
4 3 4 Delay x R e s p o n s e Y e s Y e s 
4 3 5 y Delay x X-Y l ine or ienta t ion x R e s p o n s e No 
Two-Way Interactions [4.3.3 y ] 
There was no significant interaction between X - Y line orientation and hand of response in 
cither RTs [ F ( l , 14) = 0.522,p > 0.1] or mistakes [ F ( l , 14) = 0.004, p > 0.5]. This again 
suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line did not have any associated performance 
benefits for hand key press responses. See Table 4.13 for associated means. 
T a b l e 4.13 M e a n R T s ( m s ) . m i s takes (%) a n d s tanda rd e r ro rs (SE) for resu l t [4.3 3 y ] 
O h R e s m s S E % SE 
L L 4 5 3 14 1 4 0 5 
L R 4 4 1 12 2.4 0.6 
R L 4 5 3 12 1.7 0.3 
R R 4 4 5 12 2.7 0.6 
Three-Way Interactions [4.3.5 y ] 
Ihere was no significant interaction between delay, X-Y line orientation and hand of 
response either in RTs [F (2, 28) = 1.112, p > 0.1] or in mistakes \F (2, 28) = 0.284, p > 
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0.5]. This suggested that the X - Y orientation of a 2D line did not have any associated 
performance benefits for hand responses at delays of 0. 200 or 800 ms. See Table 4.14 for 
associated means. 
T a b l e 4 .14 M e a n R T s ( m s ) , m is takes (%) a n d s t a n d a r d e r ro rs (SE) for resul t [4.3 5 y ] 
BI (ms) Or i R e s m s S E S E 
0 L L 4 7 3 15 1.5 0 .4 
0 L R 455 14 3.1 0.9 
0 R L 4 7 3 14 2.4 0 .5 
0 R R 4 6 5 16 3.4 1.1 
200 L L 441 13 1.1 0.6 
200 L R 440 10 2 .9 1 
200 R L 442 12 1.0 0.3 
200 R R 445 12 3.0 0.7 
800 L L 444 14 1.6 0.6 
800 L R 4 2 8 13 1.1 0 .4 
800 R L 4 4 4 12 1.6 0.7 
800 R R 4 2 3 11 1.6 0 .5 
4.4.3 Discussion 
Following directly from Experiment 4.2, this experiment again investigated whether the X-
Y orientation of a 2D line would facilitate performance for compatible hand responses. 
Despite having reused the harder colour distinction (orange and yellow) and having 
introduced different SO As of 0, 200 and 800 ms (for the purpose of making participants 
look at the oriented line for varying periods of time before responding), the crucial 
interactions between X - Y line orientation and hand of response [4.3.3y] and between X-Y 
line orientation, hand of response and delay [4.3.5 X ] , did not reach statistical significance. 
In light of this, it again appears that the X-Y orientation of a 2D line did not (by itself at 
least) afford left-right action. 
4.5 General Discussion of Experiments 4.1-4.3 
The most important finding from Experiments 4.1-4.3 was the repeated lack of 
performance-related benefits associated with the X-Y orientation of a 2D line. ITiis lack of 
an effect remained despite trying different response effectors, colour categories and SO As. 
In conclusion. Experiments 4.1-4.3 did not support the hypothesis that the most basic 
visual attribute underiying an object's orientation (i.e. its primary axis of elongation in the 
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X - Y plane) might eifford left-right actions. Considering this lack of an effect, no legitimate 
conclusions could be drawn regarding the specificity of left-right actions that might have 
been afforded (Action Specificity Hypotheses 1-4). 
It is possible that the isolated X - Y orientation property of a 2D stimulus might produce 
performance-related benefits but only under specific conditions that have not been tested 
for (e.g. at SOA delays other than those used here, for less abstract 2D stimuli, or for 2D 
stimuli that are given a behavioural significance). Any number of SOA manipulations 
might be investigated. However, it was considered unlikely that such an approach would 
be fiiiitful, bearing in mind the results obtained here. Alternatively, a 2D stimulus oriented 
in the X - Y plane might be given some sort of meaning or visual saliency (e.g. a 2D 
depiction of a real 3D object). For example, an arrowhead or shape attached to one end of a 
diagonal line might produce compatibility effects. Indeed, such compatibility effects might 
be expected. An arrow pointing left, for example, would presumably promote left 
responses. Similarly, a blob attached to the lefbnost end of a line might promote left 
responses. Furthermore, the orientation of a 2D stimulus might be endowed with a 
behavioural significance that must be understood in order to perform the task (e.g. one 
might have to mentally rotate a 2D line clockwise or anticlockwise in order to match a 
target). Such manipulations however, would not say much about a specific visual attribute 
of an object's orientation (such as orientation in the X - Y plane), but rather would inform 
about the influence of the added visual or behavioural component. For this reason, such a 
line of inquiry was not pursued 
Nevertheless, there are other possible reasons why no compatibility effects were found 
with respect to the visual attribute of X - Y orientation. It may be that the isolated X - Y 
orientation property of a stimulus simply does not evoke performance-related benefits (i.e. 
'^ Indeed, as has been previously discussed, the 'attention-directing hypothesis' provided by Anderson et al 
(2002) tested these very intuitions. Not surprisingly, the data suggested that a point of visual and/or 
behavioural salience on a 2D object or shape (such as a large blob, or a graspable area) promoted compatible 
responses. 
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does not afford left-right actions). On the other hand, it may be that a stimulus must be 3D 
in order for X - Y orientation to exert an influence on responses. Alternatively, orientation-
action compatibility effects may relate to orientation in another dimension altogether, such 
as the X-Z plane (i.e. the depth plane). In order to test these possibilities, the use of 3D 
oriented objects would be required. Ideally, orientation within the three dimensions should 
remain ft-ee from additional object properties (as was the case in 2D, where the line had no 
geometrical features other than its axis of elongation). One possible extension of a 2D line 
in this vein would be a 3D cylinder. Using a computer-generated 3D cylinder that is 
oriented in 3D space would have the advantage of simultaneously testing for the influence 
on spatial responses of three interacting planes of object orientation (X-Y plane, Y-Z plane 
and X-Z plane). These planes could be separated in the statistical analyses, thus allowing 
for an investigation of the relative influence that orientation in each plane had on response 
performance. Chapter 5 adopted this approach. 
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5. Three-dimensional (3D) object orientation 
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5.1 Experimental Hypotheses and Overview 
Objective 3: To test for orientation-action compatibility etTects associated with 
computer-generated three-dimensional cylinders that are oriented in three-dimensional 
space, thus exploring the possibility that a specific visual attribute (i.e. the angle of an 
object's primary axis within a particular three-dimensional plane) might afford left-righl 
actions. Using these stimuli, different left-right response types are used in order to test 
whether any compatibility etTects are specific to hands, or viable for a range of actions. 
This chapter follows on from Chapter 4 by addressing the issues of visual attribute 
specificity and action specificity with relation to a 3D object. To reiterate, the orientation-
action compatibility effects of Tucker and Ellis (1998) did not distinguish between a 
number of possibilities. Two of these possibilities were as follows: 
Firstly, if these effects reflected the automatic potentiation of left-right actions associated 
with purely visual attributes of an object (possibly through activating a 'default 
representational setting' that is abstracted from viewing an oriented object); then one must 
ask what these visual attributes are. It was concluded from Experiments 4.1-4.3 that 
orientation in the X - Y plane did not, by itself at least, present a visual attribute that evoked 
any affordance for left-right actions. 
Secondly, there is the possibility that the motor components of potential visual attribute-
related affordances are abstract or primitive enough to influence a range of compatible 
responses, particularly if these responses are 'set up' in the first place by the physical 
context of the task. Experiment 3.1 provided some evidence supporting this notion, by 
establishing orientation-compatibility effects using foot responses. 
The three experiments reported below re-addressed these two possibilities using 3D 
graphically rendered cylinders. In addressing the sp)ecificity of left-right actions afforded, 
the four Action Specificity Hypotheses generated in Chapter 3 remained under 
investigation (1- a specific action property is afforded that is exclusive to one action; 2- a 
primitive action property is afforded that is common to many actions; 3- a specific action 
property is maximally afforded but other action properties are to a lesser extent activated; 
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4- a range of actions can be afforded by virtue of being physically 'set up' by task 
parameters). 
Although the cylinder stimuli used are described in detail in the method section of 
Experiment 5.1, it may be useful at this stage to see an example global orientation of a 3D 
cylinder, which can be described in terms of the three dimensional planes (see Figure 5.1). 
\ F i g u r e 5.1 A n i m a g e of a 3D cy l inder that is o r ien ted in 3D s p a c e T h e b lue wa l l rep resen ts the X - Y p lane (i e the f ronta l or p ic ture p l a n e ) , t he o range 
wa l l s rep resen t the Y - Z p lane (i e the 
sagg i ta l p lane) , a n d the g r e e n wal ls 
rep resen t the X - Z p lane (i e the 
hor izonta l or dep th p lane) T h e thick 
co lou red l ines rep resen t an arbi t rary 
re fe rence point in e a c h p lane T h e s e 
re fe rence po in ts a l l ow t he or ientat ion 
l ines tha t a re p ro jec ted o n e a c h planar 
wal l to have an a r r o w h e a d (which 
a lways po in ts t o w a r d s a re fe rence 
point ) Us ing these a r rows , it can t)e 
s e e n tha t t he e x a m p l e cy l inder is 
o r ien ted r igh twards in the X - Y plane, 
u p w a r d s in the Y-Z p lane a n d le f twards 
in the X - Z p lane 
hi addressing the specificity of visual attributes that might afford left-right actions, the 
following three hypotheses were under investigation: 
most basic property of an object's orientation (its 
primary axis of elongation in the X-Y plane) is a specific visual attribute that aflbrds 
components of lefl-right actions. Facilitation might occur for let\ or right responses that 
are compatible with this X-Y orientation. 
Although evidence from 2D stimuli did not support this first hypothesis (see Experiments 
4.1-4.3), it may be the case that the X - Y orientation of a 3D object affords components of 
left-right actions. Finding that the X-Y orientation of a 3D object did not facilitate 
compatible responses might suggest that as a basic visual attribute, orientation in the X-Y 
plane simply does not afford components of left-right actions. 
Visual Attribute Hypothesis 2: The *up-dowTi' dimension of an object's orientation (its 
primar>' axis of elongation in the Y-Z plane) is not a specific visual attribute that atTords 
components of left-right actions, since it is not a Mett-right" dimension. C onsequent!) 
facilitation of a particular spatial response should not occur with relation to Y 
orientation. 
, ' - / 
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\ i s u a l A t T i b u t e l l > p o . h c s i s 3: Another rrop.r,> o f an object's oricnlation (its primarx 
axis of elongation in the X-Z plane) is a specific visual attribute that aftords comjx)nents 
of left-right actions. Facilitation might occur for responses that are compatible with this 
X - / orientation. 
Alternatively, as this third hypothesis suggests, it is possible that another aspect of an 
object's orientation affords components of left-right actions, such as the visual cue of 
orientation in the X-Z plane. Indeed, when orientation-action compatibility effects have 
been observed with photographs of real objects (e.g. Hxperiment 3.1; Symes, 1999; Tucker 
& Ellis, 1998) the objects were oriented in the X-Z plane. 
In testing these three Visual Attribute Hypotheses, Experiments 5.1-5.3 investigated spatial 
(left or right) responses that were made to the surf ace pattern of an oriented 3D cylinder. In 
responding to the cylinder's surface pattern, the orientation of the cylinder was task 
irrelevant. Consequently it was assumed that any orientation-action compatibility effects 
obtained would reflect a goal-independent automatic activation of afforded motor 
properties. There were four variations of this cylinder's global orientation. Crucially, each 
global orientation was derived from the interaction of local orientations within each 
dimensional plane. Ihc orientation of a cylinder within each plane could be isohiicd 
statistically, thus providing an opportunity to see whether any orientation-compatibility 
effects were specific to the X-Y, Y-Z or X-Z planes. The results consistently provided 
support for Visual Attribute Hypothesis 3. Thus when the closest end of a cylinder in the 
X-Z plane pointed leftwards, performance was best for left responses (and vice versa for 
rightwards pointing cylinders). No such benefits were associated with the X - Y plane (thus 
refuting Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1); a finding that suggested (in accordance with 
Experiments 4.1-4.3) that orientation in the X-Y plane did not afford components of left-
right actions. Furthermore, support was provided for Visual Attribute Hypothesis 2, such 
that orientation in the Y-Z plane did not influence left-right responses. 
In tesfing Action Sf)ecificity Hypotheses 1-4, Experiments 5.1-5.3 investigated different 
left-right responses that were made to the same stimuli. Three different response types 
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were used; 1) left and right-hand key press responses that were considered analogous to the 
initiation of a reaching movement towards the cylinder; 2) Left and right-hand power grip 
responses that were considered analogous to a grasp appropriate for picking up the 
cylinder; 3) Left and right foot responses that bore no obvious action association with the 
cylinder. The pattern of results was essentially the same for all three response types 
(promoting Action Specificity Hypothesis 2, whereby a primitive action property is 
afforded that is common to many actions). However, there was a hint that X-Z orientation-
action compatibility effects for power grip responses were larger than those for foot 
responses; a finding that provided some support for Action Specificity Hypothesis 3 
(which proposed that a specific action property is maximEdly afforded but other action 
properties are to a lesser extent activated). In addition, the fact that a range of different 
response types produced X-Z orientation compatibility effects is consistent with Action 
Specificity Hypothesis 4, which proposed that a range of actions can be afforded by virtue 
of being physically 'set up' by task parameters. 
It was concluded that orientation within the X-Z plane is an identifiable visual attribute that 
that can evoke an affordance for components of left-right actions. Furthermore, in keeping 
with the findings of Experiment 3.1, the idea of an amodal action-oriented representation 
was supported. The motor component of this 'default' representation was presumably 
abstract or primitive enough to influence various kinds of response. 
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5.2 Experiment 5.1 
One might expect that the dimensionality of an object would influence the kind of actions 
that one makes towards it. 2D shapes do not intuitively afford a wide range of actions, and 
from this general perspective it is not too surprising that X - Y orientation did not influence 
left-right responses in the previous chapter. 3D objects on the other hand, have a quality 
about them (a three-dimensional quality) that opens up the possibilities for action. 
Furthermore our history of interactions with the worid is predominantly associated with 3D 
objects and surfaces. 
Research on the relationship between action and perceived object dimensionality supports 
the intuition that objects presented as 2D or 3D might affect actions differentially. 
Castiello, Bonfiglioli and Bennett (1996) manipulated the perceived dimensionality of an 
apple that participants were required to reach towards and pick up. Under normal lighting 
conditions the apple was perceived as 3D, whereas under special lighting conditions that 
made the apple appear as a dark silhouette, the same apple was perceived as 2D. When the 
apple was perceived as 2D, it was picked up using a large precision grip made between 
forefinger and thumb (as if the apple that was being picked up were a disc). When the 
apple was perceived as 3 D, it was picked up using a power grip made with a whole hand 
prehension (where all digits and the palm contacted its surface). On some trials the 
perceived object dimensionality was perturbed, such that the object was initially perceived 
as 2D and then changed to 3D just as the reach movement was initiated. On these trials 
participants demonstrated a transition fi-om an initial precision grip to a power grip during 
the reach (transport component), resulting in the apple being picked up (manipulation 
component) with a whole hand prehension. Castiello, Bonfiglioli and Bennett (1998) 
replicated these results and additionally showed the opposite transition of grip type when 
perturbations went from 3D to 2D (although only in the manipulation component and not 
the transport component of the grip). 
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These results are particularly interesting because the to-be-grasped object was always the 
same, namely a real 3D apple. Participants knew this, yet still their grasp patterns were 
differentially influenced by perceived visual dimensionality'* .^ It is also interesting that in 
the case of perturbed trials, an initial grip type could be overridden or transformed by a 
more dimension-appropriate grip. These results support the idea of 'representational 
defaults' discussed in Chapter 3. These defaults (which may be dimension-specific) are 
directly triggered by the visual attributes of an object (as evidenced by the influence on 
grip type of perceived dimensionality); and furthermore, they can be transformed, 
elaborated or rejected as required (as evidenced by the grip transitions during the 
perturbation trials). Interestingly, however, the semantic knowledge of how apples are 
usually picked up, apparently played little or no part in determining what grip-type was 
used. According to the arguments developed in Chapters 2 and 3, such practical knowledge 
might be expected to have an influence. Nevertheless, it may be the case that in this 
instance the 'default' was sufficiently robust to resist intervention (although as footnote 42 
below shows, a limited number of trials did suggest otherwise). Furthermore, had the task 
required a different outcome, such as a requirement to reach and grasp the apple and then 
throw it towards a target; it may well be that within this behavioural context the demands 
of the task would indeed override the influence that 2D visual attributes had on grip type. 
Castiello et al. (1996, 1998) argued that these results implicated visual mechanisms for 
interpreting an object's dimensions. These mechanisms directly influence motor selection 
pathways without necessarily accessing a 3D central nervous system representation of the 
object. Under a single-level representation view (such as a stored object model fi-om which 
associated actions could be derived), a whole hand prehension might be expected 
regardless of the perceived dimensionality. 
Castiello et al. (1998) interpreted a very low incidence of a) trials where whole hand prehension was used 
for the 2D apple, and b) 'hybrid grasps* that were somewhere between precision and power; as reflecting a 
default level of inter-channel cross-talk, or at least a suggestion that a 3D representational level is not entirely 
ignored. 
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Instead, Castiello et al. (1998) argued for the use of separate (but interacting) levels of 
representation (or 'different channels of visual interpretation'), along the lines of Marr's 
(1982) three stages of computation (i.e. the primal sketch, 2Vi D sketch and 3D model). 
They also alluded to the 'what' and 'how' visual systems, suggesting that their results 
implicated the 'how' pathway, where dimension was processed using early access to 
spatial pathways and to presemantic components or neural mechanisms that bypass 
elements of the 'what' pathway. Thus in bypassing the 'what' processing of an apple, the 
online 'how' processing of a perceived 2D silhouette resulted in a precision grip 
(appropriate for picking up a disc say, but inappropriate for picking up an apple). 
Bearing in mind that the (perceived) dimensionality of an object can differentially affect 
action, and that this seems to be a purely visual attribute based phenomenon; it is possible 
that while the visual cue of orientation in 2D space may not influence responses (e.g. 
orientation in the X - Y plane as used in Chapter 4), a visual cue of orientation in 3D space 
might. One would not necessarily expect orientation in Y-Z plane to influence spatial left-
right responses, as orientation within this plane can be characterised as an upwards-
downwards spatial relationship (see Visual Attribute Hypothesis 2). However, in looking 
for a visual attribute of an object's orientation that evokes an affordance for left-right 
actions, orientation in the X-Z plane (i.e. the depth plane) would seem to be a likely 
candidate. Indeed, the photographs of real-worid objects used by Tucker and Ellis (1998) 
(and Experiment 3.1 above), were all oriented in the X-Z plane, and hence had a clear left-
right dimension. However, as has already been argued, these objects all had functional 
connotations associated with their handles, and as such one cannot be sure that the 
orientation-action compatibility effects found reflected the influence of orientation in the 
X-Z plane, or the influence of visually or functionally salient features (as was argued by 
Anderson et al., 2002). Thus Experiment 5.1 tested the influence that a ftinctionally neutral 
cylinder (that was systematically oriented in the X - Y , Y-Z and X-Z planes) had on left-
right key press responses. 
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5.2.1 Method 
Participants 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (undergraduate volunteers etc.), but 20 participants took part. 
Apparatus 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (small darkened room, PC etc.), but a new response 
device was used. The response device: A wooden board with two inlaid micro-switches 
fixed approximately 40cm apart. Hinged Perspex flaps covered the micro-switches. This 
device could be used as a hand response device (when located on the table directly in front 
of the monitor), and as a foot response device (when located on the floor directly under the 
monitor). In this experiment (5.1) it was used as a hand response device. 
Materials 
The surrounding screen background was a light grey colour at all times. The inter-trial 
stimulus was a grey chequered room designed to give the impression of depth. The target 
stimulus set was created from a computer generated hollow cylinder that was set, floating, 
in the centre of the chequered room (see Figure 5.2). 
The cylinder was manipulated in two surface patterns and four global orientations, 
resulting in a stimulus set of eight cylinders. One surface pattern had the appearance of a 
'wobbly' wood pattern, and the other pattern had the appearance of a * straight' wood 
pattern. Because the cylinders were manipulated in 3D space, their global orientation could 
be described in terms of the three dimensional planes (see Figure 5.3). 
177 
Orientation 
1 
4. 
F i g u r e 5.2 T h e four g loba l onenta t ions of cy l inders u s e d in E x p e n m e n t 5 1 On ly cy l inders 
w i th a s t ra ight s u r f a c e pat tern are shown**^. 
Design considerations relat ing to 3 P objects: It is a fact that when one looks at an object in normal l ight ing 
and v iewing condit ions, one can see its leading edge, but o f course, one cannot see the whole rear end o f the 
object ( i .e. behind i t ) . Furthermore, this leading edge is larger and brighter than the rear end o f the object. In 
addi t ion, when an object is oriented (even i f it is directly in front o f a viewer in terms o f its real-world 
physical coordinates), the end that is closest to the viewer w i l l appear enlarged and thus w i l l spatially 
pro t rac t whereas the farthest end wi l l appear to have shrunk, and thus w i l l spatially retract. 
Inevitably then, a design decision had to be made regarding the theoretical implications o f these features wi th 
respect to 'at tent ion-direct ing' accounts o f S-R-C effects. Should one try and control al l o f these naturally 
occurr ing features o f an object that might be visually salient and hence attention-grabbing? For instance, one 
might ar t i f ic ia l ly manipulate l ight ing conditions such that each end o f the cyl inder had the same i l luminat ion 
values. One might also art i f ic ia l ly shrink the radius o f the leading edge o f the cyl inder such that each end had 
the same visual radius. One might also superimpose a disc on the farthest end o f the cyl inder (much like an 
' impossible f igure ' i l lus ion) such that each end o f the cyl inder had a visible leading edge. One might also 
ar t i f ic ia l ly shift the cyl inder sl ightly up or down and left or r ight to remove signs o f spatial protraction and 
retraction. Just what the end result would look like is unclear, but it would certainly not look l ike a cyl inder 
oriented in 3D space, for it wou ld have lost all o f the qualit ies that made it a 3D object. 
Al ternat ively one cou ld commit to an ecologically val id st imulus, and accept that these visually salient 
features are a basic fact about real 3D objects in 3 D space. A l l things considered, it was decided to design 
and create the most ecological ly realistic cyl inder possible (w i th in reason). Issues o f attention, whi le 
theoretical ly problematic for the current investigations, were instead addressed separately in the next chapter. 
So, although the oriented cyl inder used in this and later experiments was a perfectly symmetrical object that 
was exactly centred ( lef t -r ight and top-bottom) using simulated real-wor ld coordinate and l ight ing systems, it 
nevertheless had a sl ight ly protracting visually salient circular area at its leading edge. 
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V 
F i g u r e 5.3 T h e four g loba l or ienta t ions of cy l inders u s e d in E x p e n m e n t 5 1 . as s h o w n wi th in 
the con tex t o f the X - Y p lane (b lue) , the Y -Z p lane (o range ) a n d the X - Z p l a n e (g reen) . T h e 
thick co l ou red l ines represen t an arbi t rary re fe rence po in t in e a c h p lane. T h e s e re fe rence 
po in ts a l low t he or ienta t ion l ines that a re p ro jec ted on e a c h p lanar wa l l to h a v e an a r r o w h e a d 
(which a lways po in ts towards a re fe rence po in t ) . T h e d i rec t ion tha t an a r r o w po in ts thus 
de f ines the or ienta t ion of the cy l inder w i th in a par t icu lar p lane T h e s e def in i t ions are 
fo rma l i sed in Tab le 5 . 1 . 
Based on the graphical description given in Fig. 5.2, each global orientation was defined in 
terms of its orientation within each of the three planes (see Table 5.1). The angle of the 
cylinder was always 45° or 135° within each plane. Details of how these planes are 
reported in the data are provided later (see section 5.2.2). 
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T a b l e 5.1 A def in i t ion of each global ly o r ien ted cy l inder in t e r m s o f its d imens ion -spec i f i c 
o r ien ta t ions T h e i cons a re used later w h e n exp la in ing t h e ana lys is o f s t imu lus d i m e n s i o n s 
G l o b a l C y l i n d e r 
O r i e n t a t i o n 
D i m e n s i o n - S p e c i f i c 
O r i e n t a t i o n 
D i m e n s i o n - S p e c i f i c 
I con 
2 / 
3 ^ 
X - Y ( R i g h t w a r d s ) ; Y - Z ( U p w a r d s ) ; 
X - Z ( L e f t w a r d s ) 
X - Y ( L e f t w a r d s ) ; Y - Z ( U p w a r d s ) ; 
X - Z ( R i g h t w a r d s ) 
X - Y ( L e f t w a r d s ) ; Y - Z ( D o w n w a r d s ) ; 
X - Z ( L e f t w a r d s ) 
X - Y ( R i g h t w a r d s ) ; Y - Z ( D o w n w a r d s ) ; 
X - Z ( R i g h t w a r d s ) 
» 9 
Design 
I he two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes, fhe within subjects independent 
variables were hand of response (left, right), and a choice of two of the following^"*: X-Y 
cylinder orientation (leftwards, rightwards), Y-Z cylinder orientation (upwards, 
downwards) or X-Z cylinder orientation (leftwards, rightwards). The between subjects 
independent variable was mapping rule. Thus the experiment was based o n a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
repeated measures design, as illustrated in Table 5.2. 
T a b l e 5.2 E x p e n m e n t a l des ign for E x p e n m e n t 5 1 Key: m a p p i n g rule ( M R ) , cond i t i on 1 (C1) , 
cond i t i on 2 (C2) , e x p e n m e n t a l g r o u p (G) 
M 
C I 
R 
C2 
Hand o f Response _ . , 
Right 
G , ( n - I O ) 
G , (n=IO) 
G . ( n - I O ) 
G2 (n = 10) 
V X , ,- . Leftwards 
X - Y cyl inder orientation „ . . 
Rightwards 
G , (n=IO) 
G j (n=IO) 
G2 (n = IO) 
G^ (n=IO) 
Y - Z cyl inder orientation Upwards 
Downwards 
G , (n=IO) 
G , (n=IO) 
G2 (n=i6) 
G2 (n=10) 
It should be noted that the cyl inder orientation in a particular plane (e.g. X - Z plane) is necessarily specified 
by the interaction o f cyl inder orientations in the other two planes (e.g. X - Y ^ Y - Z planes). For example, a 
cyl inder oriented leftwards in the X -Y plane and downwards in the Y -Z plane, mt4st, as a consequence, be 
oriented leftwards in the X - Z plane, fherefore only two planes need to be entered as variables in the design. 
However, in order to have access to a range o f mean RT and mean mistake data, mul t ip le analyses were 
performed using al l combinat ions o f two stimulus variable designs. 
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In mapping rule: condition 1 (MR: C I ) [n = 10], left hand responses were made to 
cylinders with a wobbly surface pattern and right hand responses were made to cylinders 
with a straight surface pattern. The 'hand of response-cylinder pattern' pairing was 
reversed in mapping rule: condition 2 (MR: C2) [n = 10]. A practice session consisted of 
20 overt practice trials, and 40 covert practice trials, which served to pressurise participants 
to try harder in the practice so as to reach a consistent performance for the main 
experiment. The main experiment consisted of 400 trials, divided into 20 blocks of 20 
trials. Both cylinder patterns were shown 50 times for each of the four global cylinder 
orientations (thus 50 presentations x 2 patterns x 4 global cylinder orientations = 400 
trials). The order of cylinder pattern and global cylinder orientation was randomised in one 
block of 400. As responses were dependent on the pattern of the cylinder, the independent 
variables of cylinder orientation (X-Y, Y-Z and X-Z) were task irrelevant. 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (consent forms, general instruction of fast and accurate 
responses etc.). 
Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- MR: C I , 
Group 2- MR: C2). According to their group allocation, they were instructed which hand to 
respond with for the two cylinder patterns. After completing the practice session, the main 
experiment began. The trial procedure is outlined in Box 5.1. 
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B o x 5.1 Tr ia l p r o c e d u r e for E x p e r i m e n t 5 . 1 . T h e c l o c k Icon d e p i c t s a m i l l i s e c o n d t imer, 
a n d the h a n d i c o n d e p i c t s a h a n d key p r e s s . T h e c o l o u r red c o r r e s p o n d s to a n 
i n c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e . 
T h e s c h e m a t i c be low dep ic ts th ree typical t r ia ls for a par t ic ipant a s s i g n e d to M R C1 (left 
r e s p o n s e s for wobb l y cy l inder pat tern , r ight r e s p o n s e s fo r s t ra ight cy l inder pa t te rn ) . For e a c h 
tna l . t he inter-tr ia l s t imu lus was s h o w n for 1 5 s e c o n d s a n d w a s then rep laced w i th the target 
s t i m u l u s A m i l l i second t imer m e a s u r e d the t ime that the target s t imu lus r e m a i n e d on the 
s c r e e n Th i s c o u l d be unti l t he par t ic ipant m a d e a lef t or right r e s p o n s e , or unti l th ree 
s e c o n d s h a d p a s s e d a n d the tr ial w a s g iven t ime-out . Fo l lowing the r e s p o n s e (or t ime-out ) , 
t he ta rge t s t imu lus w a s immed ia te ly rep laced wi th the inter- tnal s t imu lus for a n e w tr ia l , t hus 
c o m p l e t i n g the loop 
1 T r i a l 1 | 
1 i ' 
R e q u i r e d 
R e s p o n s e 
9 
Ac tua l 
R e s p o n s e 
1.5 
s e e s / s t a r t 
(St ra ight 
tex ture) 
T r i a l 2 
Requ i r ed 
\ 7 
V i ^ s e c s Vi^^ s tar t 
T r i a l 3 
m i 5 
V i > ^ s e c s 
(Wobb ly 
tex tu re ) 
equ i r ed 
R e s p o n s e 
(Wobb ly 
tex tu re ) 
CE^stop 
A c t u a l 
R e s p o n s e 
m T i m e 
\ < l > / - o u t 
CC^stop 
Ac tua l 
R e s p o n s e 
j ^ s t o p 
Procedure part c (feedback routine) 
The experiment was split into 20 blocks of 20 trials. After each block of 20 trials 
(including the practice block), participants were shown a graphical output of their 
performance in two bar charts. These charts were presented next to each other on the 
screen, and after examination of their progress, the spacebar served to initiate the next 
block of trials. Participants were shown how to interpret the two charts, and were 
instructed to use the charts as a guide to keeping their performance as consistent as 
possible. 
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Experimental progress chart: This chart gave participants an opportunity to monitor their 
overall experimental progress. The chart updated a block at a time (i.e. new bars were 
added upon completion of each block), with blue bars representing correct responses 
(corresponding to the principal Y-axis) and red bars representing mistakes (corresponding 
to the secondary Y-axis). Mean RTs in milliseconds (for a given block of 20 trials) were 
shown along the principal Y-axis, a count of mistakes was shown along the secondary Y-
axis, and block numbers along the X-axis. 
Previous block performance chart: This chart gave participants an opportimity to monitor 
their actual performance for the just-completed block. For each of the 20 trials there was 
either a blue bar (representing a correct response) or a red bar (representing a mistake). 
Actual RTs in milliseconds (for a given trial) were shown along the Y-axis, and trial 
numbers along the X-axis. 
5.2.2 Notes to explain the analyses 
Sources of data 
The following series of Figures explain exactly what the data corresponds to, when 
orientations within a particular plane are referred to in the results (for the X - Y plane, see 
Figure 5.4; for the Y-Z plane, see Figure 5.5; for the X-Z plane, see Figure 5.6). 
Example data for the X-Y plane: Suppose that a main effect was found for X - Y orientation 
in RTs. On average, cylinders oriented rightwards in the X - Y plane were responded to 25 
ms faster than cylinders oriented leftwards. The data that revealed this main effect would 
have come from the following information: the average RTs for responses made to the two 
cylinders in Fig. 5.4A (e.g. 520 ms), compared to the average RTs for responses made to 
the two cylinders in Fig. 5.4B (e.g. 495 ms). The data comes from a combination of these 
specific cylinders because there are only two cylinders that have a leftwards X - Y 
orientation (2 & 3), and there are only two cylinders that have a rightwards X - Y orientation 
( I & 4). For example, in considering Fig. 5.4A (cylinders 2 & 3), these two cylinders share 
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no other features in any other planes (e.g. cylinder 2: Y-Z = upwards, X-Z = rightwards: 
cylinder 3: Y-Z = downwards, X-Z = leftwards); thus the only feature that they have in 
common is a leftwards orientation in the X-Y plane, fhcrefore, to reiterate, in order to 
examine information about orientation in the X-Y plane, mean RTs must be collapsed 
across the data obtained for cylinders 2 & 3 (leftwards) and cylinders 1 & 4 (rightwards). 
F i g u r e 5.4 T h e X - Y p lane A) G loba l cy l inder onen ta t i ons 2 & 3 a re s h o w n (as n u m b e r e d in 
F igs 5.1 & 5.2) . T h e s e a re the only two cy l inders tha t sha re a s their c o m m o n fea tu re a 
l e f twa rds onen ta t i on in the X-Y p lane B) G loba l cy l inder o r ien ta t ions 1 & 4 are s h o w n (as 
n u m b e r e d in F igs . 5.1 & 5.2) T h e s e a re the on ly t w o cy l i nde rs that sha re a s their c o m m o n 
fea tu re a r i gh twards or ienta t ion in the X -Y p lane C ) T h i s i l lustrat ion dep ic t s the X-Y p lane to 
he lp v isua l i se t he d i m e n s i o n under d i scuss ion Note t he arb i t rary re fe rence point (a th ick 
b l ue l ine) tha t a l l ows the def in i t ion of le f twards and r igh twards onen ta t i ons t h rough the use of 
a r r o w h e a d s that point t o w a r d s it 
Exactly the same logic applies t o the Y-Z plane (see Fig. 5.5), where mean RTs must be 
collapsed across the data obtained for cylinders 1 & 2 (upwards) and cylinders 3 & 4 
(downwards); and the X-Z plane (see Fig. 5.6), where mean R l s must be collapsed across 
the data obtained for cylinders 1 & 3 (leftwards) and cylinders 2 & 4 (rightwards). 
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F i g u r e 5.5 T h e Y-Z p lane A ) G loba l cy l inder onen ta t i ons 1 & 2 a re s h o w n (as n u m b e r e d in 
F igs 5 1 & 5 2 ) T h e s e are the only two cy l inders tha t sha re as the i r c o m m o n fea tu re an 
upward or ientat ion in the Y -Z p lane. B) G loba l cy l inder o r ien ta t ions 3 & 4 a re s h o w n (as 
n u m b e r e d in F igs 5 1 & 5 2) T h e s e are the only t w o cy l inders tha t s h a r e a s their c o m m o n 
fea ture a d o w n w a r d onen ta t ion in the Y -Z p lane C ) Th i s i l lust rabon dep i c t s the Y -Z p lane to 
he lp v isual ise the d i m e n s i o n under d i scuss ion No te the arb i t rary r e f e r e n c e point (a th ick 
o range l ine) that a l lows the def in i t ion of u p w a r d a n d d o w n w a r d onen ta t i ons th rough the use 
of a r r owheads that point t owa rds it 
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F i g u r e 5.6 T h e X - Z p lane. A ) G loba l cy l inder o n e n t a t i o n s 1 & 3 are s h o w n (as n u m b e r e d in 
F igs 5.1 & 5.2) . T h e s e a r e the only two cy l inders t ha t sha re as the i r c o m m o n fea tu re a 
l e f twa rds or ien ta t ion in the X-Z p lane B) G loba l cy l i nder o r ien ta t ions 2 & 4 a re s h o w n (as 
numt>ered in F igs . 5.1 & 5 2) T h e s e a re the only two cy l i nde rs that sha re a s their c o m m o n 
fea tu re a rightwards or ientat ion in the X - Z p lane C ) T h i s i l lustrat ion dep ic ts the X - Z p lane to 
he lp v isua l i se the d i m e n s i o n under d i scuss ion Note t h e arb i t rary re fe rence point (a th ick 
g r e e n l ine) tha t a l lows t he def in i t ion of le f twards a n d r i gh twards or ien ta t ions t h rough the use 
of a r r o w h e a d s tha t point t owa rds it. 
Conventions of reporting and interpreting the data 
It should be noted that the cylinder orientation in any plane (e.g. X-Z plane) is necessarily 
specified by the interaction of cylinder orientations in the other two planes (e.g. X-Y x Y-Z 
planes). For example, a cylinder oriented leftwards in the X-Y plane and downwards in the 
Y-Z plane, must, as a consequence, be oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane. It follows that a 
main eflect of X-Z oiientation could alternatively be described as an interaction between 
X-Y and Y-Z orientation. Indeed, supix)se that a significant main effect was found for X-Z 
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orientation [F (1 , 18) = 15.005, p < 0.0]]. Analysing the data a different way would 
produce exactly the same resuh [ F (1, 18) = 15.005, p < 0.01] for an interaction between 
X-Y and Y-Z orientations. 
I his equivalence is illustrated in Figure 5.7A. In examining an interaction between the X-
Y and Y-Z planes, the basis for a compatibility effect can be seen with respect to each 
cylinder that was responded to (see Figure 5.7C). The picture is clearer however (and 
reveals a more basic phenomenon), when the main effect is considered (see Figure 5.7B). 
Thus i f we look at these cylinders, it can be seen that cylinders 1 & 3 share the common 
feature of being oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane, whereas cylinders 2 & 4 (which in 
this example were both responded to considerably faster) share the common feature of 
being oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane. Consequently, for reasons o f conceptual clarity 
and simplicity, reported results emphasise single planes. For particularly interesting results, 
both planes are reported. Single planes are reported in the text (e.g. result [5.1 .6a]) and 
interacting planes are reported in Appendix 2 (e.g. result [5.1 .6b]). 
A. Cy l inder 1 Cy l inder 3 B. 530 
525 R (X-Y) L (X-Y) 
* + * = L ( X - Z ) - ^ 5 2 0 
U (Y-Z) D (Y-Z) 
525 515 520 
Cy l inder 2 Cy l inder 4 
L (X-Y) R (X-Y) 
* + * = R ( X - Z ) 
U 0^-Z) D (Y-Z) 
490 500 495 
S 5 1 5 -
5 1 0 -
^ 5 0 5 
S 500 
^ 4 9 5 
490 
4 8 5 
520 
495 
Le f twa rds R i g h t w a r d s 
X - Z o r ien ta t ion 
C. 530 
^ 520 
Le f twards R i g h t w a r d s 
X -Y or ien ta t ion 
U ( Y - Z ) 
D ( Y - Z ) 
Figure 5.7 A . Example data showir>g that [(XY x YZ)+{XY x YZ^^ 2 = XZ Th is data could 
be expressed as a mam effect of X -Z ohen ta ton (B.). or as an interaction o f X -Y < Y-Z (C. ) 
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The physical proximity argument 
In terms of the 'proximity argument' developed in Chapter 4, it is possible that orientation 
compatibility effects are sensitive to the physical proximity of a particular end of an object. 
In terms of the planes described, the edge of a plane that would be closest to the viewer's 
hands coincided with the arbitrary reference point used. This was done to allow definitions 
of orientation that were meaningful in terms of viewer-centred action (e.g. left, right, 
upward, downward), rather than behaviourally neutral terms (e.g. oriented 45°). 
While potential effects of cylinder proximity to the viewer 's body will be apparent within 
the three individual planes (e.g. for a cylinder oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane, the left 
end of the cylinder will be closer to the viewer than the right end), it is of interest to 
investigate whether response performance is influenced by the distance a particular hand 
would have to travel to reach an end of a cylinder. It is therefore notable that the two 
cylinders oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane (cylinders 3 & 4), are actually closer to a 
particular hand (in terms of their global orientation), whereas the two cylinders oriented 
upwards in the Y -Z plane (cylinders 1 & 2) are not. This is apparent in Figure 5.8, where it 
can be seen that regardless of which end of the cylinder a hand might hypothetically reach 
towards (i.e. the closest or the farthest end), there is an overall advantage (in terms of 
absolute physical proximity of the hands) associated with the left hand for cylinder 3, and 
the right hand for cylinder 4. Fhus if both hands are considered together, overall there is an 
advantage, in terms of absolute physical proximity, associated with cylinders 3 & 4 (both 
oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane), when compared to cylinders 1 & 2 (both oriented 
upwards in the Y -Z plane). 
In light of this, the following additional hypothesis can be generated: 
Visual Attribute Hypothesis 4: If the absolute physical property of a cylinder contributes 
to its affordance for components of left-right actions, then a main eftect of Y-Z orientation 
should reflect an advantage for responses made to cylinders oriented downwards in the Y 
picine. 
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X - Z P l a n e Sub- to ta l Total 
^ 1.41 
1^1, 
+ 1 ' ^ O + l 41 ^ 1 1+1 
4^ 
0+1 41 
3. 
1 41 / 
Distance (au) ^ ^ ^ ^ 
V/0+1 41 VXl+1 ^^^0+1 41 V/O+1 41 +1 
4. 
1 41^ -5/1 
q I / / 
Distance (.u, • ^ , „ „ fsj^, 4, f^,.! ^ 0 0+1 41 
f 7 
5.41 
5.41 
5.41 
5.41 
4 .23 
f t 
5.41 
f ; 
5.41 
4.23 
10.82 
10 .82 
9.64 
9.64 
F i g u r e 5.8 Four g lobal cy l inder o r ien ta t ions desc r i bed wi th respec t to their hypothe t ica l 
phys ica l prox imi ty to the v iewer 's h a n d s , m e a s u r e d in arb i t rary uni ts (au ) 
5.2.3 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures ANOVAs 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variable of 
mapping rule, and the within subjects independent variables of hand o f response and two 
of the following: X-Y, Y-Z or X-Z cylinder orientations. Participants were entered as a 
random factor, and the dependent variables were RTs (the first ANOVA) and mistakes (the 
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second ANOVA). The results for Experiment 5.1 are summarised in Table 5.3. Key results 
are reported in the text and remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
T a b l e 5.3 M a m e f fec ts and in teract ions repor ted in E x p e n m e n t 5 1 Key stat is t ica l 
s i gn i f i cance s ta tus (app roach ing , yes, no) M dep ic ts resu l ts of key theoret ica l in terest . 
Resu l t no S o u r c e 
Cor rec t 
R e s p o n s e s R e s p o n s e s 
5 1 . 1 X Y - Z cyl inder onen ta t ion No No 
5 1.2 R e s p o n s e N o Yes 
5 i . 3 y X -Y cyl inder or ientat ion x R e s p o n s e N o A p p 
5 1 . 4 y Y - Z cy l inder or ienta t ion x R e s p o n s e No No 
5 1 5 R e s p o n s e x Mapp ing Ru le Y e s No 
5 1 6a>*^ X - Z cyl inder or ienta t ion x R e s p o n s e Yes Yes 
5.1 6b X - Y x Y - Z cyl inder or ien ta t ion x R e s p o n s e Yes Yes 
Main Effects [5.1.1 y ] 
There was no significant main effect of Y-Z cylinder orientation in either RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 
0.218, p > 0.5] or mistakes [F (1 , 18) = 0.223, p = 0.5]. Mean RTs were 475 ms (SE = 8) 
for cylinders oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane and 476 ms (SE = 8) for cylinders 
oriented upwards in the Y-Z plane. Mean mistakes were 7.5 % (SE = 0.4) for cylinders 
oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane and 7.7 % (SE = 0.3) for cylinders oriented upwards 
in the Y-Z plane. This suggested that overall, the absolute physical proximity of a cylinder 
to the viewer's hands did not influence response performance (return to section 5.2.2 for an 
explanation of physical proximity values). 
Two-Way Interactions [5.1.3 y ] 
There was no significant interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 1.016, p > 0.1]. This suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 
3-D cylinder did not have any performance-related benefits (in RTs) associated with spatial 
key press responses. However, an interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and hand 
of response approached significance in mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 3.934,/? = 0.063] (see Figure 
5.9). The pattern of means hinted at a negative or reverse compatibility effect. For left hand 
responses, mean mistakes were 0.7 % fewer for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than 
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leftwards in the X-Y plane. For riaht hand responses, mean mistakes were 1.7% fewer for 
cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Y plane. 
10.07 
^ 9.0 • 
S 8.5 • 
8.0 -
^ 7.5 • 
S 7.0 • 
^ ' ^ 6.0 • 
^ 5.5 • 
5.0 • 
Left R ight 
R e s p o n s e 
MEANS TABLE 
X - Y R e s m s S E % S E 
L L 4 7 7 10 6.9 0.5 
L R 4 7 2 9 7.8 0.7 
R L 4 7 7 9 6.2 0 6 
R R 4 7 5 8 9.5 0.8 
KEY 
9 — Le f tward (X-Y) 
i R i g h t w a r d (X-Y) 
X-Y ORIENT 
N ^ ( R ) ^ 
F i g u r e 5.9 M e a n m i s t a k e s as a func t ion of h a n d of r e s p o n s e a n d X-Y onen ta t i on 
Two-Way Interactions [5.1.4 y ] 
There was no significant interaction between Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in RTs 18) = 1.764,/? > 0.1] or mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 0.081,/? > 0.5). This 
suggested that the Y-Z orientation of a 3D cylinder did not have any performance-related 
benefits associated with spatial key press responses. See Table 5.4 for associated means. 
Tab le 5.4 M e a n s R T s (ms ) . mistai^es (%) a n d s tanda rd e r ro rs (SE) for resul t [5 1 . 4 y ] 
Y-Z R e s m s SE 
D L 4 7 6 9 
D R 4 7 4 8 7 0.6 
U L 4 7 9 9 R n 7 
U R 4 7 3 8 7 0 7 
Two-Way Interactions [5.1.6a y ] 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and hand of response 
in both RTs [ F (1, 18) = 17.535, p = 0.001 ] and mistakes [ F (1 , 18) = 6.511, /? < 0.05] (see 
Figure 5.10). For lef^ hand responses, mean RTs were 10 ms faster (and mean mistakes 
were 2 % fewer) for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. 
For right hand responses, mean RTs were 8 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 1.8 % 
fewer) for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than lefhvards in the X-Z plane. This 
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compatibility effect suggested that the X-Z orientation of a 3-D cylinder has performance-
related benefits associated with spatial hand key press responses. 
4 8 5 . 0 
4 8 2 . 5 
4 8 0 . 0 
4 7 7 . 5 H 
4 7 5 . 0 
4 7 2 . 5 
470.0-1 
4 6 7 . 5 • 
4 6 5 . 0 
6.0 H 
Le f twa rd (L) R igh twa rd (R) 
X - Z Or ienta t ion 
Le f twa rd (L) R i g h t w a r d (R) 
X - Z Or ien ta t ion 
KEY 
Left r e s p o n s e 
R igh t response 
MEANS TABLE 
X - Z R e s m s S E % S E 
L L 472 10 5 5 0.6 
L R 477 9 9.6 0.7 
R L 4 8 2 9 7 5 0.6 
R R 4 6 9 8 7.8 0.8 
X-Z ORIENT 
(L) (R) 
V \ 
F i g u r e 5.10 M e a n R T s (b lack) a n d m e a n m i s t a k e s ( red ) a s a funct ion of hand of r e s p o n s e 
a n d X - Z o r ien ta t ion 
This influence of X-Z orientation on responses can be seen more specifically (in terms of 
each global cylinder orientation), by examining the equivalent interaction (see Appendix 2, 
result |5.1.6b]) between Y-Z, X-Z orientation and hand of resi3onsc. 
5.2.4 Discussion 
It wi l l be recalled that Experiments 4.1-4.3 consistently failed to produce orientation-action 
compatibility effects associated with the X-Y plane o f 2D diagonal lines. The use of 3D 
cylinders whose global orientation consisted, in part, of the same orientation in the X-Y 
plane (45° or 135°) did not conclusively change this pattern. Ilius in Experiment 5.1, X-Y 
cylinder orientation did not influence the performance of compatible responses in RTs, 
although there was a hint of a negative compatibility effect in mistakes [5.1.3yj. This 
suggests that even though the cylinder was 3D, its orientation in the X-Y plane did not 
afford left-right actions (thus contradicting Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1, which proposed 
that the most basic property of an object's orientation- its primary axis of elongation in the 
X-Y plane- is a specific visual attribute that affords left-right actions). 
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In terms of Y-Z cylinder orientation, support was provided for Visual Attribute Hypothesis 
2, in that left-right responses were not differentially influenced by a cylinder's Y-Z 
orientation [5.1.4y]. Furthermore, Visual Attribute Hypothesis 4 was not supported, since 
those cylinders that were physically closer overall to a particular hand (i.e. cylinders 
oriented downwards) did not produce an advantage; as evidenced by the lack of a main 
effect of Y-Z orientation [5.1.1^]. 
However, in accordance with Visual Attribute Hypothesis 3, orientation in the X-Z plane 
did appear to afford left-right actions. This was revealed by the orientation-action 
compatibility effect found in both RTs and mistakes [5.1.6ay]. 
In conclusion, this experiment provided preliminary evidence that the X-Z plane was the 
crucial dimension in which visual cues of orientation afforded left-right actions. It is 
possible that this visual attribute (i.e. an axis of elongation in the X-Z plane) was the basis 
for the compatibility effects found with photographs of real objects used in Experiment 3.1 
and the studies by Symes (1999), and Tucker and Ellis (1998). 
The next experiment investigated the specificity of left-right actions that might be afforded 
by these cylinders. This was done by examining whether orientation-action compatibility 
effects (which, in light of the above data, are most likely to be associated with the X-Z 
plane) were restricted to hand key press responses, or obtainable using spatial power grip 
responses. 
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5.3 Experiment 5.2 
This experiment addressed whether orientation-compatibility effects were specific to a 
certain kind of response (e.g. hand key presses), or viable for a range of responses. In 
particular, the four Action Sp)ecificity Hypotheses generated in Chapter 3 were tested (1- a 
specific action property is afforded that is exclusive to one action; 2- a primitive action 
property is afforded that is common to many actions; 3- a specific action property is 
maximally afforded but other action properties are to a lesser extent activated; 4- a range of 
actions can be afforded by virtue of being physically 'set up' by task parameters). 
In testing these hypotheses. Experiment 5.2 investigated left and right hand power grip 
responses made to the same cylinder stimuli of Experiment 5.1. As these power grip 
responses mimicked the kind of grasp that would be required to pick up a cylinder, it 
perhaps had a more intimate coupling with the cylinder than a simple hand key press (that 
is analogous to the initiation of a reach movement). In this respect, i f any differences of 
response type were to be found between Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, (particularly associated 
with the X-Z orientation of a cylinder), then it might be expected that these would take the 
form of a larger orientation-action compatibility effect size for power grip responses. Such 
a finding would provide support for Action Specificity Hypothesis 3. 
5.3.1 Method 
Participants 
See Experiment 5.1. 
Apparatus 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (small darkened room. PC etc.), but two graspable power 
grip response devices were used. Each graspable power grip response device was made 
from a hinged plastic tube which when squeezed, pressed an inlaid micro switch (see 
Figure 5.11). These response devices were held in each hand, which rested on the table in 
front of the monitor. 
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Materials 
See Experiment 5.1 
Design 
See Experiment 5.1 
Procedure 
As Experiment 5.1, but with power grip responses (see ^.^^^ ^ ^^^^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
E x p e r i m e n t 5.2 
Box 5.2). 
B o x 5.2 Tr ia l p r o c e d u r e for E x p e r i m e n t 5.2. T h e c l o c k i c o n d e p i c t s a m i l l i s e c o n d t imer, 
a n d the h a n d i c o n d e p i c t s a p o w e r gr ip r e s p o n s e . T h e c o l o u r red c o r r e s p o n d s to a n 
incor rec t r e s p o n s e . 
T h e schemat i c be low dep ic ts th ree typical t r ia ls for a par t ic ipant a s s i g n e d to MR; C 1 (left 
r esponses for wobb ly cy l inder pat tern , r ight r e s p o n s e s for s t ra ight cy l inder pa t te rn ) For e a c h 
tr ial , the inter-tr ial s t imu lus w a s s h o w n for 1 5 s e c o n d s a n d w a s then rep laced wi th the target 
s t imu lus A mi l l i second t imer m e a s u r e s the t ime that the ta rge t s t imu lus r e m a i n e d on the 
sc reen Th i s cou ld be unti l the par t ic ipant m a d e a left or r ight r e s p o n s e , or unti l th ree 
s e c o n d s had passed a n d the tnal w a s g iven t ime-ou t Fo l low ing the r e s p o n s e (or t ime-ou t ) , 
the target s t imu lus w a s immed ia te l y rep laced w i th the in ter - tna l s t imu lus fo r a new tnal . t hus 
comp le t i ng the loop 
1 T r ia l 1 | 
R e q u i r e d 
R e s p o n s e 
Ac tua l 
R e s p o n s e 
V t ^ ' s e c s 
X R T 
/ S t a r t 
(S t ra igh t 
t ex tu re ) CC)stop 
[ T r i a l 2 | 
L I 
—• 
R e q u i r e d 
R e s p o n s e 
Ac tua l 
R e s p o n s e 
/ ^ ^ T i m e 
V L / - o u t 
X R T 
/ S t a r t 
( W o b b l y 
t ex tu re ) V t ^ ' s t o p 
T r ia l 3 
R e q u i r e d 
R e s p o n s e 
Ac tua l 
R e s p o n s e 
V i ^ s e c s 
\ RT 
/ s t a r t 
( W o b b l y 
t ex tu re ) V j ^ s t o p 
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5.3.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Fxperiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures ANOVAs 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variable of 
mapping rule, and the within subjects independent variables of hand of response and two 
of the following: X-Y, Y-Z or X-Z cylinder orientations. Participants were entered as a 
random factor, and the dependent variables were RTs (the first ANOVA) and mistakes (the 
second ANOVA). The results for Experiment 5.2 are summarised in Table 5.4. Key results 
are reported in the text and remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
T a b l e 5.5 M a m e f fec ts and in teract ions repor ted in E x p e r i m e n t 5 2 Key: stat ist ical 
s i gn i f i cance s ta tus ( app roach ing , yes. no) y dep ic ts resu l ts o f key theore t i ca l in terest 
Resu l t no. S o u r c e 
Cor rec t 
R e s p o n s e s R e s p o n s e s 
5 2 i y Y - Z cy l inder or ien ta t ion N o No 
5 2 2 X - Y cy l inder onen ta t ion N o Y e s 
5 2 3 R e s p o n s e No Y e s 
5 2 4 y X-Y cy l inder or ien ta t ion x R e s p o n s e N o N o 
5 2 5 >^  Y - Z cy l inder onen ta t ion x R e s p o n s e N o No 
5 2 6 X - Z cy l inder onen ta t ion x M a p p i n g ru le A p p Y e s 
5 2 7a>^ X - Z cy l inder or ienta t ion x R e s p o n s e Y e s Y e s 
5 2 7b 
5 2 8 y 
X - Y X Y - Z cyl inder or ien ta t ion x R e s p o n s e 
X - Z cy l inder or ien ta t ion x R e s p o n s e 
X M a p p i n g rule 
Yes 
No 
Y e s 
Main Effects [5.2.1 y ] 
There was no significant main effect of Y-Z cylinder orientation in either RTs [ F ( K 18) = 
0.115, p > 0.5] or mistakes [F (1 , 18) = 0.251, p > 0.5] (this again suggested that the 
absolute physical proximity of the cylinder did not influence response performance). Mean 
RTs were 490 ms (SE = 10) for cylinders oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane and 491 ms 
(SE = 9) for cylinders oriented upwards in the Y-Z plane. Mean mistakes were 5.4 % (SE = 
0.4) for cylinders oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane and 5.7 % (SE = 0.5) for cylinders 
oriented upwards in the Y-Z plane. 
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Two-Way Interactions [5.2.4 
There was no significant interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in either RTs [F (1 , 18) = 0.483, p > 0.1] or mistakes [ F (1 , 18) = 3.057, p > 
0.05]. This suggested that the X-Y orientation of a 3-D cylinder did not have any 
performance-related benefits (in RTs or mistakes) associated with spatial power grip 
responses. See Table 5.6 for associated means. 
T a b l e 5.6 M e a n s R T s (ms) . m i s t a k e s (%) a n d s tanda rd en-ors (SE) for resu l t 15 2AM] 
X-Y R e s m s S E SE 
L L 4 9 0 10 6 0 0 5 
L R 491 9 6.3 0.6 
R L 4 8 8 10 3.8 0.3 
R R 4 9 2 9 6.1 0.7 
Two-Way Interactions [5.2.5 y*'] 
There was no significant interaction between Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in RTs [ F (1, 18) = 0.106, /? > 0.5] or mistakes [ F (1 , 18) = 0.548, p > 0.1 J. This 
suggested that the Y-Z orientation of a 3-D cylinder did not have any performance-related 
benefits associated with spatial power grip responses. See Table 5.7 for associated means. 
T a b l e 5.7 M e a n s R T s (ms) . m i s t a k e s (%) a n d s tandard e r ro rs (SE) for resu l t [5 2 5 y ) 
Y - Z R e s m s S E % SE 
D L 4 8 8 10 4 6 0 5 
D R 4 9 1 10 6.3 0.7 
U L 4 9 0 10 5 3 0 6 
U R 491 9 6.1 0.6 
Two-way interaction [5.2.7a y ] 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and hand of response 
in both RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 45.509,/? < 0.001] and mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 8.995,/? < 0.01] (see 
Figure 5.12). For left hand responses, mean RTs were 10 ms faster (and mean mistakes 
were 2.1 % fewer) for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. 
For right hand responses, mean RTs were 15 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 1 % 
fewer) for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Z plane. This 
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compatibility effect suggested thai the X-Z orientation of a 3-D cylinder had performance-
related benefits associated with spatial power grip responses. 
S 4 9 5 
cr 4 9 0 
8.0-1 
-—^  7 . 5 -
7 . 0 -
6 . 5 -
S
ta
k 6 . 0 -
S
ta
k 
5 . 5 -
5 . 0 -
4 . 5 -
(0 
1. 
4 . 0 -
2 3 . 5 -
3.0-1 
L e f t w a r d (L) R igh tward (R) 
X - Z Or ienta t ion 
Le f twa rd (L) R igh tward (R) 
X -Z Or ien ta t ion 
KEY 
e — Left r e s p o n s e 
-I R igh t r esponse 
M E A N S T A B L E 
X-Z Res m s SE 
L L 484 9 3 9 0 5 
L R 4 9 9 10 6.7 0.7 
R L 4 9 4 10 6 0 0.5 
R R 484 9 5.7 0.6 
X-Z O R I E N T 
F i g u r e 5.12 M e a n R T s (b lack) a n d m e a n m i s t a k e s ( r ed ) a s a func t ion of hand of r e s p o n s e 
a n d X - Z o r ien ta t ion 
This influence of X-Z orientation on responses can be seen more specifically (in terms of 
each global cylinder orientation), by examining the equivalent interaction (see Appendix 2, 
result [5.2.7b]) between Y-Z, X-Z orientation and hand of response. 
Three-Way Interactions [5.2.8 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and 
mapping rule in mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 5.392,/? < 0.05] but not in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 0.806,/? 
> 0.1] (see Figure 5.13). 
For participants in MR: C I the interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response resembled the compatibility effect observed when collapsed across mapping 
conditions [5.2.6ay]. Thus for left hand responses, mean mistakes were 2.2 % fewer for 
cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane; and for right hand 
responses, mean mistakes were 3.3 % fewer for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than 
leftwards in the X-Z plane. 
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This compatibility effect was not observed however, for participants in MR: C2. Thus for 
left hand responses, mean mistakes were 2 % fewer for cylinders oriented leftwards rather 
than rightwards in the X-Z plane. For right hand responses, mean mistakes were 1.3 % 
fewer for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. 
M R : C 1 MR: C2 
Le f tward (L) R lgh twa rd (R) 
X -Z Or ien ta t ion 
Le f tward (L) R i g h t w a r d (R) 
X-Z Or ien ta t ion 
KEY 
Left r esponse 
Right response 
M E A N S TABLE 
M R X - Z R e s % SE 
C I L L 4.0 0.7 
C I L R 8.7 1.0 
C I R L 6.2 0.7 
C I R R 5.4 0.9 
C 2 L L 3.7 0.7 
C 2 L R 4 .7 1.0 
C 2 R L 5.7 0.7 
C 2 R R 6 0 0.9 
X-Z O R I E N T 
F i g u r e 5.13 M e a n m i s t a k e s as a func t ion of h a n d o f r esponse , X - Z o r ien ta t ion a n d m a p p i n g 
rule 
5.3.3 Supplementary Results (Experiment 5.1 « 5.2) 
In comparing Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, two repeated measures ANOVAs (located in 
Appendix 1) were pertbrmed on the between subjects independent variables of mapping rule 
and Experiment; and the within subjects independent variables of hand of response and a 
choice of two of the following: X-Y, Y-Z or X-Z cylinder orientations. Participants were 
entered as a random factor, and the dependent variables were RTs (the first ANOVA) and 
mistakes (the second ANOVA). The results for Experiment 5.1 x 5.2 are summarised in 
Table 5.8. 
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T a b l e 5.8 M a m e f fec t s a n d interact ions repor ted in E x p e r i m e n t 5 1 x 5.2. Key: s tat is t ica l 
s ign i f i cance s ta tus (approach ing , yes, no) M dep ic ts resu l t s of key theore t ica l interest . 
Resu l t no S o u r c e 
Cor rec t Incor rec t 
R e s p o n s e s R e s p o n s e s 
S u p p 1 Y - Z cy l inder or ientat ion 
S u p p 2 y E x p e r i m e n t 
S u p p 3 R e s p o n s e 
No No 
N o Y e s 
N o Yes 
S u p p 4 R e s p o n s e x Mapp ing rule 
S u p p 5 X - Y cy l inder or ientat ion x R e s p o n s e 
S u p p 6 Y - Z cy l inder or ientat ion >« R e s p o n s e 
S u p p 7 M X - Y cy l inder onentat ion x E x p e n m e n t 
S u p p 8 X - Z cy l inder onentat ion x R e s p o n s e 
Y e s No 
N o Yes 
N o N o 
N o Yes 
Yes Yes 
S u p p 9/*^ X - Z cy l inder or ientat ion x R e s p o n s e x E x p e n m e n t 
S u p p 1 0 - ^ X -Z cy l inder onentat ion « M a p p i n g rulex E x p e n m e n t 
N o No 
N o 
On the whole, the results of this supplementary analysis revealed that hand key press 
responses and power grip responses behaved similarly (i.e. that the results of Hxperiments 
5.1 and 5.2 were statistically similar). Only those results that did suggest differences 
between the two experiments are reported below. 
Main Effects [Supp2y] 
I here was a significant main effect of experiment in mistakes [F (1 , 36) = 19.457, p < 
0.001] but not in RTs [ F (K 36) = 1.436, p > 0.1]. Mean mistakes were 2 % fewer in 
Experiment 5.2 (5.6 %, SE = 0.3) than in Experiment 5.1 (7.6 %, SE = 0.3). 
Two-Way Interactions [Supp 7 y ] 
I hcre was a significant interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and Experiment in 
mistakes [ F (1 , 36) = 5.059, p < 0.05] but not in RTs [F (1 , 36) = 0.286, p > 0.5] (see 
Figure 5.14). For participants in Experiment 5.1, mean mistakes were 0.6 % fewer for 
cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Y plane (this was not a 
significant main effect in Experiment 5.1). For participants in Experiment 5.2, mean 
mistakes were 1.2 % fewer for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards (this was 
a significant main effect [5.2.2] in Experiment 5.2). 
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5.1 5.2 
Expe r imen t 
M E A N S TABLE 
E x p X -Y % S E 
5.1 L 7.3 0.4 
5.1 R 7.9 0.4 
5.2 L 6.2 0.4 
5 .2 R 5.0 0.4 
KEY 
9 — Le f tward (X -Y ) 
H R igh twa rd (X-Y) 
X-Y O R I E N T 
(L) 
: r ) ^ 
F i g u r e 5.14 Mean mistakes as a function of Experiment and X - Y orientation 
Three-Way Interactions [ S u p p 9 y ] 
In the crucial comparison, there was no significant interaction between X -Z cylinder 
orientation, spatial response and Experiment, in either RTs [ F ( l , 36) = 2.274,/? > 0.1], or 
mistakes ( 1 , 36) = 0.156, p = 0.5]. This illustrates that there was no significant 
difference in the size or nature of the compatibility effect between X-Z cylinder orientation 
and spatial response for the different response types (Experiment 5 .1 : key press. 
Experiment 5.2: power grip). See Table 5.9 for associated means. 
T a b l e 5.9 M e a n s R T s (ms) . m is takes (%) a n d s tanda rd e r ro rs (SE) for resu l t [Supp 9 y ] 
Exp X -Z R e s m s SE SE 
5.1 L L 472 9 5.5 0.6 
5.1 L R 477 9 9.6 0.7 
5.1 R L 482 10 7.5 0.5 
5.1 R R 469 8 7.8 0.7 
5.2 L L 484 9 3.9 0.6 
5.2 L R 499 9 6.7 0.7 
5.2 R L 494 10 6.0 0.5 
5.2 R R 484 8 5.7 0.7 
Three-Way Interactions [Supp 10y ] 
There was a significant interaction between X -Z cylinder orientation, mapping rule and 
Experiment in mistakes [ F ( l , 36) = 4.976, p < 0.05] but not in RTs 36) = 0.166,/? > 
0.5] (see Figure 5.15). 
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M R : C1 
a; 
rz 
c: 
0; 
M R : C 2 
5.1 5 2 
Experiment 
5.1 5.2 
Experiment 
KEY 
e— L e f t w a r d (X-Z) 
• f — R i g h t w a r d (X-Z) 
M E A N S TABLE 
M R E x p X-Z % SE 
C I 5.1 L 7.1 0 6 
C I 5.1 R 7 7 0.6 
C I 5.2 L 6 .4 0.6 
C I 5.2 R 5 .8 0.6 
C2 5.1 L 
C 2 5.1 R 7 .6 0 6 
C2 5.2 L 4 . 2 0.6 
C 2 5.2 R 5 9 0 6 
X-Z ORI ENT 
F i g u r e 5.15 Mean mistakes as a function of Experiment. X-Z orientation and mapping rule 
The main effect of Experiment reported earlier is apparent in Figure 5.15 (on average, 
fewer mistakes were made in Experiment 5.2). Apart from this main effect, cylinders 
oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane did not appear to have been responded to 
differentially under each mapping condition. However, for cylinders oriented leftwards in 
the X-Z plane, the following pattern was observed: For participants in Experiment 5.1, 
mean mistakes were 1 % fewer for participants in MR: CI rather than MR: C2. For 
participants in Experiment 5.2, mean mistakes were 2.2 % fewer for participants in MR: 
C2 rather than MR: C I . 
5.3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 5.2 essentially reproduced the pattern o f results found for Experiment 5.1. 
Again, Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1 was not supported, since X-Y cylinder orientation 
did not influence the performance of compatible responses in RTs (and this time, there was 
no influence evident in mistakes either) |5.2.4y |. 
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Again, in terms of Y-Z cylinder orientation, support was provided for Visual Attribute 
Hypothesis 2, in that left-right responses were not differentially influenced by a cylinder's 
upwards or downwards Y-Z orientation [5.2.5y]. Furthermore, Visual Attribute 
Hypothesis 4 was not supported, since those cylinders that were physically closer overall to 
a particular hand (i.e. cylinders oriented downwards) did not produce an advantage; as 
evidenced by the lack of a main effect of Y-Z orientation [5.2.1 y ] . 
Again also, in accordance with Visual Attribute Hypothesis 3, orientation in the X-Z plane 
did appear to afford left-right actions. This was revealed by the orientation-action 
compatibility effect found in both RTs and mistakes [5.2.7a/<]. This finding did not 
support Action Specificity Hypothesis 1 (which proposed that a specific action property is 
afforded that is exclusive to one action) since the X-Z orientation-action compatibility 
effect has now been found for two different actions, namely hand key presses (Experiment 
5.1) and hand power grips (Experiment 5.2). Instead this finding provided some support for 
Action Specificity Hypothesis 2. Here, an object property (e.g. orientation) might afford a 
primitive left or right action property that is a common component to many different 
actions. This finding is also in keeping with Acfion Specificity Hypothesis 4, whereby an 
action that is 'set up' (i.e. partially programmed or soft-assembled) will heighten 
perceptual awareness (in terms of attention) to visual properties of the object (in this case 
X-Z orientation) that become relevant to that action. In turn that visual property will be 
more likely to afford the same properties of an action that have been 'set up'. 
There was a slight indication of a larger X-Z orientation-action compatibility effect in RTs 
for power grip responses (the effect size for key presses in Experiment 5.1 was 9 ms, and 
the effect size for power grips in Experiment 5.2 was 12.5 ms). This might be taken as 
tentative support for Action Specificity Hypothesis 3 (which proposed that a specific action 
property is maximally afforded but other action properties are to a lesser extent activated). 
However, a statistical comparison of the two experiments [Supp 9 y ] did not reveal any 
significant differences between experiments for this effect. T^is suggested that hand power 
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grips and hand key presses behaved in a similar manner with respect to X-Z cylinder 
orientation. This finding therefore provided greater support for Action Specificity 
Hypothesis 2 (which proposed that a primitive action property is afforded that is common 
to many actions). 
In conclusion, this experiment reinforced the proposal that the X-Z plane is the crucial 
dimension in which visual cues of orientation afford left-right actions. Furthermore, in 
terms of action specificity, it did not seem to make much difference whether responses 
were made with key presses or power grips. Bearing in mind the crude response measures 
of RT and mistakes (which realise very small effects), it is perhaps unrealistic to expect a 
clear indication of the subtleties of action specificity. Having said this, it is possible that 
the more distinct the response types are, the greater the likelihood would be of uncovering 
differences. For example, one response type might be optimal for interacting with the 
cylinder (e.g. power grip responses) and one might be simply viable within the context of 
the experiment (e.g. foot responses). The next experiment addressed this possibility. 
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5.4 Experiment 5.3 
This experiment used the same cylinder stimulus set, whilst contrasting (within subjects) 
two response types. For one half of the experiment foot responses were made, and for the 
other half of the experiment power grip responses were made. It remained an open 
question whether foot responses would produce any orientation-compatibility effects, 
although this possibility seemed likely, bearing in mind the positive results of Experiment 
3.1. In assuming that a compatibility effect between X-Z orientation and spatial response ( 
foot responses and power grip responses) might be replicated, the main interest of this 
experiment concerned whether these two response types would reflect any differences, 
particularly in the size of the compatibility effects. 
5.4.1 Method 
Participants 
See Experiment 5.1. 
Apparatus 
The two graspable power grip response devices from Experiment 5.2 were used, and in 
addition, the response device from Experiment 5.1 was used as a foot response device. 
Materials 
See Experiment 5.1. 
Design 
The two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. The within subjects independent 
variables were effector (hands, feet), spatial response (left, right), and a choice of two of 
the following: X - Y cylinder orientation (leftwards, rightwards), Y-Z cylinder orientation 
(upwards, downwards) or X-Z cylinder orientation (leftweu-ds, rightwards). The between 
subjects independent variables were mapping rules 1 and 2. Thus the experiment was based 
o n a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design, as illustrated in Table 5.6. 
In mapping rule I: condition 1 (MRl: C I ) [n = 10], left spatial responses were made to 
cylinders with a wobbly surface pattern and right spatial responses were made to cylinders 
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with a straight surface partem. The 'spatial response-cylinder pattern' pairing was reversed 
in mapping rule 1: condition 2 (MRl: C2) [n = 10]. In mapping mle 2: condition 1 (MR2: 
C I ) [n = 10], responses were made with the hands for the first half of the experiment and 
feet for the second half. The order of response effector was reversed in mapping rule 2: 
condition 2 (MR2: C2) [n = 10]. 
T a b l e 5.10 Experimental design for Exper iment 5.3. Key: mapping rule 1 (MR1) . mapping 
rule 2 (MR2) . condition 1 (C1 ) , condition 2 ( C 2 ) . experimental group ( G ) 
M 
C I 
Rl 
C2 
. Hands 
Effector 
Feet 
G , (n = 5) 
G , (n = 5 ) ^ 
G2 (n = 5) 
G2 (n = 5) 
o - . n Left 
Spatial Response Right 
G , (n = 5) 
G , (n = 5) 
G2 (n = 5) 
G2 (n = 5) 
C I X - Y cylinder orientation [ ; « ^ g ^ P 
High grasp 
G , (n = 5) 
G | (n = 5) 
G2 (n = 5) 
G2 (n = 5) 
Y - Z cylinder orientation Left grasp 
Right ^ rasp 
G , (n = 5) 
G , (n = 5)^ 
G2 (n = 5) 
G2 (n = 5) 
.^ . Left lirasp 
\ - / c \ hnucr oneniaiion r.-
H^j^ Riiihi iirasp G 1 (11 = ? 1 
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A practice session consisted of 20 practice trials. The main experiment consisted of 640 
trials, divided into 32 blocks of 20 trials. Both cylinder patterns were shown 80 times for 
each of the four variations of cylinder orientation (thus 80 presentations x 2 patterns x 4 
cylinder orientations = 640 trials). The order of cylinder pattern and cylinder orientation 
was randomised in three blocks (144 + 136 + 360) allowing for the possibility of a 
balanced analysis at 3 different stages within the experiment 45 
Contrary to the design, this analysis by stages was not actually performed. Instead the experiment was 
analysed in ftill. As the order of cylinder pattern and cylinder orientation was not randomised in two blocks 
of 320 to counterbalance condition instances for hand and foot responses, condition instances varied slightly. 
However this design flaw was minimal and was not regarded as problematic for the analysis. See Appendix 5 
for a table of descriptive statistics relating to condition instances. 
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As responses were dependent on the pattern of the cylinder, the independent variables of 
cylinder orientation (X-Y, Y-Z and X-Z) were task irrelevant. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 5.1, with the following exceptions: Participants 
were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- MRI: C I , MR2: C I ; 
Gwup 2- N4RI: C2, MR2: C2; Group 3- MRI: C I , MR2: C2; Group 4- MRI: C2, MR2: C2). 
According to their group allocation, they were instructed which order of response effector to 
use and v^ich spatial response to make to each cylinder pattern. The effector changeover 
associated with MR2 was signalled on the screen halfway through the experiment, and 
participants took a short break before resuming the experiment with the newly assigned 
effectors. After completing the practice session, the main experiment began (which was split 
into 32 feedback blocks of 20 trials). The trial procedure is outiined in Box 5.4. 
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5.4.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures ANOVAs 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variables of 
mapping rule 1 and mapping rule 2, and the within subjects independent variables of 
effector, spatial response, and two of the following: X-Y, Y-Z or X-Z cylinder orientation. 
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The dependent variables were RTs (the first ANOVA) and mistakes (the second ANOVA). 
The results for Experiment 5.3 are summarised in Table 5.11. Key results are reported in 
the text and remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
Table 5.11 Main effects and interactions reported in Experiment 5.3. Key: statistical 
significance status (approaching, yes. no), mapping rule 1(MR1), mapping njle 2 (MR2). M 
depicts results of key theoretical interest 
Result no. Source Correct Incorrect Responses Responses 
5.3.1 Effector Yes No 
5.3.2 Response Yes Yes 
5.3.3y Y-Z cylinder orientation Yes Yes 
5.3.4y X-Z cylinder orientation Yes No 
5.3.5y X - Y cylinder orientation ^ Response No No 
5.3.6y Y-Z cylinder orientation x Response No No 
5.3.7 Effector x MR2 Yes No 
5.3.8 Effector x Response Yes No 
5.3.9ay X-Z cylinder orientation x Response Yes Yes 
5.3.9b X-Y X Y-Z cylinder orientation x Response Yes Yes 
5.3.10 MRl X MR2 X Y-Z cylinder orientation No Yes 
5.3.1 l a y Effector x X-Z cylinder orientation x Response No Yes 
5.3.1 lb Effector x X - Y x Y - Z cylinder orientation x Response No Yes 
5.3.12 MRl X Effector x X - Y cylinder orientation x Response Yes No 
5.3.13 MRl X MR2 X Effector x X - Y cylinder orientation x Response Yes No 
5.3.14 MRl X MR2 X Effector x X-Z cylinder orientation x Response No Yes 
Main Effects [5.3.3y ] 
There was a significant main effect of Y-Z cylinder orientation in both RTs [F (1, 16) = 
4.928, p < 0.05] and mistakes [F (1, 16) = 5.972, p < 0.05]. Mean RTs were 4 ms faster 
(and mean mistakes were 0.8 % fewer), for cylinders oriented upwards (504 ms, SE = 10; 
5.5 %, SE = 0.6) rather than downwards (508 ms, SE = 10, 6.3 %, SE - 0.7) in the Y-Z 
plane. This suggested that when collapsed across hand and foot responses, performance 
was improved when cylinders were oriented upwards. It is possible that this reflected an 
effect of the absolute physical proximity of the cylinder. This pattern of mean RTs and 
mistakes however, did not support Visual Attribute Hypothesis 4. It was predicted that 
cylinders oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane might be responded to faster and with 
fewer mistakes, owing to the closer physical proximity of an end of the cylinder to a 
particular hand. An alternative possibility is that this result reflects a preference for 
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cylinders that would require an upward reach trajectory (perhaps because this is a more 
comfortable movement). 
Main Effects [5.3.4 
There was a significant main effect of X-Z cylinder orientation in RTs [F(\, 16) = 5.651,/? 
< 0.05] but not in mistakes [F (1, 16) = 0.017, p > 0.5). Mean RTs were 4 ms faster for 
cylinders oriented leftwards (504 ms, SE = 10) rather than rightwards (508 ms, SE = 10) in 
the X-Z plane. Interestingly, the opposite pattern was reported in Exj^eriment 3.1 [3.1.1 y j ; 
where it was speculated that the predominantly right-handed participants were more 
perceptually sensitive to objects oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane, by virtue of their 
long history of interacting with handled objects predominantly with their right hands. The 
difference between functional objects with handles that have a long history of interaction 
with the dominant hand (Experiment 3.1) and cylindrical objects with no functional history 
(Experiment 5.3) may underlie this discrepancy. However, this speculation should be 
tempered with caution considering that this main effect was very small, and was not 
observed in Experiments 5.1 and 5.2. 
Two-Way Interactions [5.3.5y] 
There was no significant interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and spatial response 
in either RTs [ F (1, 16) = 0.057, p > 0.5] or mistakes [F (1, 16) = 1.043, p > 0.1]. This 
suggested that the X - Y orientation of a 3-D cylinder did not have any performance-related 
benefits (in RTs or mistakes) associated with spatial responses (collapsed across hand 
power grips and foot key presses). See Table 5.12 for associated means. 
Table 5.12 Means R T s (ms), mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [5 3 5 y ] 
X-Y Res ms S E o S E 
L L 501 10 4 9 0 6 
L R 510 11 7 0 1.0 
R L 503 10 5.2 0.5 
R R 510 11 6.5 0.7 
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Two-Way Interactions [5.3.6y ] 
There was no significant interaction between Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in RTs [F (1, 18) = 2.526, /? > 0.1 ] or mistakes [F (1, 18) = 0.534, /? > 0.1 ]. This 
suggested that the Y-Z orientation of a 3-D cylinder did not have any performance-related 
benefits associated with spatial responses (collapsed across power grips and foot presses). 
See Table 5.13 for associated means. 
Table 5.13 Means R T s (nns), mistakes (%) and standard errors ( S E ) for result [5.1.4y] 
Y-Z Res ms S E % S E 
D L 505 10 5.7 0.7 
D R 510 11 6.9 1.0 
U L 499 9 4.5 0.6 
U R 510 11 6.6 0.7 
Two-Way Interactions [5.3.9ay] 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and spatial response 
in both RTs [F{\, 16) = 36.011, p < 0.001] and mistakes [ F ( l , 16)= 14.632,/? = 0.001] 
(see Figure 5.16). For left spatial responses, mean RTs were 15 ms faster (and mean 
mistakes were 2 % fewer) for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-
Z plane. For right spatial responses, mean RTs were 6 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 2 
% fewer) for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Z plane. This 
compatibility effect suggested that the X-Z orientation of a 3-D cylinder had performance-
related benefits associated with spatial responses (collapsed across hand power grips and 
foot key presses). This influence of X-Z orientation on responses can be seen more 
specifically (in terms of each global cylinder orientation), by examining the equivalent 
interaction (see Appendix 2, result [5.3.9b]) between Y-Z, X-Z orientation and hand of 
response. 
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L L 494 10 4.1 0.6 
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R R 507 11 5.8 0.6 
X-Z ORIENT 
Figure 5.16 Mean R T s (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of hand of response 
and X-Z orientation 
Three-Way Interactions [5.3.11ay] 
There was a significant interaction between effector, X-Z cylinder orientation and spatial 
response in mistakes 16) = 8.771,/? < 0.01] (see Figure 5.17). For foot responses, the 
interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and spatial response followed the usual 
compatibility pattern: For left foot responses, mean mistakes were 0.6 % fewer for 
cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. For right foot 
responses, mean mistakes were 0.8 % fewer for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than 
leftwards in the X - / plane. 
For hand responses, the interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and spatial response 
followed the same pattern, but differences in mean mistakes were larger than those 
reported for foot responses: For left hand responses, mean mistakes were 3.2 % fewer for 
cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. For right hand 
responses, mean mistakes were 3.2 % fewer for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than 
leftwards in the X-Z plane. This three-way interaction suggested that the X-Z orientation of 
a 3-D cylinder had performance-related benefits (in mistakes) associated with both types of 
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spatial response (hand power grip and foot key press responses); however, while the 
compatibility effect held for both response types, the size of the compatibility effect 
appeared larger for power grip responses rather than foot responses. 
In mean RTs, this interaction was not significant | F ( 1 , 16) = 1.438,/? > 0.1). Nevertheless, 
the trend was similar (return to Figure 5.17), with the effect size for power grip responses 
appearing to be slightly larger (13.5 ms) than that for foot responses (8 ms). 
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Eft X-Z Res ms S E S E 
H L L 464 9 3 2 0 5 
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F L L 525 12 5.1 0.8 
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Figure 5.17 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of effector, X-Z 
onentation and spatial response 
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5.4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 5.3 essentially reproduced the pattern of results found in Experiments 5.1 and 
5.2. One tmomaly was the finding of a main effect in Y - Z orientation [5.3.3 y ] , which did 
not support Visual Attribute Hypothesis 4. This finding showed an advantage in both RTs 
and mistakes for those cylinders that were physically farther overall to a particular hand 
(that is, cylinders oriented upwards). It is possible that this reflected a preference for object 
orientations that require an upward rather than downward reach trajectory. 
More in line with the two previous experiments however, was the lack of support for 
Visual Attribute Hypothesis 1, since X - Y cylinder orientation did not influence the 
performance of compatible responses in RTs or mistakes [5.3.5y]. Again, in terms of Y-Z 
cylinder orientation, support was provided for Visual Attribute Hypothesis 2, in that left-
right responses were not differentially influenced by a cylinder's upward or downward Y-Z 
orientation [5.3.6y]. 
Again also, in accordance v^th Visual Attribute Hypothesis 3, orientation in the X-Z plane 
appeared to afford left-right actions. This was revealed by the orientation-action 
compatibility effect (collapsed across hand power grips and foot responses) found in both 
RTs and mistakes [5.3.9ay ]. 
Of special interest was how this effect played out under each response type. While there 
was an indication of a larger X-Z orientation-action compatibility effect in RTs for power 
grip responses (the effect size for foot responses was 8 ms, and the effect size for power 
grips was 13.5 ms) this interaction between effector, X-Z orientation and spati£j response 
was not statistically significant in RTs [5.3.1 l a X ] . As such, this finding did not support 
Action Specificity Hypothesis 1 (which proposed that a specific action property is afforded 
that is exclusive to one action), but rather supported Action Specificity Hypothesis 2, 
whereby an object property (e.g. orientation) might afford a primitive left or right action 
property that is a common component to many different actions. This finding is also in 
keeping with Action Specificity Hypothesis 4, whereby a compatible action can be 'set 
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up'. The same trend in mistakes however, was statistically significant (the effect size for 
foot responses was 0.7 %, and the effect size for power grips was 3.2 %). This result 
suggested that X-Z cylinder orientation had a greater magnitude of influence on power 
grips than on foot responses. This significant result in mean mistakes can be taken as 
support for Action Specificity Hypothesis 3 (which proposed that a specific action property 
is maximally afforded but other associated action properties are to a lesser extent 
activated). 
In conclusion, this experiment again reinforced the proposed hypothesis that the X-Z plane 
was the crucial dimension in which visual cues of orientation afford action. Furthermore, it 
revealed differences in the extent to which orientation in the X-Z plane affected foot 
responses and power grips. While a trend that suggested a more powerful affordance for 
power grip responses (as opposed to foot responses) was consistent for both performance 
measures, it was only statistically significant for mean mistakes. These results therefore 
provided only partial support for the idea of spreading activation in a distributed 
perception-action network (where activation is strongest for the actual affordance, and 
weaker for associated action properties). As argued previously, this finding is also 
consistent with the possibility that the physical parameters of a task can 'set up' (i.e. 
partially program or soft assemble) compatible responses. Thus actions that apparently 
have no natural coupling with an object's orientation (such as foot responses) can promote 
themselves as viable couplings if they are 'set up' within the physical context of the task. 
5.5 General Discussion of Experiments 5.1- 5.3 
Experiments 5.1-5.3 investigated which specific dimension or dimensions of an object's 
orientation might afford components of left-right actions, and how specific these afforded 
action components might be. In terms of visual attributes, it was consistently shown that 
cylinder orientation in the X-Y plane, when examined in isolation, did not produce 
orientation-action compatibility effects, regardless of what kind of left-right response was 
made (i.e. hand key presses, foot key presses or hand power grips). Overall, orientation in 
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the X - Y plane has not appeared to be a basic visual attribute that affords components of 
left-right acfions, regardless of whether this visual attribute belonged to 2D lines 
(Experiments 4.1-4.3) or 3D cylinders (Experiments 5.1-5.3). 
Similarly, in Experiments 5.1-5.3, it was consistently shown that cylinder orientation in the 
Y - Z plane, when examined in isolation, did not produce orientation-action compatibility 
effects; again regardless of what kind of left-right response was made (i.e. hand key 
presses, foot key presses or hand power grips). This finding is easily attributed to the fact 
that a cylinder oriented upward or downward in the Y - Z pleme would not offer an 
advantage for either left or right responses owing to a mismatch of spatial dimension. 
Perhaps of most interest was the finding that cylinder orientation in the X-Z plane, when 
examined in isolation, consistently produced orientation-action compatibility effects. This 
suggested that when purely visual cues of orientation were provided (i.e. they are not 
confounded with fiinctional connotations, such as those associated with the handle of a 
saucepan say), it was the orientation of an object in the X-Z plane that was most relevant 
for action. 
Furthermore, this relevance for action was not restricted to the most obvious left-right 
actions (e.g. hand responses analogous to the initiation of a reach or power grip responses 
analogous to a grasp), but also for left-right actions that had little obvious relevance to an 
object's orientation (e.g. foot responses). It was not entirely clear from the data whether 
this range of actions was differently affected. There was a trend in the data that suggested a 
continuum of influence; with the least affected responses being foot responses, then hand 
key presses, and the most affected responses being hand power grip responses. The only 
statistically significant support for this trend however, resided in the difference in mean 
mistakes between foot responses and hand power grip responses. 
Thus there was not conclusive evidence to favour either a hypothesis that related to 
visuomotor primitives that are common to many actions (and should therefore influence 
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each action to a similar degree); or a hypothesis that related to a distributed perception-
action network reflecting different strengths of association. Similar to this latter hypothesis 
is T E C ' S 'feature-weighting principle' that allows these same visuomotor primitives (or 
feature codes) to be weighted more or less highly depending on the current relevance for 
action (that is in part determined by goals, intentions, attention and a history of 
associations). Consistent with all these ideas, was the possibility that a physical and 
intentional preparedness to perform a certain action or actions (as was the case for a 
participant who was required to make left or right responses), will 'set up' attention to 
select those visual properties of an object that are relevant to the partially prepared action. 
Revisiting 'the middle way' 
The findings reported above are consistent v^th the more general notion of an action-
oriented representation (that has been the focus of much discussion in previous chapters). 
Thus the data is consistent with the idea that in coding a purely visual attribute of an object 
(i.e. the orientation of its primary axis of elongation in the X-Z plane), there is a 
simultaneous coding of the components of actions that might be relevant to that visual 
attribute (i.e. left-right action properties). This might be described as a 'representational 
default setting', as orientation was a task-irrelevant object property. Although a visual 
attribute affordance may relate to aspects of a specific action (e.g. a power grip), the actual 
motor basis for this afTordance actually appears to be quite abstract, under specified or 
primitive (such that it might be a common component of many actions). This complements 
the widespread move away from highly detailed and fully specified notions of 
representation that was discussed at length in Chapter 1. 
In keeping with this, the data here supports the views held by those approaches that adopt 
'the middle way' (see Chapter 2). To take the Enactive Approach as an example, it has 
been argued that the business of persisting as an organism consists of the taking of 
suboptimal rather than optimal solutions. Structural couplings (cf perception-action 
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couplings) need only be viable; otherwise the interactions of a system (e.g. the vision-
action system) would have to be more or less prescribed. Consequently, by having action-
oriented representations that operate at a fairly abstract level (such as TEC's common 
representational domain), the properties of action that an object might afford are not rigidly 
prescribed (e.g. the X-Z orientation of an object will not activate a highly specialised motor 
component that is exclusive to a particular grip type); but instead are loosely constrained 
such that a range of possible actions might benefit (e.g. even left-right foot responses). 
This 'viability ftinction' of an action-oriented representation should not be taken to mean 
that anything goes. Instead it can be argued that some action properties are more viable 
than others. Thus, when foot responses are the most relevant context for interacting with an 
object, then the most appropriate of these foot responses (e.g. a left foot response) will hold 
the advantage. Nevertheless, this left foot response is not the optimal action since under 
different circumstances one could make a more compatible action (e.g. a left power grip). 
To clarify this point, it is helpful to consider an analogy made by Varela et al. (1992, p. 
194), 
''John needs a suit. In a fully symbolic and representationalist world, he goes to 
his tailor who measures him and produces a nice suit according to the exact 
specifications of his measurements. There is, however, another possibility, one 
that does not demand so much from the environment. John goes to several 
department stores and chooses a suit that fits well from among the various ones 
available. Although these do not suit him exactly, they are good enough, and he 
chooses the optimal one for fit and taste. Here we have a good selectionist 
alternative that uses some optimal criteria of fitness. The analogy admits, 
however, of further refinement. John, like any human being, cannot buy a suit in 
isolation from the rest of what goes on in his life. In buying a suit, he considers 
how his looks will affect the response of his boss at work, the response of his 
girlfriend, and he may also be concemed with political and economic factors. 
Indeed, the very decision to buy a suit is not given from the outset as a problem 
but is constituted by the global situation of his life. His final choice has the form 
of satisfying some very loose constraints (e.g. being well dressed) but does not 
have the form of a fit- and even less so of an optimal fit- to any of these 
constraints." 
However, the purpose of a controlled experimental setting is precisely to limit as many 
unwanted constraints as possible. Choices, therefore, are restricted to a minimum (e.g. a 
binary response decision is made to a binary stimulus distinction). In this respect, 'a good 
selectionist altemative', if somewhat oversimplified, may adequately explain the data. 
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Thus from the available options, a left foot response (that obeys the mapping rule and that 
is afforded by a visual attribute of leftwards X-Z orientation) serves as the optimal choice, 
and this is reflected in speed and accuracy. 
Having said this however, there do remain several experimenter and self-imposed task 
constraints (speed, concentration, fatigue levels, accuracy in terms of the mapping rule and 
accuracy in terms of being centred over a button, comfort such that a response is not too 
hard but not so soft as to fail to depress the key etc.). The actual response to a given 
cylinder will reflect the satisfying of some of these constraints. Some constraints vAW be 
satisfied better than others, and some of these constraints will be relaxed or loosened (e.g. 
speed may be relaxed in favour of accuracy, or vice versa- as is sometimes evidenced by 
speed/accuracy trade-offs in RT studies). Thus in terms of an afforded action property, 
seeing the cylinder does not predetermine the execution of an optimal response (in which 
case we would be ftilly stimulus-driven agents); but rather, merely triggers the activation 
of a viable visuomotor primitive (or set of visuomotor primitives) that will ensure a small 
advantage for (among other things) a compatible foot response. The execution of this 
response is actually determined by multiple constraint satisfaction. 
Indeed, it may be usefiil to consider a proposed visuomotor primitive (or abstract feature 
code) as a loose constraint itself. Rather than an affordance that evokes a comprehensive 
and detailed action plan (such as all the parameters involved in making an optimal reach to 
an object), a far less demanding solution would be an affordance that evokes a loosely 
constrjiined and elemental action plan that can be recruited by a range of different actions. 
These subtleties have interesting implications for what Ellis and Tucker (2000) have 
termed 'micro-affordances' (the terminology of which makes a good deal of sense given 
the above). 
One way of demonstrating that a micro-affordance is loosely constrained rather than fixed 
and prescribed would be to show that the same (or at least structurally similar) visual 
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stimulus that had previously evoked what might be described as a 'representational default 
setting', could, under different circumstances, produce different perception-action 
compatibility effects. For example, one might find that a different task context realises 
orientation-action compatibility effects associated with the X - Y or Y-Z planes (which, as 
we have seen, are not produced by default); or that the pattern of orientation-action 
compatibility effects associated with X-Z plane (which, as we have seen, are produced by 
default) could be changed in some way (e.g. modulated, overridden or elaborated). In light 
of the above suggestions, where Experiments 5.1-5.3 have been interpreted as revealing a 
'default' affordance for left-right actions associated with the purely visual attribute of X-Z 
orientation; the experiments in the next chapter investigated whether this default could be 
changed or added to (with the appearance of new compatibility effects) by manipulating 
the task context whilst leaving the basic structure of the oriented cylinder in tact. 
220 
Chapter 6 - Task Context 
6. Perception-action couplings and task context 
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6.1 Experimental Hypotheses and Overview 
Objective 4: To develop Objective 3 turthcr by exploring how the orientation-action 
compatibility effects established in Chapter 5 might be modulated by various task 
manipulations that include stimulus onset asynchrony, apparent motion and participation 
in an o n i i o i n i : d \ namic aclivity (see Expc r in i cn l s 6.1 - 6.3). 
This chapter follows on from Chapter 5 by addressing whether the introduction of different 
experimental contexts might change the nature of the previously established 
* representational default' (i.e. the compatibility effect associated with X-Z cylinder 
orientation) and/or whether any new compatibility effects might arise. The impetus behind 
this line of enquiry comes from the idea that action-oriented representations are not rigidly 
prescribed, but are loosely constrained such that they can be modulated, elaborated or 
overridden. This idea is wholly complementary to the various 'middle way' approaches 
discussed throughout this thesis. 
Under most circumstances where there is no specific goal to interact with an object (i.e. 
simply viewing an object), it might be expected that * representational defaults' are 
automatically activated. This source of default affordance (a loose constraint) serves to 
keep a variety of options open with respect to potential actions (e.g. as we have seen in 
Chapter 5, it can influence a range of different actions, possibly by virtue of common 
visuomotor primitives). However, there are numerous task manipulations that one might 
conceive of that change the emphasis of a stimulus or a response (even when one is 
simply viewing' an object). Under these circumstances, while a representational default 
may (or may not) remain activated, other information may present itself as a source of 
(non-default) affordance. Thus it can be speculated that these additional sources of 
information (that become relevant to action thanks to the new task context) may result in 
new perception-action compatibility effects (in addition to those associated with 
representational defaults). In addition, they may cause the tightening of constraints through 
the modulation or elaboration of a default (such that the nature of its influence on 
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components of an action changes), or they may actually override a representational default 
(such that it no longer exerts an influence on components of an action). 
In investigating these rather open-ended p>ossibilities, this last experimental chapter was 
quite exploratory in nature. The manipulations chosen were varied (Experiment 6.1: 
SOA's; Experiment 6.2: apparent motion; Experiment 6.3: participation in an ongoing 
dynamic activity) and predominantly served as stand-alone experiments. Bearing this 
exploratory feel in mind, no specific hypotheses have been formulated. Instead the 
following broad hypothesis will suffice: 
Task Context Hypothesis: In changing the context of a task (by using manipulations 
such as S O A , apparent motion and involvement in a dynamic activity), it is predicted 
that a) new perception-action compatibility effects may be revealed, and/or b) previously 
established perception-action compaiihility effects may he altered in some way. 
In testing this Task Context Hypothesis, Experiments 6.1-6.3 manipulated aspects of the 
basic cylinders used in the previous chapter (crucially however, without changing their 
global orientations). Responses were either spatial power grips (Experiments 6.1 & 6.2) or 
spatial hand key presses (Experiment 6.3). The results of all three experiments supported 
predictions a) and/or b) of the Task Context Hypothesis. 
In using SOA's that varied the time between stimulus presentation and response execution 
(Experiment 6.1), a new compatibility efl'ect associated with X - Y cylinder orientation and 
response was revealed; whereas the familiar 'default' affordance associated with X-Z 
cylinder orientation and response remained unaffected by different SOA's. 
In making a cylinder apparently move towards the viewer (Experiment 6.2), the familiar 
default' affordance associated with X-Z cylinder orientation disappeared. 
In making a cylinder part of a functioning lever-like device (Experiment 6.3), a previously 
established 'default' affordance associated with a main effect of Y-Z cylinder orientation 
was elaborated (such that its possible function of affording upward reach trajectories 
interacted in a transparent manner with the mechanics of the lever). Furthermore, the 
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familiar 'default' afTordance associated with X-Z cylinder orientation was modulated (such 
that the direction of the compatibility effect was reversed to accommodate a more 
appropriate lever-contingent action). Finally a new and remarkably intricate compatibility 
effect was revealed that was in part associated with Y - Z cylinder orientation. 
It was concluded that these various sources of evidence supported the Task Context 
Hypothesis, the cumulative impact of which suggested that the affordance-like effects 
observed were not rigidly prescribed, but appeared to be loosely constrained such that 
under certain circumstances they could be modulated, elaborated or even overridden or 
eradicated. In addition, it was concluded that despite using visually similar stimuli (that 
always maintained a cylinder's global orientation), the introduction of different task 
contexts had the effect of opening up different sources of affordance for the perceiver-
actor. 
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6.2 Experiment 6.1 
A crucial design consideration in testing the Task Context Hypothesis was to keep the 
visual stimuli as similar as possible to the cylinders used in Chapter 5. I n this way it could 
be assumed that any changes in the data did not reflect the influence o f the stimuli 
themselves (in particular their global orientations), but rather how the new task context had 
changed the way in which participants perceived these stimuli . 
One obvious manipulation was to use the same st imuli , while controlling the time before 
response that participants looked at them. Indeed, as was mentioned in Chapter 4, Tucker 
& Ellis (2001) reported a statistically significant trend in the time course o f their 
compatibility effects (compatibility between object size and grip type). The longer the RTs 
were (and hence the more time spent looking at the objects), the greater the size the 
compatibility effect was. It was therefore a possibility that the established and reliable 
compatibility effect between X - Z cylinder orientation and spatial response (as reported in 
Chapter 5) might have increased in size as viewing times increased. However, it is possible 
( i f not l ikely), that the time course results o f Tucker & Ellis (2001) were simply an artefact 
o f RTs revealed by the distributioned analyses (see Zhang & Komblum, 1997 for a detailed 
critique o f distributional analyses). Using the technique o f SOA tested directly whether the 
time o f viewing changed the nature o f responses, thus avoiding the considerations o f 
distributional analysis. 
6.2.1 Method 
Participants 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (undergraduate volunteers etc.), but 20 participants took part. 
Apparatus 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (smedl darkened room, PC etc.), but two graspable power 
grip response devices ( f rom Experiment 5.2) were used. 
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Materials 
The stimulus set was the same as that described for Experiment 5.1. In addition, for each 
global cylinder orientation there was a version with a neutral surface pattern (see Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 The four global orientations of cylinders used in Experiment 5 1 Only cylinders 
with a neutral surface pattern are shown 
Design 
The two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. The within subjects independent 
variables were delay (0 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms), hand o f response (left , right), and a choice o f 
two o f the fo l lowing : X - Y cylinder orientation (leftwards, rightwards), Y - Z cylinder 
orientation (upwards, downwards) or X - Z cylinder orientation (leftwards, rightwards). The 
between subjects independent variable was mapping rule. Thus the experiment was based 
on 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design, as illustrated in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Experimental design for Experiment 6.1. Key: mapping rule (MR), condition 1 (01), 
condition 2 (C2), experimental group (G) 
M 
CI 
R 
C2 
Delay 0 ms 
400 ms 
800 ms 
G, (n=10) 
G, (n=IO) 
G, (n"=IO) 
Gz (n=IO) 
Gz (n=IO) 
Gz (n=10) 
o Left hand Response . . ^ Ri^t hand 
G, (n=IO) 
G, (n=10) 
Gz (n=IO) 
Gz (n=IO) 
X-Y cylinder orientation ^? , 
Ri^t grasp 
Gj (n=10) 
G| (n=IO) 
Gz (n=10) 
Gz (n=10) 
Y-Z cylinder orientation [^ .?^  grasp 
: .yjSh_^_P.. 
G, {n=IO) 
G| (n=IO) 
Gz (n=IO) 
Gz (n=IO) 
I.cfl liriisn 
A - / c \ Imucr oncniaiion .. . ,~' Kmhi lirasp 
G, m - K U 
G| 0 1 ^ nil 
G: 111 = l O ) 
G: I I I ^10) 
In mapping rule: condition 1 ( M R : C I ) [n = 10], left hand responses were made to 
cylinders wi th a wobbly surface pattern and right hajid responses were made to cylinders 
wi th a straight surface pattern. The 'hand o f response-cylinder pattern' pairing was 
reversed in mapping rule: condition 2 ( M R : C2) [n = 10]. A practice session consisted o f 
20 overt practice trials. The main experiment consisted o f 600 trials, divided into 30 blocks 
o f 20 trials. Both cylinder patterns were shown 75 times for each o f the four global 
cylinder orientations (thus 75 presentations x 2 patterns x 4 global cylinder orientations = 
600 trials). In each trial, for each patterned cylinder shovwn, its counterpart neutrally 
patterned cylinder was also shovwn. The order o f cylinder pattern and global cylinder 
orientation was randomised in three blocks o f 200 (one block for each o f the three delays). 
As responses were dependent on the pattern o f the cylinder, the independent variables o f 
delay and cylinder orientation ( X - Y , Y - Z and X - Z ) were task irrelevant. 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (consent forms, general instruction o f fast and accurate 
responses etc.). 
Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- M R : C I , 
Group 2- M R : C2). According to their group allocation, they were instructed which hand to 
respond wi th for the two cylinder patterns (wobbly and straight). In addition, participants 
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were warned to expect on some trials a cylinder w i th a neutral surface pattern that would 
change to wobbly or straight after an unspecified time (the replacement o f the neutral 
patterned cylinder wi th a wobbly or straight patterned cylinder was perceived as the 
cylinder remaining on screen with just its pattern changing). Af ter completing the practice 
session, the main experiment began. The trial procedure is outlined in Box 6.1. 
Box 6.1 Trial procedure for Experiment 6.1. The clock icon depicts a millisecond timer, 
and the hand icon depicts a power grip response. The colour red corresponds to an 
incorrect response. 
The schematic below depicts three typical trials for a participant assigned to MR C1 (left 
responses for wobbly cylinder pattern, right responses for straight cylinder pattern) For each 
trial, the inter-tnal stimulus was shown for 15 seconds and was then replaced with the delay 
stimulus (a neutral patterned cylinder) that was shown for 0, 400 or 800 ms The delay 
stimulus was then replaced with the target stimulus (patterned cylinder) A millisecond timer 
measured the time that the target stimulus remained on the screen This could be until the 
participant made a left or right response, or until three seconds had passed and the trial was 
given time-out. Following the response (or time-out), the target stimulus was immediately 
replaced with the inter-tnal stimulus for a new trial, thus completing the loop. 
Trial 1 
< 
Required 
Response 
Actual 
Response 
CE^nis Vl^start (Straight texture) 
• Trial 2 1 
LL 1 ^ ^1 
Required 
Response 
Actual 
Response 
/ ^ T i m e 
\\J-out 
/sees 
p>|800 
ms start 
'/sees 
fJ\AO0 
\ ^ m s .v/start 
(Wobbly f f \ RT 
texture) vL^stop 
Required Actual 
Response Response 
(Wobbly \ RT 
texture) vL^stop 
Procedure part c (feedback routine) 
T he feedback routine was the same as that described for Experiment 5.1 ( two progress 
charts). There were 30 feedback blocks, each consisting o f 20 trials. 
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6.2.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures A N O V A s 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variable o f 
mapping rule, and the within subjects independent variables o f delay, hand o f response and 
two o f the fol lowing: X - Y , Y - Z or X - Z cylinder orientations. Participants were entered as a 
random factor, and the dependent variables were RTs (the first A N O V A ) and mistakes (the 
second A N O V A ) . The results for Experiment 6.1 are summarised in Table 6.2. Key results 
are reported in the text and remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
Table 6.2 Main effects and interactions reported in Experiment 6 1. Key statistical 
significance status (approaching, yes, no), y depicts results of key theoretical interest 
Result no Source Correct Responses 
Incorrect 
Responses 
6 1 l y Y - Z cylinder orientation No No 
6 12 X - Y cylinder orientation Yes No 
6 13 Delay Yes No 
6 1 4 Response No Yes 
6.1.5 Mapping rule x Response No Yes 
6 16 Mapping rule x Delay Yes No 
6 17 Mapping rule x X - Z cylinder orientation No Yes 
6 1 8y X - Y cylinder orientation x Response Yes No 
6 1 9y Y - Z cylinder orientation x Response No No 
6 1 lOay X - Z cylinder orientation x Response Yes Yes 
6 1 10b 
6 1.1ly 
6 1 12 
6.1.13y 
X - Y x Y - Z cylinder orientation x Response 
Delay x X - Y cylinder orientation x Response 
Delay x Y - Z cylinder onentation x Response 
Delay x X - Z cylinder orientation x Response 
Yes 
App 
No 
No 
Yes 
App 
Yes 
Main Effects [6.1.1 y ] 
There was no significant main effect o f Y - Z cylinder orientation in either RTs [F(\, 18) = 
3.157,/7 > 0.05] or mistakes 18) = 0.840,/? > 0.1 ] . Mean RTs were 490 ms (SE = 12) 
for cylinders oriented downwards in the Y - Z plane and 492 ms (SE = 12) for cylinders 
oriented upwards in the Y-Z plane. Mean mistakes were 3.9 % (SE = 0.6) for cylinders 
oriented downwards in the Y - Z plane and 4.2 % (SE = 0.6) for cylinders oriented upwards 
in the Y-Z plane. This suggested that overall, the absolute physical proximity o f a cylinder 
to the viewer's hands did not influence response performance. 
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Two-way Interactions [6.1.8 y ] 
There was a significant interaction between X - Y cylinder orientation and hand o f response 
in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 6.990,/?< 0.05] but not in mistakes [ F ( l , 1 8 ) = 1.159,/?> 0.1] (see 
Figure 6.2). 
494 T 
493 -
492 -
§ 491 -
\-
cr 
a 
490 -
489 -
488 • 
487 • 
486 -
485 -
Leftward (L) Rightward (R) 
X - Y Orientation 
MEANS TABLE X-Y ORIENT 
X - Y Res ms SE 
L 
L 
L 
R 
486 12 
493 12 4.8 0.8 
R 
R 
L 
R 
493 13 3.7 0.7 
492 12 4.4 0.6 
KEY 
Left response 
Right response 
Figure 6.2 Mean mistakes as a function of X - Y cylinder onentation and hand of response 
For left hand responses, mean RTs were 7 ms faster for cylinders oriented leftwards rather 
than rightwards in the X - Y plane. For right hand responses, mean RTs were 1 ms faster for 
cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X - Y plane. This small 
compatibility effect (that was most apparent for left hand responses) defied the trend in 
RTs thus far; a trend that has consistently shown that the X - Y orientation o f a 2D line 
(Experiments 4.1-4.3) or a 3D cylinder (Experiments 5.1-5.3) does not have performance-
related benefits associated with spatial responses (but see result [ 6 . 1 . l i y | for a possible 
explanation). 
Two-way Interactions [6.1.9 
There was no significant interaction between Y - Z cylinder orientation and hand o f 
response in RTs ( F ( l , 18) = 0.120, p > 0.5] or mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 0.761,/?> 0.1]. This 
suggested ( in accordance with Experiments 5.1-5.3) that the Y-Z orientation o f a 3D 
c\ lindcr did not have any pcrtt>rnianee-related benefits associated with spatial responses 
Sec l able 6.3 for associated means. 
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Table 6.3 Mean RTs (ms), mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [5 1.4y] 
Y-Z Res ms SE 
D L 488 12 3 2 0.6 
D R 491 12 4.6 0.8 
U L 491 13 3.8 0.5 
u R 493 12 46 0.7 
Two-Way Interactions [6.1.10a y ] 
There was a significant interaction between X - Z cylinder orientation and hand o f response 
in both RTs [ F (1 ,18) = 52.785, p < 0.001 ] and mistakes [ F ( 1 , 18) = 5.115, p < 0.05] (see 
Figure 6.3). For left hand responses, mean RTs were 7 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 
0.6 % fewer) for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X - Z plane. For 
riuht hand responses, mean RTs were 9 ms faster (and mean mistakes were 1.7 % fewer) 
for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X - Z plane. This compatibility 
effect again suggested that the X - Z orientation o f a 3-D cylinder has {performance benefits 
associated wi th spatial power grip responses. This influence o f X - Z orientation on 
responses can be seen more specifically ( in terms o f each global cylinder orientation), by 
examining the equivalent interaction (see Appendix 2, resuh [6.1.10b]) between Y-Z, X - Z 
orientation and hand o f response. 
498 -I 
496 -
I 494 -
1- 492 -
a 490 • 
n: 0) 488 -
486 -
484 -
«^? 5.0 
Leftward (L) Rightward (R) 
X-Z Orientation 
Leftward (L) Rightward (R) 
X-Z Orientation 
KEY 
O Left response 
-I Right response 
MEANS TABLE 
X-Z Res ms S E % SE 
L L 486 12 3 2 0.5 
L R 497 12 5.5 1.0 
R L 493 13 3.8 0.6 
R R 488 12 3.8 0.5 
X-Z ORIENT 
(L) \ \ ^ (R) 
Figure 6.3 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z cylinder onentation 
and hand of response 
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Three-Way Interactions [6.1.1iy] 
A likely explanation o f the X - Y orientation ^ hand o f response interaction reported earlier 
for RTs [ 6 . 1 . 8 y ] lies in the impact o f the delays. There was an interaction between delay, 
X - Y cylinder orientation and hand o f response that approached significance in RTs [ F ( l , 
18) = 3.005,p = 0.062] and in mistakes [ F ( l , I 8 ) = 1.916,/? = 0.072] (see Figure 6.4). 
A t delays o f 0 ms (comparable to Experiments 5.1-5.3 where no significant interaction 
between X - Y cylinder orientation and hand o f response was found), the fo l lowing pattern 
was observed: For lef t hand responses, mean RTs were 6 ms faster for cylinders oriented 
leftwards rather than rightwards in the X - Y plane. For right hand responses, mean RTs 
were 4 ms faster cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X - Y plane. This 
does not appear to be an interaction. A t delays o f 400 ms, the fo l lowing pattern was 
observed: For left hand responses, mean RTs were 1 ms faster for cylinders oriented 
leftwards rather than rightwards in the X - Y plane. For right hand responses, mean RTs 
were 1 ms faster for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X - Y plane. 
This was a very small compatibility effect indeed. However, at delays o f 800 ms, the 
fo l lowing pattern was observed: For left hand responses, mean RTs were 12 ms faster for 
cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X - Y plane. For right hand 
responses, mean RTs were 5 ms faster for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than 
leftwards in the X - Y plane. This resembled a more pronounced compatibility effect. A 
visual comparison o f the three delay conditions in the RT plots o f Figure 6.4 supports the 
description presented above, such that the X - Y cylinder orientation appears to 
predominantly interact wi th the hand o f response at delays o f 800 ms. 
Although ftirther from statistical significance, the pattem o f mean mistakes supported this 
trend at delays o f 800 ms. For left responses, mean mistakes were 0.3 % fewer for 
leftwards rather than rightwards X - Y oriented cylinders; and for right responses, mean 
mistakes were 2.6 % fewer for rightwards rather than leftwards X - Y oriented cylinders. 
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Interestingly, at 0 ms there was a negative compatibility effect that has been seen before in 
result [ 5 . 1 . 3 y ] o f Experiment 5.1 (where there was similarly no delay involved). 
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Leftward (L) Rightward (R) 
X - Y Orientation 
400 ms delay ^ 2.0 
Leftward (L) Rightward (R) 
X - Y Orientation 
800 ms delay 
6.0 
Leftward (L) Rightward (R) 
X - Y Orientation 
£ 5.0 H 
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1 4 . 0 1 
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X - Y Orientation 
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476 
479 
477 
478 
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477 
471 
12 
11 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
13 
3.5 
4.1 
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5.3 
3.1 
4.8 
4.4 
5.1 
3.4 
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3.7 
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Figure 6.4 Mean mistakes as a function of delay, X - Y cylinder orientation and hand of 
response 
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Three-Way Interactions [6.1.13y] 
t here was no significant interaction between delay, X - Z cylinder orientation and hand o f 
response in either RTs | f ' ( l , 36) = 0.363,/? > 0.5] or mistakes [ F ( l , 36) = 0.655,/? > 0.5]. 
This suggested that performance-related benefits associated wi th the X - Z orientation o f a 
cylinder did not behave differently at SOA delay presentations o f 0 ms, 400 ms or 800 ms. 
See Table 6.4 for associated means. 
Table 6.4 Mean RTs (ms). mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [6 1.13^) 
Del X-Z Res ms SE S E 
0 L L 517 12 2.9 0.7 
0 L R 528 12 5.3 1.1 
0 R L 525 13 3.5 0.5 
0 R R 522 12 4.1 0.7 
400 L L 475 13 3.3 0.7 
400 L R 486 13 6.2 1.4 
400 R L 479 12 4.2 1.0 
400 R R 471 12 3.7 0.7 
800 L L 467 13 3.3 0.6 
800 L R 477 12 4.9 1.1 
800 R L 475 14 3.8 0.9 
800 R R 470 14 3.5 0.8 
6.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 6.1 revealed some familiar results. In keeping with Experiments 5.1 & 5.2 
there was no significant main efl'ect o f Y-Z cylinder orientation |6.1.1 y ] ; and in keeping 
wi th Experiments 5.1-5.3 there was no significant interaction between Y - Z cylinder 
orientation and spatial response [ 6 . 1 . 9 y ] , whereas there was a significant interaction 
between X - Z cylinder orientation and spatial response |6.1.1 O a X ] . 
I lowever, a significant interaction between X - Y cylinder orientation and spatial response 
in RTs [ 6 . 1 . 8 y ] was not a familiar result. Indeed, none o f the experiments that have 
explored the relationship between orientation in the X - Y plane and spatial response (e.g. 
Experiments 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.3) have revealed such an interaction. This interaction 
resembled a straightforward compatibility effect, whereby left responses were faster for 
cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards i n the X - Y plane, and vice-versa for 
right responses. Result [6.1.1 I X ] suggested that the basis for this effect in RTs resided in 
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the SOA manipulations. Here, the interaction between X - Y cylinder orientation and hand 
o f response only featured under the longest SOA o f 800 ms. This suggested that orientation 
in the X - Y plane could only exert an influence on compatible responses i f there was 
sufficient time to process that plane. In this respect, it is possible that once 'default ' 
affordances have been automatically activated (such as might be triggered by X - Z cylinder 
orientation), given time, the visuomotor system 'searches' for other possibilities for action 
(e.g. components o f actions that might be associated with the X - Y plane). Under this 
account, it is unlikely that the compatibility effect associated wi th the X - Y plane reflected 
the automatic potentiation o f elements o f an action. 
This account receives some support f rom the finding that delays did not differentially 
affect the familiar compatibility effect obtained by the interaction between X - Z cylinder 
orientation and hand o f response [ 6 . 1 . 1 3 y ] . I f this compatibility effect really did reflect a 
'default representational setting', then it might be expected that activation would occur 
early on and behave in a more or less consistent manner over different SOA's . Differences 
might nevertheless be expected when a relevance for action changes or increases (as 
proposed by TEC's 'feature-weighting principle ') , but the use o f SOA's does not 
necessitate per se a change in goal-related processes that might bring about this change. 
What is not clear is how this idea o f a more-or-less stable 'default ' fits w i t h published data. 
However, i f the validity o f Tucker & El l i s ' (2001) time course analyses (where effect size 
increased linearly wi th viewing time) is given the benefit o f the doubt, there is room for 
speculation regarding the current findings. 
One might speculate that the visuomotor system is hungry, as it were, for action-relevant 
information. When size is the most action-relevant object property (by virtue o f being set-
up by the precision/power responses), then there is little or no further size-related 
information to be gleaned fi-om, say, a small round object. Consequently, the system might 
build upon what it does have (i.e. i t increases the weighting o f a feature that codes a 
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particular grasp-type). This increased weighting might underpin Tucker & El l i s ' (2001) 
linear increase in effect size. 
In contrast, when orientation is the most action-relevant object property (by virtue o f being 
set-up by spatial responses), then in an object such as a cylinder (that is variously oriented 
in different planes), there is ftirther orientation-related information to be gleaned f rom the 
cylinder. Consequently, free resources can be directed towards additional or alternative 
sources o f spatially relevant object information. In the meantime, the system 'makes do' 
wi th what it already has (e.g. the activity o f a 'default representational setting' associated 
wi th X - Z cylinder orientation remains more-or-less stable). Indeed, this additional or 
alternative orientation-related information that the system is uncovering might relate to the 
X - Y plane (a possibility that is supported by result [6.1.11 y ] discussed earlier). 
In conclusion, this experiment provided preliminary support for the Task Context 
Hypothesis. In changing the context o f relations between cylinders and responses ( in this 
case the temporal context was manipulated by different SOA's) a new compatibility effect 
was uncovered that was associated with the typically redundant X - Y orientation o f a 
cylinder. In contrast, the reliably established compatibili ty effect associated wi th X - Z 
cylinder orientation, remained unchanged by the various SOA manipulations. This f inding 
added support to the notion o f a 'default representational setting' that remains more-or-less 
stable (at least when there is no pressure to change). 
In continuing to explore the influence o f task context, the next experiment changed the 
nature o f the cylinder presentation further s t i l l . Spatial responses were still made to the 
surface pattern o f an oriented cylinder (but SOA's were not employed), and instead o f 
using static images the cylinders now had the appearance o f moving towards the viewer. 
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6.3 Experiment 6.2 
Another obvious manipulation o f the cylinder (without changing its global orientation) was 
to make it appear as i f it was moving in a straight line directly towards the viewer. While 
most S-R-C studies have used static stimuli for convenience, many investigations o f 
perception-action compatibility effects have used dynamic events (e.g. the moving squares 
study by Michaels, 1998; as discussed in Chapter 1). Indeed, in reviewing such cases 
Hommel et al. (2001) suggested that just like static properties o f a stimulus, dynamic 
properties o f a stimulus event are also automatically coded and activate feature-
overlapping responses. Wi th this recommendation (whereby in principle, perception-action 
compatibility effects might equally be expected using dynamic stimulus events), this 
experiment questioned whether the fact that an oriented cylinder appeared to be moving 
might change the nature o f the compatibility effects previously established in Chapter 5. 
6.3.1 Method 
Participants 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (undergraduate volunteers etc.), but 20 participants took part. 
Apparatus 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (small darkened room, PC etc.), but two graspable power 
grip response devices ( f rom Experiment 5.2) were used. 
Materials 
The stimulus set was based on the cylinders used in Experiments 5.1-6.1. However, there 
were the fo l lowing differences that enabled the apparent motion o f these cylinders. The 
screen backgroimd was coloured black al all times. The inter-trial stimulus was a black 
screen wi th a centrally placed progress bar, which updated as the st imuli for each trial 
loaded. Below the progress bar were the words "Loading Animation...Please Wait". The 
target stimuli were based on the four global cylinder orientations (wi th a wobbly and 
straight surface pattem version o f each), but these cylinders were not set in a chequered 
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room, but rather a black background. For each global cylinder orientation there were 15 
versions (15 frames) from small (depicting a ' far away' cylinder) to large (depicting a 
'close up' cylinder). When run in an animation sequence, a visual impression o f motion 
was created (v^ th the initially small ' far away' cylinder appearing to move towards the 
viewer as it increased in size). 
Design 
The design was the same as that described for Experiment 5.1. Thus the two dependent 
variables were RTs and mistakes, and the wi th in subjects independent variables were hand 
o f response ( lef t , right) and a choice o f two o f the fo l lowing: X - Y cylinder orientation 
(leftwards, rightwards), Y - Z cylinder orientation (upwards, downwards) or X - Z cylinder 
orientation (leftwards, rightwards). The between subjects independent variable was 
mapping rule. Thus the experiment was based o n a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design, 
as illustrated previously in Chapter 5 (see Table 5,2). 
In mapping rule: condition I (MR: C I ) [n = 10], left hand responses were made to 
cylinders wi th a wobbly surface pattem and right hand responses were made to cylinders 
w i th a straight surface pattem. The 'hand o f response-cylinder pattern' pairing was 
reversed in mapping rule: condition 2 ( M R : C2) [n = 10]. Both cylinder patterns were 
shown 50 times for each o f the four global cylinder orientations (thus 50 presentations x 2 
patterns x 4 global cylinder orientations = 400 trials). The order o f cylinder pattem and 
global cylinder orientation was randomised in one block o f 400. As responses were 
dependent on the pattem o f the cylinder, the independent variables o f cylinder orientation 
( X - Y , Y - Z and X - Z ) were task irrelevant. 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (consent forms, general instruction o f fast and accurate 
responses etc.). 
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Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- M R : C I , 
Group 2- MR: C2). According to their group allocation, they were instmcted which hand to 
respond wi th for the two cylinder patterns (wobbly and straight). In addition, participants 
were informed that they must respond while the cylinder was moving, which meant they 
had a window o f just over a second to respond for each trial . Af te r completing the practice 
session, the main experiment began. The trial procedure is outlined in Box 6.3. 
Box 6.2 Trial procedure for Experiment 6.2. The clock icon depicts a millisecond timer, 
the clappertK>ard icon depicts a frame and the hand icon depicts a power grip 
response. The colour red corresponds to an incorrect response. 
The schematic below depicts three typical trials for a participant assigned to MR: C1 (left 
responses for wobbly cylinder pattem, right responses for straight cylinder pattern) For each 
trial, the inter-trial stimulus was shown for 3 seconds (while the animation loaded) and was 
then replaced with the target stimulus animation. A millisecond timer measured the time that 
the target stimulus ran for on the screen. This could be until the participant made a left or 
nght response, or until 1040 ms (65 ms x 16 frames) had passed and the trial was given 
time-out When a response was made the animation stopped at its current frame, whereas 
after 1040 ms the animation had iterated through all 16 possible frames Following the 
response (or time-out), the target stimulus animation was immediately replaced with the 
inter-tnal stimulus for a new trial, thus completing the loop. 
Trial 1 
I I H 
Loading 
/sees 
Trial 2 
(Every 65ms^ frame no = frame no + T 
Required Actual 
Response Response 
VL/start 
'Every 65ms frame no = frame no. + 1 
(Straight 
texture) 
Loading 
/start 
^ s t o p 
Required Actual 
Response Response 
(Wobbly 
texture) 
ifpNTime 
VL/-out 
Vi^stop 
Trial 3 (Every 65ms frame no = frame no + 1) 
11 V V Required Response Actual Response 
Loading 
9 
i /secs jgfH V i j / s t a r t 
(Wobbly 
texture) Vi-^stop 
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Procedure part c (feedback routine) 
The feedback routine was the same as that described for Hxperiment 5.1 (two progress 
charts). There were 20 feedback blocks, each consisting o f 20 trials. 
6.3.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
.Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect respon.se data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures A N O V A s 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variable o f 
mapping rule, and the wi th in subjects independent variables o f hand o f response and two 
o f the fo l lowing : X - Y , Y - Z or X - Z cylinder orientation. Participants were entered as a 
random factor, and the dependent variables were RTs (the first A N O V A ) and mistakes (the 
second A N O V A ) . The results for Experiment 6.2 are summarised in Fable 6.5. Key results 
are reported in the text and remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
Table 6.5 Main effects and interactions reported in Experiment 6 2. Key statistical 
significance status (approaching, yes. no) y depicts results of key theoretical interest. 
Result no. Source Correct Incorrect 
Responses Responses 
6 2 i y Y - Z cylinder orientation Yes No 
6 2 2 Response Yes Yes 
6 2 3 X - Y cylinder orientation No Yes 
6 2 4 y X - Y cylinder orientation X Response No No 
6 2 5^ Y - Z cylinder orientation X Response No No 
6 2 6 y X - Z cylinder orientation X Response No No 
6 2 7 Mapping Rule x X - Y cyl inder orientation No 
Main Effects [6.2.1 y ] 
There was a significant main effect o f Y - Z cylinder orientation in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 5.846./? 
< 0.05] but not mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 0.630, p > 0.1]. Mean RTs were 598 ms (SE = 12) for 
cylinders oriented downwards in the Y - Z plane and 592 ms (SE = 11) for cylinders 
oriented upwards in the Y - Z plane. [Mean mistakes were 5.3 % (SE = 0.9) for cylinders 
oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane and 4.8 % (SE = 0.8) for cylinders oriented upwards 
in the Y - Z plane). Thus mean RTs were 6 ms faster for cylinders oriented upwards rather 
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than downwards in the Y-Z plane, suggesting that when the cylinder was moving 
performance was improved when cylinders were oriented upwards. It is possible that this 
reflected an effect of the absolute physical proximity of the cylinder. However, as with the 
main effect of Y-Z orientation (in both RTs and mistakes) found earlier in Experiment 5.3 
(see [5.3.3y]) , this pattern did not support Visual Attribute Hypothesis 4. It was predicted 
that cylinders oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane might be responded to faster and with 
fewer mistakes, owing to the closer physical proximity of an end o f the cylinder to a 
particular hand. As was suggested earlier, an alternative possibility is that this result 
reflected a preference for cylinders that would require an upward reach trajectory. 
Two-Way Interactions [6.2.4y] 
There was no significant interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in either RTs [/^ (1 , 18) = 0.039, p > 0.5] or mistakes [F (1 , 18) = 0.863, p > 0.1 ] . 
This suggested (in accordance with the previous findings of Experiments 5.1-5.3) that the 
X-Y orientation of a 3D cylinder (that on this occasion appeared to be moving) did not 
have any performance-related benefits associated with power grip responses. See Table 6.6 
for associated means. 
Table 6.6 Mean R T s (ms), mistakes (%) and standard errors ( S E ) for result [6.2.4y] 
X-Y Res ms S E % S E 
L L 580 11 3.8 1.0 
L R 607 13 4.9 1.0 
R L 582 11 4.5 0.6 
R R 610 12 7.1 1.2 
Two-Way Interactions [6.2.5X1 
There was no significant interaction between Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 0.579,/? > 0.1] or mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 0.153,/? > 0.5]. This 
suggested (in accordance with the previous findings of Experiments 5.1-5.3 and 6.1) that 
the Y-Z orientation of a 3D cylinder did not have any performance-related benefits 
associated with spatial responses. See Table 6.7 for associated means. 
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Table 6.7 Mean RTs (ms). mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [6 2 5 X ] 
Y-Z Res ms SE 
D L 583 11 4.3 
D R 613 13 6.3 1.2 
U L 580 12 4.0 0.8 
U R 604 12 5.7 1.0 
Two-Way Interactions [6.2.6 
There was no significant interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in either RTs [ F (1 , 18) = 1.004, /? > 0.1) or mistakes [ F (1 , 18) = 0.115, p > 0.5]. 
In stark contrast to the consistent findings of Experiments 5.1-6.1, this finding suggested 
that the apparent motion of the cylinders had wiped out any performance-related benefits 
normally associated with their X-Z orientation. See fable 6.8 for associated means. 
Table 6.8 Mean RTs (ms). mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [6 2 B y ] 
X-Z Res ms SE S E 
L L 583 12 4,1 1.0 
L R 608 13 5.8 1.1 
R L 579 11 4.2 0.7 
R R 609 12 6.3 1.0 
6.3.3 Discussion 
I his lixperiment has also provided some familiar results. In keeping with Experiment 5.3 
(but unlike Experiments 5.1. 5.2 & 6.1) there was a significant main effect of Y-Z cylinder 
orientation [6.2.1 y ] . Again, this finding showed an advantage in RTs (but this time not in 
mistakes) for those cylinders that were physically /i/r//j<?r overall to a particular hand (that 
is, cylinders oriented upwards). It is possible that this reflected a preference for object 
orientations that would require an upward rather than downward reach trajectory. 
In keeping with Experiments 5.1-5.3 there was no significant interaction between X-Y 
cylinder orientation and spatial response [6.2AM]. and in keeping with Experiments 5.1-
6.1 there was no significant interaction between Y-Z cylinder orientation and spatial 
response [6.2.5 X ] 
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Of most interest was the finding that this experiment has bucked the trend established by 
four previous experiments. There was no significant interaction between X-Z cylinder 
orientation and hand of response [6 .2 .6y] . Given the previous reliability of this 
interaction, the finding that it has disappeared is striking. At a guess, one might have 
expected that a moving cylinder would increase the significance for action that is normally 
associated with orientation in the X-Z plane. In providing only a small window of 
opportunity during which to respond, a moving cylinder might have promoted a state of 
heightened awareness- a pressure to act that would make the detection of affordances all 
the more important. This did not appear to be the case however. Instead, any performance-
related benefits associated with the X-Z plane were completely eradicated (or perhaps 
overridden) within the behavioural context of apparent motion. 
In hindsight it is possible that in preparing to catch a moving cylinder (assuming that is 
what participants were doing), rather than affording an interceptive reach and grasp with a 
particular hand, a cylinder moving directly towards the viewer instead afforded the 
withdrawal of a particular hand (much as in catching a cricket ball, the catching hand 
moves in the same direction as the travelling ball in order to take the pace o f f it). Even i f 
there was no automatic preparation for catching, the moving cylinder may still have 
evoked a v^thdrawal response by a particular hand (Fischer, pers. comm.): a phenomenon 
that is commonly found in cases of 'visual looming' (e.g. where a head instinctively draws 
back to avoid a looming stimulus). 
In conclusion, whatever the underlying cause may have been, this result is of particular 
interest because it demonstrates that under certain circumstances (i.e. when apparent 
motion occurs in the direction of the viewer), a previously established 'default 
representational setting' (associated with orientation in the X-Z plane) can be overridden or 
eradicated. This finding in accord with the Task Context Hypothesis. 
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The final experiment continued to apply a more dynamic feel to the stimuli by making an 
oriented cylinder a mere component in a ftinctional lever-like device. The task demanded 
that participants moved this lever up or down (with visual feedback of this event) 
according to some arbitrary response-contingent rule. In doing this, the same Task Context 
Hypothesis was tested, namely whether or not the context of a task would promote the 
modulation, overriding or elaboration of otherwise default representational settings. 
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6.4 Experiment 6.3 
The manipulations of cylinders in the previous two experiments have focussed on their 
viewer-independent context (the surface pattern of the cylinder changed at various 
temporal intervals, or the cylinder itself appeared to be moving). This experiment however, 
also investigated the viewer-dependent context of a cylinder. Here, an oriented cylinder 
was merely a component in a functioning lever-like device. When participants made a left 
or right key press response, the cylinder component of this lever-like device rotated around 
its pivoting bar in an upward or downward direction. In actively involving participants in 
this way (such that their responses effected a change in the lever), it was expected that in 
accordance with the Task Context Hypothesis, the nature of the compatibility effects 
associated with a cylinder component might change given its new context as part of a 
functioning lever. Furthermore it was expected that new compatibility effects might arise 
as a result of the new action-relevant contingencies. 
A further consideration that related to the use of a functionally unambiguous lever'*' was 
the possibility that participants might be sensitive to movement difficulty or awkwardness, 
were they to physically (rather than virtually) move the lever (i.e. i f they employed motor 
imagery that simulated real physical movements). Johnson and colleagues have recently 
investigated the extent to which motor imagery is related to real motor processes (e.g. 
Johnson, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Johnson, Corballis & Gazzaniga, 2001). In a series of 
studies by Johnson (2000a), participant's sensitivity to reach and grasp comfort and 
awkwardness was investigated using real and imagined reaches to a wooden dowel that 
could be variously oriented about 360° in the picture plane (i.e. the X-Y plane). 
In the cylinder experiments, cylinders were functionally ambiguous because one might choose to grasp a 
cylinder at either end. However with a cylinder that was a mere component of a lever (it was pierced at one 
end by a metal bar around which it could pivot), this cylinder component became functionally unambiguous-
in order to use the lever, one could only realistically grasp near the free end of the cylinder component. 
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This dowel, (half of which was coloured pink and the other half tan), was suspended by an 
axle in the centre of a black wooden box. Invisible to the participants, the rear of the axle 
protruded through the back wall of the box, and a pointer that was fixed to this axle 
indicated to the experimenter the angle of the dowel orientation (degrees were mapped on 
the back o f the box). The box was open at the front to allow a hand to reach in and grasp 
the dowel. As a general rule of interaction that applied to all experiments, the dowel was to 
be grasped (or in some cases, imagined to be grasped) in a power grip with the nhumbside' 
of the hand on the pink end of the dowel (or sometimes the tan end). In this sense the 
dowels were functionally unambiguous, since participants were always instructed which 
coloured end to grasp. 
In the first experiment, limits of comfortable hand rotation were explored. At the beginning 
of each trial the experimenter moved the dowel into a vertical position with the pink end 
facing upwards. In a prospective judgement condition (PJ) participants were instructed to 
estimate how far the dowel could rotate before it would become uncomfortable for a 
particular hand. At the beginning of a trial the participant was instructed which hand to 
base their decision on. The experimenter then rotated the dowel clockwise or anticlockwise 
at a rate of approximately 30°/s. When participants estimated that the rotation was no 
longer comfortable, they said "stop", and the experimenter recorded the angle of the dowel. 
In a motor control (MC) condition, a similar method was employed, but participants 
themselves rotated the dowel clockwise or anticlockwise with a particular hand until it 
became uncomfortable. The results showed no statistical difference between the two 
conditions. Thus estimated limits of comfortable hand supination and pronation were 
highly consistent with values obtained ft-om actual hand rotations^*. 
In following experiments that used equivalent methodologies (although PJ conditions now 
used graphically rendered images of the variously oriented dowel), judgements regarding 
While it is interesting that orientation in the X-Y plane influenced judgements and responses (whereas in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis orientation in the X-Y plane consistently failed to exert an influence on responses), it 
should be noted that a coloured end of the dowel gave action-related significance to that end of the dowel. 
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the awkwardness involved in adopting a prescribed grip (overhand with the right hand) 
were consistent across imagined and actual grips. Furthermore, selection of the most 
natural grip (overhand versus underhand) or the most natural hand (left or right) 
consistently reflected the least awkward choice, for both PJ and MC conditions. PJ's (made 
verbally as fast as possible) involving awkward hand postures had longer RTs and were 
less accurate. Similarly RTs for both grip and hand judgements increased as a fimction of 
the angular distance between the current positions of participants hands (thus relating to 
the extent of the would-be-movement), and the orientation of the chosen posture (thus 
relating to the awkwardness of the posture). It was concluded that making PJs involved 
motor imagery or mentally simulating actions (processes that might be closely related to 
somatomotor processes); and that remarkably, these simulations were highly sensitive to 
rather sophisticated considerations of comfort or awkwardness (based on various 
biomechanical parameters). 
As has been argued previously in Chapter 2, mental simulation, emulation or imagery are 
intimately related to real visuomotor processes. Given the complex nature of the stimuli 
and task used in this lever experiment, one might predict that participants would be 
sensitive to this complexity from an action perspective. That is, in deciding whether a lever 
must move up or down according to some rule (which the task required in order to select a 
response) participants might have been sensitive to the physical difficulty or awkwardness 
of moving a lever, were they to physically (rather than virtually) move it. More 
specifically, in deciding whether a lever must move up or dovm, processes of motor 
imagery may become involved that are similar to those involved when physically 
interacting with a real lever. 
Indeed the nature of the lever configurations used meant that some were intrinsically easy 
to move up or down, whereas others would require especially awkward or difficult 
movements. Aside from several notable differences in this experiment when compared to 
Johnson's (2000a) series of studies (such as the use o f a fiinctioning lever rather than a 
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dowel, and the use of dynamic visual feedback triggered by a remote key press), it is of 
special significance to note that in Johnson's studies the comfort of a movement was made 
explicit (either in judgement or actual grasping). For example, in the MC condition of one 
experiment participants were instructed to grasp a particular end of the dowel (the pink or 
tan end depending upon instruction) with the most 'natural' hand (i.e. least awkward hand). 
In the PJ condition they were instructed to say "left" or "right" for the most natural hand, 
were they to grasp a particular end of the dowel (the pink or tan end depending upon 
instruction). Thus a preferred hand was chosen with explicit reference to how comfortable 
it was (or would be). 
The current lever experiment however, had no such explicit reference. The left and right 
hand key presses were used to produce an upward or downward movement of the lever, 
and it was an arbitrary rule (the length of a previously presented line) that helped 
determine which movement should be made. In fact no reference was made to potentially 
moving the lever with the hands (let alone any reference to movement difficulties). For all 
intents and purposes, the only thing participants were explicitly concerned with was 
whether a lever should move up or down. For them, it was incidental that a left or right 
hand key press produced this movement. Crucially then, any suggestion in the data 
(reflected by latency of responses or fi^quency of mistakes) that participants were sensitive 
to the physical difficulty of moving a particular lever, would implicate automatic, 
(explicitly) goal-independent processes of the sort championed by the APH. 
6.4.1 Method 
Participants 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (undergraduate volunteers etc.), but 20 participants took part. 
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Apparatus 
Keys 'a' and T on the keyboard (that was placed directly in fi-ont of the monitor) served as 
response keys for the left and right hands respectively. 
Materials (inter-trial stimulus set) 
A background 'room' derived from the one described in Experiment 5.1 served as the 
inter-trial stimulus. It differed with respect to its pattern however, in that it was not 
chequered, but uniformly grey. There were two versions of this stimulus. In each version 
there was a vertical white line that was centrally placed and superimposed over the room. 
In one version the line was short (about % the height of the room), and in the other version 
the line was long (about the height of the room). Consequently the inter-trial stimulus set 
consisted of two images (a room with a short line, and a room with a long line). 
Materials (target stimulus set) 
The target stimulus set was based on the global cylinder orientations described in 
Experiment 5.1. However there were some important differences. Firstly, the background 
'room' was grey and not chequered, and shadows cast by the object set in the room were 
shown. Secondly, the cylinder was always a neutral pattern (not straight or wobbly). 
Thirdly, there were two versions of each of the four global cylinder orientations. In one 
version a metallic bar pierced the end of the cylinder that was nearest to the viewer (see 
Figure 6.5), and in the other version a metallic bar pierced the end of the cylinder that was 
farthest from the viewer (see Figure 6.6). In each case, the bar was fixed to the left and 
right walls of the room, thus supporting the cylinder in space to create the impression of a 
lever-like device. Consequently the target stimulus set) consisted o f eight levers (four 
global cylinder orientations x two bar positions). 
A definition of each of the eight lever configurations can be seen in Table 6.9. These 
definitions are based on the orientation of the cylinder component within each of the three 
planes and the position of the bar in two planes (X-Y - high or low, and X-Z - near or far). 
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Figure 6.5 Levers 1-4 consisting of the four global orientations of cylinders that are pierced 
by a near bar 
Figure 6.6 Levers 5-8 consisting of the four global orientations of cylinders that are pierced 
by a far bar 
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Table 6.9 A definition of each lever configuration in terms of its dimension-specific 
orientations and bar (XDsitions 
Dimension-Spec i tic 
Orientation 
X-Y (Rightwards); Y-Z (Upwards); X-Z (Uftwards); Bar (High); Bar (Near) 
X-Y (Lef^ards); Y-Z (Upwards); X-Z (Rightwards); Bar (High); Bar (Near) 
X-Y (Leftwards); Y-Z (Downwards); X-Z (Leftwards); Bar (Low); Bar (Near) 
X-Y (Rightwards); Y-Z Downwards); X-Z (Rightwards); Bar (Low); Bar (Near) 
X-Y (Rightwards); Y-Z (Upwards); X-Z (Leftwards); Bar (Low); Bar (Far) 
X-Y (Leftwards); Y-Z (Upwards); X-Z (Rightwards); Bar (Low); Bar (Far) 
X-Y (l^fhvards); Y-Z (Downwards); X-Z (Leftwards); Bar (High); Bar (Far) 
X-Y (Rightwards); Y-Z Downwards); X-Z (Rightwards); Bar (High); Bar (Far) 
Materials (feedback stimulus set) 
For each of the eight levers, there were two possible feedback images depicting the lever in 
an end-state position, as if it had been moved either up to the ceiling of the room, or down 
to the floor of the room. With relation to its start position (i.e. the target stimulus set) the 
end-state position of a given lever reflected the result of either a short movement or a long 
movement. End-state levers that reflected a short movement from the start positions of 
levers 1-4 (see Fig. Figure 6.5 above) are presented in Figure 6.7. End-state levers that 
reflected a short movement from the start positions of levers 5-8 (see Figure 6.6 above) arc 
presented in Figure 6.8. End-state levers that reflected a lon^ movement from the start 
positions of levers 1-4 (see Figure 6.5 above) are presented in Figure 6.9. End-state levers 
that reflected a long movement from the start positions of levers 5-8 (see Figure 6.6 above) 
are presented in Figure 6.10. Consequently the feedback stimulus set consisted of sixteen 
lever configurations (four global orientations x two bar positions x two end-state cylinder 
positions). 
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Figure 6.7 End-state positions that have resulted from a short movement of levers 1-4 
Figure 6.8 End-state positions that have resulted from a short movement of levers 5-8 
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Figure 6.9 End-state positions that have resulted from a long movement of levers 1 
Figure 6.10 End-state positions that have resulted from a long movement of levers 5-8 
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Design 
The two dependent variables were RTs and mistakes. The within subjects independent 
variables were hand of response (left, right); a choice of two of the following: X-Y 
cylinder orientation (leftwards, rightwards), Y-Z cylinder orientation (upwards, 
downwards) or X-Z cylinder orientation (leftwards, rightwards); and a choice of one of the 
following'*^: X-Y bar position (high, low) or X-Z bar position (near, far). The between 
subjects independent variable was mapping rule. In mapping rule: condition 1 (MR: C I ) [n 
= 10], left hand responses were made to move the lever upwards towards the ceiling and 
right hand responses were made to move the lever downwards towards the floor. The 'hand 
o f response-lever movement pairing' was reversed in mapping rule: condition 2 (MR: C2) 
[n = 10]. Thus the experiment was repeated measures design (see Table 
6.10). 
Table 6.10 Experimental design for Experiment 6.3. Key: mapping rule (MR), condition 1 
(C1), condition 2 (C2). experimental group (G) 
M 
C I 
R 
C2 
Left 
Hand of Response „ . , 
Right 
G , (n = 10) 
G | ( n = I O ) 
Gz (n = IO) 
Gz (n = IO) 
V V, . . . . ^ . Lefhvards X - Y cylinder onentation _ . . Rightwards 
G | ( n = I O ) 
G | ( n = I O ) 
Gz {n = IO) 
G2 ( n = I O ) 
Y - Z cylinder orientation J J p ^ ^ ^ s 
Downwards 
G | (n=10) 
G | (n=10) 
G2 (n=IO) 
G2 (n=10) 
V -7 I- i Leftwards X - Z cvhnder oricniauon , 
Rt^nlwards 
X - Y bar position High 
Low 
V -7 u -.- Near X - Z bar position 
Far 
G , (11=10) 
G i ( n - I O i 
G , (n=IO) 
G | (n=10) 
G , (n=in) 
G , ( n = I O ) 
G7 ( n = I O ) 
G> ( n = I O ) 
G2 (n=IO) 
G2 ( n = I O ) 
G : (n=10| 
G2 ( n = I O ) 
Just as the cylinder orientation in a particular plane (e.g. X-Z plane) is necessarily specified by the 
interaction of cylinder orientations in the other two planes (e.g. X - Y ^ Y - Z planes); the bar position in a 
particular plane (X-Z plane) is necessarily specified by the interaction between the cylinder orientation in any 
two planes and the bar position in the remaining plane (e.g. X - Y x Y - Z cylinder orientations ^ X - Y bar 
position). For example, a cylinder oriented leftwards in the X - Y plane, downwards in the Y-Z plane, and 
pierced by a bar that is positioned high in the X - Y plane; must^ as a consequence, be oriented leftwards in the 
X-Z plane and pierced by a bar that is positioned far in the X-Z plane. Therefore, just as only two planes are 
required to account for cylinder orientation, it is also the c ^ that on!y one pl^ ne needs tc be entered s a 
variable in the design to account for bar position. 
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A practice session consisted of two blocks of 24 trials (one block with all levers attached to 
a near bar, and the other block with all levers attached to a far bar). The main experiment 
consisted of 480 trials, divided into 20 blocks of 24 trials. Inter-trial stimulus presentations: 
In each block, each vertical line (long and short) was randomly presented 12 times (thus 12 
presentations x 2 lines x 20 blocks = 480 trials). Target stimulus presentations: The X-Z 
position of the metallic bar (near or far) changed alternately between blocks; hence for 
each trial in any block of 24 trials the position of the metallic bar remained constant (thus, 
[10 blocks X 24 trials x 1 bar position] + [10 blocks x 24 trials x i bar position] = 480 
trials). Within each block of 24 trials all four global cylinder orientations were randomly 
presented 6 times (thus 6 presentations x 4 global cylinder orientations x 20 blocks = 480 
trials). Feedback stimulus design: In each trial, when a left or right response was made that 
specified an upward or downward movement of the lever, the corresponding end-state 
lever configuration was presented (creating the visual impression of movement). 
Procedure part a (general procedure) 
As described for Experiment 3.1 (consent forms, general instruction o f fast and accurate 
responses etc.). 
Procedure part b (trial procedure) 
Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated to an experimental group (Group 1- MR: C I , 
Group 2- MR: C2). According to their group allocation, they were instructed which hand to 
respond with (left or right) in order to effect a particular lever movement (upward or 
downward). Participants were shown a small real-life model of the lever to assist in 
explaining its simple mechanics- in particular how the cylinder component could pivot 
around the bar that pierced it. They then watched the experimenter perform the computer 
task for approximately five minutes. While performing the task, the experimenter gave a 
verbal commentary of the thought processes employed to complete each trial. Following a 
practice session (48 trials), participants began the main experiment. 
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The experimental trial procedure is outlined in Box 6.5. 
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Box 6.3 Trial procedure for Experiment 6.6. The clock icon depicts a millisecond timer, 
and the hand icon depicts a key press response. The colour red corresponds to an 
incorrect response. 
The schematic t>elow depicts three typical trials for a participant assigned to MR; C2 (left 
responses to move the lever downwards, right responses to move the lever upwards). 
Inter-tnal stimulus procedure For each trial, the inter-tnal stimulus was shown for 3.0 
seconds When the inter-tnal stimulus appeared (a short or long vertical white line), 
participants assessed whether the line was short or long. A short line corresponded to the 
shortest distance the lever needed to move in order to make contact with either the floor or 
the ceiling of the room A long line corresponded to the longest distance the lever needed to 
move in order to make contact with either the floor or the ceiling of the room 
Target stimulus procedure: The inter-thal stimulus was then replaced with an initial lever 
configuration. Participants had to move the lever (by pressing a left or right key) in the 
direction (upwards or downwards) that would achieve the movement distance previously 
specified by the inter-trial stimulus line Perhaps the easiest way to do this was to visualise 
the lever moving up or down All participants were advised to employ this strategy If no 
response was made, after three seconds had passed the tnal was given time-out. 
Feedback stimulus procedure: If a response was made, the initial lever configuration was 
replaced by the end-state lever configuration that had been specified by the response. The 
perception of this was of the lever pivoting around its bar in an upwards or downwards 
direction. If the end-state lever configuration violated the requirements specified by the inter-
trial line length (e.g. the lever had moved a long rather than short distance), then a k>eep 
sounded to indicate that a mistake had been made After 1.5 seconds (or time-out), the 
feedback stimulus was immediately replaced with the inter-trial stimulus for a new trial, thus 
completing the loop. 
Trial 1 
® 
3.0 
sees VL^start 
Required 
Response \ y 
Actual J » RT 
Response \ y stop 
1 Trial 2 
1 R i ® 
3.0 
sees start 
Required J » 
Response \ y 
Actual 
Response 
Time 
-out 
Trial 3 
1 1 1 
® 
VuP'secs VL/start 
Required 
Response 
Actual 
Response 
RT 
stop 
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Procedure part c (feedback routine) 
The experimental feedback routine was the same as that described for Experiment 5.1 (two 
progress charts). There were 20 feedback blocks, each consisting o f 24 trials. 
6.4.2 Results 
Analytical Procedure and Summary Results 
Analyses were as described for Experiment 3.1 (correct and incorrect response data sets 
etc.), but there was only an analysis by participants. Two repeated measures ANOVAs 
(located in Appendix 1) were performed on the between subjects independent variable of 
mapping rule, and the within subjects independent variables of hand o f response; two of 
the following: X-Y, Y-Z or X-Z cylinder orientation; and one of the following: X-Y or X-
Z bar position. Participants were entered as a random factor, and the dependent variables 
were RTs (the first ANOVA) and mistakes (the second ANOVA). The results for 
Experiment 6.3 are summarised in Table 6.11. Key results are reported in the text and 
remaining results are reported in Appendix 2. 
Table 6.11 Main effects and interactions reported in Experiment 6 3. Key: statistical 
significance status (approaching, yes, no), y depicts results of key theoretical interest. 
Result 
no Source 
Correct 
Resp 
Incorrect 
Resp 
63 l y X - Z bar position Yes 
6 32 Response Yes Yes 
6 3 3 y Mapping Rule App No 
6 3 4ay X - Z bar position x Y - Z cylinder orientation App No 
6.34b X - Z bar position « X - Y « X - Z cylinder onentation App No 
635a X - Z bar position »< X - Y cylinder orientation « mapping rule Yes No 
635b X - Z bar position » Y - Z ^X-Z cylinder orientation x mapping rule Yes No 
636a X - Z bar position x X - Z cylinder orientation » mapping rule Yes Yes 
6 3 6b X - Z bar position « X - Y x Y - Z cylinder orientation « mapping rule Yes Yes 
6 3 7a X - Y cylinder onentation « hand of response « mapping rule App No 
6 3 7b Y - Z X X - Z cylinder orientation x hand of response x mapping rule App No 
638a X - Z cylinder orientation x hand of response x mapping rule No Yes 
638b X - Y X Y - Z cylinder onentation x hand of response x mapping rule No Yes 
6 3 9ay X - Z bar position x X - Z cylinder orientation x hand of response Yes Yes 
639a X - Z bar position x X - Y x X -Z cylinder orientation x hand of response Yes Yes 
6 3 10a X - Z bar position x Y - Z cylinder orientation x hand of response x Yes Yes 
mapping rule 
6.3.10b X - Z bar position x X - Y x X - Z cylinder orientation x hand of response x Yes Yes 
mappingrul^^ 
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Main Effects [6.3.1^1 
There was a significant main effect of X-Z bar position in RTs [F ( 1 , 18) = 37.983, p < 
0.001] but not in mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 1.956,/? > 0.1]. Mean RTs were 23 ms faster when 
the bar position was in the background (far bar: 511 ms, SE = 10.3) rather than in the 
foreground (near bar: 534 ms, SE = 8.8). This effect can be interpreted in terms of 
possibilities for action. When the position of the bar was far, it would not restrict possible 
reaches to the cylinder component (hence fast RTs). When the position of the bar was near, 
it could restrict possible reaches towards and possible movements of the cylinder 
component once grasped (hence slower RTs). 
Main Effects [6.3.3 y ] 
I here was a main effect of mapping rule that approached significance in RTs [F (\, 18) = 
4.193,/? = 0.055] but not in mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 0.016,/? > 0.5]. Mean RTs were 39 ms 
faster for participants in MR: CI (lef^ responses move lever upwards, right responses move 
lever downwards) rather than MR: C2 (right responses move lever upwards, left responses 
move lever downwards). Mean RTs were 503 ms (SE = 13.3) for participants in MR: C I , 
and 542 ms (SE = 13.3) for participants in MR: C2. This might simply reflect one group of 
participants having faster reactions than another group, or it might reflect an advantage for 
moving levers upwards with the \c(i hand and downwards with the right hand. 
Two-Way Interactions [6.3.4a A ] 
There was an interaction that approached significance between X-Z bar position and Y-Z 
cylinder orientation in RTs [F (1 , 18) = 4.093, /? = 0.058] (see Figure 6.11) but not in 
mistakes [ F (1 , 18) = 0.378, p > 0.5]. The main effect of bar position is apparent in this 
interaction (levers with far bars were responded to faster than levers with near bars). When 
the bar position was far, mean RTs were 9 ms faster when the cylinder component was 
oriented upwards rather than downwards in the Y-Z plane. When the bar position was near. 
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mean RTs were 9 ms faster when the cylinder component was oriented downwards rather 
than upwards in the Y-Z plane. 
550 
TO 
540 H 
530 
520 H 
510 H 
Downward (D) Upward (U) 
Y-Z Orientation 
KEY 
O Far Bar 
H Near Bar 
MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) Bar Y-Z ms SE SE 
d. F D 515 10 4.4 0.5 
c. F U 506 11 4.8 0.7 
b. N D 530 10 5.3 0.8 
a. N U 539 9 5.0 0.7 
LEVERS (T1) 
b. 
^1^ 
4¥ 
Figure 6.11 Mean RTs as a function of X-Z bar position and Y-Z cylinder orientation 
By referring to the lever configurations depicted in Figure 6.11, it can be seen that in terms 
of action (i.e. potential interactions with the free end of the cylinder component), 
regardless of the bar position there was an advantage for lever configurations that would 
require an upward (b and c) rather than downward reach trajectory (a and d). This is 
discussed in section 6.4.3. 
From this perspective it can be seen how each specific cylinder component was responded 
to (but not each lever, since X-Z bar position does not feature in this interaction). 
Three-Way Interactions [6.3.9a y ] 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z bar position, X-Z cylinder orientation and 
hand of response in RTs [F (1 , 18) = 12.570, p < 0.005] and in mistakes [F (1 , 18) = 
15.060, p < 0.005] (see Figure 6.12). 
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a: 
CD 
Left response 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Z Orientation 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Z Orientation 
Right response Right response 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Z Orientation 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Z Orientation 
KEY 
Far bar 
Near bar 
MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) Bar X-Z Res ms SE SE 
c F L L 522 12 6.1 0.9 
0 F L R 497 10 3.0 0.6 
d F R L 519 11 4.3 0.7 
d F R R 506 11 5.1 0.7 
a N L L 538 10 4.7 0.9 
a N L R 529 9 5.5 0.9 
b N R L 548 10 6.5 0.7 
b N R R 522 9 4.1 0.7 
LEVERS T1) 
Figure 6.12 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position, X-
Z cylinder orientation and hand of response 
The main effect of hand of response is apparent in this interaction (right responses were 
responded to faster than left responses). When the bar position was far the following 
pattern was observed: For lefl hand responses, mean RTs were 3 ms faster (and mistakes 
1.8 % fewer) for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Z plane. For 
right hand responses, mean RTs were 9 ms faster (and mistakes 2.1 % fewer) for cylinders 
oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. When the bar position was near 
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the following pattern was observed: For left hand responses, mean RTs were 11 ms faster 
(and mistakes 1.8 % fewer) for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the 
X-Z plane. For right hand responses, mean RTs were 7 ms faster (and mistakes 1.4 % 
fewer) for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Z plane. 
From the observed trend reported above, it can be seen that there was an advantage for a 
particular lever configuration when the hand of response was the same hand that would be 
needed to make a contralateral reach-to-grasp movement towards the free end of the 
cylinder component. It will be noted that this is the reverse of the usual X-Z compatibility 
effect found in previous experiments, which demonstrated with respect to stand-alone 
cylinders (rather than components of a lever), an advantage for a 'default' ipsilateral 
compatibility (e.g. left hand compatibility with a cylinder oriented leftwards in the X-Z 
plane). 
Higher Order Interactions [6.3.10ay/] 
There was a significant interaction between mapping rule, bar position, Y-Z cylinder 
orientation and hand of response in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 17.683,/? < 0.005] and in mistakes [F 
(1,18) = 47.234, p < 0.001 ] (see Figures 6.13 and 6.14). 
261 
Chapter 6 - Task Context 
MR: C I ; Left response MR: C I ; Left response v « 
Downward Upwanj 
Y-Z Orientation 
Downward Upward 
Y-Z Orientation 
MR: C I ; Right response MR: C I ; Right response 
Downward Upward 
Y-Z Orientation 
Downward Upward 
Y-Z Orientation 
KEY 
O Far bar 
H Near bar 
MEANS TABLE 
MR Bar Y-Z Res ms SE % SE 
CI F 
CI F 
C1 F 
CI F 
C1 N 
CI N 
CI N 
CI N 
524 18 
466 13 
474 16 
498 18 
505 14 
520 19 
548 17 
490 12 
6.2 0.8 
3.0 1.1 
3.8 1.5 
5.7 0.9 
2.8 1.3 
6.5 1.2 
7.3 1.2 
4.3 1.1 
LEVERS (T1-T2) 
Figure 6.13 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position, Y-
Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and mapping rule (n b MR: C1 in this figure) 
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Downward Upward 
Y-Z Orientation 
§ 490 
MR: C2; Rigtit response 
Downward Upward 
Y-Z Orientation 
MR: C2; Right response 
Downward Upward 
Y-Z Orientation 
KEY 
Far bar 
Near bar 
MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar Y-Z Res ms SE SE 
d C2 F D L 526 18 0 8 
d C2 F D R 546 13 4.7 1.1 
c C2 F U L 557 16 7.0 1.5 
0 C2 F U R 495 18 2.8 0.9 
b C2 N D L 567 14 7.8 1.3 
b C2 N D R 527 19 4.2 1.2 
a C2 N U L 551 17 4.3 1.2 
a C2 N U R 566 12 4.2 1.1 
LEVERS (T1-T2) 
Figure 6.14 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position, Y-
Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and mapping rule (n.b. MR: 02 in this figure) 
For responses that made the lever move upwards (MR: C l = left responses, MR: C2 = right 
responses) the following pattern was observed: When the cylinder was oriented 
downwards in the Y-Z plane, mean RTs were faster (left = 19 ms, right = 19 ms) and mean 
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mistakes were fewer (left = 3.3 %, right = 0.5 %) when the bar position was near rather 
than far. When the cylinder was oriented upwards in the Y-Z plane, mean RTs were faster 
(left = 74 ms, right = 71 ms) and mean mistakes were fewer (left = 3.5 %, right = 1.3 %) 
when the bar position was feir rather than near. 
For participants responses that made the lever move downwards (MR: C I = right 
responses, MR: C2 = left responses) the following pattern was observed: When the 
cylinder was oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane, mean RTs were faster (left = 41 ms, 
right = 54 ms) and mean mistakes were fewer (left = 4.2 %, right = 3.5 %) when the bar 
position was far rather than near. When the cylinder was oriented upwards in the Y-Z 
plane, mean RTs were faster (left = 5 ms, right = 8 ms) and mean mistakes were fewer (left 
= 4.3 %, right = 1.3 %) when the bar position was near rather than far. 
The overall pattern suggested an advantage for responses that effected a short (rather than 
long) lever movement (regardless of whether this was made with a left or right hand 
response owing to mapping rule conditions). It can be speculated that the basis of this 
effect lay in either the possibility that a) making a short lever movement would be (in real 
physical terms) less demanding than making a long lever movement and that this 
biomechaniced difficulty was coded by the visuomotor representation; or b) imagining a 
short lever movement would take a shorter time than imagining a long lever movement, 
and that this was reflected by the duration of (action-neutral) cognitive processing needed 
to determine a response. On closer inspection, it appears that there was a clearly 
identifiable gradation of effect size corresponding to the actual physical difficulty of 
moving particular lever configurations. This possibility is discussed in section 6.4.3. 
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6.4.3 Discussion 
There are a number of results relating to the mapping rule from this experiment that are 
apparently obscure. In order to understand the often-complex data relating to the mapping 
rule, the inclusion of certain other variables is crucial. When these variables are missing, 
interpretation is difficult, i f not ftitile. For example, when the mapping rule is present in an 
interaction (thus potentially providing information about whether the lever was moved up 
or down by a left or right hand of response), it is necessary also to have hand of response 
as an interacting variable (in order to explain what actually happened to a given lever). The 
interaction between X-Z bar position and various cylinder component orientations (results 
[6.3.5aifeb and 6.3.6a&b] reported in Appendix 2) behaved differently under each mapping 
condition. However, because these results were collapsed across spatial responses, one 
cannot tell what actually happened to a given lever. Similarly, when both mapping rule and 
hand of response are present in an interaction (thus potentially providing information about 
exactly what happened to a given lever), it is necessary also to have X-Z bar position as an 
interacting variable (in order to describe which end of a lever was free, and hence moved 
up or down). The interaction between hand of response and various cylinder component 
orientations (results [6,3.7 and 6.3.8] reported in Appendix 2) behaved differently under 
each mapping condition, yet because this data was collapsed across X-Z bar positions, 
specific lever configurations cannot be examined. 
Nevertheless, result [6.3. l O y ] does provide all of the information needed to make sense of 
how each lever behaved under each mapping condition. Indeed, this result contains some 
relatively large efifect sizes, and it is likely that those otherwise obscure effects relating to 
mapping rule are simply by-products of this crucial result, carried over to significance 
thanks to the large effect sizes involved. As such this discussion wil l ignore those 
*obscure' results in favour of those that are open to meaningful interpretation, such as 
result [6.3.1Oy]. Those results that do present themselves as interpretable all share one 
common theme- they all point to performance-related benefits that are associated with the 
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kinds of actions that might be directed towards a given lever, were one to actually 
physically interact with them. 
[6.3.1 y ] X-Z bar position 
The first result of interest was the main effect of X-Z bar position in RTs. Here, mean RTs 
were faster when the bar position was far (in the background) rather than near (in the 
foreground). In terms of action possibilities, it is apparent that when the position of the bar 
was far, would-be-reaches to the cylinder component would be unrestricted. However, 
when the position of the bar was near, the obstacle of the bar would potentially restrict 
would-be-reaches towards (and possible movements oO the cylinder component. 
(6.3.4 X ] X-Z bar position x Y-Z cylinder orientation 
The second result of interest was the interaction between X-Z bar position and Y-Z cylinder 
orientation [6.3.4ay ] . Here the Y-Z cylinder orientation was associated with either fast or slow 
RTs depending on whether the X-Z bar position was near or far. The apparent basis for this 
interaction lay in the kind of reach that one might make towards the free end of the cylinder 
component of a given lever. This can be seen in Figure 6.15, where arms have been embedded 
in the lever displays in an attempt to fwrtray the sort of action that might be required were one to 
physically interact with a given lever. These arm illustrations are of course an approximation, 
and the arm: lever ratio has been arbitrarily chosen. Nevertheless, they do suggest that in terms of 
action, the pattern of RTs can be explained in terms of the direction of a required reach trajectory. 
Those levers that would require an upward reach trajectory (levers b & d) were responded to 
faster than those levers that would require a downward reach trajectory (levers a & c). Thus the 
pattern of RTs was as follows: levers b (530 ms) < levers a (539 ms); levers d (506 ms) < levers c 
(515 ms). This trend held for each specific lever configuration also, as reflected by the equivalent 
result [6.3.4by] reported in Appendix 2, where those specific levers that would require an 
upward reach trajectory (levers 3-6) were responded to faster than those levers that would require 
a downward reach trajectory Oevers 1, 2, 7 & 8). Thus the pattern of RTs was as follows: lever 3 
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(526 ms) < lever 1 (541 ms); lever 4 (533 ms) < lever 2 (537 ms); lever 5 (505 ms) < lever 7 (513 
ms); lever 6 (507 ms) < lever 8 (518 ms). 
Interestingly, this result related to a main effect of Y-Z cylinder orientation found in Experiments 
5.3 [5.3.3y] and 6.2 [6.2.1 y ] . In both cases there was an advantage for cylinders oriented 
upwards, and it was suggested that this might have reflected a preference for cylinders that would 
require an upward reach trajectoiy. The pattern of data currently under discussion provides some 
support for this notion, whereby those lever configurations that would require an upward reach 
trajectory held the advantage. Furthermore, it can be seen that the orientation of the cylinder 
component did not itself ensure this pattern. Instead what mattered was how this cylinder 
orientation interacted with the X-Z position of the bar, such that the whole lever configuration 
described significance for action. 
From this perspective, it can be argued that a visuomotor primitive associated with Y-Z cylinder 
orientation (e.g. a representational 'default setting' that automatically potentiated aspects of an 
upward reach trajectory) has been elaborated (as predicted by the Task Context Hypothesis) in 
accordance with the context of a functional lever whose simple mechanics demand that the 
cylinder component be interacted with in a particular way (i.e. by grasping its free end). 
Crucially, the underlying function of this affordance is unchanged from that of the 'default 
setting' (i.e. its function is to afford upward reaches). 
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Figure 6.15 The levers involved in result [ 6 3 4 y ] , with approximate arm configurations 
displayed 
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[6.3.9 y ] X-Z bar position x X-Z cylinder orientation x response 
Following from the ideas discussed above, this result suggested a modulation (rather than 
elaboration) of a previously identified 'default setting' (again supporting the Task Context 
Hypothesis). Where Experiments 5.1- 5.3 and 6.1 consistently showed performance-related 
benefits for the hand of response that was on the same side as the nearest end of a cylinder 
in the X-Z plane, here the compatibility effect reversed such that the advantage was always 
for the opposite hand. It can be argued that the different action-context of a functionally 
unambiguous lever resulted in the modification of a representational default associated 
with the X-Z orientation of a functionally ambiguous cylinder. In short, it appears that the 
cylinder recommended a different type of interaction when it was part o f a lever. 
The apparent basis for this interaction between X-Z bar position, X-Z cylinder orientation 
and hand of response [6.3.9ay] therefore lay in the kind of reach that one might make 
towards the fi^e end of the cylinder component of a given lever (regardless of what 
movement might follow, since this result was collapsed across mapping conditions). This 
can be seen in Figure 6.16, which suggests that the pattern of mean RTs (and mistakes) can 
be explained in terms of the direction of a would-be-reach trajectory. For left responses, 
those levers that would require a contralateral reach with the left hand (levers a & d) were 
responded to faster and more accurately than those levers that would require an ipsi lateral 
reach with the left hand (levers b & c). For right responses, those levers that would require 
a contralateral reach with the right hand (levers b & c) were responded to faster and more 
accurately than those levers that would require an ipsilateral reach with the right hand 
(levers a & d). 
Thus the pattern of RTs and mistakes was as follows: for left hand responses levers a (538 
ms, 4.7 %) < levers b (548 ms, 6.5 %) and levers d (519 ms, 4.3 %) < levers c (522 ms, 6.1 
% ) ; and for right responses levers b (522 ms, 4.1 %) < levers a (529 ms, 5.5 %) and levers 
c (497 ms, 3.0 %) < levers d (506 ms, 5.1 % ) . This trend held for each specific lever 
configuration also (except for one case in bold typeface), as reflected by the equivalent 
269 
Chapter 6-Task Context 
result reported in Appendix 2 [6.3.9by]. Here, those specific levers that would require 
contralateral reaches with a particular hand were responded to faster and more accurately 
than those levers that would require ipsilateral reaches with a particular hand. Thus the 
pattern of RTs and mistakes was as follows: for left restxjnses lever 1 (548 ms, 4.2 %) < 
lever 2 (552 ms, 7.5 % ) ; lever 3 (528 ms, 5.2 %) < lever 4 (545 ms, 5.5 % ) ; lever 6 (513 
ms, 5.0 %) < lever 5 (518 ms, 5.8 %) and lever 8 (525 ms, 3.5 % ) < lever 7 (525 ms, 6.3 
% ) ; and for right hand responses lever 2 (522 ms, 3.7 % ) < lever 1 (534 ms, 4.8 % ) ; lever 4 
(522 ms, 4.5 %) < lever 3 (525 ms, 6.2 % ) ; lever 5 (493 ms, 3.5 %) < lever 6 (501 ms, 5.0 
% ) and lever 7 (501 ms, 2.5 %) < lever 8 (510 ms, 5.2 % ) . 
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Figure 6.16 The levers invotved in result [6 3 9 y ] . with approximate arm configurations 
displayed 
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[6.3,10 y] Mapping rule x X-Z bar position x Y-Z cylinder orientation x response 
In perhaps the most revealing result of this experiment, result [6.3.10ay] has revealed new 
compatibility effects that included as interacting variables Y-Z cylinder orientation and 
hand of response. In Chapter 5, Visual Attribute Hypothesis 2 suggested that Y-Z cylinder 
orientation would not interact with hand of response, since they are not shared dimensions 
(i.e. upward/ downward is fiindamentally incompatible with left/right). Indeed, all of the 
cylinder exj)eriments have supported this hypothesis. However, within the context of an 
artificial perception-action coupling in which a lever moves up or down as a consequence 
of left and right hand responses, the same Y-Z orientation of a cylinder component now 
becomes highly relevant to left-right responses. Thus when other variables are considered 
(mapping rule and X-Z bar position), a highly context specific influence of Y-Z cylinder 
orientation on responses can be identified. 
Such a high-order interaction (between mapping rule, X-Z bar position, Y-Z orientation 
£ind hand of response) is naturally complex and needs to be broken down into manageable 
parts (see Figs. 6.17-6.20). As a general observation, it can be seen in each figure that 
response performance (in both speed and accuracy) was always better for levers that had 
moved a short rather than long distance. This trend might reflect motor imagery sensitive 
to movement difficulty, since it would be physically easier to move a lever a short rather 
than a long distance. However, it could alternatively be argued that this pattern instead 
reflected the cognitive processing time taken to imagine (in an action-neutral manner) a 
lever moving a short or long distance. Under this view, long movements would take a 
longer time to imagine. 
Remarkably however, a subtler pattem was apparent in the data, whereby lever movements 
appeared to be graded in terms of their physical difficulty relative to each other. This 
finding does not support an action-neutral cognitive processing time explanation, since the 
distances that a lever could move were identical for all levers (from its start position a lever 
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either moved a long or short distance to the floor, or a long or short distance to the ceiling). 
In other words, since each lever could only move one of two distances (long or short), with 
absolutely no other variation of movement distance, then the cognitive processing time 
should be equally short for all levers that moved a short distance, and equally long for all 
levers that moved a long distance. However, as Figs. 6.17-6.20 suggest, the pattern of RTs 
reflected a gradation of differences between long and short lever movements, depending 
upon the lever configxu^tions involved. Furthermore, the gradation o f these differences 
appeared to correspond to the discrepancy in movement difficulty between these different 
levers, were one to actually physically move them. The following examines four 
identifiable patterns in the data. 
273 
Chapter 6 - Task Context 
Pattern 1: For example, when two kinds of lever movements were of a similar difficulty, the 
ditTerence between them in terms of RTs was small. Thus in Figure 6.17, it can be seen that 
moving levers a. downwards a short distance (left responses: 551 ms, right responses: 490 
ms) took on average 6 ms (left responses) and 8 ms (right responses) less than moving 
levers c^  downwards a long distance (left responses: 557 ms, right responses: 498 ms). 
MR 02 
557 ms 
498 ms 
5L-a. = 6 ms 8 ms 27 % 1 4 ms 
MR C2 
551 ms 
MRC1 
490 ms 
F i g u r e 6.17 Pattem 1 of result [6 3 1 0 ay] , with approximate arm configurations displayed 
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Pattern 2: However, in using difiercnl levers, when a long upward movement appeared to be 
physically more diHlcuit than a short upward movement, then the difTerences between them 
in terms of RTs were slightly more pronounced. Thus in Figure 6.18, it can be seen that 
moving levers b. upwards a short distance (left responses: 505 ms, right responses: 527 ms) 
took on average 19 ms (left responses) and 19 ms (right responses) less than moving levers 
d. upwards a long distance (left responses: 524 ms, right responses: 546 ms). 
MR 01 
524 ms 
6 2% 
MR: 02 
546 ms 
4 7 ms 
4 9 % 0 5 ms 19 ms 19 ms 
MR CI 
505 ms 
MR C2 
^2^ ms 
42 ms 
F i g u r e 6.18 Pattern 2 of result [6 3 10aA-], with approximate arm configurations displayed 
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Pattern 3: When the discrepancy between movement difficulties increased further still, the 
difTerence between them in terms of RTs also increased. Thus in Figure 6.19, it can be seen 
that moving levers d. downwards a short distance (lef^ responses: 526 ms, right responses: 466 
ms) took on average 41 ms (lef^ responses) and 54 ms (right responses) less than moving 
levers b, downwards a long distance (lef^ responses: 567 ms, right responses: 520 ms). 
MR:C2 
567 ms 
MR 01 
520 ms 
41 ms 54 ms 4 1 % 3 5 ms 
MR C2 
526 ms 
MR CI * 466 ms 
3 0 ms 
•0 
F i g u r e 6.19 Pattem 3 of result [6 3 10ay] , with approximate arm configurations displayed 
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Pattern 4: Finally, when the discrepancy between movement ditriculties was at its greatest, 
then the differences in RTs were at their greatest. Thus in Figure 6.20, it can be seen that 
moving levers c. upwards a short distance (left responses: 474 ms, right responses: 495 
ms) took on average 74 ms (left responses) and 71 ms (right responses) less than moving 
levers a. upwards a long distance (left responses: 548 ms, right responses: 566 ms). 
MR 01 
548 ms 
MR C2 
566 ms 
74 ms 71 ms 3 5 % 1 4 ms • 
MR CI 
474 ms 
MR 02 
495 ms 
2 8 ms 
F igure 6.20 Pattern 4 of result [6 3 lOaX] , with approximate arm configurations displayed 
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When responses to the specific lever configurations are considered (see result [6,3.10by] 
in Appendix 2), a ftirther action-sensitive trend is apparent within each of the four patterns 
discussed above. 
Lever specific pattern within Pattern 1: 
The pattem o f RTs for specific levers was as follows: for left responses, lever 5, (551 ms) -
lever 1. (551 ms) = 0 ms (smallest difference), and lever 6. (562 ms) - lever 2. (552 ms) = 
10 ms (largest difference). The opposite pattem occurred for right responses, such that 
lever 5^  (499 ms) - lever 1. (484 ms) = 15 ms (largest difference), and lever 6. (498 ms) -
lever 2. (497 ms) = 1 ms (smallest difference). 
'Smallest difference' relations: Here, the two actions common to both arms were as 
follows: for long movements, a bent-armed downward ipsilateral pull; and for short 
movements, a straight-amied contralateral pull towards the body (see Figure 6.21). 
Relating to the left response RTs, it can be argued that the long movement of lever 5^  was 
no harder to simulate than the short movement of lever 1. (the difference was 0 ms). 
Relating to the right response RTs, it can be argued that the long movement of lever 6. was 
no harder to simulate than the short movement of lever 2 (the difference was 1 ms). 
'Largest difference' relations: In contrast, when the same levers are considered using the 
opposite responses, there was a slight difference in mean RTs. This increased difference 
(when compared to the previous 'smallest difference' relations) might reflect four mentally 
simulated actions, two (the long movements) that were slightly more complex (in terms of 
biomechanical constraints) to simulate than the other two (the short movements) - a 
possibility that seems to be supported by the relative difficulty of the different arm 
illustrations in Figure 6.22. The two actions common to both arms were as follows: for 
long movements, a straight-armed movement in a contralateral downward arc; and for 
short movements, a bent-armed ipsilateral pull towards the body. Relating to the left 
response RTs, it can be argued that the long movement of lever 6. was slightly harder to 
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simulate than the short movement of lever 2. (the difTerence was 10 ms). Relating to the 
right response RTs, it can also be argued that the long movement of lever 5. was slightly 
harder to simulate than the short movement of lever 1. (the difference was 15 ms). 
MR C2 
551 ms 
Difference = 0 ms 
551 ms 
MR: 01 
498 ms 
Difference = 1 ms 
MR; 01 
497 ms 
F igure 6.21 Smallest difference relations' from Pattern 1, with approximate arm 
configurations displayed 
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M R C 1 
499 ms * 
Difference = 15 ms 
MR: 01 
484 ms 
MR: 02 
562 ms 
Difference = 10 ms 
MR: 02 
552 ms 
F i g u r e 6.22 Largest difference relations' from Pattem 1, with approximate arm 
configurations displayed 
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Lever specific pattern within Pattern 2: 
Similarly, the pattern of RTs for specific levers was as follows: for left responses, lever 8. 
(525 ms) - lever 4. (514 ms) = 11 ms (smallest difference), and lever 7. (524 ms) - lever 3. 
(496 ms) = 28 ms (largest difference). The opposite pattern occurred for right responses, 
such that lever 8. (553 ms) - lever 4. (529ms) = 24 ms (largest difference), and lever 7. 
(539 ms) - lever 3. (525 ms) = 14 ms (smallest difference). 
'Smallest difference' relations: Here, there was a slight difference in mean RTs. This 
difference might reflect four mentally simulated actions, two (the long movements) that 
were slightly more complex (in terms of biomechanical constraints) to simulate than the 
other two (the short movements) - a possibility that seems to be supported by the arm 
illustrations in Figure 6.23. The two actions common to both arms were as follows: for 
long movements, a straight-armed upward contralateral push; and for short movements, a 
bent-armed ipsilateraJ pull towards the body. Relating to the left response RTs, it can be 
argued that the long movement of lever 8. was slightly harder to simulate than the short 
movement of lever 4. (the difference was 11 ms). Relating to the right response RTs, it can 
be argued that the long movement of lever 7. was slightly harder to simulate than the short 
movement of lever 3 (the difference was 14 ms). 
'Largest difference' relations: In contrast, when the same levers are considered using the 
opposite responses, there was a considerable difference in mean RTs. This increased 
difference (when compared to the previous 'smallest difference' relations) might reflect 
four mentally simulated actions, two (the long movements) that were considerably more 
complex (in terms of biomechanical constraints) to simulate than the other two (the short 
movements) - a possibility that seems to be supported by the arm illustrations in Figure 
6.24. The two actions common to both arms were as follows: for long movements, a bent-
armed ipsilateral upward push; and for short movements, a straight-armed contralateral 
pull towards the body. Relating to the left response RTs, it can be argued that the long 
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movement of lever 7. was considerably harder to simulate than the short movement of 
lever 3. (the difference was 28 ms). Relating to the right response RTs, it can also be 
argued that the long movement of lever 8. was considerably harder to simulate than the 
short movement of lever 4. (the difference was 24 ms). 
MR:C1 
525 ms 
Difference = 11 ms 
MR: C1 
514 ms 
MR: C2 
539 ms 
Difference = 14 ms 
MR C2 
525 ms 
F i g u r e 6.23 Smallest difference relations' from Pattem 2, with approximate ami 
configurations displayed 
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MR 01 
524 ms 
Differertce = 28 ms 
MR: 01 
496 ms 
MR C2 
553 ms 
Difference = 24 ms 
MR 02 
529 ms 
F i g u r e 6.24 Largest difference relations' from Pattern 2, with approximate arm 
configurations displayed 
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Lever specific pattem within Pattem 3: 
Similarly, the pattem of RTs for specific levers was as follows: for left responses, lever 3. 
(559 ms) - lever 7. (527 ms) = 32 ms (smallest difference), and lever 4. (575 ms) - lever 8. 
(525 ms) = 50 ms (largest difference). The opposite pattem occurred for right responses, 
such that lever 3. (524 ms) - lever 7. (464 ms) = 60 ms (largest difference), and lever 4. 
(515 ms) - lever 8. (468 ms) = 47 ms (smallest difference). 
'Smallest difference' relations: Here, there was a considerable difference in mean RTs. 
This difference might reflect four mentally simulated actions, two (the long movements) 
that were considerably more complex (in terms of biomechanical constraints) to simulate 
than the other two (the short movements) -a possibility that seems to be supported by the 
arm illustrations in Figure 6.25. The two actions common to both arms were as follows: for 
long movements, a straight-amied downward contralateral push; and for short movements, 
a bent-armed downward ipsilateral push. Relating to the left response RTs, it can be argued 
that the long movement of lever 4. was considerably harder to represent than the short 
movement of lever 8. (the difference was 32 ms). Relating to the right response RTs, it can 
be argued that the long movement of lever 3. was considerably harder to represent than the 
short movement of lever 7. (the difference was 47 ms). 
'Largest difference' relations: In contrast, when the same levers are considered using the 
opposite responses, there was a substantial difference in mean RTs. This increased 
difference (when compared to the previous 'smallest difference' relations) might reflect 
four mentally simulated actions, two (the long movements) that were substantially more 
complex (in terms of biomechanical constraints) to simulate than the other two (the short 
movements); a possibility that seems to be supported by the arm illustrations in Figure 
6.26. The two actions common to both arms were as follows: for long movements, a bent-
armed downward ipsilateral push; and for short movements, a straight-armed downward 
contralateral push. Relating to the left response RTs, it can be argued that the long 
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movement of lever 4. was substantially harder to simulate than the short movement of 
lever 8. (the difference was 50 ms). Relating to the right response RTs, it can also be 
argued that the long movement of lever 3. was substantially harder to simulate than the 
short movement of lever 7. (the difference was 60 ms). 
MR C2 
559 ms 
Difference = 32 ms 
MR;C2 
527 ms 
MR C1 
515 ms 
Drfference = 47 ms 
MR:C1 
468 ms Q 
F i g u r e 6.25 Smallest difference relations' from Pattern 3. with approximate ann 
configurations displayed 
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MR 02 
575 ms 
Difference = 50 ms 
MR 02 
525 ms 
MR: 01 
524 ms 
DiffererK)e = 60 ms 
MR: 01 
464 ms 
F i g u r e 6.26 'Largest difference relations' from Pattem 3, with approximate arm 
configurations displayed 
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Lever specific pattern within Pattern 4: 
Similarly, the pattem of RTs for specific levers was as follows: for left responses, lever L 
(545 ms) - lever 5. (485 ms) = 60 ms (smallest difference), and lever 2. (552 ms) - lever 6. 
(463 ms) = 89 ms (largest difference). Similarly, for right responses, lever L (584 ms) -
lever 5. (487 ms) = 97 ms (largest difference), and lever 2. (548 ms) - lever 6. (503ms) = 
45 ms (smallest difference). 
'Smallest difference' relations: Here, there was a substantial difTerence in mean RTs. This 
difference might reflect four mentally simulated actions, two (the long movements) that 
were substantially more complex (in terms of biomechanical constraints) to simulate than 
the other two (the short movements) -a possibility that seems to be supported by the arm 
illustrations in Figure 6.27. The two actions common to both arms were as follows: for 
long movements, a straight-armed upward contralateral push; and for short movements, a 
bent-armed upward ipsilateral push. Relating to the left response RTs, it can be argued that 
the long movement of lever J_, was substantially harder to simulate than the short 
movement of lever 5. (the difference was 40 ms). Relating to the right response RTs, it can 
be argued that the long movement of lever 2. was substantially harder to simulate than the 
short movement of lever 6. (the difference was 45 ms). 
'Largest difference' relations: In contrast, when the same levers are considered using the 
opposite responses, there was a dramatic difference in mean RTs. This increased 
difference (when compared to the previous 'smallest difference' relations) might reflect 
four mentally simulated actions, two (the long movements) that were dramatically more 
complex (in terms of biomechanical constraints) to simulate than the other two (the short 
movements) - a possibility that seems to be supported by the arm illustrations in Figure 
6.28. The two actions common to both arms were as follows: for long movements, a bent-
armed upward ipsilateral push; and for short movements, a straight-armed upward 
contralateral push. Relating to the left response RTs, it can be argued that the long 
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movement of lever ]_. was dramatically harder to simulate than the short movement of 
lever 5. (the difference was 97 ms). Relating to the right response RTs, it can also be 
argued that the long movement of lever 2. was dramatically harder to simulate than the 
short movement of lever 6. (the difference was 89 ms). 
5^ 
• 
MR C I 
545 ms 
Difference =40 ms 
MR: C I 
485 ms 
MR:C2 
548 ms 
Difference = 45 ms 
MR:C2 
503 ms 
F i g u r e 6.27 Smallest difference relations' from Pattem 4, with approximate ami 
configurations displayed 
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MR: C1 
552 m s 
Difference = 89 ms 
MR: 0 1 
463 ms 
MR 0 2 
Dif ference = 97 ms 
MR 0 2 
487 ms 
Figure 6.28 La rges t d i f fe rence re la t ions ' f r o m Pat te rn 4 , w i th a p p r o x i m a t e a r m 
conf igura t ions d isp layed 
In conclusion, the clearly graded nature of the perception-action compatibility effects 
found in result [6.3.1Oy] supported the possibility that the movement of a lever was 
imagined using motor imagery (i.e. the would-be-actions were simulated). Furthermore 
these action simulations were sensitive to the biomechanical difficulty or awkwardness of 
these would-be-actions. This was reflected by the size of differences (in mean RTs) 
between responses that produced two types of lever movements (long and short). Using the 
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arm illustrations as a conceptual aid, it appeared likely that the slower the RTs were, the 
more complex the simulations were (e.g. those associated with difficult or awkward lever 
movements); and that the faster the RTs were, the less complex the simulations were (e.g. 
those associated with easy or comfortable lever movements). In taking the two simplest 
extremes (patterns 1 and 4) as an example (which did not look at specific levers, but rather 
focussed on the Y-Z plane of the cylinder component), the following summary observation 
can be made: When the discrepancy in difficulty between two lever movements was small 
(e.g. an easy/comfortable short movement and an easy/comfortable long movement), then 
the discrepancy in RTs was small (e.g. RTs relating to Pattern 1.). On the other hand, when 
the discrepancy in difficulty between two levers was large (e.g. an easy/comfortable short 
movement and a difficult/awkward long movement), then the discrepancy in RTs was large 
(e.g. RTs relating to Pattern 4.). The relative discrepancy in difficulty between classes of 
lever movements for Patterns 2 and 3 fell somewhere in between these two extremes. 
6.5 General Discussion of Experiments 6.1-6.3 
Experiments 6.1-6.3 investigated whether the reliable trends found in Chapter 5 (most 
notably, the compatibility effect between X-Z cylinder orientation and response; the lack 
of a compatibility effect between X-Y cylinder orientation and response and the lack of a 
compatibility effect between Y-Z cylinder orientation and response) would change in some 
way when the task context was manipulated. This investigation aimed to demonstrate that 
action-oriented representations are not highly prescriptive and fixed, but rather reflect 
loosely constrained mechanisms that can adjust to a range of viable actions that are 
appropriate within a current behavioural context. Thus the Task Context Hypothesis 
predicted that changing task context might a) reveal new perception-action compatibility 
effects, and/or b) alter the nature of previously established perception-action compatibility 
effects. This hypothesis was supported by all three experiments. 
In Experiment 6.1, the time-to-response was manipulated by using different SOA's. It was 
argued that because the task context was not changed in such a way that new intentions or 
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goals were formed, the activity of the automatically activated 'default' remained more-or-
less stable (hence the different SOAs did not change the nature or size o f the compatibility 
effect associated with X-Z cylinder orientation and response). It was suggested that the 
visuomotor system was nevertheless 'hungry' for new sources o f action-relevant 
information, and that those spare resources that might otherwise have enhanced this default 
were deployed to 'seek out' new possibilities for action. This appeared to occur at SOA's 
of 800 ms (which gave the system time to deploy spare resources), and took the form of a 
new compatibility effect associated with the X-Y cylinder orientation and hand of 
response. 
Experiment 6.2, which gave cylinders a dynamic feel by making them apparently move 
towards the viewer, had the effect of wiping out the normally reliable compatibility effect 
associated with X-Z cylinder orientation and hand o f response. It is possible that this 
'default' affbrdance was simply eradicated; or alternatively, a newfound pressure to 
withdraw from the visually looming cylinder may have overridden this default. 
Experiment 6.3 changed the action-context of a cylinder by making it a mere component in 
a functioning lever-like device. A previous 'default' affordance associated with Y-Z 
cylinder orientation found in Experiments 5.3 and 6.2 (where upward reaches were 
advantaged) appeared to have been elaborated, such that the basic function o f affording 
upward reaches was maintained by changing the influence of Y-Z cylinder orientation 
depending on how it behaved with respect to the bar component of the lever. In addition, 
the reliable 'default' affordance associated with X-Z cylinder orientation and response 
appeared to have been modulated (the direction of the compatibly effect reversed), such 
that the cylinder now recommended a different type of interaction in its new context as part 
of a functioning lever. 
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Finally, a new and intricate compatibility effect was revealed that was in part associated 
with Y-Z cylinder orientation and response. In the cylinder experiments of Chapter 5, Y-Z 
cylinder orientation did not interact with responses- presumably because there was no 
compatibility to be found between upward-downward orientation and left-right response. 
However, in the context o f left and right responses that moved the cylinder component of a 
lever upwards and downwards, there was a newfound basis for compatibility. The context 
of engaging in a specific behavioural activity (effecting the movement of a virtual lever) 
appeared to have implicated a sophisticated simulation of action that was sensitive to 
biomechanical constraints. Johnson (2000a) also concluded that motor imagery was 
sensitive to various biomechanical constraints. However, one major respect in which this 
experiment differed fi-om Johnson's was in its arbitrary mapping rule. In Johnson's studies 
participants made judgements or chose actions based on how comfortable they thought an 
action might be with respect to a real or graphically rendered wooden dowel that was 
variously oriented in the X-Y plane. In the current experiment however, there was no 
explicit reference to actions (e.g. reaches or grasps) or their likely comfort. In this light, it 
can be claimed that the sensitivity to movement difficulties found in this experiment is 
more likely to have reflected automatic, affordance-like processes. Rather than participants 
who were instructed to imagine how comft)rtable a movement might be (and who 
employed motor imagery to achieve this; as appeared to be the case in Johnson's studies); 
it appeared that participants in this study could not help but consider (in an action 
simulation sense) the biomechanical constraints of different movements, even though to do 
so was completely task-irrelevant. 
Interestingly, this candidate affordance appeared to be considerably more specific than 
might be expected under a more generic 'representational default setting'. Indeed, this 
makes good sense, for a representational default is just that- a default. With all things being 
equal, it offers an adequate potentiation for action (that is general enough to influence a 
whole range of actions). However, in the lever experiment all things were not equal. There 
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was a specific behavioural context within which to interact with a lever, and default 
settings were no longer adequate (although as we have seen in results [6.3.4y & 6.3.9y] , 
the origins of these defaults were arguably still detectable). Rather, what was needed was a 
more tightly constrained affordance for a specific behavioural activity, and far greater 
representational sophistication was needed. 
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7.1 Summary and recommendations 
This final chapter offers a summary of the previous six chapters, and for each experimental 
chapter (Chapters 3-6) recommendations are made for further investigations. Implications 
that the current data has for the attention-directing hypothesis are discussed, and finally, 
some concluding remarks are made that evaluate how the work of this thesis has 
contributed to our understanding of affordances. 
7.1.1 Introduction (Chapter 1) 
In setting the context for this thesis. Chapter 1 outlined two different traditions in visual 
perception. The computational tradition (which endeavours to explain how the brain 
constructs abstract general-purpose descriptions o f the world) was criticised for its 
assumption that these descriptions or 'representations' are a separate endeavour to acting in 
the world. Bom ft-om this failure to consider the sensorimotor system, computationally 
intensive translation processes are required to allow perception to guide actions. This is 
epitomised by the convention of assuming separate and linear processing stages (input -> 
translation -> output). In contrast, the ecological tradition does not consider perception and 
action as separate endeavours. However, this tradition was criticized because although it 
rejects traditional notions of representation, it provides no satisfactory alternative. 
Nevertheless, the notion of a process-driven perception-action loop with operational 
closure was considered an important departure ft-om linear-stage models. The notion of 
mental representation was given detailed theoretical and philosophical consideration, 
culminating in a meritorious alternative to traditional representations, namely action-
oriented representations. Action-oriented representations both describe a situation and 
suggest an appropriate reaction to it without requiring mediating computations. This is the 
essence of a hypothesis that has received considerable attention throughout the thesis, 
namely the Action Potentiation Hypothesis. According to Tucker and Ellis' (1998) APH, 
representing a visual object involves simultaneously encoding information about the visual 
attributes of that object and components of the actions that one might perform on it. 
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7.1.2 Seeing the wood for the trees (Chapter 2) 
This chapter adopted a wider perspective on thinking, perceiving and acting in general, by 
examining in depth a range of contemporary theories and approaches (e.g. separable but 
linked approaches to perception and action, particularly concerning the two visual systems; 
a theory of sensorimotor contingencies; the Enactive Approach; TNGS; a two-stage model 
of action control; and TEC). These theories and approaches share the common goal of 
attempting to unify our superficially distinct capacities for thought, simulation, perception 
and action (or at the very least, explain how they interact). This perspective is broadly 
known as 'Embodied Cognition', and fulfi ls much of the criteria demanded by a 
perception-action loop model of cognition. Of particular interest was the idea that there is a 
'middle' level of perceptual processing in which amodal or 'common codes' allow the 
unification or interaction of these different capacities. The experimental chapters that 
followed drew heavily on the insights gained fi-om an embodied approach to cognition by 
investigating different sources of perception-action couplings. These investigations 
focussed primarily on the direct relationship between the orientation o f visual objects and 
simplistic left-right actions made towards some arbitrary property of these objects. 
7.1.3 The Action Potentiation Hypothesis (Chapter 3) 
As a clear example of an action-oriented representation, the APH's 'micro-affordance' was 
shown to be complementary to all of the 'middle way' perspectives discussed in the 
Chapter 2. In particular the notion of visuomotor primitives (that may be common 
components of a range of different actions) appeared to sit nicely with the 'middle way' 
and especially with the concept of a 'common code'. However, an examination of the 
sources of evidence offered by the APH revealed several ambiguities. These ambiguities 
centred on the possible extent to which a) so-called 'micro-affordances' are evoked in a 
default-like manner purely by visual attributes of an object (and i f so, what are these visual 
attributes), and b) whether these micro-affordances are prescribed and fixed (such that they 
might relate exclusively to a specific component of a specific action), or whether they are 
297 
Chapter 7 - Summary 
more loosely constrained such that they might be modulated by behavioural and activity-
based context (such that a range of actions might be affected, and in different ways 
depending on the context of a task). Addressing these ambiguities was the major aim of the 
experimental chapters that followed, as reflected by four experimental objectives. The 
objective for Chapter 3 (Objective 1) was as follows: 
Objective 1 : To replicate a study by Symes (1999) where object location and object 
orientation compatibility effects were obtained using left and right hand key-press 
responses to photographs of everyday objects. In this replication however, left and right 
responses are made with the feet, thus testing the hypothesis that a range of left-right 
actions can produce orientation-action compatibility etTects. 
The experimental work began by reporting Experiment 3.1 in which participants responded 
with spatial foot responses to the object category (kitchen or garage) of a series of 
photographs of everyday objects. The location and X-Z orientation of these objects were 
manipulated. Although task-irrelevant object properties, compatibility effects were 
nevertheless observed between object location and response, and object orientation and 
response. Affordance-based explanations of perception-action compatibility effects are 
intuitive when, for example, a hand is compatible with an object's orientation, or a grip 
type is compatible with the size of an object. However, it is not obvious how the 
orientation of an object affords a foot response. These results were therefore discussed in 
terms of the specificity of actions afforded by visual objects. In particular it was argued 
that compatible actions might be 'set up' by the physical context of a task (thus 
considering the influence of action -> perception links in a loop), and furthermore the 
possibility of visuomotor primitives that are common to many actions was discussed. 
Recommendations 
In using photographs of real oriented objects, one cannot be sure of the extent to which any 
orientation-action compatibility effects are associated with the purely visual attributes of 
orientation, or with the action connotations 'semantically' associated with a functional part 
of the object (most obviously a handle). This ambiguity was a major motivation for using 
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oriented artificial objects in later experiments (oriented lines and cylinders). These 
artificial objects had no history of functionally driven interactions. In contrast, the lever's 
simple mechanics in Experiment 6.3 specified a clear functional end. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the fijnctionality of objects does impact on action. 
For example, Creem and Proffitt (2001b) ran a small series of experiments in which 
participants had to grasp and pick up a handled object. A handled object (e.g. a hammer, 
paintbrush, screwdriver etc.) was placed on a table in fi-ont of the participant. The object's 
handle always faced away from the participant, and the object was either placed 
"vertically" [sic] on the table (the object lay horizontally on the table with its head pointing 
directly towards, and its handle pointing directly away from, the perceiver-actor's body), 
or it was rotated 45° to the left or right of 'vertical'. With respect to the participant's 
dominant hand, the object's handle was classified as either neutral ('vertical'), towards 
(e.g. 45° to the left of vertical) or away (e.g. 45° to right of vertical). In one experiment, 
where the task was simply to pick up the object with the dominant hand (control group), 72 
% of grasps were appropriate for the object's use (i.e. the handle was grasped in such a 
way that the object might be used for its correct purpose). When grasps were made with a 
concurrent 'spatial' task (spatial imagery group), appropriateness of grasp fell to 55 % 
(statistically, this difference was not significantly different from the control group). 
However, when grasps were made with a concurrent 'semantic' task (word-pair association 
group), appropriateness of grasp fell to 17 % (statistically, this difference was significantly 
different from the control). Furthermore, in all tasks, appropriate grasping came mostly 
from the "towards" orientation, followed by "neutral" and then "away". Creem and Proffitt 
(2001b) concluded that v^thout the influence of the cognitive system, the visuomotor 
system can reach and grasp an object effectively. However, to grasp an object 
appropriately for its proper use, partial information is needed from the semantic system 
(which was interfered with in the concurrent semantic task group). 
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It is of particular interest whether such an interaction between cognition and visuomotor 
processing might also occur automatically, even without the intention to grasp an object (in 
a similar way to the APH's claim that that purely visual attributes of an object 
automatically potentiate aspects of action, regardless of an intention to act). Indeed, in 
addressing this question a series of experiments that have not been reported were 
performed as part of this thesis. Unfortunately, the stimuli used had serious confounds that 
were reflected in the data (see Appendix 6 for example stimuli and brief descriptions). 
In light of these failed efforts, the following recommends a potential experiment that uses 
carefully considered and apparently confound-free stimuli. The experimenter shows 
participants a model of an object, and demonstrates how it can be used as a bottle stop (by 
holding the square component to push the cylinder component into a bottle), or as an ink 
stamp (by holding the cylinder component to push the ink covered square component down 
onto a piece of paper). The participants then perform a reaction-time study where 
responses are made to variously oriented pictures of this object (see two example 
orientations in Figure 7.1). An inter-trial stimulus is shown with the words 'towards me' or 
'away from me'. According to the stated direction, upon viewing the oriented object (target 
stimulus), participants must make a left or right response that classifies the object's identity 
(e.g. ink stamp = left, bottle stop = right). This classification is based on what function the 
object would have i f it moved in the direction stated. Should object function automatically 
influence action (regardless of an intention to act), then it might be predicted that the 
orientation most appropriate for grasping with a particular hand would change depending 
upon the perceived object identity (and that this might be reflected in RTs and mistakes). 
Crucially, because the same object is used (albeit with two identities), there are no visual 
features that differ between a stamp and a bottle stop. This proposed experiment would 
therefore tap into the influence of an object's function without being confounded by its 
visual features. 
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Figure 7.1 T w o ngh twards or ien ta t ions of t he dual - ident i ty ob jec t . T a k i n g t h e le f tmost p ic ture 
as an e x a m p l e , a t o w a r d s m e ' d i rec t ion wou ld m a k e the ob jec t a n ink s t a m p ( thus a f fo rd ing 
a left hand reach- to -g rasp) , a n d a n away f r o m m e d i rec t ion w o u l d m a k e t h e ob jec t a bot t le 
s top ( thus a f fo rd ing a right hand reach- to -g rasp) 
7.1.4 Two-dimensional object orientation (Chapter 4) 
Having established that photographs of real oriented objects could influence a range of 
responses, including foot responses (Chapter 3), experimentation now sought to establish 
what specific visual properties of an object's orientation might be (in part) responsible for 
such effects. Three reaction-time experiments (Experiments 4.1-4.3) were reported that 
examined the relationship between spatial responses and perhaps the most basic element of 
orientation, namely the angle of the X-Y axis. Objective 2 was therefore as follows: 
Objective 2: To test for orientation-action compatibility effects associated with diagonal 
two-dimensional lines, thus exploring the possibility that a specific visual attribute might 
afford left-right actions; namely the angle of an object's X-Y axis. Using these simple 
stimuli, different left-right response types are used in order to test whether any 
compatibility cfTccts are specific to hands, or \ iaMc for a range of aclior 
In Experiment 4.1 line location as well as X-Y line orientation were varied. Both were 
task-irrelevant properties since responses were based on the colour of the line. While line 
location produced a straightforward Simon Effect for both hand and foot key presses, X-Y 
line orientation did not facilitate performance (regardless of the type of response effector). 
In focussing on X-Y line orientation and hand key presses, efforts were made in the next 
two experiments (Experiments 4.2 and 4.3) to uncover an effect of X-Y line orientation on 
compatible responses. Such an effect was not forthcoming, despite making the colour 
distinction upon which responses were based harder (demanding that more attention was 
paid to the stimulus), and despite the use of different SOAs (which ensured further control 
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over stimulus viewing times). It was concluded that the X-Y dimension of an oriented 2D 
line did not present itself as a visual attribute that afforded elements of an action (e.g. 
spatial hand or foot selection/initiation). 
Recommendations 
Although the potential influence of 2D line orientation was 
not pursued further in the experimental work, it is possible 
that orientation in the X-Z plane (which proved to be the 
crucial plane for action when using 3D oriented cylinders) 
Figure 7.2 A 2D line onented 
might similarly benefit compatible responses, even when rightwards in the X-Z plane 
using 2D lines. Thus an experiment that used colour 
classification criteria for making responses might be performed using a 2D line that 
appeared (thanks to its background) to be oriented in the X-Z plane (see Figure 7.2). 
Finding that such a stimulus did evoke faster and more accurate compatible responses 
would have serious implications for the 'attention-directing hypothesis', since there is no 
visually or functionally salient area of the line. 
7.1.5 Three-dimensional object orientation (Chapter 5) 
Having found no orientation-action compatibility effects with 2D lines that were oriented 
in the X-Y plane (Chapter 4), experimentation turned to 3D stimuli. In continuing to ask 
what visual properties of an object's orientation might afford components of an action, 
three further reaction-time experiments (Experiments 5.1-5.3) were reported that used a 3D 
version of the diagonal line, namely an oriented cylinder. In orienting this cylinder in 3D 
space, the relative influence of all three planes on responses could be examined. Objective 
3 was therefore as follows: 
Objective 3: To test for orientation-action compatibility effects associated with 
computer-generated three-dimensional cylinders that are oriented in three-dimensional 
space, thus exploring the possibility that a specific visual attribute (i.e. the angle of an 
object's primary axis within a particular three-dimensional plane) might afford left-right 
actions. Using these stimuli, different left-right response types are used in order to test 
w hether any compatibility ctTects are specific to hands, or viable for a range of actions. 
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As spatial responses were made to the surface pattern of a cylinder, cylinder orientation 
was task-irrelevant. In all three experiments the only plane that produced a 'pure' 
orientation-action compatibility effect was the X-Z plane. This occurred for spatial hand 
key presses, spatial power grips and spatial foot key presses. This finding supported the 
idea of visuomotor primitives common to a range of actions. In this instance, it was 
suggested that these visuomotor primitives were activated automatically upon encoding the 
visual attribute of X-Z cylinder orientation. However, there was a slight trend that 
suggested this effect was largest for spatial power grips and smallest for spatial foot key 
presses. This was discussed in terms of spreading activation in a distributed perception-
action network and in terms of TEC's 'feature-weighting principle' whereby the different 
effect sizes observed possibly reflected different activation strengths o f the same feature 
codes. Consistent with all these ideas was the possibility that a physical and intentional 
preparedness to perform a certain action (i.e. an action with a left-right spatial dimension) 
had 'set up' attention to select those visual properties of an object that were relevant to that 
partially prepared action (i.e. the leftward-rightward X-Z cylinder orientation). 
Recommendations 
In opting for the most ecologically realistic portrayal of an oriented 3 D cylinder, the 
visually salient area at the cylinder's leading edge was accepted as a fact about real objects 
that theoretically at least, presented itself as an unfortunate confound. Consequently all 
data relating to the X-Z orientation of a cylinder was open to an altemative attention-
directing hypothesis. There is scope however to isolate various properties of this visual 
saliency, and incrementally remove them^^. By incrementally removing these properties, 
the essence of the cylinder would hopeftilly remain (whereas to remove them all at once, 
this essence would surely be lost). 
^ Having said this, it is likely that the combination of these 'confounding' features actually describes an 
object*s orientation in 3D space and consequently helps describe significance for action. That attention is 
directed towards them is presumably an important part of an affordance mechanism, so to remove these 
features in the name of experimental control somewhat misses the point! 
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So, as was suggested earlier (see footnote 44, p. 183), one could a) artificially manipulate 
lighting conditions such that each end of the cylinder had the same illumination values, b) 
artificially shrink the radius of the leading edge of the cylinder such that each end had the 
same visual radius, c) superimpose a disc on the farthest end of the cylinder such that each 
end of the cylinder had a visible leading edge, and d) artificially shift the cylinder slightly 
up or down and left or right to remove signs of spatial protraction and retraction. It is 
possible that removing one of these features would remove the influence o f X-Z cylinder 
orientation on compatible responses. 
7.1.6 Perception-action couplings and task context (Chapter 6) 
Having demonstrated that the X-Z plane was the crucial dimension from which cylinder 
orientation exerted its influence on spatial responses (Chapter 5), investigations turned to 
task context. Could the apparently 'default' relationship between the visual attribute of 
orientation in the X-Z plane and elements of a left-or-right action (that was observed 
independently of any object function, and independently of any intention to actually 
interact with the cylinder), be changed or added to in some way by manipulating the task 
context? The impetus behind this question came from a theoretical px^sition that supposed 
action-oriented representations are not fixed and prescribed, but are loosely constrained 
mechanisms that are adaptable to the context o f new perception-action couplings. 
Objective 4 was therefore as follows: 
Objective 4: To develop Objective 3 further by exploring how the orientation-action 
compatibility effects established in Chapter 5 m i ^ t be modulated by various task 
manipulations that include stimulus onset asynchrony, apparent motion and participation 
in an ongoing dynamic acti\ i i \ 
In Experiment 6.1 the same cylinders from Chapter 5 were used, but the time-to-response 
was manipulated by introducing different SOAs (0, 400 and 800 ms). Again, because 
spatial responses were based on surface pattern, cylinder orientation was task-irrelevant. In 
addition to the now familiar effect of X-Z cylinder orientation, it appeared that under the 
longest delays of 800 ms, responses were faster when they were compatible with a 
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cylinder's X-Y orientation. It was speculated that given time (thanks to the delay), the 
visuomotor system had 'sought out' new visual features that could be relevant to action. 
In Experiment 6.2 the same cylinders were presented in an animation sequence such that 
they appeared to be moving directly towards the viewer. Again, because spatial responses 
were based on surface pattern, cylinder orientation was task-irrelevant. This apparent 
motion had the dramatic effect of wiping out the influence that X-Z cylinder orientation 
had previously and consistently been shown to have on compatible spatial responses. It 
was suggested that the 'default' affordance associated with X-Z cylinder orientation had 
been eradicated or overridden in response to a newfound pressure to withdraw away from 
the visually looming stimulus. 
In Experiment 6.3, similarly oriented cylmders featured as a component in a lever-like 
device. Spatial responses categorised the movement of the lever according to the length of 
a previously shown line. On its own the orientation of the cylinder component was task 
irrelevant. However, it was relevant to the task in its relation with the bar, since an 
understanding of the simple mechanics of each lever configuration was necessary for 
determining how it should move. The results showed three particularly interesting effects. 
Firstly there was an interaction between Y-Z cylinder orientation and bar position. 
Responses were faster for those levers that would require an upward reach trajectory (were 
one to physically reach toward the lever). This appeared to be an elaboration of a main 
effect of Y-Z cylinder orientation from two previous experiments, perhaps reflecting the 
elaboration of a less reliable 'default' affordance. Secondly, in interacting with X-Z bar 
position, there was a reversal of the previously established compatibility effect between X-
Z cylinder orientation and spatial response. This was interpreted as the modulation of a 
'default' affordance. Thirdly there was an interaction between mapping rule, X-Z bar 
position, Y-Z cylinder orientation and spatial response. This interaction appeared to reflect 
a graded sensitivity to lever movement difficulties, were one to physically move the lever. 
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It was argued that this reflected action simulation or motor imagery that was sensitive to 
biomechanical constraints. 
Recommendations 
In relation to Experiment 6.1, the onset o f new compatibility effects (in particular the 
interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and response) could be investigated further 
by varying SOA's in a more thorough and systematic manner. 
In relation to Experiment 6.2, the idea that withdrawal or release responses were afforded 
needs testing. Participants could make left and right power grip releases, rather than 
squeezes; or key-press releases (rather than presses). Alternatively, the animation sequence 
could be played in reverse, such that the cylinder appeared to move away from the viewer, 
thus taking away the possible influence of visual looming. 
In relation to Experiment 6.3, there are a number of foilow-up studies that may be 
revealing. Firstly, the elaboration and modification o f 'defaults' deserves some attention. 
The data that applied to these possibly changed 'defaults' related to initial lever 
configurations (it was collapsed across mapping rule conditions, and consequently across 
upward and downward lever movements). As the important factor was the initial lever 
configuration, these changed 'defaults' should be present when visual feedback is 
removed. While removing feedback addresses the robustness of these changed defaults, it 
would also ask an important question with regards to those effects that did include 
mapping rule. Was the visual feedback of an event necessary for the appearance of these 
effects? Thus the lever experiment could be replicated with the single change of removing 
visual feedback of lever movements. 
Secondly, in asking whether visual feedback of an event was necessary, one might also ask 
to what extent the whole activity of moving levers was necessary for producing such a 
range of interesting data. Clearly the high-order interaction that appeared to reflect the use 
o f biomechanically sensitive motor imagery was dependent on having to move a lever 
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upwards or downwards. Nevertheless, with respect to the other results, it would be 
interesting to see how many remained when the activity aspect of the task was removed. 
Thus responses could quite simply categorise the surface pattern of the cylinder component 
of the lever. In this way, orientation and the simple mechanics of the lever would be 
completely task irrelevant. 
Finally, while the high-order interaction irrefutably produced clearly graded effect sizes, its 
interpretation (that implicated the biomechanical difficulty of actually moving these levers) 
could be strengthened by some qualification. Thus in much the same way as the Johnson 
(2000a) studies reported earlier, it would be helpful to have participants rate the difficulty 
of moving the different levers. One such study might involve rating the physical difficulty/ 
awkwardness, were one to produce the lever movements displayed on the screen (the time 
taken to rate each movement could also be measured). Another might involve rating the 
physical difficulty of making real movements of a scaled up working model of the lever 
(indeed these actual movements could be timed also, and various other measurements 
might be taken that established the degrees of freedom and forces involved). It might be 
predicted that these measures would support the interpretation of biomechanical 
sensitivity, such that those lever movements rated as most difficult or awkward 
corresponded to those lever movements in Experiment 6.3 that took the longest time to 
respond to (and similarly for easy movements and short RTs). 
General recommendations 
Investigating visuomotor processes such as affordance-based mechanisms is no longer a 
marginalized line of inquiry, hi recent years recognition that perception and action are 
intimately linked processes has ensured that an embodied perspective has become almost 
mainstream in cognitive science. This embodied perspective will doubtless spurn many 
different research initiatives, and theories will develop and be rejected, hideed, very recently 
a hypothesis has been proposed that questions the now-orthodox dichotomy of the two visual 
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systems. Glover (2003) proposes instead that there is a dichotomy between planning and the 
on-line control of actions, each of which has a separate visual representation. Whether this 
hypothesis stands or falls, it has important implications for afifordance-based research. Do 
afTordances operate solely in an action-planning domain, or can they influence action control 
also? With this in mind, it is clear that i f the control o f actions is to be investigated, binary 
response measures wil l not be adequate. More suitable measures might use data gloves and 
other virtual reality equipment that would allow visual events, actions and sequences of 
actions to unfold over time. 
7.2 Implications for the 'attention-directing hypothesis' 
It was noted in the previous chapter (see p. 155, footnote 23) that although it was a 
perfectly symmetrical object centred in 3D space, the oriented cylinder used in 
Experiments 5.1-6.2 nevertheless had a slightly protracting visually salient circular area at 
its leading edge (where the cylinder ended). Unavoidably then, the data pertaining to the 
X-Z plane that was interpreted as reflecting a 'default' affordance for left-right action 
properties, could equally be interpreted as reflecting the influence of a directing of 
attention towards this salient area. It has already been argued in Chapter 1 that the directing 
of attention is but one (albeit important) link in a perception-action loop, and therefore 
should not hold an explanative monopoly. 
Nevertheless, a challenge to the 'attention-directing hypothesis' (e.g. Anderson et al. 2002) 
would arise i f the trend of an orientation-action compatibility effect (e.g. that could be 
attributed to the directing of attention towards a visually salient area) were to actually be 
reversed in accordance with a new affordance for action (e.g. as promoted by a behavioural 
task that gave the same cylinder a new significance for action). In such a case, the visually 
salient area could not be responsible for the changed compatibility effect. The following 
points outline some challenges to the attention-directing hypothesis that have arisen from 
the current work. 
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1. In Experiment 6.3, result [6 .3 .9^] revealed a change of compatibility that reflected 
a new affordance for action despite an unchanged area of visual salience. In 
interacting with X-Z bar position, there was a reversal of the previously established 
compatibility effect between X-Z cylinder orientation and spatial response^*. 
2. The intricate pattern present in result [6.3.1 O y ] broke down into meaningful 
components only with respect to the difficulty of lever movements (were one to 
actually make them). Such a complex pattern (that was nevertheless wholly 
interpretable from an action perspective) does not lend itself whatsoever to a 
simplistic directing of attention account (i.e. neither the visually salient area or the 
fiinctionally salient area of the cylinder component can explain the graded pattem 
of these results). 
3. In Experiment 6.1, the appearance of a new compatibility effect between X-Y 
cylinder orientation and hand of response came from those cylinders that were 
oriented leftwards or rightwards in the X-Y plane. Firstly it wi l l be noted that the 
cylinder had no functional connotations. Secondly, it wil l be noted that the two 
cylinders from which leftwards X-Y orientation was derived (cylinders 2 & 3) had 
a visually salient area on the left (cylinder 3) or on the right (cylinder 2). Similarly, 
the two cylinders from which rightwards X-Y orientation was derived (cylinders 1 
& 4) had a visually salient area on the left (cylinder 1) or on the right (cylinder 4). 
Such an interaction between X-Y cylinder orientation and hand of response should 
not have occurred under an attention-directing account, because the visually salient 
areas were effectively lost when collapsing the data. Furthermore, there was no 
functionally salient area. 
In conclusion, it appears to be the case that several of the effects found in Chapter 6 might 
challenge the action-neutral 'attention-directing hypothesis'. 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
The work of this thesis has tested and developed a hypothesis of visual representation that 
implicates the motor system (the APH). The experimental work has contributed to this 
hypothesis by demonstrating that micro-affordances are loosely constrained mechanisms. 
^' Actually, the attention-directing hypothesis would probably argue that rather than visual saliency, there is 
now functional saliency. However points 2 and 3 are not open to a visual or functional saliency argument. 
309 
Chapter 7 - Summary 
This finding supports the range of embodied theories and approaches that have been 
described as the 'middle way'. What is meant by Moosely constrained' is this: micro-
affordances can be described as both specific (a) and general (b). They can be described as 
representational default settings that remain more-or-less stable (c). However, when 
intentions, goals or behavioural contexts change, these default settings can change (d). 
This claim can be qualified as follows: 
a) Micro-affordances can be specific 
i . Visual attribute specificity: Of the dimensional planes that an object can 
be oriented in, only one specific isolated plane consistently afforded 
lefl-right components of an action (the X-Z plane). In keeping with this 
specificity, the X-Y orientation of 2D lines did not influence responses, 
and during standard tasks nor did the X-Y orientation of 3D cylinders. 
i i . Action specificity: When motor imagery appeared to have been used, a 
remarkably specific pattem of interaction was revealed in the RT data 
that suggested sensitivity to biomechanical constraints. 
b) Micro-affordances can be general 
i . Visual attribute generality: Although specific to the X-Z plane, this 
orientation's underlying visual attribute was general enough to be 
gleaned from a variety of quite different objects (kitchen and garage 
objects, cylinders, levers). 
i i . Action generality: When default jiffordances were observed they 
influenced left-right components o f actions in a general manner. Hence, 
left-right responses that were facilitated by X-Z object orientation 
(photographs of real objects and graphically rendered ones) included 
foot key presses, hand key presses and power grip responses, 
c) Micro-affordances resemble more-or-less stable defaults: When there was no 
intention to interact with an object, the affordance associated with orientation in the 
X-Z plane resembled a more-or-less stable default. Its effect on responses was 
consistent and reliable, even when time-to-response was manipulated. 
d) These defixults are not fixed or prescribed but adaptable: However, when the 
behavioural or task context changed significantly, then new affordances were 
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evoked and default ones were modified, elaborated, eradicated or overridden. For 
example, a delayed time-to-response allowed the visuomotor system to 'seek out' 
possibilities in the X-Y plane; apparent motion eradicated the default X-Z 
affordance, perhaps overriding it with an affordance to withdraw or release; and 
engaging in a dynamic activity with a lever (in which there was an intention to 
(virtually) interact with the object) elaborated a possible default associated with the 
Y-Z plane, modified a default affordance associated with the X-Z plane, and 
introduced a new and complex affordance that implicated a sensitivity to 
biomechanical constraints. 
The proposed mechanism of micro-affbrdance is a clear case of an action-oriented 
representation. The beauty of action-oriented representations is that the hard computational 
work is taken out of the initial stages of action planning. Motor programs are not 
developed from scratch, but instead are automatically partially programmed or soft 
assembled. In being partially programmed or sof^ assembled, these elemental motor 
programs are not fixed or prescribed; but are instead loosely constrained and therefore 
eminently adaptable. It would make little sense for autonomous agents like us to have a 
partial motor program that could not be modified, elaborated, overridden or rejected. I f this 
were the case we would be totally stimulus-driven agents. 
The same visuomotor code that is implicated in processing a particular visual feature of an 
object is also a partially programmed code for action. No translation is necessary from 
perception to action (or vice-versa), and as such various motor components are 
automatically activated on viewing an object. Similarly, i f proposed accounts o f these so-
called 'common codes' or 'visuomotor primitives' are correct, then it makes no difference 
which came first- the stimulus or the response. Thus the same visuomolor code implicated 
in processing an intention to grasp with a particular hand is also a partially programmed 
code for a visual feature of an object. This idea does ftill justice to the workings of a 
perception-action loop. Perceiving and acting are dynamically intertwined aspects of a 
single process: perceiving-acting. 
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8.1 Appendix 1 (ANOVA tables) 
Table 8.1 Experiment 3.1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean connect responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
loc 1765.078 1 1765.078 2.018 0.166 
loc*MR 50.710 1 50.710 0.058 0.811 
error(loc) 24489.856 28 874.638 
ori 9529.632 1 9529.632 11.675 0.002 
ori*MR 3.999 1 3.999 0.005 0.945 
error(ori) 22854.275 28 816.224 
res 1586.410 1 1586.410 0.334 0.568 
res*MR 2631.450 1 2631.450 0.553 0.463 
error(res) 133152.409 28 4755.443 
!oc* ori 1010.815 1 1010.815 2.0O4 0.168 
loc* ori*MR 94.150 1 94.150 0.187 0.669 
erTor(loc*ori) 14123.420 28 504.408 
loc*res 35797.280 1 35797.280 29.497 0.000 
loc*res*MR 200.568 1 200.568 0.165 0.687 
error(loc*res) 33980.803 28 1213.600 
ori*res 3380.102 1 3380.102 4.060 0.054 
ori*res*MR 2409.074 1 2409.074 2.893 0.100 
erTor(ori*res) 23313.916 28 832.640 
loc* ori*res 1977.889 1 1977.889 2.116 0.157 
!oc*ori*res*MR 865.640 1 865.640 0.926 0.344 
erTor<loc*ori*res) 26168.695 28 934.596 
Intercept 131148568.460 1 131148568.460 1281.595 0.000 
MR 2801.530 1 2801.530 0.027 0.870 
error 2865303.743 28 102332.277 
Table 8.2 Experiment 3.1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorrect 
responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
loc 0.022 1 0.022 0.006 0.940 
!oc*MR 43.582 1 43.582 11.562 0.002 
error(loc) 105.544 28 3.769 
ori 6.220 1 6.220 0.732 0,400 
ori* MR 13.451 1 13.451 1.583 0.219 
error(ori) 237.948 28 8.498 
res 0.194 1 0.194 0.010 0.922 
res*MR 155.497 1 155.497 7.935 0.009 
error(res) 548.726 28 19.597 
loc*ori 3.637 1 3.637 0.806 0.377 
loc*ori*MR 3.637 I 3.637 0.806 0.377 
erTX)r(loc*ori) 126.377 28 4.513 
loc*res 246.406 1 246.406 20.351 0.000 
loc*res*MR 0.194 1 0.194 0.016 0.900 
error(loc*res) 339.015 28 12.108 
ori*res 1.055 1 1.055 0.115 0.737 
ori*res*MR 2.604 1 2.604 0.284 0.598 
erroKori*res) 256.543 28 9.162 
loc*ori*res 1.055 1 1.055 0.227 0.637 
loc*ori*res*MR 0.194 1 0.194 0.042 0.840 
error(loc*ori*res) 129.821 28 4.636 
Intercept 2245.373 1 2245.373 80.519 0.000 
MR 36.179 1 36.179 1.297 0.264 
error 780.820 28 27.886 
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Table 8.3 Experiment 3.1 (A by M): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean con-ect 
responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
loc 618.473 1 618.473 .584 .449 
loc*MR 1656.997 1 1656.997 1.565 .218 
error(Ioc) 44481.903 42 1059.093 
ori 3724.798 1 3724.798 6.511 .014 
ori*MR 569.755 1 569.755 .996 .324 
error(ori) 24028.290 42 572.102 
res 255.121 1 255.121 .194 ,662 
res* MR 20733.191 1 20733.191 15.799 .000 
error(res) 55117.063 42 1312.311 55117.063 42 
loc*ori 1872.904 1 1872.904 2.019 .163 
loc*ori*MR 1205.008 1 1205.008 1.299 .261 
erTor(loc*ori) 38956.799 42 927.543 
loc*res 44806.132 1 44806.132 60.580 .000 
loc*res*MR 4.911 1 4.911 .007 .935 
error(Ioc*res) 31064.089 42 739.621935 
ori* res 3129.662 1 3129.662 4.732 .035 
ori*res*MR 1027.149 1 1027.149 1.553 .220 
error(ori*res) 27776.392 42 661.3431.553 
Ioc*ori*res 1333.822 1 1333.822 1.573 .217 
loc*ori*res*MR 112.508 1 112.508 .133 .717 
error(loc*ori*res) 35607.602 42 847.80033 
Intercept 188809963.286 1 188809963.286 11350.900 .000 
MR 684.680 1 684.680 .041 .840 
error 698624.649 42 16633.920 
Table 8.4 Experinnent 3.1 (A by M): Repeated measures 
responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
loc 3.I57E-02 1 3.I57E-02 .005 .944 
loc*MR .284 1 .284 .046 .832 
error(loc) 262.184 42 6.242 
ori 9.122 1 9.122 1.212 .277 
ori*MR 3.819 1 3.819 .507 .480 
error(ori) 316.225 42 7.529 
res .284 1 .284 .029 .866 
res*MR 53.062 1 53.062 5.374 .025 
error(res) 414.710 42 9.8745.374 
loc*ori 5.335 1 5.335 1.028 .316 
loc*ori*MR .284 1 .284 .055 .816 
erTOr(loc*ori) 217.992 42 5.190 
loc* res 361.395 1 361.395 25.136 .000 
loc*res*MR 63.920 1 63.920 4.446 .041 
error(Ioc*res) 603.851 42 14.377 
ori*res 1.547 1 1.547 .147 .703 
ori*res*MR 19.729 1 19.729 1.878 .178 
error(ori*res) 441.225 42 10.505 
loc*ori*res 1.547 1 1.547 .103 .749 
loc*ori*res*MR 5.335 1 5.335 .357 .553 
eTTor(loc*ori*res) 627.841 42 14.949 
Intercept 3293.213 1 3293.213 33.900 .000 
MR 228.062 1 228.062 2.348 .133 
error 4080.114 42 97.146 
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Table 8.5 Experiment 3.1 x Experiment 1 of Symes 1999 (A by P) Repeated measures 
ANOVA for mean correct responses 
Source SS DF MS 
loc 
loc'expt 
1567 753 
392842 
loc'MR 1 162 1 1 162 002 963 
loc'expt'MR 124 298 1 124 298 228 635 
error(loc) 30533 070 56 545 233 
on 8329 500 1 8329 500 16 876 000 
ori'expt 2189 229 1 2189 229 4 435 040 
on'MR 121 646 1 121 646 246 622 
on'expfMR 67 260 1 67 260 136 713 
error(ori) 27640 444 56 493 579 
res 1262 435 1 1262435 472 495 
res"expt 432.516 1 432 516 162 689 
res-MR 2233 703 1 2233 703 835 365 
res'expt'MR 639 270 1 639270 239 627 
error(res) 149866 864 56 2676 194 
loc'Ofi 3244072 1 3244 072 8843 004 
loc'ori'expt 143861 1 143 861 392 534 
loc'ori'MR 3 488 1 3488 010 923 
loc'on'expfMR 243048 1 243.048 663 419 
error(loc'on) 20544.189 56 366 861 
loc*res 38576036 1 38576 036 45 124 000 
k)C*res*expt 5064 282 1 5064 282 5 924 018 
k>c'res*MR 70 426 1 70 426 082 775 
loc'res'expfMR 807 720 1 807 720 945 335 
erTt)f(k>c'res) 47874 341 56 854 899 
ori'res 4041.557 1 4041.557 7794 007 
ori'res'expt 347 719 1 347.719 671 .416 
ori'res'MR 1137 629 1 1137 629 2 194 144 
ori*res*expt*MR 1273 357 1 1273.357 2456 123 
error(on'res) 29037 582 56 518 528 
loc'ori'res 104 776 1 104 776 169 683 
loc*ori*res*expt 2772966 1 2772966 4473 039 
loc'ori'res'MR 223696 1 223 696 361 550 
loc*on*res"expt'MR 710.339 1 710.339 1 146 289 
error(loc*ori*res) 34712 912 56 619 873 
Intercept 222347827 522 1 222347827 522 3609612 000 
expt 1649318 253 1 1649318253 26 775 000 
MR 2296438 1 2296 438 037 848 
expfMR 15073 639 1 15073 639 245 623 
error 3449533 648 56 61598815 
Table 8.6 Expenment 4 1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for 
Source SS DF MS F P 
eff 461781 238 1 461781 238 87 082 OOOO 
efPMRi 21673 938 1 21673938 4 087 0 053 
efrmap2 300 575 1 300575 0057 0814 
efrMR1*MR2 2218 500 1 2218500 0418 0 523 
error(eff) 148479 301 28 5302 832 
loc 10263 600 2 5131 800 21 728 0000 
loc*MR1 304 473 2 152236 0645 0 529 
loc'MR2 466 381 2 233 191 0 987 0379 
loc*MRrMR2 245642 2 122821 0 520 0 597 
error(loc) 13226 456 56 236 187 
x-y on 120 492 1 120 492 0 593 0448 
x-y on*MR1 237 897 1 237.897 1 171 0288 
x-y on*MR2 234 879 1 234 879 1 156 0291 
x-y on-MR1'MR2 50 287 1 50287 0248 0623 
erroitx-y ori) 5688 784 28 203 171 
res 2323 805 1 2323805 2635 0 116 
res'MRl 4627 773 1 4627 773 5 248 003O 
res'MR2 18 976 1 18 976 0 022 0884 
res'MRl •MR2 530 338 1 530 338 0 601 0 445 
error(res) 24691 441 28 881 837 
ef f loc 632214 2 316 107 1 221 0303 
efrioc-MRl 1199 984 2 599992 2 318 0 108 
efrioc*MR2 219979 2 109.989 0 425 0 656 
efnoc'MR1*MR2 443 945 2 221 973 0 858 043O 
error(efrioc) 14494 866 56 258 837 
efTx-y ori 5 845 1 5 845 0 029 0867 
1567 753 
392 842 
2 875 
721 
095 
400 
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Repeated measures ANOVA for mean correct responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
e f f x-y ori*MRl 87.750 1 87.750 0.429 0.518 
eff"x-y ori"MR2 20.073 1 20.073 0.098 0.757 
efTx-y or i*MRrMR2 1434.563 1 1434.563 7.007 0.013 
erroiteffx-y ori) 5732.905 28 204.747 
loc*x-y ori 253.899 2 126.949 0.664 0.519 
loc*x-y ori'MRI 1250.408 2 625.204 3.272 0.045 
loc*x-y ori*MR2 172.748 2 86.374 0.452 0.639 
loc'x-y ori'MRI *MR2 744.067 2 372.034 1.947 0.152 
error(loc'x-y ori) 10699.955 56 191.071 
efPIoc'x-y ori 181.225 2 90.613 0.406 0.668 
efPloc'x-y ori*MR1 350.431 2 175.215 0.785 0.461 
efnoc*x-y ori'MR2 167.317 2 83.658 0.375 0.689 
effioc"x-y ori'MR1*MR2 704.384 2 352.192 1.578 0.215 
erTor{eff'loc"x-y ori) 12500.535 56 223.224 
efPres 2404.510 1 2404.510 2.344 0.137 
efrresTWRI 47.442 1 47.442 0.046 0.831 
efrres*MR2 952.746 1 952.746 0.929 0.343 
efPres*MR1*MR2 121.986 1 121.986 0.119 0.733 
erTor(efPres) 28717.627 28 1025.630 
loc'res 103297.694 2 51648.847 106.070 0.000 
(oc'res'MRI 354.490 2 177.245 0.364 0.697 
loc*res"MR2 420.556 2 210.278 0.432 0.651 
loc'res*MR1*MR2 283.636 2 141.818 0.291 0.748 
error(loc*res) 27268.068 56 486.930 
efTIoc'res 14056.558 2 7028.279 22.863 0.000 
efnoc*res*MR1 89.324 2 44.662 0.145 0.865 
efrioc*res*MR2 1248.165 2 624.083 2.030 0.141 
efnoc*res*MR1'MR2 180.687 2 90.344 0.294 0.747 
eiTor(eff*loc*res) 17214.72873 56 307.4058702 
x-y ori'res 468.281 1 468.281 2.004 0.168 
x-y ori*res*MR1 299.126 1 299.126 1.280 0.267 
x-y ori*res'MR2 53.288 1 53.288 0.228 0.637 
x-y ori*res'MR1"MR2 13.005 1 13.005 0.056 0.815 
erTor(x-y ori'res) 6543.113 28 233.683 
efTx-y ori'res 52.847 1 52.847 0.309 0.583 
eff*x-y ori'res*MR1 260.983 1 260.983 1.527 0.227 
effx-y ori'res'MR2 130.763 1 130.763 0.765 0.389 
efTx-y ori-resTWRI 'MR2 627.022 1 627.022 3.668 0.066 
enx)r(efPx-y ori'res) 4786.522 28 170.947 
loc*x-y ori'res 642.339 2 321.169 1.810 0.173 
loc'x-y ori'res'MRI 280.038 2 140.019 0.789 0.459 
loc'x-y ori'res'MR2 923.768 2 461.884 2.603 0.083 
loc'x-y ori'res'MRI •MR2 27.608 2 13.804 0.078 0.925 
erTOr(loc'x-y ori'res) 9935.047 56 177.412 
eff*loc*x-y ori'res 34.007 2 17.004 0.127 0.881 
efPloc'x-y ori'res'MRI 475.786 2 237.893 1.779 0.178 
efHoc'x-y ori'res*MR2 0.964 2 0.482 0.004 0.996 
effloc'x-y 
ori'res'MRI "MR2 125.260 2 62.630 0.468 0.628 
eTTor<efrioc*x-y ori'res) 7489.241 56 133.736 
intercept 168109565.046 1 168109565.046 2203.0760.000 
MR1 1197.951 1 1197.951 0.016 0.901 
MR2 72340.682 1 72340.682 0.948 0.339 
MR1'MR2 32594.024 1 32594.024 0.427 0.519 
error 2136588.645 28 76306.737 
Table 8.7 Experiment 4.1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorrect 
responses 
Source S S D F MS F P 
eff 256.724 1 256.724 15.613 .000 
efTMRI 4.431 1 4.431 .269 .608 
e frMR2 10.277 1 10.277 .625 .436 
e frMR1'MR2 .162 1 .162 .010 .922 
error(eff) 460.395 28 16.443 
loc 84.124 2 42.062 5.929 .005 
l o C M R I 13.491 2 6.745 .951 .393 
loc*MR2 3.077 2 1.539 .217 .806 
toc"MR1*MR2 12.671 2 6.335 .893 .415 
en^r<loc) 397.300 56 7.095 
x-y ori 24.669 1 24.669 3.474 .073 
x-y ori'MRI 6.298 1 6.298 .887 .354 
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Table 8.7 Experiment 4.1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorrect 
responses (continued) 
Source SS DF MS F P 
x-y ori*MR2 4 045 1 4 045 570 .457 
x-y on-MR1*MR2 1 321 1 1 321 186 670 
error(x-y on) 198 831 28 7 101 
res 6253 1 6253 428 518 
res'MRI 14230 1 14 230 974 332 
re8*MR2 5 111 1 5.111 350 559 
res-MRrMR2 6 508 1 6 508 446 510 
error(res) 409 005 28 14607 
efTkx: 19785 2 9893 1 625 206 
effloc'MRI 6 153 2 3077 505 606 
efrioc'MR2 21 642 2 10 821 1 778 178 
efrioc'MRrMR2 335 2 168 028 973 
erTor(effloc) 340 865 56 6087 
eff'x-y on 1 247E-02 1 1.247E-02 001 970 
eff*x-y on'MRI 14481 1 14481 1 649 210 
efTx-y orrMR2 3 347 1 3347 381 542 
efTx-y ori*MR1*MR2 5259 1 5259 599 445 
enorteffx-y ori) 245 899 28 8 782 
loc*x-y ori 60 946 2 30 473 4 339 018 
loc'x-y ori*MR1 22 991 2 11 496 1 637 204 
loc*x-y on*MR2 2489 2 1 245 177 838 
loc*x-y ori*MRrMR2 17446 2 8 723 1 242 297 
ent>r(k)c*x-y ori) 393314 be 7023 
efrtoc*x-y ori 12 283 2 6 142 810 450 
effloc'x-y on*MR1 11.516 2 5758 760 473 
efrioc*x-y ori*MR2 1 173 2 587 077 926 
effloc'x-y ori*MRrMR2 9 831E-02 2 4.915E-02 006 994 
erTor(efrioc'x-y ori) 424.502 56 7 580 
efTres 6 505E-02 1 6 505E-02 .007 936 
efTres'MRl 16.558 1 16558 1 677 206 
efrres'MR2 709 1 709 072 791 
efrres*MRrMR2 26 235 1 26 235 2657 114 
enor(efrres) 276 448 28 9873 
loc'res 839973 2 419 986 27 492 000 
loc'res'MRI 3 116 2 1.558 102 903 
loc*res*MR2 22 618 2 11 309 740 482 
loc"res'MR1*MR2 15 060 2 7 530 493 613 
enor(loc'res) 855 479 56 15276 
effloc'res 11 908 2 5.954 788 460 
efrioc'res'MRI 20 780 2 10390 1 376 261 
eff k>c*res*MR2 29 363 2 14.681 1 944 153 
efrk>c*res*MRl *MR2 36 660 2 18.330 2427 098 
en-or(efnoc*res) 422 872 56 7 551 
x-y on'res 3 813E-02 1 3 813E-02 004 951 
x-y ori'res*MR1 31 283 1 31 283 3 174 086 
x-y ori*res*MR2 1 227 1 1 227 125 727 
x-y on'res'MRrMR2 10 388 1 10 388 1 054 313 
error(x-y ori'res) 275930 28 9 855 
efTx-y ori'res 1 097 1 1 097 099 755 
etTx-y ori*res*MR1 361 1 361 033 858 
efTx-y on*res*MR2 7 643E-03 1 7.643E-03 001 979 
efTx-y onVes'MRrMR2 23 828 1 23 828 2 158 153 
enor(efrx-y ori'res) 309 226 28 11.044 
loc'x-y on'res 7 169 2 3 584 385 682 
loc*x-y ori'res'MRI 83 768 2 41 884 4 501 015 
loc'x-y orTres*MR2 9 434 2 4 717 507 605 
loc'x-y on*res'MR1*MR2 24031 2 12015 1 291 283 
error(loc*x-y ori'res) 521 075 56 9 305 
effloc'x-y ori'res 928 2 464 059 943 
effloc'x-y on*res*MR1 15.674 2 7 837 989 378 
effloc'x-y ori'res*MR2 19916 2 9958 1 256 293 
efrioc*x-y ori-res'MRI •MR2 23 020 2 11 510 1 452 243 
en-or(efrioc*x-y ori'res) 443 915 56 7927' 
intercept 4547 935 1 4547 935 57 969 ooo 
MR1 180 486 1 180 486 2 301 .141 
MR2 159 513 1 159 513 2 033 165 
MRrMR2 19.217 1 19217 245 625 
enor 2196 730 28 78 455 
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Table 8.8 Experiment 4.2 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean correct responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
Delay 295.796 1 295.796 1.721 ,206 
De!ay*MR 509.832 1 509.832 2.966 .102 
Error (Delay) 3093.630 18 171.868 
x-y on 121.562 1 121.562 1.318 .266 
x-y ori*MR 19.754 1 19.754 .214 .649 
Error (x-y on) 1660.668 18 92.259 
Response 2639.574 1 2639.574 2.115 .163 
Response* MR 92.759 1 92.759 .074 .788 
Error (Response) 22468.553 18 1248.253 
Delay*x-y ori 69.731 1 69.731 .472 .501 
Delay*x-y ori*MR 69.085 1 69.085 .467 .503 
Error (Delay*x-y ori) 2661.528 18 147.863 
Delay*Response 58.868 1 58.868 .223 .643 
De lay * Response * M R 3653.466 1 3653.466 13.820 .002 
Error(Delay*Response) 4758.571 18 264.365 
x-y ori*Response 1104.386 1 1104.386 2.547 .128 
x-y ori*Response*MR 3.698 I 3.698 .009 .927 
Error<x-y ori*Response) 7805.766 18 433.654 
Delay*x-y ori'Response 39.644 1 39.644 .441 .515 
Delay*x-y ori*Response*MR 30.774 1 30.774 .342 .566 
ErTor^Delay*x-y ori*Response) 1618.944 18 89.941 
Intercept 29403530.923 1 29403530.923 1939.000 .000 
MR 2538.259 1 2538.259 0.167 .687 
Error 272956.907 18 15164.273 
Table 8.9 Experiment 4.2 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean inc 
responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
Delay 57.600 57.600 5.589 .030 
Delay*MR 4.900 4.900 .475 .499 
Error (Delay) 185.500 18 10.306 
x-y ori 3.600 3.600 .557 .465 
x-y ori*MR 8.100 8.100 1.254 .278 
Error (x-y ori) 116.300 18 6.461254 
Response 4.900 4.900 .462 .506 
Response*MR .000 .000 .000 l.OOO 
Error (Response) 191.100 18 10.617 
Delay*x-y ori .400 .400 .050 .825 
Delay*x-y ori*MR 22.500 22.500 2.830 .110 
Error (Delay*x-y ori) 143.100 18 7.950 
Delay* Response 16.900 16.900 1.314 .267 
Delay* Response*M R 1.600 1.600 .124 .728 
ErTOf(Delay*Response) 231.500 18 12.861 
x-y ori*Response 
x-y ori*Response*MR 
36.100 36.100 2.950 .103 
1.600 1.600 .131 .722 
Error(x-y ori*Response) 220.300 18 12.239 
Delay*x-y ori*Response 2.500 2.500 .479 .498 
Delay*x-y ori*Response*MR 3.600 3.600 .690 .417 
Error(Delay*x-y ori*Response) 93.900 18 5.217 
Intercept 2016.400 2016.400 56.579 .000 
MR 260.100 260.100 7.298 .015 
Error 641.500 18 35.639 
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Table 8.10 Experiment 4.3 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean correct 
responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
Delay 33743.494 2 16871.747 19.070 .00 
Error (Delay) 24771.838 28 884.70 
x-y ori 143.813 1 143.813 .667 .42 
Error (x-y ori) 3017.949 14 215.56 
Response 4419.354 1 4419.354 3.847 .07 
Error (Response) 16081.581 14 1148.68 
Delay*x-y ori 366.834 2 183.417 1.184 .32 
Error (Delay*x-y ori) 4336.027 28 154.85 
Delay*Response 3004.534 2 1502.267 8.896 .00 
Error(De lay * Response) 4728.475 28 168.87 
x-y ori*Response 142.646 1 142.646 .522 .48 
Error(x-y ori*Response) 3822.206 14 273.01 
Delay*x-y ori*Response 459.644 2 229.822 1.112 .34 
Error(Delay*x-y ori*Response) 5786.914 28 206.67 
Intercept 36084589.734 I 36084589.734 1374.327 .00 
Error 367586.736 14 26256.19 
Table 8.11 Experiment 4.3 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for 
responses 
Source SS DF MS F P 
Delay 36.419 2 18.210 4.157 .02 
Error (Delay) 122.656 28 4.38 
x-y ori 3.293 I 3.293 1.188 .29 
Error (x-y ori) 38.825 14 2.77 
Response 43.510 1 43.510 4.717 .04 
Error (Response) 129.140 14 9.22 
Delay*x-y ori 2.463 2 1.231 ^52 .77 
Error (Delay*x-y ori) 136.782 28 4.88 
Delay*Response 36.663 2 18.331 3.341 .05 
Error( Delay* Response) 153.608 28 5.48 
x-y ori*Response 2.376E-0 1 2.376E-0 0.004 0.948 
Error(x-y ori* Response) 75.663 14 5.40 
Delay*x-y ori*Response 2.670 2 1.335 .284 .75 
Error(Delay*x-y ori*Response) 131.486 28 4.69 
Intercept 752.789 1 752.789 25.089 .00 
Error 420.058 14 30.00 
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Table 8.12 Experiment 5.1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean correct 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 63.483 1 63.483 .250 .623 
x-y*MR [y-z*x-z*MR] 647.952 1 647.952 2.547 .128 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)] 4578.444 18 254.358 
x-z [ x-y*y-z] 30.440 I 30.440 .152 .701 
x-z*MR(x-y*y-z*MR] 192.294 1 192.294 .961 .340 
erTor(x-z) [ error(x-y*y-z)] 3601.218 18 200.068 
resp 594.107 1 594.107 1.546 .230 
resp*MR 3349.076 1 3349.076 8.717 .009 
error(resp) 6915.214 18 384.179 
y-z [ x-y*x-zj 27.391 1 27.391 .218 .646 
y-z*MR [ x-y*x-z*MRJ 7.221 1 7.221 .058 .813 
error(y-z) (erTOr(x-y*x-z)] 2259.932 18 125.552 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z*resp] 128.788 I 128.788 1.016 .327 
x-y*resp*MR [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 1.736 1 1.736 .014 .908 
erTor(x-y*resp) [ erTor(y-z*x-z*resp)] 2282.393 18 126.800 
x-z*resp (x-y*y-z'resp] 3122.726 1 3122.726 17.535 .001 
x-z*resp*MR (x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 276.572 1 276.572 1.553 .229 
error(x-z*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 3205.544 18 178.086 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-z*resp] 224.027 1 224.027 1.764 .201 
y-zVesp*MR (x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 3.799 1 3.799 .030 .865 
error(y-z*resp) [ error(x-y*x-z*resp)] 2286.411 18 127.023 
intercept 36145914.948 I 36145914.948 3209.226 .000 
MR 27121.802 1 27121.802 2.408 .138 
error 202736.248 18 11263.125 
Table 8.13 Experiment 5.1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorrect 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y (y-z*x-z] 11.901 1 11.901 .605 .447 
x-y*MR [ y-z*x-z*MR] 6.694 1 6.694 .340 .567 
error(x-y) [ erTor(y-z*x-z)] 354.132 18 19.674 
x-z I x-y*y-z] .331 1 .331 .027 .870 
x-z*MR (x-y*y-z*MR] 10.000 1 10.000 .830 .374 
error(x-z) [ error(x-y*y-z)] 216.942 18 12.052 
resp 182.562 1 182.562 8.380 .010 
resp'MR 47.603 1 47.603 2.185 .157 
error(resp) 392.149 18 21.786 
y-z [ x-y*x-z] 2.066 1 2.066 .223 .643 
y-z*MR [x-y*x-z*MR] 5.289 1 5.289 .570 .460 
error(y-z) [ erTor(x-y*x-z)] 167.025 18 9.279 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z*resp] 55.868 1 55.868 3.934 .063 
x-y*resp*MR [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 10.000 1 10.000 .704 .412 
error(x-y*resp) [ error(y-z*x-z*resp)] 255.620 18 14.201 
x-z*resp [ x-y*y-z*resp] 145.785 1 145.785 6.511 .020 
x-z*resp*MR [ x-y*y-z*'"esp*MR] 13.967 1 13.967 .624 .440 
error(x-z*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 403.058 18 22.392 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-z*resp] 2.066 1 2.066 .081 .779 
y-z*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z*r8sp*MR] 1.322 1 1.322 .052 .822 
error(y-z*resp) [ error(x-y*x-z*resp)] 456.942 18 25.386 
intercept 9274.793 1 9274.793 735.902 .000 
MR 8.264 1 8.264 .656 .429 
error 226.860 18 12.603 
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Repeated nneasures ANOVA for mean correct 
Source S S DF MS F - P 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 3.679 1 3.679 .042 .840 
x-y*MR t y-z*x-z*MR] 9.853 1 9.853 .112 .741 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)l 1577.041 18 87.61 
x-z [ x-y*y-z] 261.825 1 261.825 2.580 .126 
x-z*MR [ x-y*y-z*MR] 438.873 1 438.873 4.325 .052 
error(x-z) [ error(x-y*y-z)l 1826.490 18 101.472 
resp 233.121 1 233.121 .369 .551 
resp'MR 183.047 1 183.047 .290 .597 
error(resp) 11356.508 18 630.917 
y-z [ x-y*x-z] 15.324 1 15.324 .115 .739 
y-z*MR (x-y*x-z*MR] 11.761 1 11.761 .088 .770 
error(y-z) [ error(x-y*x-2)] 2406.099 18 133.672 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z*resp] 101.045 1 101.045 .483 .496 
x-y*resp*MR (y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 6.617 1 6.617 .032 .861 
error(x-y*resp) [ erTor(y-z*x-z*resp)] 3765.369 18 209.187 
x-z*resp [ x-y*y-z*resp] 6938.937 1 6938.937 45.509 .000 
x-z*resp*MR [ x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 122.849 1 122.849 .806 .381 
error(x-z*resp) [ erTDr(x-y*y-z*resp)l 2744.519 18 152.473 
y-z*resp (x-y*x-2*resp] 13.314 1 13.314 .106 .748 
y-z*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 393.618 1 393.618 3.144 .093 
error(y-2*resp) (error(x-y*x-z*resp)l 2253.236 18 125.180 
intercept 38451864.632 1 38451864.632 2834.423 .000 
MR 3764.275 1 3764.275 .277 .605 
error 244188.521 18 13566.029 
Table 8.15 Experiment 5.2 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for nr 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 57.600 1 57.600 13.042 .002 
x-y*MR [ y-z*x-z*MR) .900 1 .900 .204 .657 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)] 79.500 18 4.417 
x-z [ x-y*y-z] 12.100 1 12.100 1.419 .249 
x-z*MR(x-y*y-z*MR] 48.400 1 48.400 5.676 .028 
error(x-z) [ error(x-y*y-z)) 153.500 18 8.528 
resp 67.600 1 67.600 5.646 .029 
resp*MR 16.900 1 16.900 1.412 .250 
error(resp) 215.500 18 11.972 
y-2 [ x-y*x-zl 2.500 1 2.500 .251 .622 
y-z*MR(x-y*x-z*MR] 14.400 1 14.400 1.447 .245 
error(y-z) [ error(x-y*x-z)] 179.100 18 9.950 
x-y*resp (y-z*x-z*respj 40.000 1 40.000 3.057 .097 
x-y*resp*MR [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 22.500 1 22.500 1.720 .206 
erTor(x-y*resp) [ error(y-z*x-z*resp)J 235.500 18 13.083 
x-z*resp (x-y*y-2*resp) 96.100 1 96.100 8.995 .008 
x-z*resp*MR [ x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 57.600 1 57.600 5J92 .032 
error(x-z*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)l 192.300 18 10.683 
y-2*resp (x-y*x-2*resp] 8.100 1 8.100 .548 .469 
y-z*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 10.000 1 10.000 .677 .421 
error(y-z*resp) [ error(x-y*x-2*resp)] 265.900 18 14.772 
intercept 4928.400 1 4928.400 219.854 .000 
MR 44.100 1 44.100 1.967 .178 
error 403.500 18 22.417 
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Table 8.16 Experiment 5.1*5.2 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean con-ect 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y [ y-2*x-z] 18.299 1 18.299 .107 .745 
x-y'MR [y-z*x-2*MRl 408.803 I 408.803 2.391 .131 
x-y*expl [ y-z*x-z*expt] 48.862 1 48.862 .286 .596 
x-y*MR*expt [ y-z*x-z*MR*expt] 249.002 1 249.002 1.456 .235 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)] 6155.485 36 170.986 
x-z [ x-y*y-z] 56.858 1 56.858 .377 .543 
x-2*MR (x-y*y-z*MR] 606.087 1 606.087 4.02O .053 
x-z*expt [ x-y*y-z*expt) 235.408 1 235.408 1.56! .220 
x-z*MR*expt [ x-y*y-z*MR*expt] 25.079 1 25.079 .166 .686 
error(x-z) (error(x-y*y-z)l 5427.707 36 150.770 
resp 41.460 1 41.460 .082 .777 
resp'MR 2549.031 1 2549.031 5.022 .031 
resp*expt 785.768 1 785.768 1.548 .221 
resp'MR'expt 983.093 1 983.093 1.937 .173 
error(resp) 18271.723 36 507.548 
y-z [ x-y*x-z] 41.844 1 41.844 .323 .573 
y-z*MR [x-y*x-z*MR] 18.706 1 18.706 .144 .706 
y-z*expt (x-y*x-z*expt] .870 1 .870 .007 .935 
y-z*MR*expt [ x-y*x-z*MR*expt] .275 1 .275 .002 .963 
error(y-z) [ erTor(x-y*x-z)] 4666.031 36 129.612 
x-y*resp (y-z*x-2*resp] 228.993 1 228.993 1.363 .251 
x-y*resp*MR (y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 7.566 1 7.566 .045 .833 
x-y*resp*expt [ y-z*x-z*resp*expt] .840 1 .840 .005 .944 
x-y*resp*MR*expt [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR*expt) .787 1 .787 .005 .946 
error(x-y*resp) [ error(y-z*x-z*resp)) 6047.761 36 167.993 
x-z*resp [ x-y*y-z*resp] 9685.765 1 9685.765 58.602 .000 
x-z*resp*MR [ x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 384.037 1 384.037 2.324 .136 
x-z*resp*expt [ x-y*y-z*resp*expt] 375.899 1 375.899 2.274 .140 
x-z*resp*MR*expt [ x-y*y-z*resp*MR*expt] 15.383 1 15.383 .093 .762 
error(x-z*resp) (error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 5950.062 36 165.280 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-z*resp] 173.285 1 173.285 1,374 .249 
y-z*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 160.040 1 160.040 1.269 .267 
y-z*resp*expt [ x-y*x-z*resp*expt] 64.056 1 64.056 .508 .481 
y-z*resp*MR*expt [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR*expt] 237.376 1 237.376 1.882 .179 
erTor(y-z*resp) [ error(x-y*x-z*resp)] 4539.647 36 126.101 
intercept 74579955.072 1 74579955.072 6007.450 .000 
MR 5338.885 1 5338.885 .430 .516 
expt 17824.508 1 17824.508 1.436 .239 
MR'expt 25547.193 1 25547.193 2.058 .160 
error 446924.769 36 12414.577 
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Table 8.17 Experiment 5.1*5.2 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorrect 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 8.569 1 8.569 .711 .405 
x-y*MR (y-2*x-2*MR] 6.252 1 6.252 .519 .476 
x-y*expt [ y-z*x-2*expt] 60.932 1 60.932 5.059 .031 
x-y*MR*expt (y-z*x-z*MR*expt] 1.343 1 1.343 .111 .740 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)] 433.632 36 12.045 
x-z [ x-y*y-z] 8.215 1 8.215 .798 .378 
x-z*MR [ x-y*y-z*MR] 7.200 1 7.200 .700 .408 
x-2*expt [ x-y*y-z*expt] 4.215 1 4.215 .410 .526 
x-z*MR*expt (x-y*y-2*MR*expt] 51.200 1 51.200 4.976 .032 
error(x-z) (error(x-y*y-z)l 370.442 36 10.290 
resp 236.172 1 236.172 13.992 .001 
resp*MR 3.888 1 3.888 .230 .634 
resp*expt 13.990 1 13.990 .829 .369 
resp*MR*expt 60.615 1 60.615 3.591 .066 
error(resp) 607.649 36 16.879 
y-z [ x-y*x-zl 4.556 1 4.556 .474 .496 
y-z*MR [ x-y*^-z*MR) 1.117 1 1.117 .116 .735 
y-z*expt (x-y*x-z*expt) I.033E-02 1 1.033E-02 .001 .974 
y-z*MR*expt [ x-y*x-z*MR*exptl 18.572 1 18.572 1.932 .173 
error(y-2) [ error(x-y*x-z)] 346.125 36 9.615 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z*resp] 95.207 1 95.207 6.979 .012 
x-y*resp*MR [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 1.250 I 1.250 .092 .764 
x-y*resp*expt (y-z*x-z*resp*expt] .661 1 .661 .048 .827 
x-y*resp*MR*expt [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR*expt) 31.250 1 31.250 2.291 .139 
error(x-y*resp) (error(y-z*x-z*resp)] 491.120 36 13.642 
x-z*resp [ x-y*y-z*respl 239.306 1 239.306 14.470 .001 
x-z*resp*MR [ x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 7.420 1 7.420 .449 .507 
x-z*resp*expt [ x-y*y-z*resp*expt] 2.579 1 2.579 .156 .695 
x-z*resp*MR*expt [ x-y*y-z*»"esp*MR*expt] 64.147 1 64.147 3.879 .057 
erTor(x-z*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 595.358 36 16.538 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-z*resp] 9.174 1 9.174 .457 .503 
y-z*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 9.298 1 9.298 .463 .501 
y-z*resp*expt [ x-y*x-z*resp*expt] .992 1 .992 .049 .825 
y-z*resp*MR*expt [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR*expt] 2.025 1 2.025 .101 .753 
error(y-z*resp) (eiTor(x-y*x-z*resp)] 722.842 36 20.079 
intercept 13862.506 1 13862.506 791.691 .000 
MR 7.091 1 7.091 .405 .529 
expt 340.688 1 340.688 19.457 .000 
MR*expt 45.273 1 45.273 2.586 .117 
error 630.360 36 17.510 
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Table 8.18 Experiment 5.3 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean correct 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
eff 203558.649 I 203558.649 63.274 .000 
efPMRI 1405.160 1 1405.160 .437 .518 
efrMR2 34119.072 1 34119.072 10.606 .005 
eff*MR1'MR2 2608.763 I 2608.763 .811 .381 
erTor(eff) 51473.380 16 3217.086 
x-y [ y-2*x-zl 90.169 1 90.169 .535 .475 
x-y"MR1 [y-z'x-z*MR1J 58.480 1 58.480 .347 .564 
x-y'MR2 [ y-z"x-z"MR2] 79.641 1 79.641 .473 .501 
x-y'MR1-MR2 ( y-z"x-z-MRnVIR2] 36.048 1 36.048 .214 .650 
error<x-y) [ erroity-z'x-z)! 2694.143 16 168.384 
x-z [ x-y*y-zl 1434.325 1 1434.325 5.651 .030 
x-z*MR1 tx-y-y-z-MRIl 239.546 1 239.546 .944 .346 
x-z"MR2 [ x-y*y-zTyiR21 1.113 1 1.113 .004 .948 
x-z'MRrMR2 [ x-y'y-z'MR1*MR2] 1.543 1 1.543 .006 .939 
error(x-z) [ errortx-y"y-z)l 4061.285 16 253.830 
resp 5603.351 1 5603.351 5.296 .035 
resp'MRI 1636.280 1 1636.280 1.546 .232 
resp'MR2 1725.966 1 1725.966 1.631 .220 
resp"MR1"MR2 1380.072 1 1380.072 1.304 .270 
error(resp) 16929.079 16 1058.067 
efPx-y [ efPy-z'x-z] 5.651 1 5.651 .025 .876 
efPx-y*MR1 (e f fy -z 'x -z 'MRI ] 183.583 1 183.583 .820 .379 
efrx-y"MR2 [ efry-z*x-z"MR2J 178.736 1 178.736 .798 .385 
efrx-y'MR1*MR2 (efry-z*x-z'MRrMR2] 24.299 1 24.299 .108 .746 
erroKefPx-y) [erTor{eff^-z*x-z)I 3583.997 16 224.000 
efPx-z [ e f f x-y'y-zl 233.566 1 233.566 .543 .472 
efPx-z*MR1 [efrx-y*y-z*MR1l 647.934 1 647.934 1.505 .238 
efrx-z*MR2 [ e fPx-y>z 'MR2) 110.973 I 110.973 .258 .619 
efrx-z*MR1'MR2 [ e f fx -yy-z*MR1'MR2l 227.139 1 227.139 .528 .478 
error(eff*x-z) [ error(efrx-y*y-z)] 6887.463 16 430.466 
y-z Ix-y*x-z) 816.831 1 816.831 4.928 .041 
y-z"MR1 [x-y*x-z*MR11 330.776 1 330.776 1.996 .177 
y-z*MR2 [x-y*x-z*MR2i 318.061 1 318.061 1.919 .185 
y-z'MRrMR2 [x-y*x-z"MR1"MR2l 10.749 1 10.749 .065 .802 
error(x-z) [error(x-y*x-z)J 2651.974 16 165.748 
efTy-z [ efr^-y*x-z] 54.410 1 54.410 .326 .576 
efTy-z'MRI (efPx-y*x-z'MR1] 103.788 I 103.788 .622 .442 
efry-z*MR2 (efrx-y'x-z*MR2i 139.632 I 139.632 .837 .374 
efry-z*MRrMR2 I efrx-y*x-z*MRrMR2) 4.242 1 4.242 .025 .875 
errorteffy-z) (errorteff^c-y*x-z)J 2667.891 16 166.743 
efPresp 6572.105 1 6572.105 12.324 .003 
efrresp*MR1 329.240 1 329.240 .617 .443 
efPresp'MR2 89.287 1 89.287 .167 .688 
efPresp*MR1'MR2 192.179 1 192.179 .360 .557 
error(eff*resp) 8532.386 16 533.274 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z'respl 23.316 1 23.316 .057 .815 
x-y*resp"MR1 [ y-z*x-z'resp*MR1l 159.656 1 159.656 .388 .542 
x-y*resp*MR2 [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR21 56.651 1 56.651 .138 .715 
x-y*resp'MRrMR2 [ y-z 'x-z ' resp'MRI 'MRZ] 47.704 1 47.704 .116 .738 
erTOr(x-y*resp) [ error(y-z*x-z"resp)l 6582.797 16 411.425 
efTx-y'resp I eff*y-z*x-z*respl 88.213 1 88.213 .449 .512 
efrx-y*resp*MR1 [ efry-z*x-z*resp-MR11 1883.444 I 1883.444 9.596 .007 
efPx-yTesp'MR2 (efry-z*x-2'resp'MR21 .298 1 .298 .002 .969 
efrx-y*resp*MR1*MR2 [ efry-2*x-zTesp'MR1*MR2J 895.421 1 895.421 4.562 .048 
error(efF^-y*resp) [ error(eff*y-z'x-z*resp)J 3140.538 16 196.284 
x-z'resp [ x-y*y-z*respl 8818.808 1 8818.808 36.011 .000 
x-z'resp'MRI [ x-y*y-z'resp'MR1) 97.800 1 97.800 .399 .536 
x-z*resp'MR2 [ x-y*y-z'resp'MR2] 253.677 1 253.677 1.036 .324 
x-2*resp*MR1*MR2 [ x-y*y-z*resp'MRrMR2] 5.022 1 5.022 .021 .888 
error(x-z*resp) [efror(x-yVz*resp)l 3918.231 16 244.889 
ef f x-z'resp [ e f rx -y*y-z ' r^p] 413.228 1 413.228 1.438 .248 
effx-zTespTVIRI [ efPx-yy-2Tesp*MR1] 843.887 1 843.887 2.936 .106 
efrx-z*resp*MR2 [ efrx-y>z*resp*MR21 4.584 1 4.584 .016 .901 
eff^-z"resp'MR1^MR2 (eff^-y>z*resp*MR1'MR2] 127.496 I 127.496 .444 .515 
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Source S S DF MS F P 
error(efrx-z*resp) [error<efPx-y*y-2*resp)) 4598.189 16 287.387 
y-z*resp [ x-y'X-z'resp] 748.702 1 748.702 2.526 .132 
y-z*resp*MR1 [ x-y*x-z'resp'MR1l 10.068 1 10.068 .034 .856 
y-z'resp*MR2 (x-y'x-z*resp*MR2j 20.711 1 20.711 .070 .795 
y-zTesp'MR1*MR2 [ x-yx-2Tesp*MR1*MR2) 67.209 1 67.209 .227 .640 
erTDr<y-z'resp) [ erTor<x-y*x-z'resp)] 4741.791 16 296.362 
eff*y-z*resp [ efrx-y*x-z*respl 154.174 1 154.174 .821 .378 
efry-z*resp*MR1 (efTx-y'x-z 'resp'MRI] 236.515 1 236.515 1.260 .278 
eff'y-z*resp*MR2 (efrx-y'x-z*resp*MR2] 755.519 1 755.519 4.024 .062 
efry-zTesp-MR1*MR21 efPx-y^-zTesp*MR1'MR2l 573.484 1 573.484 3.054 .100 
error(eff^-z*resp) [error(efPx-y*x-z*rBsp)l 3004.401 16 187.775 
Intercept 81945961.020 1 81945961.020 2452.655 .000 
MR1 42630.773 I 42630.773 1.276 .275 
MR2 45594.533 1 45594.533 1.365 .260 
MRrMR2 1196.327 1 1196.327 .036 .852 
error 534577.982 16 33411.124 
Table 8.19 Experiment 5.3 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorre 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
eff 2.778 1 2.778 .251 .624 
efTMRI .255 1 .255 .023 .881 
efPMR2 20.570 1 20.570 1.855 .192 
efrMR1*MR2 .892 1 .892 .080 .780 
errorteff) 177.388 16 11.087 
x-y {y-z*x-z] .419 1 .419 .022 .883 
x-y*WIR1 (y-z*x-z*MR1] 7.710 1 7.710 .409 .532 
x-y"MR2 (y-z*x-z*MR2I .555 1 .555 .029 .866 
x-yMR1*MR2 [ y-z*x-z*MRn«R2] 1.306 1 1.306 .069 .796 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)] 301.910 16 18.869 
x-z [ x-y*y-z] .340 1 .340 .017 .898 
x-2*MRl [x-y*y-z'MR1] 33.190 1 33.190 1.652 .217 
x-z'MRa [ x-y*y-z*MR2] 19.567 1 19.567 .974 .338 
x-z"MR1*MR2 [ x-y*y-z*MR1*MR2] 2.524 1 2.524 .126 .728 
error(x-z) [ error(x-y*y-2)} 321.393 16 20.087 
resp 222.384 1 222.384 10.117 .006 
resp*MR1 34.862 I 34.862 1.586 .226 
resp*MR2 42.713 i 42.713 1.943 .182 
re3p*MR1'MR2 27.586 1 27.586 1.255 .279 
error(resp) 351.687 16 21.980 
efPx-y (efF*y-z*x-zl .635 1 .635 .023 .881 
efTx-yTWlRI [ efry-z*x-z*MR11 10.961 1 10.961 .401 .536 
efrx-y*MR2 [ efry-z*x-z*MR2) 11.902 1 11.902 .435 .519 
efrx-y*MRl*MR2 [ eff'y-z*x-z*MR1*MR2) 1.503 1 1.503 .055 .818 
error(eff*x-y) [error(effy-z*x-z)] 437.519 16 27.345 
efPx-z [ efPx-y*y-zl .233 1 .233 .028 .868 
efrx-z*MR1 [efrx-y>z*MR1] .845 1 .845 .103 .753 
efrx-z'MR2 [ efrx-y'y-z*MR21 3.732 1 3.732 .454 .510 
e r x - z * M R 1 * M R 2 (e f rx -y^-z 'MR1-MR2) 4.621 1 4.621 .562 .464 
erTor(efPx-z) (error<efrx-y*y-z)] 131.658 16 8.229 
y-z [x-y'x-z] 50.411 1 50.411 5.972 .027 
y-z*MR1 (x-y*x-zTyiR1] 9.934 I 9.934 1.177 .294 
y-z'MR2 [x-yx-z*MR2] 5.264 1 5.264 .624 .441 
y-z*MR1*MR2 [x-y*x-z*MRl-MR21 40.508 1 40.508 4.799 .044 
error^x-z) [errortx-y'x-z)! 135.063 16 8.441 
efPy-z [ efTx-y'x-z] .699 1 .699 .047 .832 
efPy-z*MR1 (efnc-y'x-z'MRI] 9.892 1 9.892 .659 .429 
efry-z-MR2 [ efrx-y*x-z*MR2) 3.299 I 3.299 .220 .645 
efPy-z*MRnvIR2 ( e f f x-y*x-z-MR1*MR21 .322 1 .322 .021 .885 
error(efry-z) (error<eff*x-y*x-z)J 240.015 16 15.001 
e f f resp 44.535 1 44.535 2.558 .129 
effresp*MR1 23.706 I 23.706 1.362 .260 
ef fresp"MR2 10.101 1 10.101 .580 .457 
ef fresp*MR1*MR2 5.917 1 5.917 .340 .568 
error(effresp) 278.535 16 17.408 
x-y*resp I y-z*x-z*respl 11.893 11.893 1.043 .322 
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Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorrect 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y*resp'MRl [ y-z*x-z*resp'MR1] 12.595 1 12.595 1.105 .309 
x-y*resp*MR2 [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR21 1.490 1 1.490 .131 .722 
x-y*resp"MRrMR2 [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR1'MR2l 1.009 I 1.009 .088 .770 
errortx-y'resp) [ error(y-z'x-z*resp)l 182.412 16 11.401 
efTx-y'resp [ efry-z*x-z'resp] 2.253 1 2.253 .161 .693 
efrx-y'resp*MR1 [ efTy-z 'x-z ' resp'MRI] 41.577 I 41.577 2.975 .104 
efPx-y*resp'MR2 [ effV-2'x-zTesp'MR2] 3.185 1 3.185 .228 .640 
efrx-y*resp1ViRrMR2 [ efry-z*x-z"resp*MR1*MR2] 7.956 1 7.956 .569 .462 
error(efrx-y*resp) (error(eff^-z*x-z"resp)] 223.605 16 13.975 
x-z*resp (x-y*y-z*respl 300.835 1 300.835 14.632 .001 
x-z'resp*MR1 [ x -y>z * resp 'MRl ] .530 1 .530 .026 .874 
x-z*resp*MR2 I x-y>z*resp'MR2i 18.774 1 18.774 .913 .353 
x-zTesp*MR1*MR2 [ x - y > z T e s p " M R r M R 2 ] 1.530 I 1.530 .074 .788 
error(x-z"resp) (erTor(x-y*y-z*resp)l 328.956 16 20.560 
ef f x-z*resp (ef fx-y 'y-z ' respl 120.230 1 120.230 8.771 .009 
efPx-z*resp*MR1 [ eff"x-y>z"resp*MR11 1.558 1 1.558 .114 .740 
efPx-z*resp*MR2 [ eff*x-y*y-z*resp*MR2i 10.895 1 10.895 .795 .386 
efrx-z*resp'MR1"MR2 [ efPx-y>z*resp'MR1*MR2] 90.719 1 90.719 6.618 .020 
error(eff"x-z*resp) [erTor(efrx-y'y-z*resp)] 219.321 16 13.708 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-z*respl 14.757 1 14.757 .534 .475 
y-z*resp*MR1 [ x-y*x-z*resp*MRlJ 5.504 1 5.504 .199 .661 
y-z*resp"MR2 [ x-y"x-z'resp'MR2J 21.944 1 21.944 .794 .386 
y-z*resp"MRrMR2 [ x-y*x-zTesp*MR1'MR21 57.605 I 57.605 2.085 .168 
errotty-z'resp) [ error(x-y*x-z*resp)l 441.996 16 27.625 
efTy-z'resp [ efTx-y'x-z'respl 32.450 1 32.450 3.668 .074 
efry-z*resp'MR1 [ efrx-y*x-z*resp'MR1l 25.567 I 25.567 2.890 .108 
eff'y-z*resp'MR2 [ e f f x-y*x-zTe3p*MR2] 8.352 1 8.352 .944 .346 
e f r y - z T e s p ' M R r M R 2 [ eff'x-y*x-zTesp*MR1*MR2] 33.501 I 33.501 3.787 .069 
eiTor(efPy-z*resp) {eiTor(eff"x-y*x-z*resp)] 141.553 16 8.847 
Intercept 11208.611 1 11208.611 95.793 .000 
MR1 307.495 1 307.495 2.628 .125 
MR2 3.796 1 3.796 .032 .859 
M R r M R 2 60.097 1 60.097 .514 .484 
error 1872.146 16 117.009 
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Table 8.20 Experiment 6.1 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean c o n ^ 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
delay 251507.442 2 125753.721 101.585 .000 
delay*MR 15351.940 2 7675.970 6.201 .005 
error(delay) 44565.054 36 1237.918 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 1044.791 1 1044.791 4.747 .043 
x-y*MR [y-z*x-2*MR] 4.126E-05 1 4.126E-05 .000 1.000 
en-orCx-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)] 3961.989 18 220.110 
x-z [ x-y*y-z) 180.239 1 180.239 .863 .365 
x-z*MR [ x-y*y-z*MR] .813 1 .813 .004 .951 
error(x-z) [ error(x-yVz)] 3757.809 18 208.767 
resp 964.534 1 964.534 .588 .453 
resp*MR 1.363 1 1.363 .001 .977 
error(resp) 29539.855 18 1641.103 
delay*x-y (delay*y-2*x-2) 493.618 2 246.809 .673 .516 
deIay*x-y*MR [ delay>z*x-z*MR) 165.411 2 82.706 .226 .799 
erTOr(deIay*x-y) [error(delay^-z*x-z)] 13193.852 36 366.496 
delay*x-2 [ delay*x-y*y-2) 939.308 2 469.654 1.531 .230 
delay*x-z*MR [ delay*x-y*y-z*MR] 57.466 2 28.733 .094 .911 
error(deIay*x-z) [error(delay*x-y*y-z)] 11047.020 36 306.862 
y-z [ x-y*x-z] 514.531 1 514.531 3.157 .092 
y-2*MR [ x-y*x-2*MR) 82.394 1 82.394 .506 .486 
error(y-z) [ erTor(x-y*x-z)] 2933.509 18 162.973 
delay*y-z (delay*x-y*x-z] 155.173 2 77.587 .371 .693 
delay*y-z*MR [ delay*x-y*x-z*MR] 682,766 2 341.383 1.632 .210 
error(delay*y-z) [ error(delay*x-y*x-z)) 7530.655 36 209.185 
delay'resp 187.665 2 93.832 .248 .782 
delay*resp*MR 2326.181 2 1163.090 3.071 .059 
error(delay*resp) 13634.578 36 378.738 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z*resp] 1637.430 1 1637.430 6.990 .017 
x-y*resp*MR [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 679.658 1 679.658 2.901 .106 
error(x-y*resp) [ error(y-z*x-z*resp)] 4216.615 18 234.256 
de!ay*x-y*resp [ delay*y-2*x-z*resp] 1681.144 2 840.572 3.005 .062 
delay*x-y*resp*MR [ delay*y-z*x-z*resp*MR) 949.412 2 474.706 1.697 .198 
error(delay*x-y*resp) [ error(delay*y-z*x-z*resp)] 10069.019 36 279.695 
x-z*resp [ x-y*y-z*resp) 7388.927 1 7388.927 52.785 .000 
x-2*resp*MR [ x-y*y-2*resp*MR) 17.260 1 17.260 .123 .730 
error(x-z*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 2519.669 18 139.982 
delay*x-z*resp [delay*x-y*y-z*resp] 178.378 2 89.189 .363 .698 
delay*x-2*resp*MR [delay*x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 1175.783 2 587.892 2.395 .106 
en^or(delay*x-2*resp) [ error(delay*x-y*y-2*resp)] 8837.325 36 245.481 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-z*resp) 25.734 1 25.734 .120 .733 
y-z*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z'resp*MR] 81.042 1 81.042 .379 .546 
error(y-z*resp) [ error(x-y*x-2*resp)] 3851.548 18 213.975 
delay*y-2*resp [ delay*x-y*x-z*resp] 53.319 2 26.659 .106 .899 
delay*y-z*resp*MR [ delay*x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 1383.019 2 691.509 2.761 .077 
error(delay* y-z*resp) [ error(delay*x-y*x-z*resp)] 9015.308 36 250.425 
intercept 115645303.9241 115645303.9241678.955 .000 
MR 6756.878 1 6756.878 .098 .758 
error 1239828.170 18 68879.343 
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Repeated measures ANOVA for mean incorrect 
Source S S DF MS F P 
delay 20.867 2 10.433 .491 .616 
delay*MR 12.200 2 6.100 .287 .752 
error(delay) 764.267 36 21.230 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 3.333E-02 1 3.333E-02 .001 .970 
x-y*MR [y-z*x-z*MR] .833 1 .833 .037 .849 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-2)] 402.467 18 22.359 
x-2 (x-y*y-z] 32.033 1 32.033 2.567 .127 
x-z*MR(x-yVz*MR] 56.033 1 56.033 4.491 .048 
error(x-z) [ error(x-y*y-z)] 224.600 18 12.478 
resp 149.633 1 149.633 5.415 .032 
resp'MR 177.633 1 177.633 6.428 .021 
error(resp) 497.400 18 27.633 
delay*x-y [ delay*y-z*x-z] 82.067 2 41.033 2.234 .122 
deIay*x-y*MR [ delay*y-z*x-z*MR] 3.267 2 1.633 .089 .915 
error(delay*x-y) [error(delay*y-z*x-z)] 661.333 36 18.370 
delay*x-z (delay*x-y*y-z] 5.267 2 2.633 .101 .904 
delay*x-z*MR [ delay*x-y*y-z*MR] 10.467 2 5.233 .200 .820 
error(delay*x-z) (error(delay*x-y*y-z)) 941.600 36 26.156 
y-z [ x-y*x-z] 12.033 1 12.033 .840 .372 
y-z'MR [ x-y*x-z*MR] 2.700 1 2.700 .188 .669 
error(y-z) [ error(x-y*x-z)] 257.933 18 14.330 
delay*y-z [ delay*x-y*x-z] 11.267 2 5.633 .422 .659 
delay*y-2*MR [ delay*x-y*x-z*MRI 9.800 2 4.900 .367 .695 
erTor(delay*y-z) I error(delay*x-y*x-z)] 480.267 36 13.341 
delay*resp 14.867 2 7.433 .436 .650 
delay*resp*MR 48.067 2 24.033 1.408 .258 
error(delay*resp) 614.400 36 17.067 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z*resp] 14.700 1 14.700 1.159 .296 
x-y*resp*MR [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 24.300 1 24.300 1.916 .183 
error(x-y*resp) (error(y-z*x-z*resp)] 228.333 18 12.685 
delay*x-y*resp (delay*y-z*x-z*resp] 111.800 2 55.900 2.829 .072 
delay*x-y*resp*MR (deIay*y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 43.400 2 21.700 1.098 .344 
erTor(deIay*x-y*resp) [ error(delay*y-z*x-z*resp)] 711.467 36 19.763 
x-z*resp [ x-y*y-z*resp] 168.033 1 168.033 5.115 .036 
x-z*resp*MR [ x-yVz*resp*MR] 4.033 1 4.033 .123 .730 
error(x-z*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 591.267 18 32.848 
delay*x-z*resp [delay*x-y*y-z*resp] 16.067 2 8.033 .655 .525 
delay*x-z*resp*MR (delay*x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 1.267 2 .633 .052 .950 
error(deIay*x-z*resp) [ erTor(delay*x-y*y-z*resp)] 441.333 36 12.259 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-z*resp] 14.700 1 14.700 .761 .395 
y-z*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 40.833 1 40.833 2.113 .163 
error(y-z*resp) [ error(x-y*x-z*resp)] 347.800 18 19.322 
delay*y-z*resp [ delay*x-y*x-z*resp] 225.800 2 112.900 5.331 .009 
delay*y-z*resp*MR [ delay*x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 22.467 2 11.233 .530 .593 
error(deIay* y-z*resp) [ erTor(delay*x-y*x-z*resp)] 762.400 36 21.178 
intercept 7905.633 1 7905.633 51.808 .000 
MR 36.300 1 36.300 .238 .632 
error 2746.733 18 152.596 
329 
Chapter 8 - Appendices 
Table 8.22 Experiment 6.2 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean correct 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 218.498 1 218.498 1.022 .325 
x-y*MR [ y-z*x-z*MR] 3.438E-05 I 3.438E-05 .000 1.000 
error(x-y) [ erTor(y-z'x-z)] 3846.582 18 213.699 
x-2 [ x-y*y-2] 39.810 1 39.810 .114 .740 
x-z*MR(x-y*y-z*MR] 183.946 1 183.946 .527 .477 
error(x-z) [ error(x-y*v-z)] 6284.753 18 349.153 
resp 29551.125 1 29551.125 33.266 .000 
resp*MR 33.255 1 33,255 .037 .849 
erTor(resp) 15989.882 18 888.327 
y-z (x-y*x-z] 1390.545 1 1390.545 5.846 .026 
y-z*MR [ x-y*x-z*MR] 2.609E-03 1 2.609E-03 .000 .997 
error(y-z) [ error(x-y*x-2)l 4281.270 18 237.848 
x-y*resp [ y-2*x-2*resp] 10.342 1 10.342 .039 .846 
x-y*resp*MR (y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 199.354 1 199.354 .749 .398 
error(x-y*resp) [ error(y-z'x-z*resp)] 4792.369 18 266.243 
x-z*resp [ x-y*y-z*resp) 256.187 1 256.187 1.004 .330 
x-z*resp*MR [ x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 985.134 1 985.134 3.859 .065 
error(x-z*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 4594.937 18 255.274 
y-z*resp (x-y*x-z*resp] 244.857 1 244.857 .579 .457 
y-2*resp*MR (x-y*x-z*resp*MR] 500.065 1 500.065 1.182 .291 
error{y-2*resp) [ error{x-y*x-2*resp)) 7614.864 18 423.048 
intercept 56615893.290 1 56615893.290 2672.025 .000 
MR 698.225 1 698.225 .033 .858 
error 381390.893 18 21188.383 
Table 8.23 Experiment 6.3 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
x-y [ y-z*x-z] 85.069 1 85.069 19.794 .000 
x-y*MR [y-2*x-2*MRl 66.736 1 66.736 15.528 .001 
error(x-y) [ error(y-z*x-z)) 77.361 18 4.298 
x-z [ x-y*y-z] 3.403 1 3.403 .339 .568 
x-z*MR(x-y*y-z*MR] 11.736 1 11.736 1.169 .294 
error(x-z) [ erTor(x-y*y-z)] 180.694 18 10.039 
resp 140.625 1 140.625 5.737 .028 
resp*MR 25.069 1 25.069 1.023 .325 
error(resp) 441.250 18 24.514 
y-z (x-y*x-z] 8.403 1 8.403 .630 .438 
y-z*MR [ x-y*x-z*MR] 25.069 1 25.069 1.879 .187 
error(y-2) [ error(x-y*X-z)] 240.139 18 13.341 
x-y*resp [ y-z*x-z*resp] 20.069 1 20.069 .863 .365 
x-y*resp*MR [ y-z*x-z*resp*MR] 1.736 1 1.736 .075 .788 
error{x-y*resp) [ error{y-z*x-z*resp)] 418.472 18 23.248 
x-z*resp (x-y*y-z*resp] 1.736 1 1.736 .115 .738 
x-z*resp*MR (x-y*y-z*resp*MR] 6.944E-02 1 6.944E-02 .005 .947 
error(x-2*resp) [ error(x-y*y-z*resp)] 271.806 18 15.100 
y-z*resp [ x-y*x-2*resp] 1.736 1 1.736 .153 .701 
y-2*resp*MR [ x-y*x-z*resp*MR) .625 1 .625 .055 .817 
error(y-2*resp) [ eTTor(x-y*x-z*resp)] 204,583 18 11.366 
intercept 4100.625 1 4100.625 41.412 .000 
MR 390,625 1 390.625 3.945 ,062 
error 1782.361 18 99.020 
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Table 8.24 Experiment 6.3 (A by P): Repeated measures ANOVA for mean con-ect 
responses 
Source S S DF MS F P 
bar 44314.289 1 44314.289 37.983 .000 
bar*MR 192.188 1 192.188 .165 .690 
error(bar) 21000.355 18 1166.686 
x-y [y-z*x-z] 963.020 1 963.020 2.566 .127 
x-y*MR [y-z*x-z*MR] 207.471 1 207.471 .553 .467 
error(x-y) [error(y-z*x-z)] 6756.071 18 375.337 
x-z [x-y*y-z] 443.367 1 443.367 .894 .357 
x-z*MR [x-y*y-2*MR] 61.527 1 61.527 .124 .729 
error(x-2) (error(x-y*y-z)I 8928.116 18 496.006 
res 26626.196 1 26626.196 14.656 .001 
res*MR 131.784 1 131.784 .073 .791 
error(res) 32700.713 18 1816.706 
bar*x-y [bar*y-z*x-z] 281.843 1 281.843 .749 .398 
barx-y*MR (bar*y-z*x-z*MR] 3720.544 1 3720.544 9.882 .006 
error(bar*x-y) [error(bar'y-z*x-z)) 6777.160 18 376.509 
bar*x-z [bar*x-y*y-z] 22.088 1 22.088 .042 .840 
bar*x-z*MR [bar*x-yVz*MR] 3157.971 1 3157.971 5.994 .025 
error(bar*x-z) [error(bar*x-y*y-2)] 9483.025 18 526.835 
x-y*x-z (y-2] .131 1 .131 .000 .988 
x-y*x-2*MR [y-2*MR] 60.328 1 60.328 .104 .751 
error(x-y*x-2) [error(y-2)] 10456.340 18 580.908 
bar*x-y*x-z (bar*y-zj 6949.597 1 6949.597 4.093 .058 
bar*x-y*x-z*MR [bar'y-z^MR] 150.644 1 150.644 .089 .769 
erTor(bar*x-y*x-z) [error(bar'y-z)l 30564.449 18 1698.025 
bar*res 60.546 1 60.546 .181 .676 
bar*res*MR 853.622 1 853.622 2.551 .128 
error(bar'res) 6023.824 18 334.657 
x-y*res [y-z*x-z*res] 68.906 1 68.906 .135 .718 
x-y*res*MR [y-z'x-zVes*MR] 2207.498 1 2207.498 4.310 .052 
error(x-y*res) [error(y-z*x-z*res)] 9219.046 18 512.169 
bar*x-y*res [bar*y-z*x-z*res] .452 1 .452 .002 .963 
bar*x-y*res*MR (bar*y-z*x-z*res*MR) 283.820 1 283.820 1.359 .259 
error(bar*x-y*res) (erTor(bar*y-z*x-z*res)] 3759.667 18 208.870 
x-z*res [x-y*y-z*res] 220.303 1 220.303 .522 .479 
x-z*res'MR [x-yVz*res*MRl 321.714 1 321.714 .763 .394 
error(x-z*res) [error(x-y*y-z*res)] 7592.032 18 421.780 
bar*x-z*res [bar*x-y*y-z*res] 4282.513 1 4282.513 12.570 .002 
bar*x-z*res*MR [bar*x-y*y-zVes*MR] 176.419 1 176.419 .518 .481 
error(bar^-z*res) (error(bar*x-y*y-z*resJ 6132.615 18 340.701 
x-y*x-z*res [y-z*res] 341.907 1 341.907 .443 .514 
x-y*x-2*res*MR [y-2*res*MR] 1699.786 1 1699.786 2.203 .155 
error(x-y*x-2*res) (error(y-2*res)] 13887.356 18 771.520 
bar*x-y*x-2*res [bar*y-2*res] 453.045 1 453.045 .076 .786 
bar*x-y*x-z*res*MR [l5ar*y-z*res'MR) 105978.688 1 105978.688 17.683 .001 
error(bar*x-y*x-z*res) [error(bar*y-2*res)] 107877.813 18 5993.212 
Intercept 87389398.922 1 87389398.922 3092.712 .000 
MR 118478.043 1 118478.043 4.193 .055 
error 508618.093 18 28256.561 
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Source S S DF MS F P 
bar 27.222 1 27.222 1.956 .179 
bar*MR .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 
error(bar) 250.556 18 13.920 
x-y [y-2*x-z] 23.472 1 23.472 2.110 .164 
x-y*MR (y-z*x-z*MR] 6.806 1 6.806 .612 .444 
error(x-y) (error(y-z*x-z)] 200.278 18 11.127 
x-z (x-y*y-z] 2.222 1 2.222 .161 .693 
x-z*MR [x-yVz*MR] .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 
error(x-z) [error(x-y*y-2)] 247.778 18 13.765 
res 73.472 1 73.472 4.834 .041 
res*MR 50.139 1 50.139 3.298 .086 
error(res) 273.611 18 15.201 
bar*x-y [bar*y-2*x-z] 8.889 1 8.889 .489 .493 
barx-y*MR [bar*y-z*x-z*MR] 13.889 1 13.889 .764 .394 
en-or(bar*x-y) (error(bar*y-z*x-z)] 327.222 18 18.179 
bar'x-2 [bar*x-y*y-z] .139 1 .139 .005 .943 
bar*x-2*MR (barx-y*y-2*MR] 170.139 1 170.139 6.347 .021 
error(bar*x-z) [erTor(bar*x-y*y-z)] 482.500 18 26.806 
x-y*x-2 [y-2] .556 1 .556 .026 .873 
x-y*x-z*MR [y-z*MR] 27.222 1 27.222 1.297 .270 
error(x-y*x-2) [enoriy-z)] 377.778 18 20.988 
bar*x-y*x-z [bar*y-z] 11.250 1 11.250 .378 .546 
bar-x-y*x-z*MR [bar*y-z*MR) 61.250 1 61.250 2.058 .169 
erTOr(bar'x-y*x-z) [error(bar*y-z)] 535.833 18 29.769 
bar*res 2.222 1 2.222 .138 .714 
bar*res*MR 8.889 I 8.889 .554 .466 
erTor(bar*res) 288.889 18 16.049 
x-y*res [y-2*x-2*resl 40.139 1 40.139 2.651 .121 
x-y*res*MR [y-2*x-2*res*MRl 23.472 1 23.472 1.550 .229 
error(x-y*res) [error(y-z*x-z*res)) 272.500 18 15.139 
bar*x-y*res [bar*y-z*x-z*res] .556 1 .556 .041 .843 
bar*x-y*res*MR [bar*y-z*x-z*res*MR) 13.889 1 13.889 1.014 .327 
error(bar*x-y*res) [en*or(bar*y-z*x-z*res)] 246.667 18 13.704 
x-z*res [x-y*y-z*res] 2.222 1 2.222 .236 .633 
x-z*res*MR [x-y*y-z*res*MRl 45.000 1 45.000 4,780 .042 
error(x-2*res) [erTor(x-y*y-2*res)] 169.444 18 9.414 
bar*x-2*res [bar*x-y*y-z*res] 256.806 1 256.806 15.060 .001 
bar*x-2*res*MR [barx-y>2*res*MRl 16.806 1 16.806 .986 .334 
erTor(bar^-2*res) {enor(bar*x-y*y-2*res] 306.944 18 17.052 
x-y*x-2*res [y-2*res] 13.889 1 13.889 .448 .512 
x-y*x-z*res*MR [y-z*res*MR) .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 
error(x-y*x-z*res) [error(y-z*res)] 558.333 18 31.019 
bar*x-y*x-2*res \bar*y-z*res] 11.250 1 11.250 1.028 .324 
bar*x-y*x-z*res*MR [bar*y-z*res*MR] 516.806 1 516.806 47.234 .000 
error(bar*x-y*x-z*res) [erTor{bar'y-z*res)] 196.944 18 10.941 
Intercept 7670.139 1 7670.139 96.454 .000 
MR 1.250 1 1.250 .016 .902 
error 1431.389 18 79.522 
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8.2 Appendix 2 (Additional experimental data) 
8.2.1 Experiment 3.1 
Two-Way Interactions [3.1.2] 
In the A by M , there was a significant interaction between mapping rule and foot of 
response in both RTs [ F ( l , 42) = 15.799,/? < 0.001] and mistakes 42) = 5.374,/? < 
0.05] (see Figure 8.1). For participants in MR: CI (kitchen/left, garage/right), mean RTs 
were 18 ms faster for right (garage objects) rather than left (kitchen objects) foot 
responses. For participants in MR: C2 (garage/left, kitchen/right), mean RTs were 14 ms 
faster for left (garage objects) rather than right (kitchen objects) foot responses. This 
pattern was reversed in the frequency of mistakes. For participants in MR: CK mean 
mistakes were 0.9 % fewer for left (kitchen objects) rather than right (garage objects) foot 
responses. For participants in MR: C2, mean mistakes were 0.7 % fewer for right (kitchen 
objects) rather than left (garage objects) foot responses. This suggested a speed/accuracy 
trade-off whereby garage objects were responded to faster at the cost of more mistakes for 
kitchen objects. 
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Mapping Rule 
4 5 -r 
? 4 . 0 -
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Condition 1 Condition 2 
Mapping Rule 
KEY MEANS TABLE 
MR Resp ms S E SE 
— e — Left response 
1^— Right response 
1 L 740 10 3 4 0 8 
1 R 722 10 4 3 0.8 
2 L 727 10 2 6 0.8 
2 R 741 10 1 9 0.8 
Figure 8.1 (A by M) Mean R T s (black lines) and mean mistakes (red lines) as a function of 
foot of response and mapping rule 
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In the A by P, there was also a significant interaction between mapping rule and foot of 
response in mistakes [F (1 , 28) = 7.935, p < 0.01] but not in RTs [F (1 , 28) = 0.553, p > 
0.1] (see Figure 8.2). 
Condrtion 1 Condition 2 
Mapping Rule 
MEANS TABLE 
MR Resp % SE 
1 L 3.4 0.6 
1 R 1.9 0.7 
2 L 2.6 0.6 
2 R 4.3 0.7 
KEY 
a — Left response 
-I Right response 
Figure 8.2 (A by P) Mean mistakes as a function of foot of response and mapping rule 
For participants in MR: C I , mean mistakes were 1.5 % fewer for right (garage objects) 
rather than lef\ (kitchen objects) foot responses. For participants in MR: C2, mean mistakes 
were 1.7 % fewer for lef^ (garage objects) rather than right (kitchen objects) foot responses. 
This suggested that fewer mistakes were made when responding to garage rather than 
kitchen objccis. 
Two-Way Interactions [3.1.3] 
In the A by P, there was a significant interaction between mapping rule and object location 
in mistakes [ F ( l , 28) = 1 1.562,/7 < 0.005] but not in RTs [ F ( l , 28) = 0.058,p > 0.5] (see 
Figure 8.3). For participants in MR: C I , mean mistakes were 0.9 % fewer for lef\ rather 
than right located objects. For participants in MR: C2, mean mistakes were 0.9 % fewer for 
right rather than lef^ located objects. 
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Condition 1 Condition 2 
Mapping Rule 
MEANS TABLE 
MR Loc 0 SE 
1 L 2 2 0.5 
1 R 3.1 0.5 
2 L 3.9 0.5 
2 R 3.0 0.5 
KEY 
Left location 
Right location 
Figure 8.3 (A by P) Mean mistakes as a function of object location and mapping rule 
Three-Way Interactions [3.1.6] 
In the A by M , there was a significant interaction between mapping rule, foot of response 
and object location in mistakes [ F (1 , 42) = 4.446, p < 0.05] but not in RTs [F (1 , 42) = 
0.007,/? > 0.5] (see Figure 8.4). 
Right Location Left Location 
Condition 1 Condition 2 
Mapping Rule 
Condition 1 Condition 2 
Mapping Rule 
KEY 
- e — Left response 
H Right response 
MEANS TABLE 
MR Loc Resp % SE 
1 L L 2.0 0 7 
1 L R 5.7 1.1 
1 R L 4.9 1.0 
1 R R 2.9 0.5 
2 L L 2.0 0.7 
2 L R 2.5 1.1 
2 R L 3.2 1.0 
2 R R 1.3 0.5 
Figure 8.4 (A by M) Mean mistakes as a function of object location, foot of response and 
mapping rule 
For left located objects the following pattern was observed: For participants in MR: C I , 
mean mistakes were 3.7 % fewer for left rather than right foot responses. For participants 
in MR: C2, mean mistakes were 0.5 % fewer for left rather than right foot responses. For 
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right located objects the following pattern was observed: For participants in MR: C I , mean 
mistakes were 2 % fewer for right rather than left foot responses. For participants in MR: 
C2, mean mistakes were 1.9 % fewer for right rather than left foot responses. 
8.2.2 Experiment 4.1 
Main Effects [4.1.1] 
There was a significant main effect for line location in both RTs [F (2, 56) = 21.728, p< 
0.001] and mistakes [F (2, 56) = 5.929, p = 0.005]. Centrally located lines produced the 
fastest mean RTs (463 ms, SE =10) and the fewest mean mistakes (2.0 %, SE = 0.3). 
This reflected the ease of the location-response 'compatibility neutraP trials. Left located 
lines took on average 471 ms (SE = 10) with 2.8 % mistakes (SE = 0.3), and right located 
lines took on average 470 ms (SE = 10) with 2.4 % mistakes (SE = 0.4). 
Main Effects [4.1.2] 
There was a significant main effect of effector in both RTs [F ( 1 , 28) = 87.082, p< 0.001) 
and mistakes [F (1 , 28) = 15.613, p < 0.01]. Mean RTs were 49 ms faster for hand (443 
ms, SE = 9) rather than foot (492 ms, SE = 11) responses. Mean mistakes were 1.1 % 
fewer for foot (1.9 %, SE = 0.3) rather than hand (3.0 %, SE = 0.4) responses. This 
suggested a speed/accuracy trade-off whereby hand responses were faster at the cost of 
more mistakes. 
Two-Way Interactions [4.1.3] 
A result related to the main effect of effector reported above was the interaction between 
mapping rule 1 and effector. This interaction approached significance in RTs [ F ( l , 28) = 
4.087,/?= 0.053] but not in mistakes [ F ( l , 28) = 0.269,/?> 0.5] (see Figure 8.5). 
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Hands Feet 
Response Effector 
MEANS TABLE 
MR1 Eff ms S E 
C1 H 450 13 
C1 H 488 16 
C2 F 437 13 
C2 F 496 16 
KEY 
•G MR1-C1 
MR1-C2 
Figure 8.5 Mean RTs as a function of mapping mie 1 and response effector 
The difference between mean RTs for effector type was more pronounced at M R l : C2. For 
participants in M R l : C2 (feet first, hands second), mean RTs were 59 ms faster for hand 
rather than foot responses. For participants in M R l : C I (hands first, feet second), mean 
RTs were a smaller 38 ms faster for hand rather than foot responses. 
Two-Way Interactions [4.1.51 
There was a significant interaction between line location and X-Y line orientation in 
mistakes [F (2, 56) = 4.339, p < 0.05] but not in RTs [F ( 1 , 28) = 0.664, p > 0.5] (see 
Figure 8.6). For lines oriented leftwards in the X-Y plane, mean mistakes were similar 
when they were located left or right, and faster when located centrally. However, for lines 
oriented rightwards in the X-Y plane, mean mistakes were fewest when located right, then 
centrally, and greatest when located left. 
Left Centre Right 
Line Location 
MEANS TABLE 
Loc Ori % SE 
3.1 0 4 
2.6 0.3 
1.8 0.4 
2.2 0.3 
2.9 0.4 
2.0 0.4 
KEY 
Left Orientation 
H Right Orientation 
Figure 8.6 Mean mistakes as a function of line location and X-Y line orientation 
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Two-Way Interactions [4.1.6] 
There was a significant interaction between spatial response and mapping rule 1 in RTs [F 
(1 , 28) = 5.248,/7 < 0.05] but not in mistakes [ F ( l , 28) = 0.974,/? > 0.1] (see Figure 8.7). 
For participants in M R l : C I (hands first, feet second), mean RTs were 8 ms faster for right 
rather than left spatial responses. For participants in M R l : C2 (feet first, hands second), 
mean RTs were similar for both spatial responses (1 ms faster for left rather than right 
spatial responses). 
468 i 
9> 467 i 
Left Right 
Spatial Response 
MEANS TABLE 
MR1 Res ms SE 
CI L 473 14 
C1 R 465 14 
C2 L 466 14 
C2 R 467 14 
KEY 
— e — MR1 -CI 
1 MR1 -C2 
Figure 8.7 Mean RTs as a function of mapping rule 1 and spatial response. 
Three-Way Interactions [4.1.9] 
There was a significant interaction between line location, X-Y line orientation and 
mapping rule 1 in RTs, [F (2, 56) = 4.272, p < 0.05] but not in mistakes [F (2, 56) = 1.637, 
p > OA]. \n part this appeared to reflect the main effect of line location reported earlier, 
where centrally located lines were responded to 7-8 ms faster than left and right located 
lines (note faster RTs at the central line location in Figure 8.8). This difference however, 
was noticeably less for rightwardsHDriented lines under M R l : C I , when compared to the 
other three conditions. 
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g 465.5 
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KEY MEANS TABLE 
O Left Orientation MR C1 C1 CI CI CI CI C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 
Loc L L C c R R L L C C R R \ — Right Orientation On L R L R L R L R L R L R 
ms 474 470 463 466 473 468 468 470 462 460 469 470 
SE 14 13 14 15 14 14 14 13 14 15 14 14 
Figure 8.8 Mean RTs as a function of X-Y line orientation, line location and mapping njfe. 
Higher Order Interactions [4.1.13] 
There was a significant interaction between efTector type, X-Y line orientation, mapping 
rule 1 and mapping rule 2 in RTs, [F (1 , 28) = 7.007, p < 0.05] but not in mistakes [F (1 , 
28) = 0.599,p>0.1]. 
Higher Order Interactions [4.1.14] 
There was a significant interaction between line location, X-Y line orientation, spatial 
response and mapping rule 1 for mistakes, [F (2, 56) = 4.501, p < 0.05], but not for RTs [F 
(2, 56) = 1.779,/? > 0.1]. Means and standard errors for higher order interactions' [4.1.13 
& 4.1.14] are located in Appendix 3. 
8.2.3 Experiment 4.2 
Main Effects [4.2.1] 
There was a significant main effect of mapping rule in mistakes, [F {\, 18) = 7.298, p < 
0.05] but not in RTs [F (1 , 18) = 0.167, p > 0.5]. Mean mistakes were 2.5 % fewer for 
'No attempt has been made to offer interpretations for these higher-order interactions. They do not hold any 
obvious theoretical relevance for the hypotheses under investigation, and as such are not amenable to 
constnictively meaningfiil interpretation. Nevertheless, the means are presented in Appendix 2. 
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participants in MR: C2 (left response for yellow, right for orange: 2.3 %, SE = 0.7) than for 
participants in MR: CI (left response for orange, right for yellow: 4.8 %, SE = 0.7). 
Main Effects [4.2.2] 
There was a significant main effect of delay in mistakes [F (1 , 18) = 5.589, p < 0.05] but 
not in RTs [ F ( 1 , 18) = 1.721, p > 0.1]. Mean mistakes were 1.2 % fewer at delays of 50 
ms (3.0 %, SE = 0.4) than at delays of 100 ms (4.2 %, SE = 0.7). 
Three-Way Interactions [4.2.5] 
There was a significant interaction between delay, hand of response and mapping rule in 
RTs, [ F ( l , 18) = 13.820,/7 < 0.005] but not in mistakes [ F ( 1 , 18) = 0.124, p < 0.5] (see 
Figure 8.9). 
MR: C 2 MR: C1 
50 ms 100 ms 
Delay 
50 ms 100 ms 
Delay 
KEY 
- e — Left response 
I Right response 
M E A N S TABLE 
MR Del (ms) Res ms S E 
C1 50 L 441 14 
C I 50 R 423 15 
C I 100 L 434 15 
C I 100 R 432 14 
C 2 50 L 426 14 
C 2 50 R 430 15 
C 2 100 L 430 15 
C 2 100 R 413 14 
Figure 8.9 Mean RTs as a function of delay, hand of response and mapping rule 
As an overall pattern, mean RTs were fastest for participants in MR: C2 for both hands in 
both delays, with the exception of right hand responses at delays of 50 ms, where mean 
RTs were fastest for participants in MR: C I . More specifically, at delays of 50 ms the 
following pattern was observed: For left hand responses, mean RTs were 15 ms faster for 
participants in MR: C2 rather than MR: C I . For right hand responses, mean RTs were 7 
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ms faster for participants in MR: CI rather than MR: C2. At delays of 100 ms the 
following pattern was observed: For left hand responses, mean RTs were 4 ms faster for 
participants in MR: C2 rather than MR: C I . For right hand responses, mean RTs were 19 
ms faster for participants in MR: C2 rather than MR: C I . 
8.2.4 Experiment 4.3 
Main Effects [4.3.1] 
There was a significant main effect of delay in both RTs [F (2, 28) = 19.070, p < 0.001] 
and mistakes [F(2 , 28) = 4.157,/; < 0.05]. Mean RTs were as follows: 800 ms delays (435 
ms, SE = 12); 200 ms delays (442 ms, SE = 11); 0 ms delays (467 ms, SE = 14). Mean 
mistakes were as follows: 800 ms delays (1.5 %, SE = 0.4); 200 ms delays (2.0 %, SE = 
0.4); 0 ms delays (2.6 %, SE = 0.5). Thus mean RTs were 7 ms faster (and mean mistakes 
0.5 % fewer) for delays of 800 ms rather than 200ms, and mean RTs were 25 ms faster 
(and mean mistakes 0.6 % fewer) for delays of 200 ms rather than 0ms. 
Main Effects [4.3.2] 
There was a main effect of hand of response, which approached significance in RTs [F{\, 
14) = 3.847,/? = 0.07] and was significant in mistakes [F(\, 14) = 4.717,/? < 0.05]. Mean 
RTs were 10 ms faster for right (443 ms, SE = 12) rather than left (453 ms, SE = 13) hand 
responses. Mean mistakes were 0.9 % fewer for left (1.6 %, SE = 0.3) rather than right (2.5 
%, SE = 0.6) hand responses. This suggested a speed/accuracy trade-off whereby right 
hand responses were faster at the cost of more mistakes. 
Two-Way Interactions [4.3.4] 
There was a significant interaction between delay and hand of response in both RTs [F (2, 
28) = 8.896, p < 0.005] and mistakes [F (2, 28) = 3.341, /? = 0.05] (see Figure 8.10). At 
delays of 0 ms, mean RTs were 13 ms faster for right rather than left hand responses. 
Similarly, at delays of 800 ms, mean RTs were 19 ms faster for right rather than left hand 
responses. However, at delays of 200 ms, mean RTs were similar for left and right hand 
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responses (left hand responses were just 2 ms faster than right). A different pattern was 
revealed in the mistakes. At delays of 0 ms, mean mistakes were 1.3 % fewer for left rather 
than right hand responses. Similarly, at delays of 200 ms, mean mistakes were 1.9 % fewer 
for left rather than right hand responses. However, at delays of 800 ms, mean mistakes 
were similar for left and right hand responses (right hand responses made just 0.2 % fewer 
mean mistakes than left). 
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M E A N S TABLE 
Del (ms) Res ms SE SE 
0 L 473 15 2.0 0.3 
0 R 460 14 3.3 0.8 
200 L 441 12 1.1 0.4 
200 R 443 11 3.0 0.8 
800 L 444 13 1.6 0.5 
800 R 425 12 0.4 
Figure 8.10 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of hand of response 
and delay 
8.2.5 Experiment 5.1 
Main Effects [5.1.2] 
There was a significant main effect of hand of response in mistakes, [ F ( l , 18) = 8.380, p = 
0.01 ] but not in RTs [ F (1 , 18) = 1.546, /> > 0.1 ] . Mean mistakes were 2.2 % fewer for left 
hand responses (6.5 %, SE: 0.4), rather than right (8.7 %, SE: 0.5). 
Two-Way Interactions [5.1.5] 
Tliere was a significant interaction between mapping rule and hand of response in RTs 
[F( 1, 18) = 8.717, / 7 = 0.009)] but not in mistakes [fX 1, 18) = 2.185, /? > 0.1)] (see Figure 
8.11). For participants in MR: CI (wobbly pattern/left response, straight pattern/right 
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response), mean RTs were 13 ms faster for right hand responses (straight pattem) rather 
than left (wobbly pattem). For participants in MR: C2 (wobbly pattern/right response, 
straight pattern/left response), mean RTs were 5 ms faster for left hand responses (straight 
pattem) rather than right (wobbly pattem). This suggested that participants responded 
fastest to cylinders with a straight pattem (perhaps because they found this pattem the 
easiest to identify). 
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C1 L 495 13 
C1 R 482 11 
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O Left response 
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Figure 8.11 Mean RTs as a function of hand of response and mapping rule 
Three-Way Interactions [5.1.6b] 
Figure 8.12 reports the pattem of means for the statistically equivalent result to the 
interaction reported in the main text [5.1.6ay]; namely an interaction between X-Y, Y-Z 
cylinder orientation and hand of response in both RTs [F (1 , 18) = 17.535, p = 0.001] and 
mistakes [ F (1 , 18) = 6.511, p < 0.05]. From this perspective it can be seen how each 
specific global cylinder orientation was responded to. The main feature of interest 
however, is better described by result [5.1.6ay], where it is apparent that cylinders 
oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane were responded to faster and more accurately with the 
left rather than right hand, and cylinders oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane were 
responded to faster and more accurately with the right rather than left hand. 
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KEY 
Upward (Y-Z) 
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M E A N S TABLE 
X-Y Y-Z Res ms SE 
L D L 471 10 5.6 0.8 
L D R 477 9 8.7 0.7 
L U L 484 9 8.1 1.0 
L u R 467 9 6.9 1.1 
R D L 480 9 7.0 0.6 
R D R 472 7 8.6 1.0 
R u L 474 9 5.5 0.9 
R U R 478 8 10.5 1.2 
GLOBAL ORIENT 
Figure 8.12 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Y. Y-Z cylinder 
onentation and hand of response. 
8.2.6 Experiment 5.2 
Main Effects [5.2.2] 
There was a significant main cfTect of X-Y cylinder orientation in mistakes, [F (1 , 18) = 
13.042, p < 0.01] but not in RTs [F (1 , 18) = 0.042, p > 0.5]. Mistakes were 1.2 % fewer 
for cylinders oriented rightwards (5.0 %, SE = 0.4) rather than leftwards (6.2 %, SE = 0.5) 
in the X-Y plane. Interestingly, no main effects were found for X-Y cylinder orientation in 
the previous experiment, or in Chapter 4 (which used 2D lines). Furthermore, there was a 
main ctTcct of X - / object orientation in I xpcriment 3.1, which although in R I s. rctlcctcd 
the same advantage for right orientations. Although the real objects of Experiment 3.1 
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were essentially oriented in the X-Z plane, on the screen their orientations nevertheless 
also portrayed an element of X-Y orientation. 
Main Effects [5.2.3] 
There was a significant main effect of hand of response in mistakes, [ ^ ' ( l , 18) = 5.646, p< 
0.05] but not in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 0.369, p> 0.5]. Mistakes were 1.3 % fewer for left (4.9 
%, SE = 0.3) rather than right (6.2 %, SE = 0.6) hand responses. 
Two-Way Interactions [5.2.6] 
There was an interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation and mapping rule, which 
approached significance in RTs [F {\, 18) = 4.325, p = 0.052] and was significant in 
mistakes [F (1, 18) = 5.676, p < 0.05] (see Figure 8.13). For participants in MR: CI 
(wobbly pattern/left response, straight pattem/right response), mean RTs were 6 ms faster 
for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than a leftwards in the X-Z plane. For participants 
in MR: C2 (wobbly pattem/right response, straight pattem/left response), mean RTs were 
the same for cylinders oriented leftwards and rightwards in the X-Z plane ( M = 495 ms). A 
different pattem was observed for mistakes. For cylinders oriented leftwards in the X-Z 
plane, mean mistakes were 2.2 % fewer at MR: C2, rather than MR: C I . However, for 
cylinders oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane, mean mistakes were similar across 
mapping conditions (mean mistakes were 0.1 % fewer for participants in MR: C I , rather 
than MR: C2). 
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M E A N S TABLE 
MR X-Z ms SE % SE 
CI L 488 13 6.4 0.7 
CI R 482 13 5.8 0.6 
C2 L 495 13 4.2 0.7 
C2 R 495 13 5.9 0.6 
X-Z O R I E N T 
Figure 8.13 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of mapping rule and 
X-Z orientation 
Three-Way Interactions [5.2.7b] 
Figure 8.14 reports the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to the 
interaction reported in the main text [5.2.7ayj; namely an interaction between X-Y, Y-Z 
cylinder orientation and hand of response in both RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 45.509,/? < 0.001] and 
mistakes [/•' (1 , 18) = 8.995, p < 0.01]. From this perspective it can be seen how each 
specific global cylinder orientation was responded to. The main feature of interest 
however, is better described by result [5.2.7ay], where it is apparent that cylinders 
oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane are responded to faster and more accurately with the 
left rather than right hand, and cylinders oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane are 
responded to faster and more accurately with the right rather than left hand. 
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M E A N S TABLE 
X-Y Y-Z Res ms SE SE 
L D L 484 9 0.7 
L D R 499 10 6.9 0.8 
L U L 496 10 7.4 1.0 
L U R 483 9 5.7 0.6 
R D L 493 11 4.5 0.4 
R D R 484 9 5.7 0.9 
R U L 483 10 3.1 0.5 
R U R 500 9 6.5 0.9 
GLOBAL ORIENT 
1 
3 
Figure 8.14 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Y. Y-Z cylinder 
orientation and hand of response 
8.2.7 Experiment 5.3 
Main Effects [5.3.1] 
There was a significant main effect of effector in RTs [ F (1 , 16) = 63.274, p < 0.001 ] but 
not in mistakes [ F ( l , 16) = 0.251,/? > 0.5]. Mean RTs were 50 ms faster for hand (481 ms, 
SE = 9) rather than foot (531 ms, SE = 12) responses. 
Main Effects [5.3.2] 
There was a significant main effect of spatial response in both RTs [ F ( l , 16) = 5.296, p < 
0.05] and mistakes [F (1 , 16) = 10.117, p > 0.01]. Mean RTs were 8 ms faster (and 
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mistakes were 1.7 % fewer) for left (502 ms, SE = 10; 5.1 %, SE = 0.5) rather than right ( 
510 ms, SE = 11; 6.8 %, SE = 0.8) spatial responses. 
Two-Way Interactions [5.3.7] 
There was a significant interaction between effector and mapping rule 2 in RTs [F (1 , 16) 
= 10.606,/? = 0.005] but not in mistakes [ F ( l , 16) = 1.855,/? > 0.1] (see Figure 8.15). For 
foot responses, mean RTs were 45 ms faster for participants in MR2: C I (hands first, then 
feet) than for participants in MR2: C2 (feet first, then hands). For hand responses, mean 
RTs were 3 ms faster for participants in MR2: CI than for participants in MR2: C2. This 
suggested that when just hand responses are considered, the two conditions of mapping 
rule 2 did not have a differential influence; whereas when just foot responses are 
considered, mean RTs were considerably slower when they were the responses that began 
the experiment. 
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Figure 8.15 Mean RTs as a function of mapping rule 2 and response effector 
Two-Way Interactions [5.3.8] 
There was a significant interaction between effector and spatial response in RTs [F{\, 16) 
= 12.324, p < 0.005] but not in mistakes [ F ( 1 , 16) = 2.558,p>OA] (see Figure 8.16). 
348 
530 H 
i 490 
5 48G 
Chapter 8 - Appendices 
Feet Hands 
Response Effector 
MEANS TABLE 
Eff Res ms S E 
H L 472 9 
H R 490 10 
F L 532 12 
F R 531 13 
KEY 
O — Left Response 
H Right Response 
Figure 8.16 Mean RTs as a function of spatial response and response effector 
For foot responses, mean RTs were only 1 ms faster for left rather than right responses. For 
hand responses, mean RTs were 18 ms faster for left rather than right responses. This 
suggested that hand responses were primarily responsible for the main effect [5.3.2] of 
spatial response (reflecting an advantage for left spatial responses). 
Three-Way Interactions (5.3.9b] 
Figure 8.17 reports the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to the 
interaction reported in the main text [5.3.9ay]; namely an interaction between X-Y, Y-Z 
cylinder orientation and spatial response in both RTs [F (1 , 16) = 36.011,/? < 0.001] and 
mistakes [ F ( l , 16)= 14.632,/? = 0.001]. 
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Figure 8.17 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Y, Y-Z cylinder 
onentation and hand of response 
From this perspective it can be seen how each specific global cylinder orientation was 
responded to. Furthermore, the overall advantage for left over right spatial responses (as 
seen earlier [5.3.2 & 5.3.7]) can be seen clearly in the discrepancy between the upper 
graphs (left spatial responses) and the lower graphs (right spatial responses). The main 
feature of interest however, is better described by result [5.3.9aX], where it is apparent 
that cylinders oriented leftwards in the X -Z plane are responded to faster and more 
accurately with left rather than right spatial responses, and cylinders oriented rightwards in 
the X -Z plane are responded to faster and more accurately with right rather than left spatial 
responses. 
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Three-Way Interactions [5.3.10] 
rhere was a significant interaction between mapping rule 1, mapping rule 2 and Y-Z 
cylinder orientation in mistakes [F (1 , 16) = 4.799, p < 0.05] but not in RTs [F (1 , 16) = 
0.065, p > 0.5]. For cylinders oriented downwards in the Y-Z plane (see almost parallel 
solid lines in the left graph of Figure 8.18) mapping rules did not appear to interact; overall 
however, mean mistakes were considerably fewer under MR2 (surface pattern mapping) 
rather than M R l (effector mapping). Examining this pattern under different mapping 
conditions, mean mistakes were 0.3 % fewer for participants in M R l : C2 (wobbly 
pattern/right response, straight pattern/left response) rather than M R l : CI (wobbly 
pattern/left response, straight pattern/right response) and mean mistakes were 0.7 % fewer 
for participants in MR2: C2 (feet first/ hands second) rather than MR2: CI (hands first/ 
feet second). For cylinders oriented upwards in the Y-Z plane (see disordinal interaction of 
the right graphs in Figure 8.18) the following pattern was observed: mean mistakes were 
1.6 % fewer for participants in M R l : CI rather than M R l : C2, and mean mistakes were 1.6 
% fewer for participants in MR2: C2 rather than MR2: C I . 
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Figure 8.18 Mean mistakes as a function of mapping rules 1 & 2 and Y-Z orientation 
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Higher-order Interactions [5.3.11b] 
Figures 8.19 and 8,20 report the pattern o f means for the statistically equivalent result to 
the interaction reported above [5.3.1 l a y ] ; namely an interaction between effector, X-Y, 
Y-Z cylinder orientation and spatial response in mistakes 16) = 8.771,/? < 0.01] (and 
the equivalent in RTs that was not statistically significant (1 , 16) = 1.438, /> > 0.1 ]) . 
From this perspective it can be seen how each specific global cylinder orientation was 
responded to (see). The main feature of interest however, is better described by result 
[5,3.1 l a y ] ; where it is apparent that the size of the compatibility effect between spatial 
responses and compatible X-Z cylinder orientations is more pronounced for hand power 
grip responses than for foot responses (although this was not statistically significant in 
RTs). 
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Figure 8.19 Mean RTs (black, blue) and mean mistakes (reds) as a function of effector (n.b. 
foot responses in this figure), X-Y. Y-Z orientation and spatial response 
353 
Left Hand Responses 
02 490 
(T 480 
Chapter 8 - Appendices 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
rz 
g 475 
470 
Right Hand Responses 
CD 
rz 
Left Hand Responses 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
Right Hand Responses 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
KEY 
Upward (Y-Z) 
Downward (Y-Z) 
MEANS TABLE 
Eft X-Y Y-Z Res ms SE 
H L D L 468 11 3.4 0.7 
H L D R 494 10 9.4 1.6 
H L U L 475 8 6.0 1.1 
H L U R 484 10 5.3 0.8 
H R D L 484 9 6.7 0.8 
H R D R 485 10 6.0 1.0 
H R U L 461 9 3.1 0.7 
H R u R 496 11 8.3 1.0 
GLOBAL ORIENT 
1. s / 2 
Figure 8.20 Mean RTs (black, blue) and mean mistakes (reds) as a function of effector (n b 
foot responses in this figure). X-Y, Y-Z orientation and spatial response 
Higher-order Interactions [5.3.12 - 5.3.14) 
I here was a significant interaction between mapping rule 1, efTeclor, X-Y cylinder 
orientation and spatial response in RTs [ F ( l , 16) = 9.596,p< 0.011 but not in mistakes [F 
( 1 , 16) = 2.975 ,/7>0.1]. 
There was a significant interaction between mapping rule 1, mapping rule 2, efTector, X-Y 
cylinder orientation and spatial response in RTs [F (1, 16) = 4.562, p < 0.05] but not in 
mistakes [ F (1 , 16) = 0.569,/7 > 0.1 ] . 
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There was a significant interaction between mapping rule 1, mapping rule 2, effector, X-Z 
cylinder orientation and spatial response in mistakes [^(1, 16) = 6.618, p < 0.05] but not in 
RTs [ f (1, 16) = 0.444,/7>0.5]. 
Means and standard errors for these higher-order interactions [5.3.12-5.3.14] are located in 
Appendix 3. 
8.2.8 Experiment 6.1 
Main Effects [6.1.2] 
There was a significant main effect for X - Y cylinder orientation in RTs [ F (1, 18) = 4.747, 
p < 0.05] but not in mistakes [ F ( l , 18) = 0.001, p > 0.5]. Mean RTs were 3 ms faster for 
cylinders oriented leftwards (489 ms, SE = 12) rather than rightwards (492 ms, SE = 12) in 
the X - Y plane. The only other occasion that a main effect was found for X - Y cylinder 
orientation was in Experiment 5.2, which also used power grip responses. However, in 
Experiment 5.2 [5.2.2], mean mistakes were fewer for cylinders oriented rightwards rather 
than leftwards (note the different performance measure of mistakes). 
Main Effects [6.1.3] 
There was a significant main effect for delay in RTs, [F (2, 36) = 101.585, p < 0.001] but 
not in mistakes [F (2, 36) = 0.491, p > 0.5]. Mean RTs were as follows: 0 ms delays (523 
ms, SE = 12); 400 ms delays (477 ms, SE = 12); 800 ms delays (472 ms, SE = 13). Thus 
mean RTs were 5 ms faster at delays of 800 ms rather than 400 ms, and were 46 ms faster 
at delays of 400 ms rather than 0 ms. This suggested that the longer the delay, the faster the 
response. Under long delays, it is likely that afforded actions are abeady planned and if 
selected upon target presentation, can be quickly executed. Related to this argument, it is 
presumably the case that at one extreme (the 0 ms delay), the participant simultaneously 
processes all available information (various object properties, including the surface 
pattem). This heavy processing load takes time to do (hence, to an extent, response times 
suffer). However, at the other extreme (the 800 ms delay), a good deal of processing that is 
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superfluous to task requirements (coding various object properties) can be achieved during 
the delay. When the target stimulus (the surface pattern) arrives, it is the only remaining 
processing task, and can be achieved quickly (hence, to an extent, response times benefit). 
Main Effects [6.1.4] 
There was a significant main effect for hand of response in mistakes, [ F ( l , 18) = 5.415,/? 
< 0.05] but not in RTs [ F (1 , 18) = 0.588, p > OA]. Mean mistakes were 1.1 % fewer for 
left (3.5 %, SE = 0.5) rather than right (4.6 %, SE = 0.7) hand responses. 
Two-Way Interactions [6.1.5] 
There was a significant interaction between mapping rule and hand of response in mistakes 
[F( 1, 18) = 6.428, p < 0.05)] but not in RTs [F( 1, 18) = 0.001, > 0.5)] (see Figure 8.21). 
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Figure 8.21 Mean mistakes as a function of hand of response and mapping rule 
For left hand responses, mean mistakes were 0.6 % fewer for participants in MR: CI (left 
responses were made to wobbly patterned cylinders) rather than MR: C2 (left responses 
were made to straight patterned cylinders). For right hand responses, mean mistakes were 
1.8 % fewer for participants in MR: C2 (right responses were made to wobbly patterned 
cylinders) rather than MR: CI (right responses were made to straight patterned cylinders). 
This suggested an advantage for responses made to wobbly patterned cylinders (perhaps 
because participants found this pattern the easiest to identify). Interestingly, when this 
interaction has proved significant before (for mean mistakes in Experiment 5.1 [5.1.5]), 
there was an opposite pattern whereby an advantage was shown for responses made to 
straight patterned cylinders. 
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Two-Way Interactions [6.1.6] 
There was a significant interaction between mapping rule and delay in RTs [F (2, 36) = 
6.201, p = 0.005] but not in mistakes [F (2, 36) = 0.287, p > 0.5] (see Figure 8.22). For 
participants in MR: C K mean RTs were 11 ms faster at delays of 800 ms rather than 
400ms, and mean RTs were 32 ms faster at delays of 400 ms rather than 0 ms. For 
participants in MR: C2, mean RTs were the same at delays of 800 ms and 400ms, and 
mean RTs were 59 ms faster at delays of 800 ms and 400 ms rather than 0 ms. 
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Figure 8.22 Mean R T s as a function of delay and mapping rule 
Two-Way Interactions [6.1.7] 
There was a significant interaction between mapping rule and X-Z cylinder orientation in 
mistakes [F (1, 18) = 4.491, p < 0.05)] but not in RTs [F( l , 18) = 0.004, p > 0.5)] (see 
Figure 8.23). For cylinders oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane, mean mistakes were 1.2 % 
fewer for participants in MR: C2 rather than MR: C I . For cylinders oriented rightwards in 
the X-Z plane, mean mistakes were 0.2 % fewer for participants in MR: CI rather than 
MR: C2. 
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Figure 8.23 Mean mistakes as a function of mapping rule and X-Z cylinder orientation 
Three-Way Interactions [6.1.10by ] 
Figure 8.24 reports the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to the 
interaction reported in the main text [6.1.10ay]: namely an interaction between X-Y, Y-Z 
cylinder orientation and hand of response in both RTs [F (1, 18) = 52.785, p < 0.001 ] and 
mistakes (F (1, 18) = 5.115, p < 0.05). From this perspective it can be seen how each 
specific global cylinder orientation was responded to. The main feature of interest 
however, is better described by result [6.1.10ayi, where it is apparent that cylinders 
oriented leftwards in the X-Z plane are responded to faster and more accurately with the 
left rather than right hand, and cylinders oriented rightwards in the X-Z plane are 
responded to faster and more accurately with the right rather than left hand. 
358 
c 
a; 
500 
495 
490 
485 
480 
Chapter 8 - Appendices 
1 
Left Responses 
ce
s 
(%
) 
5 -
Left R e s p o n s e s 
2 O — O l 
n 
M
is
ta
f 
4 -
^ 4. 
3 >C 
(U 
0) 3 • 
2 -
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
Right Responses Right Responses 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
Leftward Rightward 
X-Y Orientation 
KEY 
8 — Upward (Y-Z) 
^ Downward (Y-Z) 
MEANS TABLE 
X-Y Y-Z Res ms SE SE 
L D L 482 12 0 5 
L D R 496 12 5.7 1.2 
L u L 491 13 4.0 0.7 
L U R 489 12 3.9 0.7 
R D L 495 12 3.7 0.8 
R D R 487 12 3.6 0.6 
R U L 491 13 3.7 0.7 
R U R 497 12 5.3 0 9 
GLOBAL ORIENT 
1. V y 2 
Figure 8.24 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Y, Y-Z cylinder 
onentation and hand of response 
Three-Way Interactions [6.1.12] 
Tliere was a significant interaction between delay, Y - Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response in mistakes 18) = 5.331,/? < 0.01] but not in RTs 18) = 0.106,/? > 
0.5] (see Figure 8.25). 
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Figure 8.25 Mean mistakes as a function of delay. Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of 
response 
At delays of 0 ms, the following pattern was observed: For lef\ hand responses, mean 
mistakes were 0.8 % fewer for cylinders oriented downwards rather than upwards in the Y-
Z plane. For right hand responses, mean mistakes were 0.2 % fewer for cylinders oriented 
upwards rather than downwards in the Y-Z plane. At delays of 400 ms, the following 
pattern was observed: For left hand responses, mean mistakes were 0.7 % fewer for 
cylinders oriented upwards rather than downwards in the Y-Z plane. For right hand 
responses, mean mistakes were 2.1 % fewer for cylinders oriented downwards rather than 
upwards in the Y-Z plane. At delays of 800 ms, the following pattern was observed: For 
left hand responses, mean mistakes were 1.9 % fewer for cylinders oriented downwards 
rather than upwards in the Y-Z plane. For right hand responses, mean mistakes were 2 % 
fewer for cylinders oriented upwards rather than downwards in the Y-Z plane. 
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8.2.9 Experiment 6.2 
Main Effects [6.2.2] 
There was a significant main effect for hand of response in both RTs, [ F (1, 18) = 33.266, 
p < 0.001] and mistakes [ F (1, 18) = 5.737, p < 0.05]. Mean RTs were 27 ms faster (and 
mistakes were 1.9 % fewer) for left (581 ms, SE = 11; 4.1 %, SE = 0.7) rather than right 
(608 ms, SE = 12; 6.0 %, SE = 1.0) hand responses. 
Main Effects [6.2.3] 
There was a significant main effect for X - Y cylinder orientation in mistakes [F (I , 18) = 
I9.794,;;< 0.001] but not in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 1.022,/? > 0.1]. Mean mistakes were 1.5 % 
fewer for cylinders oriented leftwards (4.3 %, SE = 0.8) rather than rightwards (5.8 %, SE 
= 0.8) in the X - Y plane. A similar advantage for cylinders oriented leftwards in the X - Y 
plane was previously found for man RTs in Experiment 6.1 (see result [6.1.2]). 
Two-Way Interactions [6.2.7] 
There was a significant interaction between mapping rule and X - Y cylinder orientation in 
mistakes [ F ( l , 18)= 15.528,p = 0.001] but not in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 0.000,/?= 1.000] (see 
Figure 8.26). For participants in MR: CI (wobbly pattern/ left responses, straight pattern/ 
right), mean mistakes were 2.7 % fewer for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than 
rightwards in the X - Y plane. For participants in MR: C2 (wobbly pattern/ right responses, 
straight pattern/left), mean mistakes were 0.2 % fewer for cylinders oriented leftwards 
rather than rightwards in the X - Y plane. This suggested that the main effect of X - Y 
orientation reported earlier for mean mistakes [6.2.3] was largely down to those 
participants in MR: C I . 
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Figure 8.26 Mean mistakes as a function of X-Y cylinder orientation and mapping rule 
8.2.10 Experiment 6.3 
Main Effects [6.3.2] 
There was a significant main effect of hand of response in both RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 14.656,/? 
= 0.001] and mistakes [F (1, 18) = 4.834, p < 0.05]. Mean RTs were 19 ms faster (and 
mean mistakes 1 % fewer) for right (513 ms, SE = 9.2; 4.4 %, SE = 0.5) rather than left 
(532 ms, SE = 10.2; 5.4 %, SE = 0.6) hand key press responses. This may reflect the 
predominance of right-handed participants, who would under most circumstances probably 
favour interacting with a lever with their right hand. 
Three-Way Interactions [6.3.4b] 
Figure 8.27 reports the pattem of means for the statistically equivalent result to the 
interaction reported in the main text [6.3.4a]; namely an interaction between X-Z bar 
position, X - Y and Y-Z cylinder orientation in RTs [ F ( l , 18) = 4.093,/? = 0.058]. From this 
perspective it can be seen how fast each specific lever configuration was responded to. The 
main feature of interest however, is better described by result [6.3.4a], where it is apparent 
that regardless of the bar position there was an advantage for lever configurations that 
would require an upward rather than downward reach trajectory (which in this instance is 
reflected by an advantage for levers 3, 4, 5 and 6 over levers 1, 2, 7 and 8 respectively). 
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Figure 8.27 Mean RTs as a function of X-Y, X-Z cylinder orientation and hand of response 
Three-Way Interactions [6.3.5a] 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z bar position, X-Y cylinder orientation and 
mapping rule in RTs 18) = 9.882,/? < 0.01] (see Figure 8.28) but not in mistakes [F 
( I , 18) = 0.764, p > 0.1]. The main effect of mapping rule [6.3.3] is apparent in this 
interaction (participants in MR: C I responded faster than participants in MR: C2), as is the 
main effect of bar position [6.3.1] (where levers with a far bar were responded to faster 
than levers with a near bar. In addition, for participants in MR: CI (left response/ lever up, 
right response/lever down) the following pattem was observed: when the bar position was 
far, mean RTs were 7 ms faster for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in 
the X-Y plane. When the bar position was near, mean RTs were 3 ms faster for cylinders 
oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Y plane. For participants in MR: C2 (left 
response/ lever down, right response/lever up) the opposite pattem was observed: when the 
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bar position was far, mean RTs were 4 ms faster for cylinders oriented rightwards rather 
than leftwards in the X-Y plane. When the bar position was near, mean RTs were 14 ms 
faster for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Y plane. 
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Figure 8.28 Mean RTs as a function of X-Z bar position, X-Y cylinder orientation and 
mapping rule 
Higher-Order Interactions [6.3.5b] 
Figure 8.29 reports the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to the 
interaction reported in the main text [6.3.5a]; namely an interaction between X-Z bar 
position, Y-Z, X-Z cylinder orientation and mapping rule in RTs [F (1 , 18) = 9.882. p < 
0.01 ]. From this perspective it can be seen how fast each specific lever configuration was 
responded to. 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar Y-Z X-Z ms SE 
7 1 F D L 494 15 
8 1 F D R 496 15 
5 1 F U L 492 16 
6 1 F U R 481 16 
3 1 N D L 510 14 
4 1 N D R 514 14 
1 1 N U L 514 13 
2 1 N U R 525 12 
7 2 F D L 533 15 
8 2 F D R 539 15 
5 2 F U L 519 16 
6 2 F u R 533 16 
3 2 N D L 542 14 
4 2 N D R 552 14 
1 2 N U L 567 13 
2 2 N u R 550 12 
Figure 8.29 Mean RTs as a function of X-Z bar position, Y-Z, X-Z cylinder orientation and 
mapping rule 
Three-Way Interactions (6.3.6a] 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z bar position, X-Z cylinder orientation and 
mapping rule in RTs 18) = 5.994,/? < 0.05] and in mistakes 18) = 6.347,/? < 
0.05] (see Figure 8.30). 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar X-Z ms SE SE 
c 1 F L 493 15 5.3 
d 1 F R 489 15 4.0 0.9 
a 1 N L 512 13 4.4 1.1 
b 1 N R 520 12 6.1 0.8 
0 2 F L 526 15 3.8 0.8 
d 2 F R 536 15 5.3 0.9 
a 2 N L 555 13 5.8 1.1 
b 2 N R 551 12 4.5 0.8 
LEVERS (T1) 
Figure 8.30 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position, X-
Z cylinder onentation and mapping rule 
The main efTects of mapping rule (participants in MR: CI responded faster than 
participants in MR: C2) and X-Z bar position (levers with far bars were responded to faster 
than levers with near bars) are again apparent in this interaction. 
In addition, for participants in MR: CI (left response/ lever up, right response/lever down) 
the following pattern was observed: when the bar position was far, mean RTs were 4 ms 
faster (and mistakes 1.3 % fewer) for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in 
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the X-Z plane. When the bar position was near, mean RTs were 8 ms faster (and mistakes 
1.7 % fewer) for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. For 
participants in MR: C2 (left response/ lever down, right response/lever up) the opposite 
pattem was observed: when the bar position was far, mean RTs were 10 ms faster (and 
mistakes 1.6 % fewer) for cylinders oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z 
plane. When the bar position was near, mean RTs were 4 ms faster (and mistakes 1.3 % 
fewer) for cylinders oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Z plane. 
Higher-Order Interactions [6.3.6b] 
Figures 8.31 and 8.32 report the pattem of means for the statistically equivalent result to 
the interaction reported in the main text [6.3.6a]; namely an interaction between X-Z bar 
position, X-Y, Y-Z cylinder orientation and mapping rule in RTs [F (\, 18) = 5.994, p < 
0.05] and in mistakes [F (1, 18) = 6.347, p < 0.05]. From this perspective it can be seen 
how each specific lever configuration was responded to. 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar X-Y Y-Z ms SE SE 
7 1 F L D 494 15 5.0 1.0 
6 1 F L u 481 16 3.8 1.1 
8 1 F R D 496 15 4.2 0.9 
5 1 F R U 492 16 5.7 1.3 
3 1 N L D 510 14 4.3 1.4 
2 1 N L U 525 12 7.2 1.1 
4 1 N R D 514 14 5.0 1.1 
1 1 N R U 514 13 4.5 1.3 
LEVERS (T1) 
Far bar 
5. 6. 
7. 8. 
Near bar 
l / * 2 . 
3. 4. 
Figure 8.31 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position. X-
Y Y-Z cylinder orientation and mapping rule (n.b MR: C I in this figure) 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar X-Y Y-Z ms SE SE 
7 2 F L D 533 15 3.8 1.0 
6 2 F L U 533 16 6.2 1.1 
8 2 F R D 539 15 4.5 0.9 
5 2 F R U 519 16 3.7 1.3 
3 2 N L D 542 14 7.0 1.4 
2 2 N L U 550 12 4.0 1.1 
4 2 N R D 552 14 5.0 1.1 
1 2 N R U 567 13 4.5 1.3 
LEVERS (T1) 
Far bar 
Near bar 
Figure 8.32 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position, X-
Y Y-Z cylinder onentation and mapping rule (n b MR: C2 in this figure) 
Three-Way Interactions [6.3.7aJ 
I'here was an interaction that approached significance between X - Y cylinder orientation, 
hand of response and mapping rule in RTs 18) = 4.310,/? = 0.052J (see Figure 8.33) 
but not in mistakes (1, 18) = 1.550, p > 0.1]. The main effect of mapping rule 
(participants in MR: CI responded faster than participants in MR: C2) is apparent in this 
interaction. In addition, for participants in MR: CI (left response/ lever up, right 
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response/lcvcr down) the following pattern was observed: mean RTs for left hand 
responses were 8 ms faster when the cylinder component was oriented leftwards rather 
than rightwards in the X - Y plane, and mean RTs for right hand responses were 5 ms faster 
when the cylinder component was oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Y 
plane. For participants in MR: C2 (left response/ lever down, right response/lever up) the 
following pattern was observed: mean RTs for left hand responses were 1 ms faster when 
the cylinder component was oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Y plane, 
and mean RTs for right hand responses were 9 ms faster when the cylinder component was 
oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Y plane. 
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MEANS TABLE 
MR X-Y Res ms SE 
1 L L 509 15 
1 L R 496 14 
1 R L 517 14 
1 R R 491 13 
2 L L 550 15 
2 L R 529 14 
2 R L 551 14 
2 R R 538 13 
LEVERS (T1) 
(R) I-
F igure 8.33 Mean RTs as a function of X-Y cylinder orientation, hand of response and 
mapping rule 
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Higher-Order Interactions [6.3.7b] 
Figure 8.34 repx)rts the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to the interaction 
reported in the main text [6.3.7a]; namely an interaction between Y-Z, X-Z cylinder 
orientation, hand of response and mapping rule in RTs [F (1, 18) = 4.310, /? = 0.052]. From 
this perspective it can be seen how each specific cylinder component was responded to (but not 
each lever, since X-Z bar position does not feature in this interaction). 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Y-Z X-Z Res ms SE 
c 1 D L L 510 15 
c 1 D L R 494 15 
d 1 D R L 519 14 
d 1 D R R 492 14 
a 1 U L L 515 16 
a 1 U L R 491 13 
b 1 U R L 508 15 
b 1 U R R 497 13 
c 2 D L L 543 15 
c 2 D L R 532 15 
d 2 D R L 550 14 
d 2 D R R 541 14 
a 2 U L L 551 16 
a 2 U L R 535 13 
b 2 u R L 557 15 
b 2 u R R 526 13 
Figure 8.34 Mean RTs as a function of Y-Z. X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and 
mapping rule 
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Three-Way Interactions [6.3.8a] 
There was a significant interaction between X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and 
mapping rule in mistakes [F (1, 18) = 4.780, p < 0.05] (see Figure 8.35) but not in RTs [F 
(1, 18) = 0.763,/7>0.1]. 
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MEANS TABLE 
MR X-Z Res SE 
1 L L 4.7 0.9 
1 L R 5.1 0.8 
1 R L 5.4 0.8 
1 R R 4 7 0.8 
2 L L 6.1 0.9 
2 L R 3.4 0.8 
2 R L 5.3 0.8 
2 R R 4.5 0.8 
LEVERS (T1) 
(L) (R) 
F igure 8.35 Mean mistakes as a function of X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and 
mapping rule 
For participants in MR: C I (left response/ lever up, right response/lever down) the 
following pattern was observed: mean mistakes for left hand responses were 0.7 % fewer 
when the cylinder component was oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z 
plane, and mean mistakes for right hand responses were 0.4 % fewer when the cylinder 
component was oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Z plane. For participants 
in MR: C2 (left response/ lever down, right response/lever up) the following pattern was 
observed: mean mistakes for left hand responses were 0.8 % fewer when the cylinder 
component was oriented rightwards rather than leftwards in the X-Z plane, and mean 
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mistakes for right hand responses were 1.1 % fewer when the cylinder component was 
oriented leftwards rather than rightwards in the X-Z plane. 
Higher-Order Interactions [6.3.8b] 
Figure 8.36 reports the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to the interaction 
reported in the main text [6.3.8a]; namely an interaction between X-Y, Y-Z cylinder orientation, 
hand of respoase and mapping rule in mistakes [F ( l , 18) = 4.780,/? < 0.05]. 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR X-Y Y-Z Res SE 
c 1 L D L 4.3 12 
c 1 L D R 5.0 1.0 
b 1 L U L 6.2 1.4 
b 1 L U R 4.8 1.0 
d 1 R D L 4.7 0.8 
d 1 R D R 4.5 1.2 
a 1 R U L 5.0 1.3 
a 1 R U R 5.2 1.1 
c 2 L D L 7.2 1.2 
c 2 L D R 3.7 1.0 
b 2 L U L 6.3 1.4 
b 2 L U R 3.8 1.0 
d 2 R D L 4.3 0.8 
d 2 R D R 5.2 1.2 
a 2 R U L 5.0 1.3 
2 R U R 3.2 1.1 
Figure 8.36 Mean mistakes as a function of X-Y, Y-Z cylinder onentation. hand of response 
and mapping rule 
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Higher Order Interactions [6.3.9b 
Figures 8.37 and 8.38 report the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to 
the interaction reported in the main text [6.3.9a]; namely an interaction between X-Z bar 
position, X - Y , Y - Z cylinder orientation and hand of response in both RTs [ F (1, 18) = 
12.570, p < 0.005] and mistakes [F (1, 18) = 15.060, p < 0.005]. From this perspective it 
can be seen how each specific lever was responded to. 
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F igure 8.37 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position, X-
Y, Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of response (n b left responses in this figure) 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) Bar X-Y Y-Z Res ms SE SE 
7 F L D R 501 9 2 5 0 7 
6 F L U R 501 13 5.0 0.9 
8 F R D R 510 9 5.2 1.0 
5 F R U R 493 13 3.5 0.9 
3 N L D R 525 14 6.2 1.1 
2 N L U R 522 8 3.7 0.9 
4 N R D R 522 13 4.5 1.0 
1 N R U R 534 9 4.8 1.0 
LEVERS (T1) 
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Figure 8.38 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position. X-
Y Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of response (n b nght responses in this figure) 
Higher Order Interactions [6.3.10bX] 
Figures 8.39 - 8.42 report the pattern of means for the statistically equivalent result to 
the interaction reported in the main text [6.3.10a]; namely an interaction between 
mapping rule, X-Z bar position, X - Y , Y-Z cylinder orientation and hand of response in 
both RTs [F (1, 18) = 17.683, p < 0.005] and in mistakes [F (1, 18) = 47.234, p < 
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0.001 ]. From this perspective it can be seen how each specific lever was responded to. 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar X-Y X-Z Res ms SE % SE 
3 0 1 N L L L 496 15 1.3 1.6 
3 C I N L L R 524 20 7.3 1.5 
2 C I N L R L 552 18 10.3 1.7 
2 C I N L R R 497 11 4.0 1.2 
1 C I N R L L 545 17 4.3 1.6 
1 C I N R L R 484 13 4.7 1.5 
4 C1 N R R L 514 15 4.3 1.3 
4 C I N R R R 515 18 5.7 1.4 
LEVERS (T1-T2) 
Figure 8.39 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position 
(n.b near in this figure). X-Y, X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and mapping rule 
(n.b. MR: C I in this figure) 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar X-Y X-Z Res ms SE SE 
3 02 N L L L 559 15 9.0 1.6 
3 02 N L L R 525 20 5.0 1.5 
2 02 N L R L 552 18 4.7 1.7 
2 02 N L R R 548 11 3.3 1.2 
1 02 N R L L 551 17 4.0 1.6 
1 02 N R L R 584 13 5.0 1.5 
4 02 N R R L 575 15 6.7 1.3 
4 02 N R R R 529 18 3.3 1.4 
LEVERS (T1-T2) 
Figure 8.40 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position 
(n.b. near in this figure). X-Y X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and mapping rule 
(n b MR 02 in this figure) 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev, MR Bar X-Y X-Z Res ms SE SE 
7 C1 F L L L 524 19 7.3 1.6 
7 C1 F L L R 464 13 2.7 1.0 
6 C I F L R L 463 16 2.0 1.7 
6 C1 F L R R 498 19 5.7 1.2 
5 C1 F R L L 485 17 5.7 2.1 
5 C1 F R L R 499 18 5.7 1.3 
8 C1 F R R L 525 18 5.0 1.0 
8 C1 F R R R 468 13 3.3 1.4 
LEVERS (T1-T2) 
Figure 8.41 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position 
(n b far in this figure). X-Y, X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of response and mapping rule (n.b. 
MR: 0 1 in this figure) 
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MEANS TABLE 
(Lev) MR Bar X-Y X-Z Res ms SE SE 
7 C2 F L L L 527 19 5.3 1.6 
7 C2 F L L R 539 13 2 3 1.0 
6 C2 F L R L 562 16 8.0 1.7 
6 C2 F L R R 503 19 4.3 1.2 
5 C2 F R L L 551 17 6 0 2.1 
5 C2 F R L R 487 18 1.3 1.3 
8 C2 F R R L 525 18 2.0 1.0 
8 C2 F R R R 553 13 7.0 1.4 
LEVERS (T1-T2) 
• V . V. 
Figure 8.42 Mean RTs (black) and mean mistakes (red) as a function of X-Z bar position 
(n b far in this figure). X-Y, X-Z cylinder orientation, hand of resF)onse and mapping rule (n.b. 
MR C2 in this figure) 
I he overwhelming pattern supported an advantage for short rather than long movements of 
each specific lever configuration (levers 1-8), regardless of whether this was effected by an 
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up or down movement (i.e. a left or right response). Furthermore, upon closer inspection 
(see section 6.4.3), it appeared that there was a clearly identifiable gradation of effect size 
corresponding to the actual physical difficulty of moving particular lever configurations. 
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8.3 Appendix 3 (Means tables) 
Table 8.26 Experiment 4 . 1 - Mean RTs (ms) and standard errors (SE) for result [4.1.13] 
MR1 
(C) 
MR2 
(C) 
Response 
Effector 
X-Y Line 
Orientation '^ (ms) SE 
1 1 Hands Leftwards 467 18 
1 1 Hands Rightwards 468 19 
1 1 Feet Leftwards 505 23 
1 1 Feet Rightwards 502 22 
1 2 Hands Leftwards 436 18 
1 2 Hands Rightwards 430 19 
1 2 Feet Leftwards 473 23 
1 2 Feet Rightwards 474 22 
2 1 Hands Leftwards 437 18 
2 1 Hands Rightwards 438 19 
2 1 Feet Leftwards 500 23 
2 1 Feet Rightwards 504 22 
2 2 Hands Leftwards 435 18 
2 2 Hands Rightwards 437 19 
2 2 Feet Leftwards 493 23 
2 2 Feet Rightwards 489 22 
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Table 8.27 Experiment 4 1- Mean mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [4.1 14] 
MR1 Line X-Y Line Spatial X(o/o) SE 
(C) Location Orientation Respons 
Left Leftwards Left 2 1 0 5 
Left Leftwards Right 5 3 0.9 
Left Rightwards Left 1.5 0.3 
Left Rightwards Right 3 9 0.8 
Centre Leftwards Left 2 9 0.7 
Centre Leftwards Right 1.9 0.4 
Centre Rightwards Left 2.5 0.5 
Centre Rightwards Right 2.5 0.7 
Right Leftwards Left 4.1 1.0 
Right Leftwards Right 2 8 0.7 
Right Rightwards Left 4.7 1.0 
Right Rightwards Right 0.8 0 4 
2 Left Leftwards Left 1.4 0 5 
2 Left Leftwards Right 3.6 0.9 
2 Left Rightwards Left 0 5 0.3 
2 Left Rightwards Right 4 5 08 
2 Centre Leftwards Left 1.0 0 7 
2 Centre Leftwards Right 0.4 
2 Centre Rightwards Left o o 0.5 
2 Centre Rightwards Right 1.7 0.7 
2 Right Leftwards Left 3.7 1.0 
2 Right Leftwards Right 1.1 0.7 
2 Right Rightwards Left 1.6 1.0 
2 Right Rightwards Right 0.7 04 
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Table 8.28 Experiment 4.3- Mean RTs (ms) and standard errors (SE) for result [5.3.12] 
MR1 
(C) 
Response 
Effector 
X-Y Cylinder 
Orientation 
Spatial 
Response ^ ( m s ) 
SE 
Feet Leftwards Left 524 16 
1 Feet Leftwards Right 519 18 
1 Feet Rightwards Left 523 17 
1 Feet Rightwards Right 522 19 
1 Hands Leftwards Left 459 13 
1 Hands Leftwards Right 476 14 
1 Hands Rightwards Left 464 12 
1 Hands Rightwards Right 469 15 
2 Feet Leftwards Left 537 16 
2 Feet Leftwards Right 544 18 
2 Feet Rightwards Left 542 17 
2 Feet Rightwards Right 539 19 
2 Hands Leftwards Left 484 13 
2 Hands Leftwards Right 501 14 
2 Hands Rightwards Left 481 12 
2 Hands Rightwards Right 512 15 
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Table 8.29 Experiment 5.3- Mean RTs (ms) and standard errors (SE) for result [5.3.13] 
M R l 
(C) 
MR2 
(C) 
Response 
Effector 
X-Y Cylinder 
Orientation 
Spatial 
Response '^(ms) 
SE 
Feet Leftwards Left 501 23 
1 1 Feet Leftwards Right 488 26 
1 1 Feet Rightwards Left 503 23 
1 I Feet Rightwards Right 487 26 
I 1 Hands Leftwards U f t 462 19 
I I Hands Leftwards Right 469 20 
1 1 Hands Rightwards Left 467 17 
1 1 Hands Rightwards Right 469 21 
I 2 Feet Leftwards U f t 546 23 
I 2 Feet Leftwards Right 550 26 
1 2 Feet Rightwards Left 543 23 
1 2 Feet Rightwards Right 556 26 
I 2 Hands Leftwards Left 457 19 
1 2 Hands Leftwards Right 483 20 
1 2 Hands Rightwards U f t 462 17 
I 2 Hands Rightwards Right 469 21 
2 1 Feet Leftwards U f t 523 23 
2 1 Feet Leftwards Right 524 26 
2 I Feet Rightwards Left 522 23 
2 I Feet Rightwards Right 524 26 
2 ! Hands Leftwards U f t 480 19 
2 1 Hands Leftwards Right 498 20 
2 I Hands Rightwards U f t 480 17 
2 1 Hands Rightwards Right 508 21 
2 2 Feet Leftwards Left 552 23 
2 2 Feet Leftwards Right 564 26 
2 2 Feet Rightwards Left 563 23 
2 2 Feet Rightwards Right 554 26 
2 2 Hands Leftwards U f t 488 19 
2 2 Hands Leftwards Right 504 20 
2 2 Hands Rightwards U f t 481 17 
2 2 Hands Rightwards Right 515 21 
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Table 8.30 Experiment 5 3- Mean mistakes (%) and standard errors (SE) for result [5.3 14] 
M R I 
( C ) 
MR2 
( C ) 
Response 
EfTector 
X - Z C y l i n d e r 
O r i e n t a t i o n 
Spa t ia l 
Response 
1 Feet L e f t w a r d s L e f t 7.32 1 63 
1 1 Feet L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 5.23 2.21 
1 1 Feet R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 7.17 1.21 
1 1 Feet R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 7.32 1.51 
1 1 H a n d s L e f t w a r d s U f t 3.56 1 08 
1 1 H a n d s L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 8.39 2.50 
1 1 H a n d s R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 8.86 I 43 
1 1 H a n d s R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 4.74 1 51 
1 2 Feet L e f t w a r d s L e f t 5.23 1.63 
1 2 Feet L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 8.07 221 
1 2 Feet R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 7.95 1.21 
1 2 Feet R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 5.92 1.51 
I 2 H a n d s L e f t w a r d s L e f t 4.26 1 08 
1 2 H a n d s L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 10.80 2 50 
1 2 H a n d s R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 6.80 1.43 
1 2 H a n d s R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 8.74 1.51 
2 1 Feet L e f t w a r d s L e f t 4.49 I 63 
2 1 Feet L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 7.40 221 
2 1 Feet R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 4.68 1.21 
2 I Feet R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 5.90 1.51 
2 1 H a n d s L e f t w a r d s L e f t 3.09 1 08 
2 1 H a n d s L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 7.02 2 50 
2 1 H a n d s R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 5.29 I 43 
2 1 H a n d s R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 5.97 1.51 
2 2 Feet L e f t w a r d s L e f t 3.23 1 63 
2 2 Feet L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 6.11 2 21 
2 2 Feet R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 2.85 1 21 
2 2 Feet R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 4.33 1.51 
: 2 1 lands L e f t w a r d s L e f t 1.99 1 08 
2 2 Hands L e f t w a r d s R i g h t 9.01 2 50 
: 2 F l ands R i g h t w a r d s L e f t 4.57 1 43 
2 H a n d s R i g h t w a r d s R i g h t 3 07 
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8.4 Appendix 4 (Overall experimental means) 
Table 8.31 - Overall experimental nneans for Experiment 3.1 
AbyM Aby P 
mr loc ori res mean (ms) mean (%) mean (ms) mean 
L L L 726.23 1.061 722.649 1.061 
L L R 729.502 5.758 749.61 2.121 
L R L 723.017 2.879 714.888 2.879 
L R R 731.242 5.606 743.397 2.879 
R L L 759.311 4.697 758.661 4.697 
R L R 727.03 2.879 736.999 1.212 
R R L 749.518 5.152 744.071 5.152 
R R R 702.094 2.879 716.185 1.364 
2 L L L 714.855 2.121 737.825 2.121 
2 L L R 757.447 2.121 752.961 5.758 
2 L R L 718.424 1.97 732.119 1.97 
2 L R R 747.781 2.879 738.649 5.606 
2 R L L 733.645 3.333 758.239 3.333 
2 R L R 737.106 1.212 747.259 2.879 
2 R R L 740.913 3.03 765.909 3.03 
2 R R R 720.089 1.364 708.165 2.879 
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Table 8.32 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 4.1 (MR1: C I ) 
mr1 mr2 eff loc ori res mean (ms) mean (%) 
1 1 H L L L 459.924 4.643 
1 1 H L L R 475.018 5.833 
1 1 H L R L 453.78 2.917 
1 1 H L R R 471.751 5.417 
1 1 H C L L 470.439 4.181 
1 1 H C L R 455.125 3.75 
1 1 H C R L 468.524 4.21 
1 1 H C R R 469.291 4.167 
1 1 H R L L 478.47 5.833 
1 1 H R L R 460.456 2.5 
1 1 H R R L 484.923 6.681 
1 1 H R R R 458.627 1.667 
1 1 F L L L 498.028 1.681 
1 1 F L L R 533.015 5 
1 1 F L R L 498.951 1.25 
1 1 F L R R 512.126 5.417 
1 1 F C L L 507.356 1.667 
1 1 F C L R 478.381 1.667 
1 1 F C R L 516.364 0.833 
1 1 F C R R 487.443 2.126 
1 1 F R L L 525.153 3.75 
1 1 F R L R 490.445 3.75 
1 1 F R R L 524.221 5.417 
1 1 F R R R 470.075 0.417 
1 2 H L L L 429.86 1.667 
1 2 H L L R 439.424 7.083 
1 2 H L R L 432.318 1.695 
1 2 H L R R 437.125 2.112 
1 2 H C L L 430.279 4.239 
1 2 H C L R 429.101 1.25 
1 2 H c R L 429.787 2.5 
1 2 H c R R 417.658 2.5 
1 2 H R L L 450.331 2.976 
1 2 H R L R 434.815 3.75 
1 2 H R R L 442.246 3.75 
1 2 H R R R 418.329 0.417 
1 2 F L L L 458.591 0.417 
1 2 F L L R 500.733 3.348 
1 2 F L R L 463.02 0 
1 2 F L R R 489.354 2.543 
1 2 F C L L 470.199 1.667 
1 2 F C L R 462.94 0.833 
1 2 F C R L 473.581 2.5 
1 2 F C R R 467.565 1.25 
1 2 F R L L 495.577 3.75 
1 2 F R L R 447.811 1-279 
1 2 F R R L 497.346 2.917 
1 2 F R R R 451.337 0.862 
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Table 8.33 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 4.1 (MR1: C2) 
mr1 mr2 eff loc ori res mean (ms) mean {%) 
2 1 H L L L 421.475 1.695 
2 1 H L L R 452.256 5.417 
2 1 H L R L 425.726 1.25 
2 1 H L R R 457.063 5 
2 1 H C L L 430.57 0.833 
2 1 H C L R 435.294 2.917 
2 1 H C R L 427.35 4.167 
2 1 H C R R 434.865 3.333 
2 1 H R L L 446.224 3.333 
2 1 H R L R 438.901 2.5 
2 1 H R R L 449.779 1.667 
2 1 H R R R 432.213 2.083 
2 1 F L L L 484.641 1.25 
2 1 F L L R 514.939 3.393 
2 1 F L R L 484.989 0 
2 1 F L R R 524.665 3.75 
2 1 F C L L 502.854 0.848 
2 1 F C L R 491.754 1.25 
2 1 F C R L 496.208 1.25 
2 1 F C R R 497.223 1.264 
2 1 F R L L 520.315 3.779 
2 1 F R L R 486.762 0.431 
2 1 F R R L 530.819 2.083 
2 1 F R R R 488.353 0.417 
2 2 H L L L 428.636 1.25 
2 2 H L L R 451.728 3.75 
2 2 H L R L 432.406 0 
2 2 H L R R 449.414 6.695 
2 2 H C L L 427.992 1.25 
2 2 H C L R 429.968 0.417 
2 2 H C R L 430.123 2.5 
2 2 H C R R 432.08 1.25 
2 2 H R L L 442.989 5 
2 2 H R L R 428.268 0.417 
2 2 H R R L 445.26 2.098 
2 2 H R R R 432.08 0 
2 2 F L L L 476.367 1.25 
2 2 F L L R 516.901 1.668 
2 2 F L R L 471.588 0.833 
2 2 F L R R 515.312 2.5 
2 2 F C L L 487.781 1.25 
2 2 F C L R 486.594 1.25 
2 2 F C R L 485.041 0.833 
2 2 F C R R 476.541 0.833 
2 2 F R L L 517.094 2.5 
2 2 F R L R 474.504 1.25 
2 2 F R R L 515.265 0.417 
2 2 F R R R 468.149 0.417 
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Table 8.34 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 4.2 
mr soa (ms) ori res mean (ms) mean (%) 
50 L L 438.176 4 
50 L R 423.872 4.2 
50 R L 444.302 4.6 
50 R R 422.626 3.4 
100 L L 428.804 3.8 
100 L R 434.933 5.8 
100 R L 438.688 6.2 
100 R R 429.954 6.6 
50 L L 424.144 0.8 
50 L R 433.146 2.4 
50 R L 427.382 3 
50 R R 426.72 1.2 
100 L L 425.872 2.4 
100 L R 413.57 3.8 
100 R L 434.616 2.2 
100 R R 412.176 2.4 
Table 8.35 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 4.3 
soa (ms) ori res mean (ms) mean (%) 
0 L L 473.11 1.509 
0 L R 455.459 3.145 
0 R L 472.538 2.39 
0 R R 465.334 3.396 
400 L L 441.385 1.144 
400 L R 439.906 2.893 
400 R L 441.612 1.006 
400 R R 445.322 3.019 
800 L L 443.575 1.635 
800 L R 427.633 1.132 
800 R L 443.942 1.635 
800 R R 423.047 1.635 
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Table 8.36 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 5.1 
Chapter 8 - Appendices 
mr ori (xy) ori (X2) res mean (ms) mean (%) 
1 L L L 490.696 6.727 
1 L L R 489.63 7.455 
1 L R L 503.302 8.545 
1 L R R 475.188 6-545 
1 R L L 488.806 5.091 
1 R L R 486.795 9.091 
1 R R L 496.49 7.091 
1 R R R 475.665 8.545 
2 L L L 451.394 4.545 
2 L L R 463.569 10 
2 L R L 464.592 7.636 
2 L R R 459.005 7.273 
2 R L L 458.603 5.818 
2 R L R 469.434 11.818 
2 R R L 463.947 6.909 
2 R R R 467.715 8.727 
Table 8.37 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 5.2 
mr ori (xy) ori (xz) res mean (ms) mean (%) 
1 L L L 479.81 4.4 
1 L L R 497.54 8-8 
1 L R L 492.653 7-4 
1 L R R 473-108 6.4 
1 R L L 481.619 3.6 
1 R L R 494.286 8.6 
1 R R L 486.881 5 
1 R R R 477.129 4.4 
2 L L L 488.317 4.8 
2 L L R 499.733 5 
2 L R L 499.091 7.4 
2 L R R 492.79 5 
2 R L L 485.115 2.6 
2 R L R 505.643 4.4 
2 R R L 498.687 4 
2 R R R 491.258 7 
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mrl mr2 eff ori (xy) ori (xz) res mean (ms) mean (%) 
1 H L L L 462.909 2.978 
1 H L L R 476.895 11.436 
1 H L R L 460.321 7.974 
1 H L R R 460.516 3.873 
1 H R L L 447.08 4.152 
1 H R L R 476.782 5.346 
1 H R R L 486.296 9.749 
1 H R R R 461.173 5.606 
1 F L L L 492.62 10.228 
1 F L L R 489.089 5.28 
1 F L R L 509.065 5.41 
1 F L R R 486.141 7.79 
1 F R L L 491.11 4.42 
1 F R L R 483.687 5.171 
1 F R R L 515.464 8.926 
1 F R R R 490.969 6.848 
2 H L L L 447.607 5.071 
2 H L L R 494.98 11.672 
2 H L R L 466.717 6.119 
2 H L R R 471.709 9.693 
2 H R L L 452.311 3.452 
2 H R L R 473.28 9.933 
2 H R R L 470.716 7.476 
2 H R R R 465.677 7.791 
2 F L L L 545.008 4.982 
2 F L L R 543.141 7.344 
2 F L R L 547.75 6.801 
2 F L R R 555.919 6.79 
2 F R L L 531.71 5.48 
2 F R L R 556.113 8.803 
2 F R R L 554.583 9.104 
2 F R R R 556.741 5.059 
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mrl mr2 eff ori (xy) ori (xz) res mean (ms) mean (%) 
2 1 H L L L 476.371 3.826 
2 1 H L L R 500.061 4.698 
2 1 H L R L 484.501 4.834 
2 1 H L R R 496.845 6.039 
2 1 H R L L 466.53 2.359 
2 1 H R L R 511.784 9.343 
2 1 H R R L 494.312 5.754 
2 1 H R R R 505.021 5.903 
2 1 F L L L 517.817 5.256 
2 1 F L L R 532.211 7.623 
2 1 F L R L 527.332 3.592 
2 1 F L R R 516.558 6.844 
2 1 F R L L 517 3.717 
2 1 F R L R 528.962 7.169 
2 1 F R R L 527.205 5.769 
2 1 F R R R 518.827 4.959 
2 2 H L L L 486.244 1.553 
2 2 H L L R 502.185 9.637 
2 2 H L R L 488.914 5.145 
2 2 H L R R 505.775 1.502 
2 2 H R L L 476.61 2.432 
2 2 H R L R 521.335 8.385 
2 2 H R R L 486.267 4.004 
2 2 H R R R 508.615 4.633 
2 2 F L L L 545.981 2.929 
2 2 F L L R 566.788 7.633 
2 2 F L R L 557.791 2.153 
2 2 F L R R 560.678 3.841 
2 2 F R L L 554.983 3.53 
2 2 F R L R 556.492 4.594 
2 2 F R R L 570.395 3.538 
2 2 F R R R 552.382 4.825 
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Table 8.40 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 6.1 
mr soa (ms) Ori (xy) Ori (xz) res mean (ms) mean (%) 
0 L L L 506.135 2 
0 L L R 515.678 5.6 
0 L R L 508.811 3.2 
0 L R R 505.585 4.4 
0 R L L 508.743 4 
0 R L R 517.338 6.4 
0 R R L 527.198 2.4 
0 R R R 505.995 4.8 
400 L L L 472.626 3.2 
400 L L R 490.516 7.2 
400 L R L 477.443 2.4 
400 L R R 482.437 5.2 
400 R L L 480.735 3.6 
400 R L R 486.384 9.2 
400 R R L 478.668 3.6 
400 R R R 471.694 4.4 
800 L L L 454 1.2 
800 L L R 474.94 8.8 
800 L R L 467.637 4.4 
800 L R R 471.588 4 
800 R L L 473.008 5.6 
800 R L R 472.847 2.4 
800 R R L 472.45 2.4 
800 R R R 467.752 3.6 
0 L L L 520.11 3.6 
0 L L R 537.131 4 
0 L R L 536.051 5.2 
0 L R R 534.404 2.4 
0 R L L 533.098 2 
0 R L R 542.472 5.2 
0 R R L 526.404 3.2 
0 R R R 543.865 4.8 
400 L L L 472.298 2.8 
400 L L R 477.895 2.8 
400 L R L 481.657 4 
400 L R R 463.697 4 
400 R L L 472.52 3.6 
400 R L R 487.325 5.6 
400 R R L 477.782 6.8 
400 R R R 465.519 1.2 
800 L L L 463.99 3.2 
800 L L R 482.032 5.6 
800 L R L 472.491 4.8 
800 L R R 475-693 3.6 
800 R L L 476.124 3.2 
800 R L R 477.013 2.8 
800 R R L 486.253 3.6 
800 R R R 464.475 2.8 
393 
Chapter 8 - Appendices 
Table 8.41 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 6.2 
mr ori (xy) ori (xz) res mean (ms) mean (%) 
L L L 585.488 6 
L L R 606.749 6 
L R L 567.886 4.333 
L R R 606.258 4.667 
R L L 582.582 6.667 
R L R 602.519 8.333 
R R L 578.912 7.333 
R R R 611.713 9.667 
L L L 582.158 1.667 
L L R 614.128 4 
L R L 585.859 3 
L R R 600.945 5 
R L L 581.877 2 
R L R 607.309 4.667 
R R L 585.334 2 
R R R 617.922 5.667 
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Table 8.42 - Overall experimental means for Experiment 6.3 
mr dist ori (xy) ori (xz) res mean (ms) mean (%) 
F L L L 524.092 7.333 
F L L R 463.838 2.667 
F L R L 463.459 2 
F L R R 498.197 5.667 
F R L L 485.091 5.667 
F R L R 498.729 5.667 
F R R L 524.809 5 
F R R R 468.164 3.333 
N L L L 496.395 1.333 
N L L R 524.181 7.333 
N L R L 552.389 10.333 
N L R R 496.735 4 
N R L L 544.575 4.333 
N R L R 483.913 4.667 
N R R L 514.021 4.333 
N R R R 514.857 5.667 
F L L L 526.505 5.333 
F L L R 538.599 2.333 
F L R L 562.236 8 
F L R R 503.216 4.333 
F R L L 551.351 6 
F R L R 486.79 1.333 
F R R L 525.424 2 
F R R R 552.525 7 
N L L L 558.947 9 
N L L R 524.966 5 
N L R L 552.016 4.667 
N L R R 547.783 3.333 
N R L L 550.62 4 
N R L R 583.887 5 
N R R L 575.329 6.667 
N R R R 528.983 3.333 
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8.5 Appendix 5 (Experiment 5.3 condition instances) 
Table 8.43 Experiment 5.3- Descriptive statistics for condition instances (n.b. had design 
been fully counterbalanced all condition instances: mean = 40. sd = 0. min = 40, max = 40). 
Response X-Y Cylinder Y-Z Cylinder X-Z Cylinder Spatial mean sd min max Effector Orientation Orientation Orientation Response (n) (n) (n) 
Feet Leftwards Downward Leftwards Left 40.10 1.74 37 43 
Feet Leftwards Downward Leftwards Right 41-05 1.67 39 44 
Feet Leftwards Upward Rightwards Left 39.60 2.39 35 45 
Feet Leftwards Upward Rightwards Right 39.85 2.25 36 44 
Feet Rightwards Downward Leftwards Left 40.10 1.92 36 43 
Feet Rightwards Downward Leftwards Right 40.55 1.96 37 44 
Feet Rightwards Upward Rightwards Left 39.35 2.52 35 45 
Feet Rightwards Upward Rightwards Right 39.40 1.43 37 43 
Hands Leftwards Downward Leftwards Left 39.90 1.74 37 43 
Hands Leftwards Downward Leftwards Right 38.95 1.67 36 41 
Hands Leftwards Upward Rightwards Left 40.40 2.39 35 45 
Hands Leftwards Upward Rightwards Right 40.15 2.25 36 44 
Hands Rightwards Downward Leftwards Left 39.90 1.92 37 44 
Hands Rightwards Downward Leftwards Right 39.45 1.96 36 43 
Hands Rightwards Upward Rightwards Left 40.65 2.52 35 45 
Hands Rightwards Upward Rightwards Right 40.60 1.43 37 43 
396 
Chapter 8 - Appendices 
8.6 Appendix 6 (Non-reported experimental series) 
The following briefly reports a series of experiments that tested the influence of the 
functional end of a visual object (e.g. its handle), and how this might interact with the 
object's orientation. In the first experiment (see Figure 8.43 for example stimuli), the 
horizontal orientation of a series of kitchen knives and garage files was manipulated 
(leftwards, rightwards, neutral). Ilie orientation and handle position o f the objects were 
task irrelevant, since participants made left-right responses that classified the identity of 
the object (e.g. left/knife; right/file). The data revealed an unacceptably high frequency of 
mistakes and unusually high standard errors (suggesting the distinction between a knife 
and a file was not an easy one to make). Overall the data was messy with no clearly 
interpretable patterns. 
Figure 8.43 Oriented knives and files, with handle position varied 
In the second experiment, an attempt was made to make the task easier by using only one 
object (a graphically rendered table-tennis bat). The orientation of the bat followed from 
the cylinder experiments (four global orientations), but the handle position varied for each 
(see Figure 8.44 for example stimuli). 
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Figure 8.44 Onented table-tennis bat. witti handle position varied 
Participants were told that the object was a table-tennis bat, but again, orientation and 
handle position were task irrelevant, since left-right responses categorised the surface 
pattern (e.g. left/wobbly; right/straight). The data supported an attention-directing account, 
for all advantages in performance (RTs and mistakes) occurred for responses that were the 
same side as the end of the object that was nearest to the viewer. It appeared that wherever 
the clearest and largest area of the object was; this was where participants had attended to 
in order to retrieve the clearest source of information about the surface pattern. 
A third experiment used a dual-function object (in a similar manner to the experiment 
proposed in Chapter 7, where an object could be an ink stamp or a bottle stop). For one 
group of participants the object was a pestle (and before trials began, participants had to 
use a scale model of the object as a pestle, grinding matter in a mortar bowl). I-or another 
group of participants the object was the handle component of a pimip (and before trials 
began, participants had to use the same scale model of the object that was now attached to 
a pump device, in order to blow up a balloon). Thus for the pestle group the functional end 
of the object was perceived to be the cylinder component, whereas for the pimip group the 
functional end of the object was perceived to be the ball component (see Figure 8.45 for 
example stimuli). Again, the object's orientation and functional-end position were task 
irrelevant, since left-right responses categorised the surface pattern (e.g. left/wobbly; 
right/straight). This experiment was run in parallel to the table-tennis bat experiment, and 
unwittingly was subject to the same design flaw. Thus the data again suggested that 
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wherever the clearest and largest area of the object was; this was where participants had 
attended to in order to retrieve the clearest source of information about the surface pattern. 
Figure 8.45 Oriented pump-or-pestle. with functional end position varied 
h will therefore be noted that the ^ink stamp/bottle stop' experiment proposed in Chapter 7 
avoids any visually salient areas from which a response can be based, by making the task 
to do with the object's functional identity within the context of which direction it is said to 
be moving (e.g. 'towards me\ 'away from me'). 
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